Point 2: Dividing up roles between actors and
Point 3: Situations not covered by IHL, or those of a non-international conflict
It was emphasized by one expert that points 2 and 3 were interlinked and should be considered from a threefold perspective: 1) the field of operations (operating in national territory, transit through a third country, or operating in a receiving country), 2) the situation (disaster in peacetime, non-international armed conflict, or international armed conflict) and 3) the type of organization (purely civil defence organizations as defined in Article 61, military organizations performing civil defence tasks as defined in Article 67 or other non-governmental organizations authorized to perform civil defence tasks). A peacetime disaster in national territory was governed by national legislation and had no international law implications. For international assistance in peacetime disasters, the Oslo guidelines, even though not binding, should be followed. There was, however, no valid international humanitarian law on assistance by humanitarian forces operating in a third country. The development of the United Nations programme on the use of military and civil defence resources in disaster relief had opened up an entire new area , but had raised the issue of defining the resources. Since the time of adoption of Additional Protocol I, the use of foreign military resources for humanitarian assistance had become much more common, even though many countries had strong civil defence structures capable of providing humanitarian assistance in third countries. In the light of this new situation, the United Nations had decided to set up the Military and Civil Defence Unit, which he headed, within the Department of Humanitarian Affairs. In addition to dealing with traditional military and civil defence organizations, the Unit also utilized private organizations authorized by governments to supply humanitarian assistance provided that the government made the assistance available in response to a request sent to it by the Unit. It was noted that it was preferable to receive a request from the receiving nation, but that was not always possible and operations could be implemented pursuant to a Security Council decision if a government was no longer in effective control of the territory. These new elements made the situation in respect of humanitarian law still more complex and they were not covered by the present text of the Additional Protocols.
Another participant said that, from a humanitarian viewpoint, the use of military and civil defence resources in situations of conflict raised serious problems. Humanitarian action should be independent, impartial and neutral and the actors should respect these principles. The military, however, were not necessarily perceived to be impartial or the aid might be channelled through a peacekeeping operation decided upon by the Security Council at the political level. It was essential to distinguish clearly between military and humanitarian tasks, and the military's task should be to provide security in order to allow humanitarian operations to take place, rather than to be directly involved therein.
Referring to the previous speaker's position regarding the concept of impartiality, an expert emphasized that it was a peacekeeping principle. Nevertheless, perception was the key to impartiality, and the provision of humanitarian aid itself might be seen as partial by some factions. He explained that Chapters VI and VII of the United Nations Charter allowed UN troops to defend themselves. The political mandate given by the Security Council was the essential factor. If a political aim was clearly defined in the mandate, together with the tasks to be performed, the military could then define the specific action required to achieve that state. The problem in some recent United Nations operations had been that the political aims had not been correctly identified at the outset or had changed during the course of the operation. The military staff then had to evaluate exactly what it was hoped to achieve and adapt the action accordingly while still using the means originally put at their disposal. Basing itself on lessons learned from the past, the United Nations had realized that its capability to carry out more robust operations was limited by political will and the resources made available to it. If these were adequate, such operations could be implemented successfully. He finally noted that, to his knowledge, the international civil defence emblem had not been used in United Nations operations.
The Chairman noted that the factor distinguishing humanitarian action and United Nations operations was not so much impartiality as neutrality. The ICRC, for example, did not have any position regarding the causes of a conflict, whereas by virtue of a Security Council decision the United Nations had adopted a position. Civil defence tasks could be performed in United Nations operations, but it was difficult to relate them to Additional Protocol I and the protection it afforded.
Tuesday, 1 July, Afternoon session
Point 2: Dividing up roles between actors and
Point 3: Situations not covered by IHL, or those of a non-international conflict (continued)
The Chairman asked the participants for their views on whether United Nations forces could be protected under Additional Protocol I if they were carrying out civil defence tasks and displaying the emblem. In his view, they were not covered by the present system but were protected under the United Nations Convention. One of the problems was that UN forces were entrusted with such a wide variety of missions.
Referring to use of the civil defence emblem by United Nations forces, one expert gave his personal view that the United Nations uniform was sufficient to distinguish them and the addition of the emblem would not make any meaningful difference. Furthermore, if the forces had to put on and divest themselves of the emblem constantly according to the task they were performing, they would have reservations about carrying out civil defence tasks. In addition, for military reasons, it would not be advisable to use several different emblems, as this would only cause confusion. In conclusion civil defence de facto formed part of the mandate of peacekeeping forces.
