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 Archived page (may contain outdated information)31-05-1996 Annual Report 1995 The Former Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia The year began on a note of cautious optimism following the signing of a four-month cease-fire agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina on 31 December 1994. An atmosphere of relative restraint seemed to settle over most of Bosnia and Herzegovina although fighting in the Bihac enclave, which flared up in mid-October 1994, spilled over into the new year. In many areas access to people in need remained extremely difficult and, with a severe winter looming, the situation of civilians, displaced people and refugees was desperate. UN-controlled `blue roads' into Sarajevo for convoys bringing humanitarian assistance were opened up, and the ICRC took advantage of the lull in the hostilities to plan for emergency stocks to be set up in strategic locations, to deploy additional staff in certain areas and to take measures to provide extra protection for their offices. Pursuant to Article 8 of the 31 December cease-fire agreement, the warring parties held regular meetings in the presence of ICRC delegates at Sarajevo airport to discuss possibilities for the exchange of detainees. The Central Commission for Prisoners and Persons Unaccounted for, established under ICRC auspices in implementation of the agreement, yielded few tangible results during the course of the year as political considerations far outweighed humanitarian concerns. As a result delegates continued to be denied access to several places of detention, very few detainees were released, and scant information about persons unaccounted for was forthcoming. The situation in Croatia eased temporarily when, as a result of intensive negotiations, the United Nations' mandate and the deadline for the UNPROFOR* withdrawal from all four UNPAs,* originally scheduled for 31 March, was extended. The UN Security Council passed a resolution establishing UNCRO*, and the new mandate, up to end November consisted of a three-step plan incorporating the implementation of the March 1994 cease-fire accord between Croatian and local Serb authorities, the setting up of an economic agreement and control of the international borders. However, despite the presence of UN contingents, tension mounted along the dividing lines and new strategic alliances were formed in the Sectors --- the Serbs in the Sectors forming an alliance with the Bosnian Serbs, while the Croatian army and the Bosnian government army set up joint military headquarters under the command of the Croatian Chief of Staff. In March the situation took a rapid turn for the worse. Renewed hostilities broke out in Bosnia and Herzegovina, effectively bringing the cease-fire to an ignominious end well before the projected April deadline, and the airlift into Sarajevo had to be halted pending an improvement in security conditions. The expulsion of minority groups from Bijeljina resumed in early April after more than four months' respite and people were forced to cross the front line between Bijeljina and Tuzla on foot. ICRC delegates based in Tuzla provided medical and other assistance as they arrived, and the ICRC delegation in Pale made representations to the Bosnian Serb authorities urging them to put an end to this practice. Meanwhile, the cease-fire agreement signed in March 1994 between Croatian and local Serb authorities in all four UNPAs was shattered when hostilities broke out at the beginning of May. Originally portrayed as a limited police operation, the Croatian Operation Flash was in fact a military confrontation between the Croatian authorities and the authorities of the self-proclaimed ``Republic of Serbian Krajina''. As a result, western Slavonia came under Croatian control and some 12,000 Serb refugees fled to northern Bosnia and, from there, to Sectors North and East. Serb forces from Knin retaliated by launching two cluster missile attacks against the Croatian capital. Tension surged in May between Bosnian government forces and Bosnian Serbs in Sarajevo. Murderous hostilities raged in the Bihac area, the eastern Bosnian pockets of Gorazde and Srebrenica, along the Posavina corridor, near Mount Ozren and Doboj (east of Tuzla), in Trnovo and the Kalinovik area, south of Sarajevo, and in Grahovo, north of Livno. The target of continued sporadic shelling, the Bosnian government-held town of Tuzla received one particularly serious attack which resulted in heavy casualties, with dozens of civilians being killed or wounded. In violation of the 20-km exclusion zone established by the United Nations in February 1994, Sarajevo came under heavy fire. The city was entirely cut off and unable to receive vital supplies, including gas, water and electricity. A United Nations ultimatum to the Bosnian Serbs went unacknowledged and, on 26 and 27 May, NATO* forces carried out retaliatory airstrikes against Bosnian Serb ammunition stocks in the Pale area. The Bosnian Serbs reacted by capturing hundreds of United Nations military observers and UNPROFOR personnel stationed in their territory. In mid-June, in view of the deteriorating situation and its serious repercussions on the ongoing negotiations and the humanitarian outlook, the ICRC President urged all parties involved to agree on a minimum of humanitarian consensus and respect their obligations under international humanitarian law, to exercise restraint in their treatment of civilians and captured combatants and to guarantee the inhabitants of the besieged city of Sarajevo at least minimum conditions of survival: clean water, food and medicines. At the same time the ICRC contacted the parties to remind them of its mandate, to reiterate its readiness to act as a neutral intermediary and to re-emphasize their obligations under the Geneva Conventions towards detainees. In late June the ICRC was able to bring some medical and surgical supplies into Sarajevo for medical facilities treating the war-wounded on both sides. This emergency operation was short-lived, however, as despite the