Practice Relating to Rule 107. Spies
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Hague Regulations (1899)
Article 29 of the 1899 Hague Regulations provides:
An individual can only be considered a spy if, acting clandestinely, or on false pretences, he obtains, or seeks to obtain information in the zone of operations of a belligerent, with the intention of communicating it to the hostile party.
Thus, soldiers not in disguise who have penetrated into the zone of operations of a hostile army to obtain information are not considered spies. Similarly, the following are not considered spies: soldiers or civilians, carrying out their mission openly, charged with the delivery of despatches destined either for their own army or for that of the enemy. To this class belong likewise individuals sent in balloons to deliver despatches, and generally to maintain communication between the various parts of an army or a territory. 
Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 29 July 1899, Article 29.

Hague Regulations (1907)
Article 29 of the 1907 Hague Regulations provides:
A person can only be considered a spy when, acting clandestinely or on false pretences, he obtains or endeavours to obtain information in the zone of operations of a belligerent, with the intention of communicating it to the hostile party.
Thus, soldiers not wearing a disguise who have penetrated into the zone of operations of the hostile army, for the purpose of obtaining information, are not considered spies. Similarly, the following are not considered spies: Soldiers and civilians, carrying out their mission openly, entrusted with the delivery of despatches intended either for their own army or for the enemy’s army. To this class belong likewise persons sent in balloons for the purpose of carrying despatches and, generally, of maintaining communications between the different parts of an army or a territory. 
Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 18 October 1907, Article 29.

Additional Protocol I
Article 46(2) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I provides:
A member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict who, on behalf of that Party and in territory controlled by an adverse Party, gathers or attempts to gather information shall not be considered as engaging in espionage if, while so acting, he is in the uniform of his armed forces. 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Geneva, 8 June 1977, Article 46(2). Article 46 was adopted by consensus. CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VI, CDDH/SR.39, 25 May 1977, p. 111.

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Lieber Code
Article 88 of the 1863 Lieber Code states: “A spy is a person who secretly, in disguise or under false pretense, seeks information with the intention of communicating it to the enemy.” 
Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, prepared by Francis Lieber, promulgated as General Order No. 100 by President Abraham Lincoln, Washington D.C., 24 April 1863, Article 88.

Brussels Declaration
Article 19 of the 1874 Brussels Declaration provides:
A person can only be considered a spy when acting clandestinely or on false pretenses he obtains or endeavours to obtain information in the districts occupied by the enemy, with the intention of communicating it to the hostile party. 
Project of an International Declaration concerning the Laws and Customs of War, Brussels, 27 August 1874, Article 19.

Article 22 of the 1874 Brussels Declaration provides: “Soldiers not wearing a disguise who have penetrated into the zone of operations of the hostile army, for the purpose of obtaining information, are not considered spies.” 
Project of an International Declaration concerning the Laws and Customs of War, Brussels, 27 August 1874, Article 22.

Oxford Manual
Article 24 of the 1880 Oxford Manual provides: “Individuals may not be regarded as spies, who, belonging to the armed force of either belligerent, have penetrated, without disguise, into the zone of operations of the enemy.” 
The Laws of War on Land, adopted by the Institute of International Law, Oxford, 9 September 1880, Article 24.

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Argentina
Argentina’s Law of War Manual (1989) defines spies with reference to Article 29 of the 1907 Hague Regulations and considers that this definition implies that members of the armed forces who wear their uniform while gathering information are not considered to be spies. 
Argentina, Leyes de Guerra, PC-08-01, Público, Edición 1989, Estado Mayor Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas, aprobado por Resolución No. 489/89 del Ministerio de Defensa, 23 April 1990, § 1.09(1); see also Leyes de Guerra, RC-46-1, Público, II Edición 1969, Ejército Argentino, Edición original aprobado por el Comandante en Jefe del Ejército, 9 May 1967, § 2.009(1).

Australia
Australia’s Commanders’ Guide (1994) defines spies as “combatants who conduct covert espionage operations in enemy occupied territory, while not in uniform”. 
Australia, Law of Armed Conflict, Commanders’ Guide, Australian Defence Force Publication, Operations Series, ADFP 37 Supplement 1 – Interim Edition, 7 March 1994, § 707; see also § 913.

Australia’s Defence Force Manual (1994) defines espionage as “the clandestine collection of information behind enemy lines or in the area of operations with the intention of communicating that information to a hostile party to the conflict”. 
Australia, Manual on Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Force Publication, Operations Series, ADFP 37 – Interim Edition, 1994, § 717.

Australia’s LOAC Manual (2006) defines espionage as “the clandestine collection of information behind enemy lines or in the area of operations with the intention of communicating that information to a hostile party to the conflict”. 
Australia, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 06.4, Australian Defence Headquarters, 11 May 2006, § 7.18.

The LOAC Manual (2006) replaces both the Defence Force Manual (1994) and the Commanders’ Guide (1994).
Belgium
Belgium’s Law of War Manual (1983) defines a spy as:
an individual who gathers or attempts to gather, clandestinely or on false pretences, information in the zone of operations of a belligerent with the intention of communicating it to the adverse party. The “zone of operations” comprises zones where no land operations are taking place but which may be hit by aerial bombardment (including bombardment by long-range missiles). This interpretation is very wide. Neutral territory on which a spy may operate cannot, however, be considered as a “zone of operations”. 
Belgium, Droit Pénal et Disciplinaire Militaire et Droit de la Guerre, Deuxième Partie, Droit de la Guerre, Ecole Royale Militaire, par J. Maes, Chargé de cours, Avocat-général près la Cour Militaire, D/1983/1187/029, 1983, p. 21.

Cameroon
Cameroon’s Instructor’s Manual (1992) states:
Spying is to be distinguished from military intelligence. The latter is legal while the former is vigorously condemned in all national and international jurisdictions. Spying is an unlawful search for information. 
Cameroon, Droit international humanitaire et droit de la guerre, Manuel de l’instructeur en vigueur dans les Forces Armées, Présidence de la République, Ministère de la Défense, Etat-major des Armées, Troisième Division, Edition 1992, pp. 36 and 60.

Cameroon’s Instructor’s Manual (2006), under the heading “Non-Combatants”, states:
Spying is different from military intelligence and is rigorously condemned by all national and international jurisdictions. Spies are persons who gather information of military interest in the enemy zone for the benefit of a belligerent on false or deceitful pretences or in disguise; whereas military intelligence is a lawful activity. 
Cameroon, Droit des conflits armés et droit international humanitaire, Manuel de l’instructeur en vigueur dans les forces de défense, Ministère de la Défense, Présidence de la République, Etat-major des Armées, 2006, p. 154, § 443; see also p. 21, § 112, p. 41, § 41, p. 67, § 302, p. 112, § 383, p. 180, § 491.A and p. 211, § 512.

The manual also states:
A combatant who gathers or attempts to gather information of military interest in the operational zone of a belligerent in a deliberately clandestine way or under false pretences, must not be considered to be spying if, in so doing, he wears the uniform of his armed forces. 
Cameroon, Droit des conflits armés et droit international humanitaire, Manuel de l’instructeur en vigueur dans les forces de défense, Ministère de la Défense, Présidence de la République, Etat-major des Armées, 2006, p. 211, § 512.

Canada
Canada’s LOAC Manual (1999) defines espionage as “the collection of information clandestinely behind enemy lines or in the zone of operations while wearing civilian clothing or otherwise disguised or concealed. Spies are those who engage in espionage.” 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 1999, p. 6-3, § 23.

The manual further states:
Members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict who gather or attempt to gather information while wearing the uniform of their armed forces will not be considered as engaging in espionage. 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 1999, p. 3-4, § 33.
[emphasis in original]
Canada’s LOAC Manual (2001) states in its chapter entitled “Combatant Status”:
1. Espionage means to gather or attempt to gather information of military value through an act of false pretence or deliberately in a clandestine manner. Generally speaking, persons engaging in espionage may be attacked and if captured while doing so shall NOT have the right to the status of prisoner of war.
2. Members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict who gather or attempt to gather information while wearing the uniform of their armed forces will not be considered as engaging in espionage.
3. Members of the armed forces engaging in espionage while not in uniform may be treated as spies and lose their entitlement to PW [prisoner-of-war] status if they are captured before rejoining the armed forces to which they belong.
4. Spies who are not in uniform are not lawful combatants. If they engage in hostilities, they may be punished for doing so but only after a fair trial affording all judicial guarantees. 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 13 August 2001, § 320.
[emphasis in original]
In its chapter on land warfare, the manual further states:
Espionage is the collection of information clandestinely behind enemy lines or in the zone of operations while wearing civilian clothing or otherwise disguised or concealed. Spies are those who engage in espionage. 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 13 August 2001, § 611.1.

Central African Republic
The Central African Republic’s Instructor’s Manual (1999) states in Volume 3 (Instruction for non-commissioned officers studying for the level 1 and 2 certificates and for future officers of the criminal police): “Intelligence must be obtained in uniform or without attempting to conceal the status of combatant. If intelligence is sought in areas controlled by the enemy under false pretence or in a deliberately clandestine way, this will be considered espionage.” 
Central African Republic, Le Droit de la Guerre, Fascicule No. 3: Formation pour l’obtention du Brevet d’Armes No. 1, du Brevet d’Armes No. 2 et le stage d’Officier de Police Judiciaire (OPJ), Ministère de la Défense, Forces Armées Centrafricaines, 1999, Chapter II, Section II, § 2.1.

Chad
Chad’s Instructor’s Manual (2006) states that “spies are people who act clandestinely or under false pretences to gather information in a territory controlled by an enemy party, their aim being to pass this information on to the enemy”. 
Chad, Droit international humanitaire, Manuel de l’instructeur en vigueur dans les forces armées et de sécurité, Ministère de la Défense, Présidence de la République, Etat-major des Armées, 2006, p. 55.

The manual further states: “Unlike military intelligence, which is legitimate, espionage is vigorously criticized by all national and international jurisdictions.” 
Chad, Droit international humanitaire, Manuel de l’instructeur en vigueur dans les forces armées et de sécurité, Ministère de la Défense, Présidence de la République, Etat-major des Armées, 2006, p. 42.

Côte d’Ivoire
Côte d’Ivoire’s Teaching Manual (2007) provides in Book III, Volume 1 (Instruction of first-year trainee officers):
I.6. Spies
The law clearly defines spies: they are persons who, in a clandestine or disguised manner, i.e. without wearing the uniform of their armed forces, collect or try to collect information in the territory of the enemy in order to transmit it to the adversary. 
Côte d’Ivoire, Droit de la guerre, Manuel d’instruction, Livre III, Tome 1: Instruction de l’élève officier d’active de 1ère année, Manuel de l’élève, Ministère de la Défense, Forces Armées Nationales, November 2007, p. 30; see also Droit de la guerre, Manuel d’instruction, Livre III, Tome 2: Instruction de l’élève officier d’active de 2ème année, Manuel de l’instructeur, Ministère de la Défense, Forces Armées Nationales, November 2007, p. 25.

In Book IV (Instruction of heads of division and company commanders), the Teaching Manual provides:
I.4.3. Spies
Espionage consists in collecting or trying to collect information on military strength by an act of false representation or an act deliberately of a clandestine nature. …
Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict who collect or try to collect the information while wearing the uniform of their armed forces are not considered as participants in activities of espionage. 
Côte d’Ivoire, Droit de la guerre, Manuel d’instruction, Livre IV: Instruction du chef de section et du commandant de compagnie, Manuel de l’élève, Ministère de la Défense, Forces Armées Nationales, November 2007, p. 24.