The Chairman agreed that it would not bring real advantage to United Nations forces to display the emblem and that the United Nations emblem was of much broader scope than the civil defence emblem.
One participant emphasized that a distinction had to be drawn between peacekeeping in the traditional sense, which depended on agreement among the parties, and peace enforcement, which was subject to a decision by the United Nations. In peace enforcement missions, it might be advisable to display the civil defence emblem under the appropriate circumstances.
It was noted that most civil defence organizations already had distinctive uniforms that could not be confused with military uniforms, but problems arose when military forces were asked by the United Nations to carry out specifically humanitarian activities. At present, no rules governed that situation. If peacekeeping forces were given a totally separate status, they could not carry out humanitarian activities.
The view was expressed that the United Nations role was covered by Article 64, which referred to international coordinating organizations without specifying them.
The Chairman said that, for the ICRC, it was important to distinguish between United Nations peace enforcement operations, in which United Nations forces might be attacked and IHL had to be respected, and purely peacekeeping operations, in which the forces should not be subject to attack but, if they were, the offenders should be punished. Finally, he asked to what extent United Nations forces had collaborated with national civil defence organizations when carrying out civil defence tasks?
One participant noted that United Nations peacekeeping forces might find themselves in a war situation so the context was always fluid and there could be no clear-cut distinction between peace enforcement and peacekeeping.
One expert explained that in his country the relations between the civil defence organizations and the United Nations forces had fluctuated. For the latter, the focus had been on protecting and assisting the local population, so they had to receive the support of the local authorities in order to fulfil their mandate. They not only carried out the tasks enumerated in Article 61, but also undertook other action such as providing clothing and rebuilding schools.
Referring to the same context, another participant said that there had been instantaneous cooperation between civil defence and United Nations forces. The difficulties had occurred with the military in charge of civil defence, through whom all requests for assistance had to be channelled.
Another expert emphasized that NATO had had to learn how to deal with a multitude of non-governmental organizations and with local authorities that were not always friendly. It had been perceived that there was a cultural gap between the thinking of the military and civilians and to overcome this and enhance military-civilian cooperation joint military-civilian units had been set up at NATO military headquarters.
It was indicated that the civil defence organization in the Russian Federation had provided assistance in former Yugoslavia under a contract with UNHCR.
The Chairman asked what was the relationship between civil defence organizations and the local Red Cross or Red Crescent Society in times of war and peace? He also enquired whether there was competition between the National Society and civil defence to attract volunteers?
He drew attention to Articles 68 to 71 of Additional Protocol I, which dealt with relief action, noting that there were two approaches to such operations, either through the civil defence structure or through international action involving the Red Cross. The Chairman asked further whether civil defence services were perceived more as humanitarian organizations rather than State bodies?
It was replied by several experts that civil defence organizations should work closely with the Red Cross or Red Crescent Societies, which were ubiquitous and thus played a useful role in disseminating IHL. In many countries, the relations were good and the two played complementary roles. For example, courses for the national first aid certificate were taught by firefighters, who were military personnel with special training.
Another participant said that in his country the civil defence organization was better equipped to cope with disasters because it had government resources at its disposal. On the other hand, the Red Crescent was present on the spot to a greater extent and covered virtually the whole country. The National Society trained first aid workers in cooperation with civil defence. Civil defence took no part in the dissemination of IHL, which was the responsibility of the Society, although he believed it was indispensable for civil defence to become involved in this aspect.
It was noted that in some countries there was confusion among the population regarding the roles of the military and civil defence, even though they were fundamentally different. The situation had improved somewhat with media reports on the assistance provided by civil defence in disasters abroad.
One expert explained that the legal situation in his country before the war had been that civil defence had overall responsibility for assisting the population and one of its components was the Red Cross, which carried out its mission under the direction of civil defence. Cooperation with the ICRC during the conflict had been good and was being pursued with a programme on mines coordinated by civil defence.
Another participant emphasized that each country organized its civil defence structure according to its needs. In his country, in peacetime, civil defence carried out the tasks assigned to it by the government and in time of war it coordinated the work of the Red Cross and non-governmental organizations.
There seemed to be two trends: in eastern Europe, civil defence was becoming less military while in Africa the opposite was true. There, fire brigades, which had given birth to civil defence in most countries, were strongly military: they wore military uniform and carried weapons. That obviously posed problems in the light of discussions at the meeting, especially in regard to peacetime civil defence activities.