authorities' permission and ICRC vehicles clearly marked with the red cross emblem, delegates were fired on while driving through no-man's land, and cross-line activities had to be suspended until security conditions improved. The second half of the year saw a radical change in the military and political outlook, and consequently in the humanitarian situation in the former Yugoslavia. The first in a new series of crises was the fall of the Bosnian government-held, UN ``safe areas'' of Srebrenica and Zepa to Bosnian Serb forces in July. Mass expulsions of the populations from these areas ensued, while thousands of men of combat age, both soldiers and civilians, were separated from their families and arrested. Most of them still remained unaccounted for by year's end. When bilateral talks in Geneva failed to defuse the continuing build-up of tension in Croatia over the status of Sectors North and South, the Croatian armed forces launched Operation Storm in early August. The takeover of the two Sectors by the Croatians provoked a massive outpouring of more than 170,000 Serbs across Bosnian Serb-held territories in Bosnia. As many as 30,000 remained in Banja Luka, while the rest made their way along the Posavina corridor towards the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The two-and-a-half year siege of the Bosnian government-held enclave of Bihac was lifted as a result of this military operation and regular access to the city was restored. Most of the inhabitants of Velika Kladusa (30,000 people) in the former Bihac enclave, many of them loyal to the dissident Bosnian Muslim leader, Fikret Abdic, subsequently also fled the area when the Bosnian government 5th Army Corps took Velika Kladusa. They made their way across the border to Kupljensko, where they were halted by Croatian authorities. Despite serious security hazards, the ICRC was the only humanitarian organization to remain present throughout the Croatian offensive in Sectors North and South. In early August the ICRC President visited the former Yugoslavia to obtain assurances from the authorities in Belgrade, Pale, Sarajevo and Zagreb that the ICRC would be allowed to assist and endeavour to ensure the protection of all conflict victims in the region, in accordance with its mandate. The shelling of a Sarajevo marketplace on 28 August triggered the move from peace-keeping to peace-making operations. A joint British/French rapid reaction force was deployed on Mount Igman and NATO airstrikes against Bosnian Serb military and strategic communications posts, arms depots, weapons factories and other military installations around Sarajevo were launched on 30 August. A period of relative calm ensued. Although the city remained without electricity, gas or water, the re-opening of the UN-controlled ``blue roads'' into the city meant that commercial lorries bringing food, fuel and other goods had access to Sarajevo. Relief was also flown in by UN planes for the first time since April. In September, the ICRC was the first international organization to make a survey of the Bosnian Serb-controlled parts and suburbs of Sarajevo and to bring in urgently needed supplies of blankets, plastic sheeting and candles, as well as medicines and surgical material, since that area had become inaccessible following the NATO airstrikes. Elsewhere in central and western Bosnia the Croatian, Bosnian Croat and Bosnian government forces were making considerable territorial gains, and by the end of September the results of these hostilities were seriously aggravating the humanitarian situation. The ICRC office and delegations in Banja Luka, Pale and Sarajevo were under enormous pressure to provide relief, medical, water and sanitation services, as well as protection for civilians and to maintain contact between separated relatives through Red Cross messages. The ICRC's policy of maintaining decentralized emergency stocks throughout the region proved extremely useful in ensuring a rapid supply of medicines, food, blankets, tents, plastic sheeting, hygiene items and water and sanitation equipment during periods of major crisis. During and following these military operations, the international community, led by the United States, resumed political negotiations with a view to settling the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Talks were held in Geneva and New York during the month of September with representatives from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia and the Serbian President, Slobodan Milosevic, leading the Serb delegation representing the Bosnian Serbs. On 5 October a cease-fire agreement was signed by the parties to the conflict but did not take effect until 12 October, when the Bosnian government's condition that gas and electricity be restored in Sarajevo was met. Hostilities did not abate, however, nor did the cease-fire have any immediate effect on the expulsion and harassment of civilians. The parties actively continued with hostilities in western Bosnia and to the south-east of Sarajevo towards Trnovo, Gorazde and on and around Mount Ozren (west of Tuzla) and ethnic minorities continued to be forced out. Fearing for their safety, large numbers of Serbs also fled certain areas. Although the cease-fire was generally respected as of 16 October, the human tide of Serb displaced and Muslim and Croat expelled continued to swell. Under pressure from the United States, and in the presence of mediators from Europe, Russia and the US, the leaders of all the parties to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia met for talks in Dayton, Ohio, on 1 November. The ICRC worked hard during this negotiation process, holding meetings behind the scenes to ensure that humanitarian issues, such as the plight of displaced populations, the treatment of ethnic minorities, the unconditional release of detainees and information on people unaccounted for, were recognized and given all due attention. The institution's position on population movements is very much in line with that of UNHCR, which is responsible for refugees in host countries. The return of people to