Ecuador
Ecuador’s Naval Manual (1989) defines a spy as:
someone who, while in territory under enemy control or the zone of operations of a belligerent force, seeks to obtain information while operating under a false claim of non-combatant or friendly forces status with the intention of passing that information to an opposing belligerent. Members of the armed forces who penetrate enemy-held territory in civilian attire or enemy uniform to collect intelligence are spies. Conversely, personnel conducting reconnaissance missions behind enemy lines while properly uniformed are not spies. 
Ecuador, Aspectos Importantes del Derecho Internacional Marítimo que Deben Tener Presente los Comandantes de los Buques, Academia de Guerra Naval, 1989, § 12.8.

France
France’s LOAC Manual (2001) defines spies with reference to Article 29 of the 1907 Hague Regulations. 
France, Manuel de droit des conflits armés, Ministère de la Défense, Direction des Affaires Juridiques, Sous-Direction du droit international humanitaire et du droit européen, Bureau du droit des conflits armés, 2001, p. 64.

The manual further provides:
Commando
Trained, equipped and organized for carrying out special operations in the enemy zone, commandos, whatever their mission and their weapons, must respect the law of armed conflicts. In case of capture, they are protected by prisoner-of-war status if they comply with the definition of a combatant specified by Article 4 of Geneva Convention II of 12 August 1949 relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. 
France, Manuel de droit des conflits armés, Ministère de la Défense, Direction des Affaires Juridiques, Sous-Direction du droit international humanitaire et du droit européen, Bureau du droit des conflits armés, 2001, p. 40.

Under the heading “Intelligence activity”, the manual restates, inter alia, Article 46(2) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I and further provides:
The gathering of information, compatible with the law of armed conflicts, is based on the distinction which is to be made between permitted and prohibited methods. Gathering of information of military value in zones dominated by the enemy is lawful if it is carried out in uniform and without concealing the status as combatant. Gathering of information of military value in zones dominated by the enemy is considered as espionage if it is carried out under false pretexts or by acting in a deliberately clandestine manner. A combatant captured while engaging in espionage (i.e. who conceals his status as combatant) loses his right to prisoner-of-war status and can be convicted by the tribunals of the State on whose territory he is captured. The captured combatant, if he carried out a lawful intelligence mission, is entitled to prisoner-of-war status and to the protections linked to it. 
France, Manuel de droit des conflits armés, Ministère de la Défense, Direction des Affaires Juridiques, Sous-Direction du droit international humanitaire et du droit européen, Bureau du droit des conflits armés, 2001, pp. 107–108.

Germany
Germany’s Military Manual (1992) defines spies as “persons who clandestinely or on false pretences, i.e. not wearing the uniform of their armed forces, gather information in the territory controlled by the adversary”. 
Germany, Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts – Manual, DSK VV207320067, edited by The Federal Ministry of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany, VR II 3, August 1992, English translation of ZDv 15/2, Humanitäres Völkerrecht in bewaffneten Konflikten – Handbuch, August 1992, § 321.

Greece
The Hellenic Navy’s International Law Manual (1995) provides: “A person acting undercover in the war zone or under false pretences with a view to obtain information for imparting it to the enemy is considered a spy.” 
Greece, International Law Manual, Hellenic Navy General Staff, Directorate A2, Division IV, 1995, Chapter 5, § 6.

Kenya
Kenya’s LOAC Manual (1997) defines spies as:
persons who, acting clandestinely or on false pretences, gather information in the territory of a belligerent party with the intent of communicating it to the enemy … If members of the armed forces gather intelligence in occupied territory, they may not be treated as spies provided they are in uniform. 
Kenya, Law of Armed Conflict, Military Basic Course (ORS), 4 Précis, The School of Military Police, 1997, Précis No. 2, p. 9.

Netherlands
The Military Manual (1993) of the Netherlands defines spies with reference to Article 29 of the 1907 Hague Regulations and states that this definition implies that combatants gathering information in uniform are not considered as spies. 
Netherlands, Toepassing Humanitair Oorlogsrecht, Voorschift No. 27-412/1, Koninklijke Landmacht, Ministerie van Defensie, 1993, p. III-5.

The Military Manual (2005) of the Netherlands states:
A person who obtains, or tries to obtain, intelligence in a combatant’s field of operations, secretly or under false pretences, with a view to passing it to the opposite side, is treated as a spy. It follows that an undisguised member of the military, who engages in intelligence gathering behind enemy lines, is not a spy (e.g. reconnaissance units, AP II [1977 Additional Protocol II] Article 46). The same is true for undisguised military personnel in the area under the other side’s control. 
Netherlands, Humanitair Oorlogsrecht: Handleiding, Voorschift No. 27-412, Koninklijke Landmacht, Militair Juridische Dienst, 2005, § 0320.

New Zealand
New Zealand’s Military Manual (1992) defines spies as “people, wearing civilian clothing or otherwise disguised, who collect information clandestinely behind enemy lines or in the zone of operations with the intention of communicating that information to a hostile Party”. 
New Zealand, Interim Law of Armed Conflict Manual, DM 112, New Zealand Defence Force, Headquarters, Directorate of Legal Services, Wellington, November 1992, § 506(2).

Nigeria
Nigeria’s Manual on the Laws of War states:
Soldiers or civilians acting clandestinely or on false pretences to obtain information about a belligerent with the intention to communicate it to his enemy are engaged in espionage … Soldiers wearing their uniform when penetrating the enemy zone of operations are not spies and if captured, should be treated as prisoners of war. 
Nigeria, The Laws of War, by Lt. Col. L. Ode PSC, Nigerian Army, Lagos, undated, § 31.

Pakistan
The Manual of Pakistan Military Law (1987) states:
2. Spying. – Section 3 [of the Official Secrets Act] narrates offences of spying. If any person for any purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State: –
a. approaches, inspects, passes over or is in the vicinity of, or enters, any prohibited place; or
b. makes any sketch, plan, model, or note which is calculated to be or might be or is intended to be directly or indirectly, useful to an enemy; or
c. obtains, collects, records or publishes or communicates to any other person any secret official code or password, or any sketch, plan, model, article or note or other document or information which is calculated to be or might be or is intended to be, directly or indirectly useful to an enemy;
he shall be guilty of an offence under Section 3. 
Pakistan, Manual of Pakistan Military Law, Vol. 1, Ministry of Defence, Government of Pakistan, 1987, p. 165.

Peru
Peru’s IHL Manual (2004) states that, in the context of air warfare:
An individual found on board a belligerent or neutral aircraft can be considered a spy only when, during a flight acting clandestinely or on false pretences, he obtains or endeavours to obtain information within the belligerent jurisdiction or in the zone of operations of a belligerent, with the intention of communicating it to the hostile party. 
Peru, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario para las Fuerzas Armadas, Resolución Ministerial Nº 1394-2004-DE/CCFFAA/CDIH-FFAA, Lima, 1 December 2004, § 173.a.

Peru’s IHL and Human Rights Manual (2010) states:
An individual found on board a belligerent or neutral aircraft can be considered a spy only when, during a flight acting clandestinely or on false pretences, he obtains or endeavours to obtain information within the belligerent jurisdiction or in the zone of operations of a belligerent, with the intention of communicating it to the hostile party. 
Peru, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario y Derechos Humanos para las Fuerzas Armadas, Resolución Ministerial No. 049-2010/DE/VPD, Lima, 21 May 2010, § 164(a), p. 344.

Russian Federation
The Russian Federation’s Regulations on the Application of IHL (2001) states:
spies means persons who, acting clandestinely, or on false pretences, obtain, or seek to obtain information within the territory controlled by a party to the conflict to be further transmitted to the adverse party.
Members of the armed forces engaged in gathering information in the territory controlled by the adverse party shall not be considered as spies and shall have the right to the prisoner of war status provided they were wearing the uniform of their armed forces when captured by the enemy. 
Russian Federation, Regulations on the Application of International Humanitarian Law by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, Moscow, 8 August 2001, § 1.

Sierra Leone
Sierra Leone’s Instructor Manual (2007) states: “A spy is any person who, acting clandestinely or under false pretences, gathers information in the territory of one of the belligerents with the intention of communicating it directly to the opposing side.” 
Sierra Leone, The Law of Armed Conflict. Instructor Manual for the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF), Armed Forces Education Centre, September 2007, p. 28.

South Africa
South Africa’s LOAC Manual (1996) states that espionage “entails acting clandestinely in order to obtain information for transmission back to one’s own side”. 
South Africa, Presentation on the South African Approach to International Humanitarian Law, Appendix A, Chapter 4: International Humanitarian Law (The Law of Armed Conflict), National Defence Force, 1996, § 34(d).

South Africa’s Revised Civic Education Manual (2004) states: “Espionage entails acting clandestinely in order to obtain information for transmission back to one’s own side.” 
South Africa, Revised Civic Education Manual, South African National Defence Force, 2004, Chapter 4, § 56(d).

Spain
Spain’s LOAC Manual (1996) states:
A member of the armed forces who gathers information is not considered to be engaged in espionage if that person is wearing regular uniform or is a resident in an occupied territory and is collecting information in that territory on behalf of the occupied power. 
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Publicación OR7-004, 2 Tomos, aprobado por el Estado Mayor del Ejército, Division de Operaciones, 18 March 1996, Vol. I, § 1.4.a.

Spain’s LOAC Manual (2007) states:
The law of war refers only to military spies, that is, members of the armed forces who engage in espionage.
The gathering of information by a member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict on behalf of that party is not considered to be engaging in espionage if, while so acting:
- he is in the uniform of his armed forces;
- he is a resident of an occupied territory and gathers information on behalf of the occupied power within that territory. 
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Tomo 1, Publicación OR7–004, (Edición Segunda), Mando de Adiestramiento y Doctrina, Dirección de Doctrina, Orgánica y Materiales, 2 November 2007, § 1.4.a.

The manual further states:
Espionage activities are considered to be those carried out in areas controlled by the adverse party using false pretences or acting in a deliberately clandestine manner. The law of armed conflict does not prohibit such activities, but penalizes them by depriving members of the armed forces captured engaging in espionage of prisoner-of-war status. 
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Tomo 1, Publicación OR7–004, (Edición Segunda), Mando de Adiestramiento y Doctrina, Dirección de Doctrina, Orgánica y Materiales, 2 November 2007, § 2.3.b.(5).

Switzerland
Switzerland’s Basic Military Manual (1987) defines a spy as “an individual who, acting clandestinely or on false pretences, gathers or attempts to gather information in the zone of operation of a belligerent with the intention of communicating it to the adverse party”. 
Switzerland, Lois et coutumes de la guerre (Extrait et commentaire), Règlement 51.7/II f, Armée Suisse, 1987, Article 42.

Ukraine
Ukraine’s IHL Manual (2004) states:
Spies are persons who, acting secretly or by deceit, gather (or attempt to gather) information in the territory controlled by a party to the armed conflict with the purpose of further transmission of information to the adverse party. 
Ukraine, Manual on the Application of IHL Rules, Ministry of Defence, 11 September 2004, § 1.2.25.1.

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
The UK LOAC Pamphlet (1981) defines spies as “persons who, acting clandestinely or on false pretences, gather information in the territory of a belligerent with intent to communicate it to the enemy”. 
United Kingdom, The Law of Armed Conflict, D/DAT/13/35/66, Army Code 71130 (Revised 1981), Ministry of Defence, prepared under the Direction of The Chief of the General Staff, 1981, Section 3, p. 9, § 6.

The UK LOAC Manual (2004) defines a spy as a “person who, acting clandestinely or on false pretences obtains or endeavours to obtain information in territory controlled by an adverse party, with the intention of communicating it to the opposing party”. 
United Kingdom, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Ministry of Defence, 1 July 2004, § 4.9.1.

