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The plaintiffs, Philippine women who were assaulted, confined, and raped as "comfort women" during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines during the Second World War, claimed compensation from the government of Japan. They invoked customary international law, the domestic law of the Philippines applicable at the time of the occupation and the Japanese Civil Code. The claim based on international customary law was rejected. The Court was of the view that Article 3 of the Hague Convention No.IV of 1907 did not provide any individual right to bring a claim for compensation directly against a State and could not be regarded as a codification of such a right. The examination of State practice since the Second World War failed to reveal either that an individual right to claim compensation directly from a State was established under customary international law. The court also rejected the claim that there was an individual right under customary law to compensation for damages resulting from the commission of crimes against humanity. The claims based on the law of the Philippines and on the Civil Code of Japan were also dismissed.

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Please note that footnotes and references have been omitted.

Held: '1. All claims of the plaintiffs shall be dismissed.'

Upon the grounds stated below:

'The court begins by examining whether the plaintiffs have the right to claim compensation for damages.'

I. On the Claim Based on Customary International Law

'The plaintiffs argue that Article 3 of the Hague Convention on Law on Land of 1907 (hereinafter the Hague Convention) provides residents of an occupied territory with the right to claim compensation for damages caused by the acts of members of the occupying force in violation of the Hague Regulations annexed to the Convention (hereinafter the Hague Regulations). They maintain that this had been established as a rule of customary international law, at the latest, by the outbreak of the World War II. The Court, therefore, first examined whether or not the alleged rule had been established at the time of the offenses.

1. Elements Constituting Customary International Law
(1) Equated with international custom as general practice
Customary international law is "international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law." The existence of a rule of customary international law is recognized by the general practice and opinio juris of states.

(2) General principle of international law
It is a general principle of international law that it regulates relations between
States. In case of a violation of rights and benefits of individuals, the general principle of international law intends to provide remedies for the individual victims indirectly through the exercise of diplomatic protection by the national states of the victims. When individual persons seek to remedy the violation of their rights and benefits directly from foreign States, they need a special norm of international law that provides them rights to claim redress.

(3) Method of Interpretation of Treaties
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (hereinafter the Vienna Convention) prescribes rules of interpretation of treaties in Articles 31 and 32.
The plaintiffs assert that Article 3 of the Hague Convention is a codification of a principle of customary international law which recognizes the right of individual persons to claim compensation for damages directly against other Stares, The Court agrees that the rule of interpretation prescribed in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention is recognized as the rule of interpretation of treaties and customary international law which was in effect during World War II. According to the rule of interpretation mentioned above, texts of treaties should be interpreted in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms in their context, having recourse to the preparatory work of the convention and the circumstances of its conclusion. Therefore the Court examines the validity of the alleged interpretation of Article 3 of the Hague Convention as follows according to these rules of interpretation..

2. Purpose of Article 3 of the Hague Convention
(2) Interpretation of Article 3 of the Convention
'In view of the purpose of the clauses of the Hague Convention and the Regulations, Article 3 of the Convention should be understood as imposing liability for reparations on a belligerent party as a sanction against the violation of the Hague Regulations committed by its army or persons forming part of its army in order to secure effective observance of the Convention. It does not provide any right of individuals to demand compensation for damages and injury caused by the violation of the Regulations directly against belligerent State parties.
The following facts will support the interpretation of the Court. First, the general principle of international law provides that international law is a law governing relations between States. Secondly, Article 2 of the Hague Convention prescribes that the provisions of the Regulations and the Convention "do not apply except between Contracting Powers, and then only if all the belligerents are parties to the Convention." Thirdly, there is no statement in Article 3 of the Convention referring to individuals as the subject to whom wrongdoing States are liable and obliged to pay compensation.
Referring to Article 709 of the Civil Code and Article 1(1) of the Tort Claims against the State Act, the plaintiffs point out that these clauses provide the right of individuals to claim compensation for torts without question although they refer only to the liability of the wrongdoer. Therefore, according to the plaintiffs, Article 3 of the Hague Convention, which makes no reference to the claim right of individuals, also should be understood as a clause entitling individuals to claim compensation for damages. However, the Court cannot accept this reasoning, since there is a wide difference between legal relations under international law and those under domestic law.
The plaintiffs also claim that they have the right to claim compensation under Article 3 of the Hague Convention because the article constitutes a substantial part of the Hague Regulations, which are directly applicable to the relationship between residents in an occupied territory and members of the occupying force. However, the Regulations, as examined above, are nothing more than rules of conduct for the military and its members, and Article 3 of the Convention provides nothing more than State responsibility as a sanction against the State of a wrongdoer. Therefore, it is not possible to recognize that the article provides the right to individuals to claim directly against an occupying State.
Furthermore, the plaintiffs insist that the drafters of Article 3, Sentence 1 had it in mind to deal with the claims of individual victims, pointing out that the article utilizes the term "compensation" instead of the general term "reparation," in the same way as the terms prescribed in Articles 53 and 54 of the Regulations. However, even if the article imposes payment of compensation on the belligerent parties, it does not lead directly to the recognition of the right of individuals to file claims.

(3) Summary
To summarize, according to the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms in their context, Article 3 of the Hague Convention cannot be understood as a clause that entitles individual victims to bring a claim for compensation directly against a wrongdoing State. Accordingly, it is impossible to recognize that the article is a codification of a rule of customary international law.'

'3. Drafting Process of Article 3 of the Hague Convention
The plaintiffs assert that it is possible to identify Article 3 of the Hague Convention as a rule of customary international law by examining the drafting process of the article.'