In the broad meaning, it was noted, civil defence functions were prevention, prediction and intervention. In order to intervene in disasters, personnel must be well trained, disciplined and used to obeying orders. In order to attenuate the military aspect, civil defence in one expert's country was in the hands of the Ministry of Territorial Administration and all civil defence personnel were seconded to the Ministry of the Interior. Furthermore, in peacetime, they came under the general directorate of civil defence which included an operational service directorate covering civilians who were called up and wished to do their service in the civil defence organization. Training was given in first aid, fire fighting and relief but not soldiering. They were therefore practically civilian. In the countries of the Mahgreb, however, civilians were seconded and given civil defence functions, directly under the interior or territorial ministries. In West Africa, in some countries such as Côte d'Ivoire, the fire brigade carried out civil defence activities and came under the Ministry of Defence. In Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and Senegal, however, civil defence came under the interior or territorial ministries but its personnel were seconded by the military authorities.
It was finally noted that in Africa, apart from the matter of discipline, in peacetime civil defence activities were undertaken by the armed forces as a mean of occupying them and employing their training and discipline. They retained their military status and continued their military training. In wartime, a way must be found of dissociating the two functions. Perhaps civil defence functions should be demilitarized in Africa.
The Chairman said that the use of armies for civil defence tasks in peacetime was fairly widespread and did not really pose a problem. It was important, however, to distinguish between civil defence and military functions during armed conflicts when there was a risk of confusion.
It was explained that in another country civil defence, under the Ministry of the Interior, played a coordinating role in disaster relief in peacetime. It also coordinated emergency relief in time of war. The way in which civil defence services were perceived depended on the situation in each country. In this country, for example, it was a State body with a humanitarian mission.
Another expert thought that one reason civil defence was perceived as a State body was that it was very well organized, with a clear command and control structure, and was easily recognized. For the United Nations, it was important to be able to receive assistance from governments in this form. In fulfilling its role, it was very useful for civil defence to have clearly distinguishable uniforms.
The Chairman pointed out that one clear distinction between humanitarian non-governmental organizations and State bodies was that the former were financed from private sources and staffed by volunteers, whereas the latter received public finance and were largely staffed by professionals. The discussion had shown that United Nations forces, the Red Cross and Red Crescent, and civil defence often carried out the same type of activity so in order to be able to identify which of them was carrying out a particular activity the issue of the emblem or distinctive sign was a critical factor, bearing in mind that the Red Cross and Red Crescent emblems were also used by the army's medical services. Combining emblems or introducing new emblems would probably only give rise to confusion and diminish the chances of protection. He finally said that the whole issue of armed protection for humanitarian aid was an extremely sensitive and topical issue. The reaction of the Red Cross was prudent, although a distinction had to be drawn between situations where a government authority still existed and those where there was no government structure in place.
One participant indicated that his experience in Rwanda had shown that humanitarian assistance had been placed in two different categories by the Rwandans, one category being UNAMIR and the other all the remaining organizations, irrespective of whether they were United Nations bodies or non-governmental organizations. UNAMIR had benefited from much more favourable treatment.
The previous speaker noted that the conclusion appeared to be that civil defence did not have the same qualms as the Red Cross about utilizing armed protection for humanitarian aid and was perhaps better placed to provide aid where armed protection was necessary.
The Chairman said that the question under discussion was to what extent various tasks, including civil defence ones, were given protection. Humanitarian and civil defence tasks could only be protected with the agreement of the military forces involved and must, in any case, be clearly recognizable. There were two types of reasons for failure to comply with IHL: the first was that structures and discipline had broken down and that the Parties to the conflict were no longer in control of the situation; the second - much more serious - was the refusal by the conflicting Parties to accept the concept of IHL. Sometimes both types of problem were present. There had been several cases in recent conflicts where humanitarian workers and infrastructure had been deliberately attacked. In the second type of problem, only a few refusals to comply sufficed to ensure that IHL was violated and the problem became a political one.
The matter of armed protection for humanitarian services was difficult: should they be protected by the emblem, by arms, or both? The matter was very sensitive and the ICRC was extremely reluctant to admit the use of arms. Sometimes food distribution had taken place under the auspices of humanitarian organizations whereas the food reached distribution points under military escort - clearly the situation was extremely complex and solutions must be sought.