United States of America
The US Naval Handbook (1995) defines a spy as:
someone who, while in territory under enemy control or the zone of operations of a belligerent force, seeks to obtain information while operating under a false claim of noncombatant or friendly forces status with the intention of passing that information to an opposing belligerent. Members of the armed forces who penetrate enemy-held territory in civilian attire or enemy uniform to collect intelligence are spies. Conversely, personnel conducting reconnaissance missions behind enemy lines while properly uniformed are not spies. 
United States, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-2.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7, issued by the Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, US Marine Corps, and Department of Transportation, US Coast Guard, October 1995 (formerly NWP 9 (Rev. A)/FMFM 1-10, October 1989), § 12.8.

The US Manual for Military Commissions (2007), Part IV, Crimes and Elements, includes in the list of crimes triable by military commissions:
SPYING.
a. Text. “Any person subject to this chapter who with intent or reason to believe that it is to be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign power, collects or attempts to collect information by clandestine means or while acting under false pretenses, for the purpose of conveying such information to an enemy of the United States, or one of the co-belligerents of the enemy, shall be punished by death or such other punishment as a military commission under this chapter may direct.”
b. Elements.
(1) The accused collected or attempted to collect certain information by clandestine means or while acting under false pretenses;
(2) The accused intended or had reason to believe the information collected would be used to injure the United States or to provide an advantage to a foreign power;
(3) The accused intended to convey such information to an enemy of the United States or one of the co-belligerents of the enemy; and
(4) The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with armed conflict.
c. Maximum punishment. Death. 
United States, Manual for Military Commissions, published in implementation of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a, et seq., 18 January 2007, Part IV, § 6(27), p. IV-20.

The US Naval Handbook (2007) states:
A spy is someone who, while in territory under enemy control or the zone of operations of a belligerent force, seeks to obtain information while operating under a false claim of noncombatant or friendly forces status with the intention of passing that information to an opposing belligerent. Members of the armed forces who penetrate enemy-held territory in civilian attire or enemy uniform to collect intelligence are spies. Conversely, personnel conducting reconnaissance missions behind enemy lines while properly uniformed are not spies. 
United States, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-12.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7, issued by the Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, US Marine Corps, and Department of Homeland Security, US Coast Guard, July 2007, § 12.8.

The US Manual for Military Commissions (2010), Part IV, Crimes and Elements, includes in the list of crimes triable by military commissions:
SPYING.
a. Text. “Any person subject to this chapter who, in violation of the law of war and with intent or reason to believe that it is to be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign power, collects or attempts to collect information by clandestine means or while acting under false pretenses, for the purpose of conveying such information to an enemy of the United States, or one of the co-belligerents of the enemy, shall be punished by death or such other punishment as a military commission under this chapter may direct.”
b. Elements.
(1) The accused collected or attempted to collect certain information by clandestine means or while acting under false pretenses;
(2) The accused intended or had reason to believe the information collected would be used to injure the United States or to provide an advantage to a foreign power;
(3) The accused intended to convey such information to an enemy of the United States or one of the co-belligerents of the enemy;
(4) The conduct was in violation of the law of war; and
(5) The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with hostilities.
c. Comment. For purposes of offenses (13) [intentionally causing serious bodily injury], (15) [murder in violation of the law of war], (16) [destruction of property in violation of the law of war], and (27) [spying] in Part IV of this Manual (corresponding to offenses enumerated in paragraphs (13), (15), (16), and (27) of § 950t of title 10, United States Code), an accused may be convicted in a military commission for these offenses if the commission finds that the accused employed a means (e.g., poison gas) or method (e.g., perfidy) prohibited by the law of war; intentionally attacked a “protected person” or “protected property” under the law of war; or engaged in conduct traditionally triable by military commission (e.g., spying; murder committed while the accused did not meet the requirements of privileged belligerency) even if such conduct does not violate the international law of war.
d. Maximum punishment. Death. 
United States, Manual for Military Commissions, published in implementation of Chapter 47A of Title 10, United States Code, as amended by the Military Commissions Act of 2009, 10 U.S.C, §§ 948a, et seq., 27 April 2010, § 5(27), pp. IV-21 and IV-22.

Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal Republic of
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s Military Manual (1988) provides a definition of spies similar to that contained in Article 29 of the 1907 Hague Regulations. 
Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal Republic of, Propisi o Primeri Pravila Medjunarodnog Ratnog Prava u Oruzanim Snagama SFRJ, PrU-2, Savezni Sekretarijat za Narodnu Odbranu (Pravna Uprava), 1988, § 109.

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Bosnia and Herzegovina
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Criminal Code (2003), as amended in 2006, states:
(1) Whoever discloses, delivers or renders secret data to a foreign country, foreign organization or a person in the service thereof,
shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of between one and ten years.

(4) Whoever obtains secret data with an aim of disclosing or delivering it to a foreign country, foreign organization or a person in the service thereof,
shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of between one and ten years. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Criminal Code, 2003, as amended on 13 June 2006, Article 163(1) and (4).

Central African Republic
The Central African Republic’s Penal Code (2010) states:
Any foreigner who has committed one of the acts mentioned in article 266 2, 3, 4 and 5 and article 267 1, 2 and 3 shall be guilty of espionage and sentenced to death.
Incitement to commit or the offer to commit one of the offences mentioned in articles 266 and 267 of this code will be punished in the same way as the offence itself. 
Central African Republic, Penal Code, 2010, Article 270.

Article 266 of the Code states:
Shall be guilty of treason and sentenced to death:

2. Any Central African [national] who is in contact with a foreign power with the aim of seeking it to engage in hostilities against the Central African State or that provides it with the means to do so, by aiding foreign forces to enter the Central African territory, by undermining the confidence of the land, sea and air armed forces, or in any other way;
3. Any Central African [national] who gives over to a foreign power Central African troops, territories, cities, fortresses, construction, posts, warehouses, arsenals, materials, vessels, buildings or aerial navigation devices belonging to the Central African State;
4. Any Central African [national] who, in times of war, provokes members of the armed forces or of the navy to transfer to the service of a foreign power, facilitates the means to do so or carries-out enrollments for a [foreign] power at war with the Central African State;
5. Any Central African [national] who, in times of war, exchanges intelligence with a foreign power or its agents in order to favour the undertakings of this power against the Central African State. 
Central African Republic, Penal Code, 2010, Article 266 (2–5).

Article 267 of the Code states:
Shall be guilty of treason and sentenced to death:
1. Any Central African [national] who gives over to a foreign power or to its agents, under any format and in any way, a secret of national security, or assures in any way the possession of this type of secret with a view to handing it over to a foreign power or to its agents;
2. Any Central African [national] who voluntarily destroys or damages a vessel, an aerial navigation device, a material or supply, [and] a construction or installation likely to be employed for national security, or who deliberately causes a defect, either before or after their completion, of a nature to prevent functioning or to provoke an accident;
3. Any Central African national that deliberately engages in an initiative to demoralize the army or the nation with the aim of causing harm to national security. 
Central African Republic, Penal Code, 2010, Article 267 (1–3).

Chile
Chile’s Code of Military Justice (1925) defines a spy as:
1) anyone who surreptitiously or with the aid of a disguise or a false name, or by concealing his status or nationality, introduces himself in time of war and without justified aim in a war zone, a military post or among troops in the field; 2) anyone who conveys communications, messages or sealed documents from the enemy without being compelled to do so, or who being so compelled does not hand them over to the national authorities; 3) anyone who engages in reconnaissance, draws up plans or makes sketches of the terrain; 4) anyone who conceals, causes to be concealed or places in a safe place a person whom he knows to be an enemy spy, agent or member of the military.
The Code also provides that “enemy soldiers who, wearing their uniforms, openly enter the national territory for, inter alia, the purpose of engaging in reconnaissance of the terrain or observing troop movements” shall not be considered as spies but shall be subject to the rules of war as laid down by international law. 
Chile, Code of Military Justice, 1925, Articles 252–253.

Croatia
Croatia’s Criminal Code (1997), as amended in 2006, states:
Article 146

(2) Whoever collects data, objects, documents or information which are a State secret with an aim of making them accessible to a foreign State, an organization or a person working for them shall be punished by imprisonment for one to three years.

(5) Whoever commits the criminal offence referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article in time of war or armed conflict, or if the disclosed State secret is related to the defence or security of the Republic of Croatia, shall be punished by imprisonment for three to ten years. 
Croatia, Criminal Code, 1997, as amended in June 2006, Article 146(2) and (5).

Democratic Republic of the Congo
The Democratic Republic of the Congo’s Military Penal Code (2002) provides:
Article 127
Without prejudice to the provisions of articles 181 to 186 of book II of the ordinary Penal Code, treason and espionage, in times of war, are punished according to the provisions of the present Code.
Article 128
In times of war, every Congolese national who is guilty of treason is punished by death.
Treason is to be understood as:
1. The act of delivering to a foreign power, a foreign or foreign-controlled organization, or to their agents, either troops belonging to the Congolese Armed Forces or the national territory as a whole or in parts;
2. The act of delivering to a foreign power, a foreign or foreign-controlled company or organization, or to their agents, material, constructions, equipment, installations, appliances or other material devoted to national defence;
3. The act of entertaining contacts with a foreign power, a foreign or foreign-controlled company or organization, or to their agents, with a view to provoking hostilities or acts of aggression against the Republic;
4. The act of delivering to a foreign power, a foreign or foreign-controlled company or organization, or to their agents, the means to undertake hostilities or to accomplish acts of aggression against the Republic;
5. The act of delivering or of making accessible to a foreign power, a foreign or foreign-controlled company or organization, or to their agents, information, procedures, objects, documents, computerized data or files, whose exploitation, divulgation or reunion is of a nature to endanger the fundamental interests of the Nation.

Article 129
Guilty of espionage and punished by death is every foreigner who is the perpetrator of the acts listed in the article above. 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Military Penal Code, 2002, Articles 127–129.

El Salvador
El Salvador’s Penal Code (1997), as amended in 2008, states:
Treason
Art. 352.- Any Salvadoran or foreigner, exercising a function, position, or public or technical office, who takes up arms against El Salvador under an enemy flag, joins or provides any kind of political, military, technical or economic assistance, propaganda or any other act or economic activity that favours or facilitates the military capacity of a State at war with El Salvador shall be sanctioned with fifteen to twenty five years of prison.
The above-mentioned provision is applicable to foreigners, present in the country, exercising a function, position, or public or technical office for an international organization, having carried out any of the mentioned acts.
Intelligence with a Foreign State
Art. 353.- Any Salvadoran or foreigner in the circumstances mentioned in the previous article, who is in contact with, [provides] intelligence to, or engages in any other act with a foreign State in order for a war to be declared or for the carrying out of hostile acts against the Salvadoran State, will be punished with fifteen to twenty five years of prison if these acts resulted in war; with ten to fifteen years if they only resulted in hostile acts, and five to ten years if they did not result in war or hostile acts.
Provocation of War, Retaliation or International Enmity
Art. 354.- Anyone who engages in Salvador territory in the recruitment [of persons], or in any other hostile act against El Salvador in a manner that increases the danger of war for El Salvador, will be punished with five to ten years of prison, and with ten to fifteen years if the war occurs.
Disclosure of State Secrets
Art. 355.- Anyone who discloses political or military secrets concerning State security or facilitate their disclosure will be punished with one to six years of prison.
The sanction will increase by a third of the indicated maximum if the responsible [person] had knowledge of the secrets due to their position, or if [these were] obtained through the use of violence or fraud.
Espionage
Art. 356.- Any Salvadoran, any [person] having been [a national of El Salvador] and no longer one, and foreigners owing obedience to the Republic of El Salvador due to their function, position or public or technical office, who place themselves at the service of a foreign nation or of its agents in time of peace in order to provide information on political, diplomatic or military secrets of the State, will be sanctioned with eight to twenty years of prison.
If the Salvadoran was a public official or a public servant the sanction can increase by up to a third of the maximum amount indicated.
If committed by a foreigner not in the conditions mentioned above, the sanction will be between four to ten years of prison.
Sabotage
Art. 357.- Anyone who destroys or renders unusable in whole or in part, even if temporarily, systems of attack, defence, communication, transportation, procurement, deposit, other military works or that are at the service of the armed forces or public security of the State, will be sanctioned with five to ten years of prison if committed with the aim of sabotage and in time of war to cause a serious disruption of public order or a public calamity. Sabotage will be sanctioned with ten to twenty years of prison if committed with the intent of causing a state of war with the Salvadoran State, and if it resulted in the preparation of its military capacity or of military operations. If the indicated acts are carried out in a period of normalcy, and they directly affect the national military capacity, the punishment will be between one to three years of prison. 
El Salvador, Penal Code, 1997, as amended in 2008, Articles 352–357.