(2) Meanings of the suggestions
'Throughout the examination of the statements of delegations at the drafting process of the article, no overt expression was found to affirm that the article provides individual victims the right to claim compensation directly against belligerent States, nor was any statement referring to the method of realization of the alleged rights.

(3) Summary
Consequently, after examining the text of the article and its drafting process, the Court cannot recognize the existence of the alleged principle that admits the right to claim compensation directly against belligerent States.'

'4. Reconfirmation of the Principle of Article 3 of the Hague Convention since World War II
(1) Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol
The plaintiffs maintain that the principle of Article 3 of the Hague Convention has been reconfirmed in Article 154 of the Geneva Convention (IV) of 1949 and Article 91 of the Additional Protocol.
These clauses, however, confirm only the rules defined in articles of the Hague Convention and its Regulations, and do not recognize the alleged principle providing the right of individuals to claim compensation directly against belligerent States.

(2) State practices
The plaintiffs further insist that the alleged principle has been reconfirmed and developed by the following State practices, and that they strengthen the interpretation of Article 3 of the Hague Convention presented by the plaintiffs.
However, the Court cannot identify these State practices as evidence of the existence of the alleged principle of customary international law .

1) The Mixed Arbitration Tribunals
These tribunals were established after World War I, and they allowed individual victims to pursue litigation directly to the courts regardless of the intention of their governments. These tribunals, however, were special courts established by specific agreements between States, their jurisdiction was limited to specific damages, and nationals of defeated States were refused the right to sue at these tribunals. Considering these points, the establishing of these tribunals itself does not lead directly to the recognition of the alleged principle.

2) Judgment of the Administrative Court of Appeals of Munster
This decision concerned a claim raised by a German national for damages and injuries resulting from a traffic accident caused by a British soldier who was a member of the occupying force in occupied Germany. The court accepted the claim on the basis of Article 3 of the Hague Convention.
However, this is a case in which an individual victim brought a claim not against the occupying power but against his own government, and the court recognized not the alleged principle which provides the right of individuals to file such claims but only the principle of State responsibility. Therefore, this case cannot be considered as evidence of the alleged principle.

3) Practices of the United Nations
(a) The United Nations paid compensation directly to Belgian nationals for damages caused by the United Nations Forces in the Congo in the 1960s. The United Nations acknowledged that the UN Forces had violated the laws of war and that the victims had the right to seek compensation from the United Nations.
(a) Regarding the settlement of the Gulf War, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 687 under Article 25 of the UN Charter reconfirming the liability of Iraq under international law for compensation for damages caused by Iraq. The Governing Council of the United Nations Compensation Commission, established under Resolution 687, acknowledged the right of civilians and prisoners of war to claim compensation for damages caused by violations of the laws of war.
(a) The United Nations General Assembly acknowledged in its resolution on December 23, 1994 that States are responsible for grave violations of international humanitarian law and violation of human rights, and that the victims of "ethnic cleansing" were entitled to receive compensation.
Considering these UN practices, the Court recognizes the following facts: that the victims of wrongdoing by the UN Forces received compensation from the United Nations, that the United Nations Security Council clearly confirmed the State responsibility of Iraq, and that the victims of crimes against humanity are entitled to receive compensation for damages. However, the Court cannot perceive the establishment or development of the principle of customary international law which entitles individuals to claim compensation directly from the wrongdoing State for damages resulting from violations of the Hague Regulations.'

4) Lump-Sum Agreement between States
'The lump-sum agreements on reparations between States, one typical example being the Case concerning the Factory of Chorzów, partly intend to provide remedies for damages caused to individuals by war. However, they originally regulate claims for reparations between States, and do not mean to acknowledge the rights of individuals to file claims even though the sum of compensation could be estimated based on the amount of the damages to individuals. Therefore, this case cannot be recognized as a confirmation of the alleged principle.

5) Judgment of the District Court of Bonn
In this case the victims of forced labor at the concentration camp in Auschwitz, who were not German nationals raised claims for unpaid wages against the government of Germany. The District Court of Bonn accepted one of the claims based on the violation of the laws of war, including the violation of the Hague Convention, referring to the general principle of international law which provides State liability to pay compensation to victims for violations of the international laws of war.
The Court agrees that this case is evidence supporting the claim of the plaintiffs. However, it cannot recognize the existence of the customary rule from only one case.

6) Others.'

(1) Paragraph 6 of the supplementary provision of the Tort Claims against the State Law provides that "with regard to the damages arising from an act committed before the establishment of this Law, [the application of law] should follow the precedent of the past." In that respect, the Civil Code was not applicable to governmental acts of the State or other public entities under the doctrine of sovereign immunity at the time of World War II, during which the alleged offenses were committed.
In addition, under the legal system of Japan at that time, actions for compensation against the State could not be brought to the Administrative Court.
Also, there was no legislation that acknowledged state liability concerning governmental acts.
Moreover, the Courts also had denied civil liability for torts of the State or other public entities resulting from governmental acts unless the liability of the State was specified in a statute.'

(2) 'It was after the end of World War II that Article 17 of the Constitution provided for the State's liability concerning its governmental acts, and the Tort Claims against the State Law was established.

(3) As observed above, until the Tort Claims against the State Law was enacted, the Civil Code could not be applied to governmental acts of the State and other public entities under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Additionally, the alleged offenses were committed incidentally to the conduct of war by the Japanese military, therefore, in light of their nature, they should be characterized as governmental acts of the State. Therefore the liability of the State to pay compensation for the offenses is denied by the doctrine of State immunity.