One expert cited the words of President Sommaruga who had said earlier in the year that the use of force against the will of Parties to a conflict, even for valid humanitarian reasons, would necessarily turn humanitarian action into a military operation. Nowadays, there were often anarchical situations in conflicts, as in Albania; small criminal or guerrilla units were operating and ways had to be found of protecting civil defence staff against them. The President of the German Red Cross had stated after the events in Chechnya that he disagreed with President Sommaruga's strict attitude and believed that, in some cases, armed protection had to be sought.
One expert drew attention to the practical implementation of provisions: to take the example of Chechnya, less than a month earlier, President Sommaruga had stated that the ICRC could not work with the armed forces. The Chechen side, however, was unable to guarantee security and the ICRC no longer worked there on such a large scale as it had earlier. So the problem was how to make the Parties fulfil their obligations under IHL.
Another participant said that the question was very sensitive and complex. It was very difficult to envisage civil defence personnel being armed. If they were, there would be great temptation to use the weapons. Armed United Nations and regional organizations such as ECOWAS were engaged in the purely humanitarian task of maintaining order in some countries of Africa but excesses had occurred, for example, in the Central African Republic. He could not agree with the rigid stance adopted by President Sommaruga. A choice had to be made in a realistic manner, as had been done by paying factions in Somalia to allow food supplies to be delivered. He believed that civil defence personnel should not carry weapons but that armed cover might be provided where needed for them to fulfil their function.
One participant said that civil defence groups should not be armed or accompanied by armed escorts as that led to their confusion with irregular armed forces and they risked becoming targets. Naturally, they needed to be protected while carrying out their duties. Civil defence organizations could be protected by international armed forces if necessary, but not by the Parties to the conflict. The armed forces on the same side as the civil defence organizations should protect them, but in Bosnia that had not been the case. In any event, there was a need for civil defence organizations to have armed protection.
The Chairman thought that no final decision regarding security measures could be taken as everything depended on circumstances and how matters progressed. The danger of being armed had already been discussed and the ICRC was very hesitant about the matter although it had not entirely precluded the possibility. Armed protection against banditry could be very useful although there was always a danger that aggression might escalate. For the ICRC, the problem of neutrality would arise if it were escorted by United Nations forces; it was essential that confusion did not occur between the two organizations, whose function was quite different. Imposed armed protection raised other problems as it amounted to armed intervention: various scenarios could be envisaged which might further humanitarian ends but political and humanitarian aims must not be confused.
Two participants wondered whether another additional protocol was needed, enumerating the tasks performed by international humanitarian assistance, to cover non-international conflicts. It should enable the conflicting Parties to authorize foreign governmental and non-governmental institutions to provide such services. They would be identified by the international emblems and, in turn, the conflicting Parties would afford protection. The tasks, not the organizational structure, would receive the protection. Could such a possibility be explored?
On the matter of preparing a new protocol, the Chairman pointed out that present instruments did not exclude armed protection although institutions were reluctant to use it. He warned that the procedure to prepare a new protocol was very long and cumbersome, involving huge negotiation, as national sovereignty was affected. Personally, he did not favour such action but thought that attention should be focused on promoting and implementing existing instruments. He acknowledged that the question of accepting armed escorts was an open one.
One expert considered that the ICRC was confusing two different situations. The subject under discussion was civil defence action which, whether carried out by private or State-run organizations, had structures in place within countries whereas the ICRC was not a State structure. The point at issue was whether national civil defence organizations could have armed protection. The wording of Additional Protocol I implied that the protection could be active. Furthermore, if the ICRC were unable to continue its work, it could withdraw from the country while civil defence structures remained since they were national entities.
The Chairman agreed but said that the problems were similar as protection depended on respect for an emblem borne by organizations carrying out non-military activities. The issue was to what extent military protection could be accepted in order to allow civil defence organizations to perform their tasks, especially where law and order had broken down and no protective signs were respected.
He said it was very clear that there was no simple answer to the problem. The instruments adopted in 1977 concentrated on international armed conflicts while the vast majority of conflicts were now internal. The issue was whether civil defence organizations would be protected in internal conflicts but some of the concepts in the 1977 Protocols were clearly not really applicable to such cases. He wondered whether it was acceptable to have two standards: one regarding civil defence activities in international conflicts and the other in internal conflicts. There must be a certain logical approach. He would increasingly defend the idea that a certain practice had been established to the effect that protection afforded in international conflicts should also apply to internal ones and he felt that there was a certain acceptance among States that that should apply to the civil defence function also.