Islamic Republic of Iran
The Islamic Republic of Iran’s Army Penal and Procedure Code (1939) states:
[T]he following persons are considered as spies and are to be sentenced to capital punishment:
1. Anyone who entered a fort or fortified place or post or any military institution … to gain information and documents for the benefit of the enemy.
2. Anyone who obtains information or documents for the enemy which can be harmful for army operations or for the security of forts or fortified places or posts or military institutions.
3. Anyone who deliberately hides or provides the means for hiding spies …
4. Anyone who, against the interests of the country, gives political or military secrets or keys of the codes to foreigners. 
Islamic Republic of Iran, Army Penal and Procedure Code, 1939, Article 313.

Mexico
Mexico’s Code of Military Justice (1933), as amended in 1996, defines a spy as someone who has penetrated a defended place or troops in the field with the aim of collecting useful information and communicating it to the enemy. 
Mexico, Code of Military Justice, 1933, as amended in 1996, Articles 206–207.

Philippines
A publication on Philippine Military Law (1956) states:
A spy is a person who, without authority and secretly, or under a false pretext, contrives to enter within the lines of an army for the purpose of obtaining material information and communicating it to the enemy; or one who, being by authority within the lines, attempts secretly to accomplish such purpose. 
Claro C. Gloria, Philippine Military Law, Capitol Publishing House, Quezon City, 1956, p. 263.

United States of America
The US Military Commissions Act (2006), passed by Congress following the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld in 2006, amends Title 10 of the United States Code and, inter alia, defines the term “spy” as:
Any person subject to this chapter who with intent or reason to believe that it is to be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign power, collects or attempts to collect information by clandestine means or while acting under false pretenses, for the purpose of conveying such information to an enemy of the United States, or one of the co-belligerents of the enemy.  
United States, Military Commissions Act, 2006, Public Law 109-366, Chapter 47A of Title 10 of the United States Code, 17 October 2006, p. 120 Stat. 2630, § 950v(b)(27).

Switzerland
Switzerland’s Military Criminal Code (1927), as amended in 2007, states:
A person who has gathered military information on Swiss territory for a foreign State to the detriment of another foreign State or has organized such service … is to be punished with three years’ or more imprisonment or with a monetary penalty. 
Switzerland, Military Criminal Code, 1927, as amended in 2007, Article 93(1).

United States of America
The US Military Commissions Act (2009) amends Chapter 47A of Title 10 of the United States Code as follows:
Ҥ 950t. Crimes triable by military commission
“The following offenses shall be triable by military commission under this chapter at any time without limitation:

“(27) SPYING.—Any person subject to this chapter who, in violation of the law of war and with intent or reason to believe that it is to be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign power, collects or attempts to collect information by clandestine means or while acting under false pretenses, for the purpose of conveying such information to an enemy of the United States, or one of the co-belligerents of the enemy, shall be punished by death or such other punishment as a military commission under this chapter may direct. 
United States, Military Commissions Act, 2009, § 950t(27).

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Hague Regulations (1899)
Article 30 of the 1899 Hague Regulations provides: “A spy taken in the act cannot be punished without previous trial.” Article 31 further provides: “A spy who, after rejoining the army to which he belongs, is subsequently captured by the enemy, is treated as a prisoner of war, and incurs no responsibility for his previous acts of espionage.” 
Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 29 July 1899, Articles 30 and 31.

Hague Regulations (1907)
Article 30 of the 1907 Hague Regulations provides: “A spy taken in the act shall not be punished without previous trial.” Article 31 further provides: “A spy who, after rejoining the army to which he belongs, is subsequently captured by the enemy, is treated as a prisoner of war, and incurs no responsibility for his previous acts of espionage.” 
Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 18 October 1907, Articles 30 and 31.

Geneva Convention IV
Article 5 of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV provides: “Where in occupied territory an individual protected person is detained as a spy … such … [person] shall nevertheless be treated with humanity, and in case of trial, shall not be deprived of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed by the present Convention.” 
Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Geneva, 12 August 1949, Article 5.

Additional Protocol I
Article 46(1) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of the Conventions or of this Protocol, any member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict who falls into the power of an adverse Party while engaging in espionage shall not have the right to the status of prisoner of war and may be treated as a spy. 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Geneva, 8 June 1977, Article 46(1). Article 46 was adopted by consensus. CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VI, CDDH/SR.39, 25 May 1977, p. 11.

Article 45(3) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I provides:
Any person who has taken part in hostilities, who is not entitled to prisoner-of-war status and who does not benefit from more favourable treatment in accordance with the Fourth Convention shall have the right at all times to the protection of Article 75 of this Protocol. 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Geneva, 8 June 1977, Article 45(3). Article 45 was adopted by consensus. CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VI, CDDH/SR.41, 26 May 1977, p. 155.

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Lieber Code
Article 88 of the 1863 Lieber Code states: “The spy is punishable with death by hanging by the neck, whether or not he succeeded in obtaining information or in conveying it to the enemy.” 
Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, prepared by Francis Lieber, promulgated as General Order No. 100 by President Abraham Lincoln, Washington D.C., 24 April 1863, Article 88.

Brussels Declaration
Article 20 of the 1874 Brussels Declaration states: “A spy taken in the act shall be tried and treated according to the laws in force in the army which captures him.” Article 21 states: “A spy who rejoins the army to which he belongs and who is subsequently captured by the enemy is treated as a prisoner of war and incurs no responsibility for his previous acts.” 
Project of an International Declaration concerning the Laws and Customs of War, Brussels, 27 August 1874, Articles 20 and 21.

Oxford Manual
Article 23 of the 1880 Oxford Manual states: “Individuals captured as spies cannot demand to be treated as prisoners of war.” 
The Laws of War on Land, adopted by the Institute of International Law, Oxford, 9 September 1880, Article 23.

Article 25 of the 1880 Oxford Manual states:
In order to avoid the abuses to which accusations of espionage too often give rise in war, it is important to assert emphatically that no person charged with espionage shall be punished until the judicial authority shall have pronounced judgment. 
The Laws of War on Land, adopted by the Institute of International Law, Oxford, 9 September 1880, Article 25.

Article 26 of the 1880 Oxford Manual states: “A spy who succeeds in quitting the territory occupied by the enemy incurs no responsibility for his previous acts, should he afterwards fall into the hands of that enemy.” 
The Laws of War on Land, adopted by the Institute of International Law, Oxford, 9 September 1880, Article 26.

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Argentina
Argentina’s Law of War Manual (1969) cites Articles 29–31 of the 1907 Hague Regulations. 
Argentina, Leyes de Guerra, RC-46-1, Público, II Edición 1969, Ejército Argentino, Edición original aprobado por el Comandante en Jefe del Ejército, 9 May 1967, § 2.009.

Australia
Australia’s Commanders’ Guide (1994) states:
The most notable exception to granting of PW [prisoner-of-war] status to enemy military personnel is to those individuals who are classified as spies … Such individuals are not entitled to PW status and may be tried as common criminals under the detaining power’s criminal code. It is important to note, however, that if military clothing is worn during such operations, the perpetrators are lawful combatants and are entitled to PW status. 
Australia, Law of Armed Conflict, Commanders’ Guide, Australian Defence Force Publication, Operations Series, ADFP 37 Supplement 1 – Interim Edition, 7 March 1994, § 707; see also §§ 511 and 913–914 and Manual on Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Force Publication, Operations Series, ADFP 37 – Interim Edition, 1994, § 717.

Australia’s LOAC Manual (2006) states:
7.18 … A member of an armed force who is in territory controlled by an adverse party to a conflict gathering, or attempting to gather, information is not considered as a spy if that person is wearing a military uniform. Any person captured while engaging in espionage is not entitled to the status of prisoner of war (PW) and is liable to be tried by the civil courts of the adversary.
7.19 … Saboteurs in uniform are combatants and entitled to PW status if captured. Civilian saboteurs or saboteurs not in uniform are not so protected. Generally speaking, saboteurs are persons operating behind the lines of the enemy to commit acts of destruction. If they are operating in civilian clothing they are liable to be treated as spies.
7.20 Members of forces participating in acts of espionage or sabotage should wear uniform whenever possible while in enemy or enemy-occupied territory. Otherwise, they run the risk of being treated as spies if captured.

7.22 A person engaged in gathering intelligence and captured in an aircraft or vessel while dressed in civilian clothes may only be charged with espionage if they are engaged in such activities. However, the crew of an aircraft carrying spies cannot be treated as spies in the absence of clear evidence that they are spying. 
Australia, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 06.4, Australian Defence Headquarters, 11 May 2006, §§ 7.18–7.20 and 7.22; see also § 7.6.

The manual further states: “Protected personnel lose their protected status when … an otherwise protected person in an occupied territory is detained as a spy or saboteur.” 
Australia, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 06.4, Australian Defence Headquarters, 11 May 2006, § 9.11; see also § 9.56.

The LOAC Manual (2006) replaces both the Defence Force Manual (1994) and the Commanders’ Guide (1994).
Belgium
Belgium’s Law of War Manual (1983) states:
Spying is not contrary to the law of war and, as a result, does not constitute a war crime. Most countries provide, however, that spying is a crime [under domestic law] in order to protect their national interests and the interests of their armed forces. A person who is caught spying for the enemy is liable to punishment, but only after being tried … In general, civilians act as spies. This activity, by itself, does not give them the status of combatant … Members of the armed forces who perform spying missions in the zone of operations will be treated, if captured, either as prisoners of war or as spies, depending on whether they accomplished their mission wearing their uniform or disguised as civilians wearing civilian clothes. 
Belgium, Droit Pénal et Disciplinaire Militaire et Droit de la Guerre, Deuxième Partie, Droit de la Guerre, Ecole Royale Militaire, par J. Maes, Chargé de cours, Avocat-général près la Cour Militaire, D/1983/1187/029, 1983, pp. 21–22.

Burundi
Burundi’s Regulations on International Humanitarian Law (2007) states:
If captured, a combatant must have the status of prisoner of war. In contrast, a combatant in search of information, who acts under false pretences or in a deliberately clandestine way, must be considered a spy if captured. He does not have the status of prisoner of war and must be judged by the courts of the State on whose territory he is captured. 
Burundi, Règlement n° 98 sur le droit international humanitaire, Ministère de la Défense Nationale et des Anciens Combattants, Projet “Moralisation” (BDI/B-05), August 2007, Part I bis, p. 62.

