Japan
Title: X et al. v. The State of Japan, Tokyo District Court, 27 July 1995
Date: 27.07.1995
Source: Hanrei Jiho, vol. 1563, p. 121; translated in The Japanese Annual of International Law, vol. 39, 1996, p. 265.
Summary:
Full text in pdf: 
The plaintiffs, three Korean nationals, brought a suit against the Japanese State claiming compensation for the wrongful arrest and execution of their fathers and brothers by the Japanese military police on charges of spying immediately after the end of the Second World War. They claimed compensation on the basis of the Japanese Civil Code and international law. The court rejected the claims on the basis of its interpretation of the Civil Code on the ground that the action was time-barred. With regard to the claims based on customary international law, the court found that there was no evidence for general practice supporting the existence of an individual right under customary law to claim compensation for violations of international human rights or humanitarian law. It concluded that there was "no cause for the claims of the plaintiffs based upon international law" and the action was dismissed. (See also decision of the High Court on appeal 
).
Text:
Held: "All of the plaintiffs claims are dismissed."
"The cost of the action shall be borne by the plaintiffs."
Upon the grounds stated below:
[...]
'2. Concerning the Claim Based on International Law
(1) Admissibility of the claim based directly on international law
Article 3 of the Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land stipulates: "A belligerent party which violates the provisions of the said Regulations shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces." Here it expressly lays down the responsibility of the belligerents to pay damages. This being so, the purpose of this provision can only be interpreted as to define the state's responsibility and cannot be interpreted to obligate the state to pay damages to each individual victim of the belligerent state.
Moreover, whereas both the Charter of the International Military Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg and the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East defined certain crimes as "crimes against humanity," and described their constituent elements, their legal effect is only to place international criminal responsibility upon the perpetrator and cannot be understood as laying down civil liability on the state to which the perpetrator belongs as one of its nationals.
Therefore, the plaintiffs' allegation that the defendant has the duty to pay damages based on the cited provisions is without grounds.
(2) Now, as customary international law should be understood as "international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law" (Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice), it follows that in order to establish that there is a customary international law, it is necessary , first, that there be a certain international practice (a general practice) of the states as a result of the accumulation of the states' conduct, and secondly, that there are the convictions of the states (opinio juris) that they are legally obligated to do so.
Regarding the existence of international customary law as alleged by the plaintiffs, neither the general practice nor the conviction (opinio juris) that the state has a duty to pay damages to each individual when that state infringes its obligations under international human rights law or international humanitarian law can be said to exist. As international customary law as alleged by the plaintiffs cannot be determined, therefore, the plaintiffs' claim based on international law is also without grounds
Judge Yasushige Hagio (presiding)
Judge Atsutoshi Uraki
Judge Tomoko Ichikawa
References: International Treaties and Documents
Hague Convention IV 1907: Art. 3