One expert said that civilians would never be a legal target but that the issue was to ensure that there was a norm to allow the civil defence organizations to perform their tasks. It should be possible to include NGOs to the extent that they fulfilled certain criteria as they carried out the same tasks. The situation which had occurred when the Rwandan authorities had confiscated the equipment and facilities of NGOs and asked them to leave the country should not occur. There should be international standards to guard against such arbitrary nationalization of assets and cessation of functions. If States accepted humanitarian assistance, they should have to allow the organizations supplying it to function without hindrance and, if they were requested to leave the country, their assets should not be confiscated.
Another participant said that the situation regarding civil defence differed in the two types of conflict, especially when the civil defence organization was a State body. Even if it was free to do its work, it would tend to be taken over by the strongest party. It was therefore necessary for civil defence organizations to have the same working conditions whether they were State or private bodies. It was said that the civil defence organization could play its part in non-international armed conflicts. The State had a duty to protect its nationals, especially since the State could impose sanctions on the national territory. IHL could be applied by analogy.
The Chairman pointed out that it was difficult to envisage a State organization, such as a civil defence organization, functioning in a non-international conflict in a part of the country held by a dissident force.
One expert said that, bearing in mind that civil defence organizations were in an inherently dangerous situation and might lose personnel, there were two options: the first was to adopt a coercive approach, providing physical protection, and the second was to provide inducement not to attack them. There seemed to be reasonable agreement among participants that the coercive approach was not the best way forward and the inducement side must be explored. A number of measures therefore had to be adopted to ensure that the antagonist understood the tasks undertaken by the civil defence bodies. First, the civil defence organizations had to be recognizable and, secondly, their role must be understood. The list of tasks set out in Additional Protocol I must also be studied, since several of them could have military connotations. Legal protection was inherent in the Protocol but it had to be publicized.
The Chairman referred to the situation in Rwanda and Burundi where the purpose had been to exterminate populations. It was clear that humanitarian action aimed at allowing people to remain where they were would not be tolerated.
One expert said that it was difficult to think of a basis for civil defence being allowed to perform its work in internal conflicts: it could perhaps be sought in the provisions of Additional Protocol II which implied the right of the civilian population to receive assistance and allowed impartial relief actions to be carried out. Civil defence could be envisaged in that context. Human rights also played a part in that everyone had the right to life.
Wednesday, 2 July, Morning
Opening of the session
Mr. Sandoz (ICRC), Chairman of the session, explained that the plenary session would break up into two groups: Working Group 1 would discuss issues related to the emblem in the broad sense, the identification and recognition of civil defence services and how to guarantee their protection; Working Group 2 would deal with issues related to IHL norms and the measures to be taken for their dissemination. The Groups would then present their conclusions to the plenary session.
Wednesday 2 July 1997, Morning session, second part
Working Group 1: Issues relative to the emblem.
The Working Group met at 9.15 a.m. on Wednesday 2 July 1997. Four main issues were discussed. For conclusions, see the report of the Working Group chairman to plenary.
1. Is the CD emblem (referred to in the Protocol as "the international distinctive sign") known, used and efficient?
Dr. Jakovljevic, Chairman of the Working Group, said that some countries were using the emblem with additions, which should not be done. Countries not Parties to Additional Protocol I were not bound to use the CD emblem as identification, but if they did use the emblem they must also apply the provisions of Additional Protocol I. France, for example, was not a Party to the Protocol but found it valuable to comply with the law and practice.
Several participants said that if the emblem was used, the conditions must be complied with. They would recommend that ICDO should use the international emblem rather than its present identifying sign of two red stripes.
In contrast, the Chairman felt that ICDO could retain its own identification sign but should recommend to its members that they use the international emblem.
It was also suggested that ICDO should disseminate information on the international emblem and associated rules to all signatories to the 1949 Geneva Conventions which were not Parties to Additional Protocol I. Mention was also made of the possibility for United Nations agencies to use the emblem.
2. Is the emblem protected by law?
The Chairman proposed that the meeting should recommend that governments enact laws relating to the correct use of the civil defence emblem and protection when it was displayed. He said it was important to decide who had the right to use the emblem; organizations should have that right only when performing civil defence activities. National legislation could take a number of forms as appropriate and could be any legal act that was valid and legally binding in the country concerned. If States not Parties to Additional Protocol I wished to use the emblem they must enact national legislation providing sanctions for misuse.