Cameroon
Cameroon’s Disciplinary Regulations (1975) states:
Members of the Armed Forces in organized units, francs-tireurs detached from their regular units, commando detachments and isolated saboteurs, as well as voluntary militias, self-defence groups and organized resistance formations are lawful combatants on condition that those units, organizations or formations have a designated commander, that their members wear a distinctive sign, notably on their clothing, that they carry arms openly and that they respect the laws and customs of war. These combatants must be considered prisoners of war. Anyone who does not comply with these conditions may be considered a spy subject to the applicable criminal sanctions. 
Cameroon, Règlement de discipline dans les Forces Armées, Décret No. 75/700, 6 November 1975, Article 30.

Cameroon’s Instructor’s Manual (1992) states that a combatant caught spying “loses his status as a prisoner of war”. 
Cameroon, Droit international humanitaire et droit de la guerre, Manuel de l’instructeur en vigueur dans les Forces Armées, Présidence de la République, Ministère de la Défense, Etat-major des Armées, Troisième Division, Edition 1992, p. 89; see also pp. 36, 60, 77 and 143.

Cameroon’s Instructor’s Manual (2006), under the heading “Non-Combatants”, states that
[S]pies are … considered non-combatants and do not benefit from the status of prisoner of war in case of capture … [S]pies must be treated humanely … [and] one must avoid … infringements of their physical or psychological integrity. These persons must be tried in accordance with the law of the state. 
Cameroon, Droit des conflits armés et droit international humanitaire, Manuel de l’instructeur en vigueur dans les forces de défense, Ministère de la Défense, Présidence de la République, Etat-major des Armées, 2006, p. 21, § 112; see also p. 60, § 252, p. 67, § 302, p. 86, § 342; p. 112, § 383, p. 154, §44, p. 180, § 491.A and p. 222, § 221.

The manual also states: “Spies … do not benefit from the protection of the law of armed conflict and international humanitarian law. Nonetheless, they must in all cases be treated humanely.” 
Cameroon, Droit des conflits armés et droit international humanitaire, Manuel de l’instructeur en vigueur dans les forces de défense, Ministère de la Défense, Présidence de la République, Etat-major des Armées, 2006, p. 211, § 512.

The manual further states that “[t]he actions which they [spies] have undertaken are only subject to individual responsibility”. 
Cameroon, Droit des conflits armés et droit international humanitaire, Manuel de l’instructeur en vigueur dans les forces de défense, Ministère de la Défense, Présidence de la République, Etat-major des Armées, 2006, p. 60, § 252; see also p. 86, § 342.

Cameroon’s Disciplinary Regulations (2007) states:
Article 30: Definition
Members of armed forces in organized units, franc-tireurs detached from regular units, commando detachments and isolated saboteurs, as well as the members of voluntary militias, self-defence groups and organized resistance formations are lawful combatants.
It is sufficient that those units, organizations or formations have a designated commander, that their members wear a distinctive sign, notably on their clothing, that they carry their arms openly and that they respect the laws and customs of war.
These combatants, if they are captured, must be considered prisoners of war.
Anyone who does not comply with the conditions contained in the preceding paragraphs may be considered a spy and be subjected to the penal sanctions provided in that case. 
Cameroon, Règlement de discipline générale dans les forces de défense, Décret N° 2007/199, Président de la République, 7 July 2007, Article 30.

Canada
Canada’s LOAC Manual (1999) states:
Members of the armed forces engaging in espionage while not in uniform may be treated as spies and lose their entitlement to PW status if they are captured before rejoining the armed forces to which they belong. Spies who are not in uniform are not lawful combatants. If they engage in hostilities, they may be punished for doing so but only after a fair trial affording all judicial guarantees. 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 1999, p. 3-4, §§ 34 and 35; see also p. 6-3, §§ 23 and 24.
[emphasis in original]
Canada’s LOAC Manual (2001) states in its chapter entitled “Combatant Status”:
3. Members of the armed forces engaging in espionage while not in uniform may be treated as spies and lose their entitlement to PW [prisoner-of-war] status if they are captured before rejoining the armed forces to which they belong.
4. Spies who are not in uniform are not lawful combatants. If they engage in hostilities, they may be punished for doing so but only after a fair trial affording all judicial guarantees. 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 13 August 2001, § 320.3–4.
[emphasis in original]
In its chapter on land warfare, the manual further states:
Members of the armed forces who engage in intelligence gathering while in uniform are not considered to be spies and are entitled to PW status. Members of the armed forces who engage in espionage while not in uniform can be considered as spies. For further discussion of the status of persons captured while engaging in espionage, refer to Chapter 3 (Combatant Status). 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 13 August 2001, § 611.2.
[emphasis in original]
In its chapter on the treatment of prisoners of war (PWs), the manual states: “If captured and detained, the following persons are not entitled to PW status, but they must nevertheless be treated humanely: … c. spies”. 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 13 August 2001, § 1007.1.c.
(emphasis in original)
Central African Republic
The Central African Republic’s Instructor’s Manual (1999) states in Volume 3 (Instruction for non-commissioned officers studying for the level 1 and 2 certificates and for future officers of the criminal police):
Intelligence must be obtained in uniform or without attempting to conceal the status of combatant. If intelligence is sought in areas controlled by the enemy under false pretence or in a deliberately clandestine way, this will be considered espionage. A combatant captured under these conditions will lose his prisoner-of-war status. 
Central African Republic, Le Droit de la Guerre, Fascicule No. 3: Formation pour l’obtention du Brevet d’Armes No. 1, du Brevet d’Armes No. 2 et le stage d’Officier de Police Judiciaire (OPJ), Ministère de la Défense, Forces Armées Centrafricaines, 1999, Chapter II, Section II, § 2.1.

Chad
Chad’s Instructor’s Manual (2006) states: “If spies are taken captive, they are subjected to the same treatment as mercenaries. Spies are also considered to be non-combatants and do not enjoy prisoner-of-war status if they are taken captive.” 
Chad, Droit international humanitaire, Manuel de l’instructeur en vigueur dans les forces armées et de sécurité, Ministère de la Défense, Présidence de la République, Etat-major des Armées, 2006, p. 42; see also pp. 55 and 65.

Côte d’Ivoire
Côte d’Ivoire’s Teaching Manual (2007) provides in Book I (Basic instruction): “Mercenaries and spies are not considered as combatants but benefit from humane treatment and must be tried in a manner consistent with national law.” 
Côte d’Ivoire, Droit de la guerre, Manuel d’instruction, Livre I: Instruction de base, Ministère de la Défense, Forces Armées Nationales, November 2007, p. 17.

In Book III, Volume 1 (Instruction of first-year trainee officers), the Teaching Manual provides:
I. 6. Spies
The law clearly defines spies: they are persons who, in a clandestine or disguised manner, i.e. without wearing the uniform of their armed forces, collect or try to collect information in the territory of the enemy in order to transmit it to the adversary. Their protection under the terms of the law is limited. If they are captured, they do not have the right to prisoner-of-war status. They can be punished for their activities. They must nevertheless be treated humanely and have the right to a fair trial. 
Côte d’Ivoire, Droit de la guerre, Manuel d’instruction, Livre III, Tome 1: Instruction de l’élève officier d’active de 1ère année, Manuel de l’élève, Ministère de la Défense, Forces Armées Nationales, November 2007, p. 30; see also Droit de la guerre, Manuel d’instruction, Livre III, Tome 2: Instruction de l’élève officier d’active de 2ème année, Manuel de l’instructeur, Ministère de la Défense, Forces Armées Nationales, November 2007, p. 25.

In Book III, Volume 2 (Instruction of second-year trainee officers), the Teaching Manual provides:
I.2.5. Spies

If a State decides to use soldiers as spies, and if they are captured, these soldiers cannot invoke the status of combatants and demand to be treated as prisoners of war. On the other hand, soldiers who in the past have been used as spies and which are captured after they have resumed their normal activities must not be punished for their earlier activities of espionage.
One must not confuse spies with elements who can be sent on reconnaissance patrol or special forces operations in enemy territory. As we have already seen, units of that type wear uniform and must in no case be treated as spies. 
Côte d’Ivoire, Droit de la guerre, Manuel d’instruction, Livre III, Tome 2: Instruction de l’élève officier d’active de 2ème année, Manuel de l’instructeur, Ministère de la Défense, Forces Armées Nationales, November 2007, p. 25.

In Book IV (Instruction of heads of division and company commanders), the Teaching Manual provides:
Chapter 2. Combatants and objectives

I.4. Unlawful combatants

I.4.3. Spies
Espionage consists in collecting or trying to collect information on military strength by an act of false representation or an act deliberately of a clandestine nature. In general, persons participating in activities of espionage can be attacked and, if they are captured during these activities, they are not entitled to prisoner-of-war [POW] status. …
Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict who collect or try to collect the information while wearing the uniform of their armed forces are not considered as participants in activities of espionage. …
Members of the armed forces engaging in activities of espionage while not wearing uniform can be treated as spies and lose their right to POW status if they are captured before having rejoined the armed forces to which they belong. …
Spies who are not in uniform are not lawful combatants. If they participate in hostilities, they can be punished for their participation, but only after a fair trial provided with all judicial guarantees. …
NB: In case of doubt as to the status of persons captured during hostilities, these persons must be treated as POWs until a regularly constituted tribunal has determined their real status. If the tribunal determines that the captive is a lawful combatant, this captive is entitled to POW status. …

Chapter 4. Methods and means of warfare

I.1.5. Sabotage

Saboteurs in uniform are combatants and are entitled to POW status if they are captured.
Civilian saboteurs or saboteurs not wearing uniform do not receive that protection and risk being treated as spies. They can be brought to justice in conformity with the laws of the force which has captured them and can incur the death penalty. They can, however, not be punished without a fair trial.

Chapter 5. Prisoners of war

I.2. Persons not entitled to POW status
If they are captured and detained, the following persons are not entitled to POW status, but they shall nevertheless be treated humanely:

- spies.

I.2.3. POW status determination procedure
When one cannot determine whether a given prisoner is entitled to be treated as POW, the prisoner is treated as such until his status has been determined by a regularly constituted tribunal …
Nationality has no effect on the right to POW status. That right depends on the country to which the armed forces belong, thus, even if the country of the prisoner is neutral, a national serving with a Party to the conflict becomes a POW if he is captured. 
Côte d’Ivoire, Droit de la guerre, Manuel d’instruction, Livre IV: Instruction du chef de section et du commandant de compagnie, Manuel de l’élève, Ministère de la Défense, Forces Armées Nationales, November 2007, pp. 17, 23, 24–25, 45, 47, 59 and 60.

Croatia
Croatia’s LOAC Compendium (1991) states:
The Occupying Power may impose the death penalty only on inhabitants guilty of espionage, sabotage [and] intentional offences having caused death. However, such offences must have been punishable by death under the law in force in occupied territory before occupation. 
Croatia, Compendium “Law of Armed Conflicts”, Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Defence, 1991, p. 65.

Croatia’s Commanders’ Manual (1992) provides: “Search for information in uniform or without disguise concealing combatant status is legitimate. Spies may be used but they do not have the right to prisoner-of-war status.” 
Croatia, Basic Rules of the Law of Armed Conflicts – Commanders’ Manual, Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Defence, 1992, § 31.

Ecuador
Ecuador’s Naval Manual (1989) provides:
Spying during armed conflict is not a violation of international law. Captured spies are not, however, entitled to prisoner-of-war status. The captor nation may try and punish spies in accordance with its national law. Should a spy succeed in eluding capture and return to friendly territory, liability to punishment terminates. If subsequently captured during some other military operation, the former spy cannot be tried or punished for the earlier act of espionage. 
Ecuador, Aspectos Importantes del Derecho Internacional Marítimo que Deben Tener Presente los Comandantes de los Buques, Academia de Guerra Naval, 1989, § 12.8.1.

The manual also provides that “individuals captured as spies … may not be summarily executed” and that they “have the right to be fairly tried for violations of the law of armed conflict”. 
Ecuador, Aspectos Importantes del Derecho Internacional Marítimo que Deben Tener Presente los Comandantes de los Buques, Academia de Guerra Naval, 1989, § 11.8.

