Print this page

  About Minister Counsellor Alfredo Labbé

Minister Counsellor Labbé is the Deputy Permanent Representative of Chile to the United Nations and the international organisations in Geneva. He is also Deputy Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament. Minister Labbé has held various posts with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile and lead his country's delegations in many bilateral and multilateral discussions and negotiations. He is a specialist in issues related to Disarmament, International Security, neighbouring relations (with focus on boundary questions) and cultural affairs. He has won several appointments and awards including the Diplomatic Merit Medal of Chile (1994).

Statement by Minister Counsellor Alfredo Labbé

Universalising the prohibition of biological and toxin weapons

In the first place allow me to thank the International Committee of the Red Cross for its kind invitation to participate in this very significant gathering.

At the outset, let me emphasise that the modest contribution I intend to make to our discussions today does not necessarily reflect the views of my Government. So, the shortcomings are my own... or so they teach you at the Diplomatic Academy.

As we all know, this Conference takes place at a very critical juncture, when the growing threats concomitant with scientific and technological progress are not
being matched by equivalent movement in the multilateral field.

In July 2001 we witnessed the foundering of seven years of negotiations to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention with a verification Protocol. Moreover, in December, the Fifth Review Conference came to a halt when insurmountable differences prevented the adoption by consensus of a Final Declaration - otherwise agreed in 95% of its text.

And recent news from Washington cast a shadow over its resumption in November.

Multilateral efforts toward the strengthening of the rules prohibition biological and toxin weapons require indeed the participation of all the players in the international stage. And the United States is the major of all of them.

The quest for the universalisation of the BWC and other arms control instruments presuppose belief and confidence in an international rule of law. By its very nature such rule of law must be placed above the interests or security requirements of individual states, no matter how powerful they might be. Its multilateral origin bestows legitimacy, which is the true foundation of democracy and civilised coexistence. No national security interest is greater than those of the International Community as a whole, and only the International Community - through legit imitate multilateral proceedings - is entitled to define those common interests. No "Pax Romana" can substitute a "Pax Communia", built and shared by everyone.

But neither a mere reassertion of our multilateral profession of faith nor a futile exercise in recrimination will provide us with practical answers.

In diplomacy - particularly the diplomacy of small and medium States - the policies and behaviour patterns of big powers are to be treated as given factors and complaining about them is of little use. Trying to exert whatever degree of influence is a much better course of action... while taking care not to sleep to close to the elephant.

So, where are we in terms of the universality of the norms proscribing the biological and toxin weapons?

These norms are contained in the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare and the 1972 Convention of the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction.

As of today the Geneva Protocol comprises 133 States Parties. The latest to accede was St. Vincent and the Grenadines, in March 1999.

The BWC is legally binding for 144 States Parties. Algeria is the most recent, having acceded on July 2001.

Another 18 States have signed but not yet ratified the Biological Weapons Convention, among them Burundi, the Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, Gabon, Morocco, Myanmar, Somalia, Syria and the United Arab Emirates. Israel - a State Party in the Geneva Protocol is neither Party nor signatory of the Convention.

The Protocol and the Convention complement each other.

In legal terms, the prohibition of the use of biological weapons is contained in the Geneva Protocol while the Convention bans their development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention.

Nevertheless, the Parties to the Convention have stated in the Final Declaration of the Fourth Review Conference that the use by the States Parties, in any way and under any circumstances, of microbial or other biological agents or toxins, that is not consistent with prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes, is effectively a violation of Article 1 of the Convention.

From the perspective of true universalisation (my word processor programme insisted in underlining this word in red, unaware of my diplomatic immunity), an additional problem is posed by the reservations maintained by 21 States Parties to the Protocol, including Algeria, Angola, Bangladesh, China, India, Iraq, Jordan, North and South Korea, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Portugal, Russia, Viet Nam and Yugoslavia. These reservations generally declare that the Protocol is binding only as regards other States Parties and that it shall cease to be binding as regard to any enemy state whose armed forces or whose allies fail to respect the prohibitions laid down in it.

The reservation of Israel is even more precise, declaring that "The protocol shall cease to be binding on Israel in regard to any enemy state whose armed forces, or the armed forces of whose allies, or the regular or irregular forces, or groups or individuals operating from its territory, fail to respect the prohibitions which are the object of the protocol".

It is understood that these reservations were drafted by some States Parties in order to keep a so called "right to retaliate" against an enemy who has used lethal gases or bacteriological methods of warfare. The retaliation could involve - theoretically at least - the use of similar gases and methods.

That is why the Final Declaration of the Fourth Review Conference in 1996 established that "...reservations concerning retaliation, through the use of any of the objects prohibited by the (...) Convention, even conditional, are totally incompatible with the absolute and universal prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition and retention of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons, with the aim to exclude completely and forever the possibility of their use".

Chile, Mexico and Peru had proposed an even stronger wording, indicating that "...the reservation of a purported right to retaliation, even conditional, through the use of any of the objects prohibited by the Convention is totally incompatible with the absolute and universal prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition and retention of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons, with the aim to exclude completely and forever the possibility of their use".

Our countries do not recognise a self-bestowed right to retaliate. Under the International Rule of Law the only legitimate use of force is that authorised or permitted by the United Nations Charter.

So, any campaign to universalise the legal norms prohibiting biological weapons has to pursue a threefold objective: accession by every State to the BWC and the Geneva Protocol, plus the withdrawal of the outstanding reservations to the latter.

Now, from a purely statistical point of view it could be argued that a vast majority of States - including all the big powers - is already bound by both instruments, (although the lack of commitment from key nations in the Middle East region does warrant concern).