One expert stressed that dissemination must first be carried out so that countries were aware of the significance of the emblem. Domestic laws could then be enacted. Governments could enact laws imposing sanctions on the misuse or disregard of the civil defence emblem in non-international conflicts but a means must be found to impose sanctions in international conflicts. That could be by agreement between the Parties.
Another participant said that in his country the two Additional Protocols were directly enforceable but the emblem was not used by all civil defence units, most of which had their own emblems. In connection with the third point which would be discussed later, he noted that punishment for misuse was very difficult if several private or public organizations used other emblems or identification.
It was mentioned that Article 66(8) of Additional Protocol I made it incumbent on Parties to take the measures necessary to supervise the display of the international distinctive sign of civil defence and to prevent and repress any misuse thereof. He suggested that Parties should be reminded of that obligation.
The Chairman thought that the ICRC might be asked to bring the matter before the next International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent. A model law on the Red Cross and Red Crescent emblem already existed.
3. What are the consequences of the use of another emblem?
The Chairman noted that some civil defence organizations used the Red Cross and Red Crescent emblem; it was clear to him that that was permissible for medical services connected with civil defence tasks but not for other civil defence work. States which had acceded to Additional Protocol I should use the international emblem but he wondered whether civil defence organizations which had other emblems or identifying marks should be allowed to display them also. He thought that civil defence authorities could be recommended to use one or the other.
One expert replied that if States had entered a reservation on the subject, it might be possible. He stressed that the civil defence emblem should be used alone, not linked to another. Two emblems could be used side by side provided they were not joined. He advised that too many emblems could lead to confusion.
Disagreement was voiced out by another participant : The intention of Additional Protocol I was to protect activities aimed at providing succour to civilians. Some countries had very long-standing civil defence organizations, which were entirely voluntary and independently funded, and which had their own emblems to which they were strongly attached. Some would probably refuse to wear only the international emblem, especially as their own emblem was recognized in their countries. The solution would be to allow display of both. National organizations which performed worthy civil defence tasks should be allowed to wear the civil defence emblem in wartime. It was essential that easily visible clothing be worn in the performance of duties, and that it bear the appropriate emblem or emblems.
Another expert said that use of the Red Cross emblem for certain services was permitted under Additional Protocol I but that use of civil defence emblems other than the international one would require notification to the other warring Party or Parties.
It was reported that in Bosnia other signs, including the Red Cross emblem, were placed inside the civil defence emblem. This should not be done but some subservices signs could be included.
The Chairman said that the civil defence authorities should provide overall control of the matter. Control was important to ensure that the organizations did not display the civil defence emblem when performing other tasks. Anarchy must be avoided.
One expert said that there was no international civil defence command and control structure. National authorities should perform that function. He was not against international guidelines but warned that, in reality, the emblem would undoubtedly be misused. He agreed that there should not be a plethora of similar sized signs but was adamant that others could be displayed in addition to the international civil defence one, which should be larger. Any attempt to proscribe the use of different emblems might result in refusal by States to accede to Additional Protocol I. The aims of the Protocol must be borne in mind. Signs must be clear and, in wartime, people learnt very quickly which ones were effective. The matter should be dealt with flexibly although a strong recommendation could be made to use the international emblem
One expert said that consideration should be given to the fact that many countries already had signs that were well-known, even abroad, and produced a feeling of safety. Many voluntary workers identified very closely with their own emblem. It should be agreed that the international emblem would be displayed in addition.
The Chairman agreed that it was dangerous if there was a proliferation of signs but confirmed that States could make reservations on the matter.
4. What are the technical possibilities of improving the protective use of the emblem?
One expert said that considerable study had been carried out in regard to better and more sophisticated means of recognition for the Red Cross and Red Crescent emblem, including infrared-visible materials. The same technical means could be used for the civil defence emblem. Governments and international organizations should be encouraged to look for such new techniques and measures.
The Chairman suggested that the ICRC could be asked to consider such possibilities for the civil defence emblem in line with those under study for the Red Cross emblem; in other words, to look for new techniques and recommend them to Governments.
Another participant suggested that ICDO and the ICRC should exchange information on the subject and that States should be invited to look for new technical means to identify the civil defence emblem. Certain international organizations such as ITU were already working on the topic. ICDO should be the lead organization and the ICRC, which did not represent civil defence organizations, could give technical support.