France
France’s LOAC Teaching Note (2000) states: “Spies … are not combatants and have no right to prisoner-of-war status.” 
France, Fiche didactique relative au droit des conflits armés, Directive of the Ministry of Defence, 4 January 2000, annexed to the Directive No. 147 of the Ministry of Defence of 4 January 2000, p. 2.

France’s LOAC Manual (2001) states: “A spy has no right to prisoner-of-war status and is subject to the national legislation of the territory where he is captured.” 
France, Manuel de droit des conflits armés, Ministère de la Défense, Direction des Affaires Juridiques, Sous-Direction du droit international humanitaire et du droit européen, Bureau du droit des conflits armés, 2001, p. 64; see also p. 40.

Germany
Germany’s Military Manual (1992) states:
Even if they are members of their armed forces, [spies] do not have the right to the status of prisoner of war. Persons who fall into the hands of the adversary while engaging in espionage shall be liable to punishment. Even if taken while engaging in espionage, a spy shall not be punished without prior conviction pursuant to regular judicial proceedings. 
Germany, Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts – Manual, DSK VV207320067, edited by The Federal Ministry of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany, VR II 3, August 1992, English translation of ZDv 15/2, Humanitäres Völkerrecht in bewaffneten Konflikten – Handbuch, August 1992, §§ 321–322.

Greece
The Hellenic Navy’s International Law Manual (1995) provides: “[Spies] can not benefit from the status of prisoner of war and may be tried and convicted even to death.” 
Greece, International Law Manual, Hellenic Navy General Staff, Directorate A2, Division IV, 1995, Chapter 5, § 6.

Hungary
Hungary’s Military Manual (1992) states:
The Occupying Power may impose the death penalty only on inhabitants guilty of espionage, sabotage [and] intentional offences having caused death. However, such offences must have been punishable by death under the law in force in occupied territory before occupation.  
Hungary, A Hadijog, Jegyzet a Katonai, Föiskolák Hallgatói Részére, Magyar Honvédség Szolnoki Repülötiszti Föiskola, 1992, p. 101.

Israel
Israel’s Manual on the Laws of War (1998) states:
The spy does not meet the conditions required of a legal combatant (since he is assimilated in the civilian population) and thus is not entitled to the prisoner-of-war’s immunity against being tried. Therefore, a state that captures a spy is allowed to bring him to trial in accordance with its own internal laws, an offense that is generally punishable by a long prison sentence or even death … A spy who has succeeded in completing his mission and returning to his army is once again entitled to legal combatant status. 
Israel, Laws of War in the Battlefield, Manual, Military Advocate General Headquarters, Military School, 1998, p. 59.

Israel’s Manual on the Rules of Warfare (2006) states:
Spying in itself is not an action that is prohibited in itself under the rules of war, and a country sending a spy into enemy territory is not in breach of international law. As has been shown, however, a spy does not meet the conditions required of a legitimate fighter (because he is hidden among the civilian population) and is consequently not entitled to the immunity from prosecution of a prisoner-of-war. A country that captures a spy is entitled to put him on trial under the domestic laws and sentence him to a long term of imprisonment or even to death (if the spy is a national of the country in which he was caught, the crime for which he may be tried may be treason, and not espionage).
The rules of The Hague Convention are also designed to protect the rights of a spy. A spy who has been caught is entitled to a trial, and as stated his punishment will be meted out under the internal laws of the country that caught him. A spy who has succeeded in fulfilling his mission and return to his army is entitled to return to the status of legitimate fighter, and if he becomes a prisoner-of-war (as a combatant) it is not permitted for him to be tried as a spy. 
Israel, Rules of Warfare on the Battlefield, Military Advocate-General’s Corps Command, IDF School of Military Law, Second Edition, 2006, p. 36.

The Manual on the Rules of Warfare (2006) is a second edition of the Manual on the Laws of War (1998).
Italy
Italy’s LOAC Elementary Rules Manual (1991) provides: “Search for information in uniform or without disguise concealing combatant status is legitimate. Spies may be used but they do not have the right to prisoner-of-war treatment.” 
Italy, Regole elementari di diritto di guerra, SMD-G-012, Stato Maggiore della Difesa, I Reparto, Ufficio Addestramento e Regolamenti, Rome, 1991, § 31.

Kenya
Kenya’s LOAC Manual (1997) states:
Those captured while engaged in espionage do not have POW [prisoner-of-war] status but may not be punished without trial … Members of the armed forces who were involved in spying cease to be spies as soon as they return to their own lines. If subsequently captured, they cannot be punished for their previous spying activities. 
Kenya, Law of Armed Conflict, Military Basic Course (ORS), 4 Précis, The School of Military Police, 1997, Précis No. 2, p. 9.

Madagascar
Madagascar’s Military Manual (1994) provides: “The search for information in uniform or without disguise concealing combatant status is legitimate. Spies may be used but they do not have the right to prisoner-of-war status.” 
Madagascar, Le Droit des Conflits Armés, Ministère des Forces Armées, August 1994, Fiche No. 5-O, § 31.

Mexico
Mexico’s Army and Air Force Manual (2009), in a section on the 1977 Additional Protocol I, states: “Spies … are not entitled to prisoner-of-war status.” 
Mexico, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario para el Ejército y la Fuerza Área Mexicanos, Ministry of National Defence, June 2009, § 259; see also § 255.

Netherlands
The Military Manual (1993) of the Netherlands states:
A member of the armed forces who falls into the hands of the adversary while engaged in espionage has no entitlement to the status of prisoner of war; he can be treated as a spy … Military spies, who rejoin their forces after having accomplished their task and are subsequently captured, must be treated as prisoners of war and no longer be convicted for their earlier spying activities … A spy caught in the act may under no circumstances be sentenced without trial. 
Netherlands, Toepassing Humanitair Oorlogsrecht, Voorschift No. 27-412/1, Koninklijke Landmacht, Ministerie van Defensie, 1993, pp. III-5 and III-6.

The Military Manual (2005) of the Netherlands states:
0321. Military spy status
A member of the armed forces of a party to a conflict who falls into the other party’s hands while spying is not entitled to prisoner-of-war status. He may be treated as a spy. This therefore constitutes an exception to the rule that a captured combatant has prisoner-of-war status. If, however, the military spy returned to his own troops after fulfilment of his mission, and is captured later, the enemy must treat him as a prisoner of war. He may no longer be convicted of his previous acts of espionage.

0322. International law does not prohibit espionage. A spy is therefore not guilty of infringing the rules of the humanitarian law of war. It also goes without saying that every State makes espionage punishable under its own national legislation. In the Netherlands, this has been done in the Criminal Code, in the section on “Offences against State Security.” A spy caught in the act may in no case be punished without due process. 
Netherlands, Humanitair Oorlogsrecht: Handleiding, Voorschift No. 27-412, Koninklijke Landmacht, Militair Juridische Dienst, 2005, §§ 0321–0322.

The manual further states:
A captured non-military spy has no right to prisoner-of-war status. A member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict who falls into the adversary’s hands while engaging in espionage also has no right to the status of prisoner of war. This is an exception to the rule that a captured combatant has the status of a prisoner of war. However, if a military spy has returned to his own side on completion of his mission, and is later captured by the enemy, he must be treated as a prisoner of war and may no longer be convicted for his earlier espionage (see also … AP I [1977 Additional Protocol I] Article 46). 
Netherlands, Humanitair Oorlogsrecht: Handleiding, Voorschift No. 27-412, Koninklijke Landmacht, Militair Juridische Dienst, 2005, § 0706.

New Zealand
New Zealand’s Military Manual (1992) states:
Although spying is not contrary to the law of armed conflict, international law provides that spies, if captured, may be tried in accordance with the law of the captor and may be liable to the death penalty. To punish them without a proper trial is, however, a war crime. The collection of information by persons wearing uniform is a permitted means of conflict and a person so engaged is liable to be fired upon as is any other member of the enemy forces. If captured, such a person is to be treated as a prisoner of war. 
New Zealand, Interim Law of Armed Conflict Manual, DM 112, New Zealand Defence Force, Headquarters, Directorate of Legal Services, Wellington, November 1992, § 506(2) and (3).

The manual adds:
Persons who have evaded capture when carrying out acts of espionage and who have rejoined their own forces or own national authority cannot be charged with such acts if subsequently captured; if they are members of armed forces they must be treated as prisoners of war. 
New Zealand, Interim Law of Armed Conflict Manual, DM 112, New Zealand Defence Force, Headquarters, Directorate of Legal Services, Wellington, November 1992, § 506(4).

Nigeria
Nigeria’s Military Manual (1994) states: “Spies … are however not to be considered as prisoner[s] of war.” 
Nigeria, International Humanitarian Law (IHL), Directorate of Legal Services, Nigerian Army, 1994, p. 8, § 9(c)(2).

Nigeria’s Manual on the Laws of War states:
For the purpose of waging war it is necessary to obtain information about the enemy. To get such information, it is lawful to employ spies and use soldiers and civilians of the enemy for committing acts of treason. But although this practice by the states is considered legitimate, lawful punishment under the municipal law may be imposed upon individuals engaged in espionage or treason when they are caught by the enemy … Soldiers wearing their uniform when penetrating the enemy zone of operations are not spies and if captured, should be treated as prisoners of war. When a spy is apprehended, he should not be punished without a fair regular trial. A spy who succeeds to rejoin his armed forces and is subsequently captured by the enemy is not liable to be punished for his previous acts of espionage. Such immunity is not accorded to a civilian spy captured by the enemy after reaching his own territory. 
Nigeria, The Laws of War, by Lt. Col. L. Ode PSC, Nigerian Army, Lagos, undated, § 31.

Republic of Korea
The Republic of Korea’s Military Regulation 187 (1991) states that “executing the death penalty for spies … through summary trial not full trial” is an “unjustifiable crime”. 
Republic of Korea, Military Regulation 187, 1 January 1991, Article 4.2; see also Military Operations Law of War Compliance Regulation, Regulation No. 525-8, 1 November 1993, Statute 525-8 of United Nations Command/Combined Force Command (UNC/CFC), Statute of Observing Laws of War of 15 December 1988, § D.

Russian Federation
The Russian Federation’s Regulations on the Application of IHL (2001) states:
When fallen into the power of the adversary, neither spies nor mercenaries shall have the right to prisoner-of-war status and shall be subject to punishment for their activities. However, sentences with respect to the above persons shall only be passed with previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court and the accused shall be provided with the generally recognized guarantees of court defence. 
Russian Federation, Regulations on the Application of International Humanitarian Law by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, Moscow, 8 August 2001, § 1.

South Africa
South Africa’s LOAC Manual (1996) states that espionage “is not a violation of the law of war but there is no protection under the Geneva Conventions in respect of acts of espionage”. 
South Africa, Presentation on the South African Approach to International Humanitarian Law, Appendix A, Chapter 4: International Humanitarian Law (The Law of Armed Conflict), National Defence Force, 1996, § 34(d).

South Africa’s Revised Civic Education Manual (2004) states: “Espionage … is not a violation of the law of war but there is no protection under the Geneva Conventions in respect of acts of espionage.” 
South Africa, Revised Civic Education Manual, South African National Defence Force, 2004, Chapter 4, § 56(d).

Spain
Spain’s LOAC Manual (1996) states that spies are not entitled to prisoner-of-war status.  
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Publicación OR7-004, 2 Tomos, aprobado por el Estado Mayor del Ejército, Division de Operaciones, 18 March 1996, Vol. I, § 1.4.