Furthermore, in a purely doctrinal sence one could believe that the ban of biological weapons has reached the status of "jus cogens", that is rules of international law of an imperative standing, which do not admit contradiction.

But enhanced and ideally, absolute universalisation is needed "per se" and to boost the actual efficacy of what the Final Declaration of the Fourth Review Conference called "... the absolute and universal prohibition of (...) (biological) weapons, with the aim to exclude completely and forever the possibility of their use".

In disarmament jargon we talk about horizontal proliferation and vertical proliferation. With the first we point to the number of States in possession of a certain category of weapons or means of delivery. With the second we refer to the qualitative development of both within a certain State.

Accordingly, if horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons remains at present relatively contained, vertical proliferation is growing at least in some of the nuclear States.

I propose you to borrow the second notion in order to advocate for vertical universalisation, a qualitative sort of commitment to the multilateral instruments prohibiting biological weapons.

Apart from ratification or accession to the treaties, enhanced vertical universalisation implies:

a) true awareness of the rules contained therein at all pertinent levels of society;

b) true national implementation of the legal obligation contained in the BWC and the political obligations emanating from the Final Documents of its Review Conferences; and,

c) internalisation of the aforementioned standards by civil society, including the related professions.

Dissemination of the rules banning biological weapons at high school level is advised under category a); exemplary criminalisation of conducts prohibited by the Convention pertains to category b), while ethical Codes of Conduct - a powerful tool for strengthening the ban at root ground - fall under category c).

Vertical universalisation is, therefore much more than a relatively straightforward constitutional process: it is also a political, deontological and even sociological undertaking requiring conscious and willing participation of all significant echelons in society. As such, it can even benefit from a doses of diplication and repetition if only for the sake of awareness.

The Fourth Review Conference’s Final Declaration requests all States Parties to “encourage wider adherence to the Convention”.

Likewise, it welcomes regional initiatives that would lead to wider accession to the Convention.”

The regional dimension has played an important role in nuclear disarmament, particularly through the establishment of Nuclear Free Zones.

With the Tlatelolco Treaty of 1967 Latin America was the first densely populated geographical region to strive for such status; last week Cuba announced its ratification of both the Tlatelolco Treaty and the NPT, thus consolidating the Latin American region as a genuine Nuclear Free Zone.

Strict parallels to the biological weapons ban are problematic (there are no “biological States” to put alongside the “nuclear States” recognised by the NPT), but some examples could be provided to demonstrate the feasibility of regional initiatives.

In September 1991 –that is, before the finalisation of the Chemical Weapons Convention- Argentina, Brazil and Chile subscribed the “Mendoza Commitment”, a political statement intended to affirm their full commitment to never use, develop, produce or otherwise stockpile, retain or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical or biological weapons. The “Mendoza Commitment” –which also signalled the willingness of its signatories to jointly endeavour to a successful Third Review Conference of the BWC- was later adhered to by Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay and Uruguay.

Later, in 1999 the Presidents of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay agreed the “Political Declaration of the MERCOSUR (region) as a Zone of Peace”. The Declaration reinforces the “Mendoza Commitment” by stating that the MERCOSUR (area) will be free of all weapons of mass destruction.

Last June Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Perú and Venezuela adopted the Andean Charter for Peace and Security which reiterates the absolute ban of weapons of mass destruction in the Andean region.

This led almost immediately to the “South American Peace Zone Declaration” signed in Guayaquil on July 27 by the Presidents of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Perú, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela.

Its second operative paragraph proscribes the emplacement, development, production, possession, deployment, experimentation and use of all weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, chemical, biological and toxic, as well as their transit through the countries in the region. As a result, South American has become the first zone free of all weapons of mass destruction.

These political initiatives could and should be replicated in other continents, starting perhaps with Africa.

In the Review Conference Paper Nº 7 of the series titled “Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention” published by the Department of Peace Studies of the University of Bradford, Professor Graham Pearson indicates that “Promotion of universality could be best tackled together by a concerted effort involving the co-depositaries for the BTWC, the depositary for the 1925 Geneva Protocol and also the depositary for the Chemical Weapons Convention, as well as the OPCW with the objective being to increase the universality of the BTWC, the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the CWC together with the withdrawal of reservations from the 1925 Geneva Protocol. Awareness should first be raised by preparation of regional comparative tabulations, showing which States have yet to accede or to withdraw their reservations”.

This is an excellent suggestion.

I would only add that since all the States Depositaries alluded by Professor Pearson -the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States for the Biological Weapons Convention and France for the 1925 Geneva Protocol- are permanent members of the Security Council, they are in a privileged position to put forward a Resolution from this body to urge ratification of, or accession to both instruments by all UN member States that have not yet done so.

Such a Resolution would carry the same considerable political authority of the Resolutions on Terrorism passed after September 11.

Regrettably, an equally desirable appeal from the Security Council to withdraw the outstanding reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol could be prevented by the fact that Beijing and Washington still insist in keeping theirs.

These ideas do not exhaust the possibilities, but are a starting point.

Finally, I find it my obligation to say that universalisation of the Biological Weapons Convention and the 1925 Geneva Protocol must to be accompanied with a strengthening of the first with a legally binding Verification Protocol.

Such a Protocol can only emerge from a truly multilateral negotiation process. And if present times are not propitious for multilateral endeavours we can at least keep the faith, while awaiting –and praying- for a revival of the Wilsonian spirit.

Other documents in this section: Focus > Biotechnology and weapons