their home areas must be voluntary, and must not be used to consolidate military conquests; conversely, voluntary return should be facilitated regardless of military gains. The return process should be well organized and properly phased while taking account of the returnees' basic requirements, and in particular the security of the areas. The agreement reached in Dayton on 21 November by the Presidents of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia was signed in Paris on 14 December. Prior to this the ICRC President, accompanied by the Delegate General for Western and Central Europe, attended the Conference on the implementation of the peace agreement, held in London in early December. There he presented the ICRC's humanitarian agenda for the peace process, highlighting the following crucial points: the release of detainees; clarification of the fate of persons unaccounted for, especially those from Srebrenica; respect for the safety and dignity of vulnerable groups, minorities and returnees; and support for vulnerable groups and public health structures. In the former Yugoslavia, large-scale population movements continued to inflate the already considerable humanitarian requirements facing the ICRC. The priority was to provide immediate aid to help uprooted and newly resettled populations through the winter. A reconstruction plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina, laid down at a meeting in Brussels on 18 and 19 December, was scheduled to begin in early 1996.
Srebrenica One of the most sensitive and distressing events of the entire conflict in the former Yugoslavia is that of the missing people from Srebrenica. When the UN "safe areas" of Srebrenica and Zepa were taken by Bosnian Serb forces in July, the Muslim populations were rounded up and expelled. In Srebrenica some 3,000 men were separated from their families and arrested. Outside the enclaves, notably in Tuzla, ICRC delegates were besieged with queries about missing family members. Barred from the area, which was declared a ``war zone'', the ICRC made repeated written representations to and had meetings with the highest Bosnian Serb civilian and military authorities. It requested immediate authorization for its delegates to visit all detainees, whether civilians or captured combatants, as had been agreed by the parties at the outset of hostilities. The ICRC was given permission to evacuate some 25 wounded and sick from the enclave to Tuzla. However, by mid-July delegates had still not been allowed access to detainees, and the ICRC President contacted not only the Bosnian Serb authorities on this matter but also the authorities of the Republic of Serbia and the Bosnian government. At the London Conference on Bosnia and Herzegovina on 21 July, reference was also made to the need for the ICRC to gain immediate access to detainees from Srebrenica and for the parties to commit themselves to cooperating in the humanitarian effort and to honour their obligations under humanitarian law. Throughout, the ICRC's top priority was to locate and register these detainees and inform their next of kin of their situation. Towards the end of July, when prison visits were authorized, the ICRC found only very few detainees from Srebrenica. Also on the institution's priority list were the almost 5,000 men who were not reported arrested, but had left the Srebrenica enclave prior to its seizure and were making their way to Bosnian government-held territory. The total absence of any reliable information about the thousands of men missing gave rise to grave concern. While various reports and numerous eyewitness accounts indicated that all these men were dead, ICRC delegates from time to time came across Srebrenica men being held in Bosnian Serb prisons. The families lived in hope of receiving information which was not forthcoming. The ICRC could only persist in its approaches to the authorities to be given specific information so that it could inform the families. A visit by the ICRC President to the area and further contacts with the authorities as concern grew over the whereabouts and fate of the some 3,000 arrested by the Bosnian Serb authorities and the missing 5,000 who had fled the area still did not result in full and unimpeded ICRC access to detainees and places of detention. Delegates compiled lists from interviews with the families who had arrived from Srebrenica, among others, in order to gather reliable information on people unaccounted for and possible places of detention. This information, recorded in ICRC databanks, was presented to the Bosnian government and Bosnian Serb authorities in early October. With the advent of the cease-fire and negotiations leading up to the Dayton peace agreement the ICRC hoped that the parties would provide information on the fate of people unaccounted for, and that delegates would be able to locate and visit those listed as missing. The institution worked hard to have numerous humanitarian issues incorporated into the agreement, in particular that regarding the fate of prisoners and all persons unaccounted for, and stated its willingness to facilitate the release of all detainees as well as assist the parties in tracing and exchanging information on missing persons. Despite the institution's openness and transparent approach regarding the issue with all the parties concerned and its unremitting efforts to find answers for the suffering and bewildered families of the missing, the overwhelming numbers of people unaccounted for remained almost unchanged. Even though the ICRC was convinced by the end of the period under review that most of these people were dead, it would continue to push for clear answers and information so that the families living in anguish and anxious for news could at least know for certain what had become of their loved ones. * UNPROFOR: United Nations Protection Force * UNPAs: United Nations Protected Areas later known as Sectors North, South, West and East (from end March) * UNCRO: United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia * NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