Spain’s LOAC Manual (2007) states:
Spies are not lawful combatants and are not entitled to prisoner-of-war status. Espionage is a criminal offence and captured spies are tried in the criminal justice system of the detaining power, which will first rule on the status of the accused, if there is any doubt about it. 
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Tomo 1, Publicación OR7–004, (Edición Segunda), Mando de Adiestramiento y Doctrina, Dirección de Doctrina, Orgánica y Materiales, 2 November 2007, § 7.3.a.(8); see also § 1.4.

The manual further states:
The law of armed conflict does not prohibit [espionage] activities, but penalizes them by depriving members of the armed forces captured engaging in espionage of prisoner-of-war status. 
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Tomo 1, Publicación OR7–004, (Edición Segunda), Mando de Adiestramiento y Doctrina, Dirección de Doctrina, Orgánica y Materiales, 2 November 2007, § 2.3.b.(5).

Sweden
Sweden’s IHL Manual (1991) states: “Spies … are not entitled to combatant or prisoner-of-war status.” 
Sweden, International Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict, with reference to the Swedish Total Defence System, Swedish Ministry of Defence, January 1991, Section 3.2.1.4, p. 36.

Switzerland
Switzerland’s Basic Military Manual (1987) states:
International law applicable in armed conflict does not prohibit the use of spies and secret agents, who can even be soldiers or civilians of enemy nationality. Nevertheless, upon their capture or arrest, these persons are liable to be sentenced severely, according to the domestic law of the State concerned … A spy who is caught in the act may not be sentenced without previous judgment. 
Switzerland, Lois et coutumes de la guerre (Extrait et commentaire), Règlement 51.7/II f, Armée Suisse, 1987, Articles 41(2) and 43.

Ukraine
Ukraine’s IHL Manual (2004) states:
1.2.25. Spies … are unlawful participants of the hostilities.
1.2.25.1. … A member of the armed forces of a Party to the armed conflict who, on behalf of that Party and in territory controlled by an adverse Party, gathers or attempts to gather information (e.g. reconnaissance scout) shall not be considered as engaging in espionage if, while so acting, he is in the uniform of his armed forces.
A member of the armed forces of a Party to the armed conflict who is a resident of territory occupied by an adverse Party and who, on behalf of the Party on which he depends, gathers or attempts to gather information of military value within that territory shall not be considered as engaging in espionage unless he does so through an act of false pretences or deliberately in a clandestine manner. Moreover, such a resident shall not lose his right to the status of prisoner of war and may not be treated as a spy unless he is captured while engaging in espionage.
A member of the armed forces of a Party to the armed conflict who is not a resident of territory occupied by an adverse Party and who has engaged in espionage in that territory shall not lose his right to the status of prisoner of war and may not be treated as a spy unless he is captured before he has rejoined the armed forces to which he belongs.

1.2.25.2. … Spies … shall not have the right to be a prisoner of war and are subject to punishment for their actions. However, their punishment may only be imposed by a competent tribunal. 
Ukraine, Manual on the Application of IHL Rules, Ministry of Defence, 11 September 2004, §§ 1.2.25, 1.2.25.1 and 1.2.25.2.

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
The UK Military Manual (1958) states:
Regular members of the armed forces who are caught as spies are not entitled to be treated as prisoners of war. But they would appear to be entitled, as a minimum, to the limited privileges conferred upon civilian spies or saboteurs by [Article 5 of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV]. 
United Kingdom, The Law of War on Land being Part III of the Manual of Military Law, The War Office, HMSO, 1958, § 96.

The manual also states: “In addition to the ‘grave breaches’ of the 1949 [Geneva] Conventions, … the following are examples of punishable violations of the laws of war, or war crimes: … killing without trial of spies”. 
United Kingdom, The Law of War on Land being Part III of the Manual of Military Law, The War Office, HMSO, 1958, § 626(l).

The UK LOAC Pamphlet (1981) provides:
Those captured while engaged in espionage do not have PW [prisoner-of-war] status but may not be punished without trial. If members of the armed forces gather intelligence in occupied territory they may not be treated as spies provided that they are in uniform. Even if not in uniform, members of the armed forces who were involved in spying cease to be spies as soon as they return to their own lines. If subsequently captured they cannot be punished for their previous spying activities. 
United Kingdom, The Law of Armed Conflict, D/DAT/13/35/66, Army Code 71130 (Revised 1981), Ministry of Defence, prepared under the Direction of The Chief of the General Staff, 1981, Section 3, pp. 9–10, § 6.

The UK LOAC Manual (2004) states:
“Any member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict who falls into the power of an adverse Party while engaging in espionage shall not have the right to the status of prisoner of war and may be treated as a spy.” Nevertheless, he is to be treated humanely and his trial must respect established judicial safeguards. A spy may not be punished without first having been tried and convicted. 
United Kingdom, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Ministry of Defence, 1 July 2004, § 4.9.

The manual specifies:
A person who falls into the hands of an adverse party while engaging in espionage, does not have the right to the status of prisoner of war, although it may be given at the discretion of the detaining power. Even without the status of prisoner of war, a spy may only be subjected to punishment after trial by a court applying the prescribed safeguards. Captured spies remain entitled to the basic humanitarian guarantees provided by Additional Protocol I. 
United Kingdom, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Ministry of Defence, 1 July 2004, § 8.13.

In its chapter on the enforcement of the law of armed conflict, the manual further states:
16.27. The Hague Regulations 1907 are now recognized as part of customary law. …
16.28. … [T]he Hague Regulations forbid … the punishment of spies without proper trials. 
United Kingdom, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Ministry of Defence, 1 July 2004, §§ 16.27–16.28.

United States of America
The US Field Manual (1956) provides: “In addition to the ‘grave breaches’ of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the following acts are representative of violations of the law of war (‘war crimes’): … killing without trial spies”. 
United States, Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, US Department of the Army, 18 July 1956, as modified by Change No. 1, 15 July 1976, § 504(l).

With respect to occupied territories, the manual uses the same wording as Articles 5 of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV. 
United States, Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, US Department of the Army, 18 July 1956, as modified by Change No. 1, 15 July 1976, § 248.

The US Air Force Pamphlet (1976) states: “Protected persons in occupied territory who are detained for spying … are guaranteed the right to a fair trial.” 
United States, Air Force Pamphlet 110-31, International Law – The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations, US Department of the Air Force, 1976, § 14-2.

The US Air Force Commander’s Handbook (1980) provides: “Even … spies … have the right to be tried and cannot be summarily executed.” 
United States, Air Force Pamphlet 110-34, Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Armed Conflict, Judge Advocate General, US Department of the Air Force, 25 July 1980, § 4-2(e).

The US Instructor’s Guide (1985) states: “In addition to the grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the following acts are further examples of war crimes: … killing, without proper legal trial, spies”. 
United States, Instructor’s Guide – The Law of War, Headquarters Department of the Army, Washington, April 1985, pp. 13 and 14.

The US Naval Handbook (1995) states:
Spying during armed conflict is not a violation of international law. Captured spies are not, however, entitled to prisoner-of-war status. The captor nation may try and punish spies in accordance with its national law. Should a spy succeed in eluding capture and return to friendly territory, liability to punishment terminates. If subsequently captured during some other military operation, the former spy cannot be tried or punished for the earlier act of espionage. 
United States, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-2.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7, issued by the Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, US Marine Corps, and Department of Transportation, US Coast Guard, October 1995 (formerly NWP 9 (Rev. A)/FMFM 1-10, October 1989), § 12.8.1.

The Handbook specifies that “individuals captured as spies … may not be summarily executed” and that they “have the right to be fairly tried for violations of the law of armed conflict”. 
United States, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-2.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7, issued by the Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, US Marine Corps, and Department of Transportation, US Coast Guard, October 1995 (formerly NWP 9 (Rev. A)/FMFM 1-10, October 1989), § 11.7.

The US Manual for Military Commissions (2007), Part IV, Crimes and Elements, includes in the list of crimes triable by military commissions:
SPYING.
a. Text. “Any person subject to this chapter who with intent or reason to believe that it is to be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign power, collects or attempts to collect information by clandestine means or while acting under false pretenses, for the purpose of conveying such information to an enemy of the United States, or one of the co-belligerents of the enemy, shall be punished by death or such other punishment as a military commission under this chapter may direct.”
b. Elements.
(1) The accused collected or attempted to collect certain information by clandestine means or while acting under false pretenses;
(2) The accused intended or had reason to believe the information collected would be used to injure the United States or to provide an advantage to a foreign power;
(3) The accused intended to convey such information to an enemy of the United States or one of the co-belligerents of the enemy; and
(4) The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with armed conflict.
c. Maximum punishment. Death. 
United States, Manual for Military Commissions, published in implementation of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a, et seq., 18 January 2007, Part IV, § 6(27), p. IV-20.

The US Naval Handbook (2007) states:
Spying during armed conflict is not a violation of international law. Captured spies are not, however, entitled to prisoner-of-war status. The captor nation may try and punish spies in accordance with its national law. Should a spy succeed in eluding capture and return to friendly territory, he is immune from punishment for his past espionage activities. If subsequently captured during some other military operation, the former spy cannot be tried or punished for the earlier act of espionage. 
United States, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-12.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7, issued by the Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, US Marine Corps, and Department of Homeland Security, US Coast Guard, July 2007, § 12.9.

The US Manual for Military Commissions (2010), Part IV, Crimes and Elements, includes in the list of crimes triable by military commissions:
SPYING.
a. Text. “Any person subject to this chapter who, in violation of the law of war and with intent or reason to believe that it is to be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign power, collects or attempts to collect information by clandestine means or while acting under false pretenses, for the purpose of conveying such information to an enemy of the United States, or one of the co-belligerents of the enemy, shall be punished by death or such other punishment as a military commission under this chapter may direct.”
b. Elements.
(1) The accused collected or attempted to collect certain information by clandestine means or while acting under false pretenses;
(2) The accused intended or had reason to believe the information collected would be used to injure the United States or to provide an advantage to a foreign power;
(3) The accused intended to convey such information to an enemy of the United States or one of the co-belligerents of the enemy;
(4) The conduct was in violation of the law of war; and
(5) The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with hostilities.
c. Comment. For purposes of offenses (13) [intentionally causing serious bodily injury], (15) [murder in violation of the law of war], (16) [destruction of property in violation of the law of war], and (27) [spying] in Part IV of this Manual (corresponding to offenses enumerated in paragraphs (13), (15), (16), and (27) of § 950t of title 10, United States Code), an accused may be convicted in a military commission for these offenses if the commission finds that the accused employed a means (e.g., poison gas) or method (e.g., perfidy) prohibited by the law of war; intentionally attacked a “protected person” or “protected property” under the law of war; or engaged in conduct traditionally triable by military commission (e.g., spying; murder committed while the accused did not meet the requirements of privileged belligerency) even if such conduct does not violate the international law of war.
d. Maximum punishment. Death. 
United States, Manual for Military Commissions, published in implementation of Chapter 47A of Title 10, United States Code, as amended by the Military Commissions Act of 2009, 10 U.S.C, §§ 948a, et seq., 27 April 2010, § 5(27), pp. IV-21 and IV-22.

Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal Republic of
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s Military Manual (1988) states that spies caught in the act cannot be punished without previous trial, but spies who rejoin their army and are subsequently caught must be treated as prisoners of war and incur no responsibility for their previous acts of espionage. 
Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal Republic of, Propisi o Primeri Pravila Medjunarodnog Ratnog Prava u Oruzanim Snagama SFRJ, PrU-2, Savezni Sekretarijat za Narodnu Odbranu (Pravna Uprava), 1988, §§ 111–112.

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Chile
Chile’s Code of Military Justice (1925) states that spies can be sentenced to life imprisonment or death. 
Chile, Code of Military Justice, 1925, Articles 252–253.

Denmark
Denmark’s Military Criminal Code (1973), as amended in 1978, provides:
Any person who uses war instruments or procedures the application of which violates an international agreement entered into by Denmark or the general rules of international law, shall be liable to the same penalty [i.e. a fine, lenient imprisonment or up to 12 years’ imprisonment]. 
Denmark, Military Criminal Code, 1973, as amended in 1978, § 25(1).

Denmark’s Military Criminal Code (2005) provides:
Any person who deliberately uses war means [“krigsmiddel”] or procedures the application of which violates an international agreement entered into by Denmark or international customary law, shall be liable to the same penalty [i.e. imprisonment up to life imprisonment]. 
Denmark, Military Criminal Code, 2005, § 36(2).

Ireland
Under Ireland’s Geneva Conventions Act (1962), as amended in 1998, any “minor breach” of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, including violations of Article 45(3), is a punishable offence. 
Ireland, Geneva Conventions Act, 1962, as amended in 1998, Section 4(1) and (4).

Italy
Italy’s Wartime Military Penal Code (1941) punishes any “commander who, with the exception of the cases of imminent danger for the security of the armed force or for the military defence of the State, orders that, without prior regular judgment, a person caught in the act of spying shall be immediately executed”. 
Italy, Wartime Military Penal Code, 1941, Article 183.

Japan
Japan’s Law concerning the Treatment of Prisoners of War and Other Detainees in Armed Attack Situations (2004) states that a “Person subject to internment” means a “foreigner” who falls under certain specified categories, including: “Member of enemy armed forces, etc. who may be treated as spy pursuant to the provision of Article 46 of the First Additional Protocol [1977 Additional Protocol I]”. 
Japan, Law concerning the Treatment of Prisoners of War and Other Detainees in Armed Attack Situations, 2004, Article 3(iv)(j).

Malaysia
Referring to Malaysia’s Armed Forces Act (1972), the Report on the Practice of Malaysia states that the use of spies is unlawful in Malaysia. The report adds that there is no statutory definition of “spy”, but it nevertheless considers that it is an offence for any person subject to service law in Malaysia to assist the enemy, communicate with it or share intelligence with it and that the Official Secrets Act and Armed Forces Act provide a penalty for spying. 
Report on the Practice of Malaysia, 1997, Answers to additional questions on Chapter 1.1, referring to Armed Forces Act, 1972, Section 41, and Official Secrets Act, 1972, Sections 2–3.

Mexico
Mexico’s Code of Military Justice (1933), as amended in 1996, provides that spies will be punished by death. Once spies have returned to their own troops and are then arrested, they cannot be punished as spies, but have to be treated as prisoners of war. 
Mexico, Code of Military Justice, 1933, as amended in 1996, Articles 206–207.

Morocco
Morocco’s Military Justice Code (1956) states:
Any enemy who, in disguise, intrudes into one of the locations listed in the preceding article [area of war, military post or establishment, works, camps, bivouacs or quarters of an army] is punished by death. 
Morocco, Military Justice Code, 1956, Article 186.

Norway
Norway’s Military Penal Code (1902), as amended in 1981, provides:
Anyone who contravenes or is accessory to the contravention of provisions relating to the protection of persons or property laid down in … the two additional protocols to [the 1949 Geneva] Conventions … is liable to imprisonment. 
Norway, Military Penal Code, 1902, as amended in 1981, § 108(b).

Philippines
A publication on Philippine Military Law (1956) states:
Any person who in time of war shall be found lurking or acting as a spy in or about any of the fortifications, posts, quarters, or encampments of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or elsewhere, shall be tried by a general court-martial or by a military commission, and shall, on conviction thereof, suffer death. 
Claro C. Gloria, Philippine Military Law, Capitol Publishing House, Quezon City, 1956, p. 263.

Spain
Spain’s Military Criminal Code (1985) provides that non-combatants involved in military espionage are subject to punishment and do not benefit from POW status. 
Spain, Military Criminal Code, 1985, Articles 52 and 57.

United States of America
The US Military Commissions Act (2006), passed by Congress following the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld in 2006, amends Title 10 of the United States Code and, inter alia, provides the penalty for “spying”:
Any person subject to this chapter who [commits the offense of spying] … shall be punished by death or such other punishment as a military commission under this chapter may direct. 
United States, Military Commissions Act, 2006, Public Law 109-366, Chapter 47A of Title 10 of the United States Code, 17 October 2006, p. 120 Stat. 2630, § 950v(b)(27).

The US Military Commissions Act (2009) amends Chapter 47A of Title 10 of the United States Code as follows:
Ҥ 950t. Crimes triable by military commission
“The following offenses shall be triable by military commission under this chapter at any time without limitation:

“(27) SPYING.—Any person subject to this chapter who, in violation of the law of war and with intent or reason to believe that it is to be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign power, collects or attempts to collect information by clandestine means or while acting under false pretenses, for the purpose of conveying such information to an enemy of the United States, or one of the co-belligerents of the enemy, shall be punished by death or such other punishment as a military commission under this chapter may direct. 
United States, Military Commissions Act, 2009, § 950t(27).

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Australia
In its judgment in the Ohashi case in 1946, Australia’s Military Court at Rabaul sentenced the accused to life imprisonment – subsequently commuted to two years’ imprisonment – for the execution of 18 civilian inhabitants of New Britain during its occupation by Japanese armed forces. The accused participated in the summary court which condemned the civilians, suspected of espionage, to death and also took part in their execution. 
Australia, Military Court at Rabaul, Ohashi case, Judgment, 23 March 1946.

South Africa
In its judgment in the Lombo case in 2002, South Africa’s Supreme Court of Appeal stated:
[45] The next question that arises is whether the appellant’s detention continued to be lawful … The parties accepted that the provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocol I of 1977 (“the Protocol”) were applicable to the conflict between the ANC [African National Congress] and the South African Government and regulated the appellant’s detention, despite the doubts expressed in this regard in Azanian Peoples Organisation (AZAPO) & Others v President of the Republic of South Africa & Others 1996 (4) SA 671 (CC) at 689 C - D. (I express no view on the matter.) It is common cause that the ANC in 1980 publicly subscribed to their provisions. The only existing issue in this respect is whether they entitled the ANC, without anything further being done, to detain the appellant as a suspected spy until the cessation of hostilities (as the ANC claimed) or whether it was obliged to afford him the benefit of a trial within a reasonable period. In this respect the appellant sought to rely upon art 75 of the Protocol while the ANC invoked articles 43 to 46 of the Geneva Conventions.
[46] I do not consider it necessary or advisable to attempt an interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Geneva Conventions and the Protocol, which are complex and, in some respects, obscure. The argument before us on the point was limited and not supported by authority. I shall accept in the appellant’s favour that, having lawfully detained him on suspicion of being a spy, the ANC was obliged to afford him the benefit of a trial within a reasonable time. The purpose of a trial would have been to establish whether he was a spy, in which case he could, at best for him, have been detained until hostilities had ceased or, failing proof that he was a spy, to oblige his release. 
South Africa, Supreme Court of Appeal, Lombo case¸ Judgment, 30 May 2002, §§ 45–46.

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
In its judgment in the Sandrock case (Almelo Trial) in 1945, the UK Military Court at Almelo held that “killing captured members of the opposing forces or civilian inhabitants of occupied territories suspected of espionage … unless their guilt had been established by a court of law” amounts to a war crime. On this basis, it found the accused guilty of the killing without trial of a British soldier who was alleged to be a spy. 
United Kingdom, Military Court at Almelo, Sandrock case (Almelo Trial), Judgment, 24–26 November 1945.

United States of America
In the Dostler case before the US Military Commission at Rome in 1945, the accused, the commander of a German army corps, was found guilty of having ordered the shooting of 15 American prisoners of war in violation of the 1907 Hague Regulations and of long-established laws and customs of war. The Defence submitted that the US soldiers had worn no distinctive emblem and that their mission had been undertaken for the purpose of sabotage. The Defence considered, therefore, that they were not entitled to the privileges of a lawful belligerent, though it was admitted that they were entitled to a lawful trial even if they were treated as spies. 
United States, Military Commission at Rome, Dostler case, Judgment, 12 October 1945.

In 2008, in the Khadr case, a Guantánamo Military Commission considered a Defence motion to dismiss a charge of murder brought against the defendant, which was defined as follows:
CHARGE I: VIOLATION OF 10 U.S.C. §950v(b)(15), MURDER IN VIOLATION OF THE LAW OF WAR
Specification: In that [the defendant], a person subject to trial by military commission as an alien unlawful enemy combatant, did, in Afghanistan, on or about July 27, 2002, while in the context of and associated with armed conflict and without enjoying combatant immunity, unlawfully and intentionally murder [a] U.S. Army Sergeant First Class … , in violation of the law of war, by throwing a hand grenade at U.S. forces resulting in the death of [the] Sergeant First Class. 
United States, Guantánamo Military Commission, Khadr case, Ruling, 21 April 2008, § 2.

The Commission stated the following in relation to the lawfulness of the offence of murder being tried by US military commissions:
As if anticipating the defense motion in this case, the Supreme Court actually defined those who are protected by the Law of Nations and those who are not:
By universal agreement and practice the law of war draws a distinction between the armed forces and the peaceful populations of belligerent nations and also between those who are lawful and unlawful combatants … Unlawful combatants are likewise subject to capture and detention, but in addition they are subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals for acts which render their belligerency unlawful. The spy who secretly and without uniform passes the military lines of a belligerent in time of war, seeking to gather military information and communicate it to the enemy … [is a familiar example of a belligerent who is] generally deemed not to be entitled to the status of prisoners of war, but to be … [an offender] against the law of war subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals. (Ex Parte Quirin, Id., at 12, emphasis added). 
United States, Guantánamo Military Commission, Khadr case, Ruling, 21 April 2008, § 6.
[emphasis in original]
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Botswana
The Report on the Practice of Botswana maintains that spies are not protected. 
Report on the Practice of Botswana, 1998, Chapter 1.1.

Jordan
The Report on the Practice of Jordan notes that while there is no definition of the concept of spies in domestic law nor any provision concerning their status, interviews with military officers confirmed that spies are put on trial in Jordan. 
Report on the Practice of Jordan, 1997, Interviews with military officers, Answers to additional questions on Chapter 1.1.

Republic of Korea
According to the legal adviser of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, a captured spy who is a member of enemy armed forces cannot be deemed a prisoner of war and may be punished under national law. 
Republic of Korea, Opinion of a legal adviser of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning the North Korean Submarine Infiltration Case, September 1996, Report on the Practice of the Republic of Korea, 1997, Chapter 1.1.

Rwanda
On the basis of replies by army officers to a questionnaire, the Report on the Practice of Rwanda affirms that spies are not considered as civilians. The report therefore concludes that spies are liable to attack. 
Report on the Practice of Rwanda, 1997, Replies by army officers to a questionnaire, Chapter 1.1.

Zimbabwe
The Report on the Practice of Zimbabwe states: “Spies and mercenaries are likely to be regarded as combatants in Zimbabwe for purposes of being military targets. They are, however, unlikely to be afforded prisoner-of-war status and related protection if captured.” 
Report on the Practice of Zimbabwe, 1998, Chapter 1.1.

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European Commission of Human Rights
In its admissibility decision in Treholt v. Norway in 1991, the European Commission of Human Rights held that the special character of espionage meant that there was a need for additional security measures and surveillance in relation to persons suspected of spying. The Commission stated that while these increased security measures were permitted, they might not extend to interference with the fundamental rights of a detainee. 
European Commission of Human Rights, Treholt v. Norway, Admissibility Decision, 9 July 1991, pp. 192 and 194.

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