Practice Relating to Rule 74. Chemical Weapons
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Hague Declaration concerning Asphyxiating Gases
The 1899 Hague Declaration concerning Asphyxiating Gases was the first treaty to outlaw the use of gas in warfare. In the Declaration, which has been ratified by 31 States, “the contracting Powers agree to abstain from the use of projectiles the sole object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases”. 
Declaration (IV, 2) concerning Asphyxiating Gases, The Hague, 29 July 1899.

Treaty of Versailles
Article 171 of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles stipulated: “The use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and analogous liquids, materials or devices being prohibited, their manufacture and importation are strictly forbidden in Germany.” 
Treaty of Versailles, Versailles, 28 June 1919, Article 171.

Treaty on the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases in Warfare
Article 5 of the 1922 Treaty on the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases in Warfare provides:
The use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials or devices, having been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world and a prohibition of such having been declared in treaties to which a majority of the civilized Powers are parties,
The Signatory Powers, to the end that this prohibition shall be universally accepted as a part of international law binding alike the conscience and practice of nations, declare their assent to such prohibition, agree to be bound thereby between themselves and invite all other civilized nations to adhere thereto. 
Treaty on the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases in Warfare between France, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom and United States, Washington, D.C., 6 February 1922, Article 5.

Geneva Gas Protocol
The 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol provides:
Whereas the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices, has been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world; and
Whereas the prohibition of such use has been declared in Treaties to which the majority of Powers of the world are Parties; and
To the end that this prohibition shall be universally accepted as a part of International Law, binding alike the conscience and the practice of nations;
Declare:
That the High Contracting Parties, so far as they are not already Parties to Treaties prohibiting such use, accept this prohibition … and agree to be bound as between themselves according to the terms of this declaration. 
Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, Geneva, 17 June 1925.

Of the 132 States party, 39 made reservations upon ratification of the Protocol, stating that if an adverse party does not respect the Protocol, the ratifying State will no longer consider itself bound by the Protocol vis-à-vis that party (a number of the reservations included non-respect by allies also as a reason for no longer being obliged to respect the Protocol). 
Algeria, Angola, Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Fiji, France, India, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Jordan, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Libya, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Portugal, Romania, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, USSR, United Kingdom, United States, Viet Nam and Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

As at 1 March 2003, 18 of these reservations had been withdrawn. 
Ireland (1972); Australia (1986); New Zealand (1989); Czechoslovakia (1990); Mongolia (1990); Bulgaria (1991); Chile (1991); Romania (1991); United Kingdom (partially, 1991); Spain (1992); Netherlands (1995); France (1996); South Africa (1996); Belgium (1997); Estonia (1999); Canada (1999); Russian Federation (2001); Republic of Korea (2002).

Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Bulgaria
Article 14 of the 1947 Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Bulgaria provides: “Bulgaria shall not retain, produce or otherwise acquire, or maintain facilities for the manufacture of, war material in excess of that required for the maintenance of the armed forces.” 
Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers on the one part and Bulgaria on the other part, Paris, 10 February 1947, Article 14.

According to Annex III of the treaty, “war material” comprises, inter alia, “asphyxiating, lethal, toxic or incapacitating substances intended for war purposes, or manufactured in excess of civilian requirements” (Category VI). 
Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers on the one part and Bulgaria on the other part, Paris, 10 February 1947, Annex III.

Article 15 further provides that Bulgaria is obliged to hand over to the Allied Powers or destroy some of such war material. 
Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers on the one part and Bulgaria on the other part, Paris, 10 February 1947, Article 15.

Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Finland
Article 18 of the 1947 Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Finland provides: “Finland shall not retain, produce or otherwise acquire, or maintain facilities for the manufacture of, war material in excess of that required for the maintenance of the armed forces.” 
Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers on the one part and Finland on the other part, Paris, 10 February 1947, Article 18.

According to Annex III of the treaty, “war material” comprises, inter alia, “asphyxiating, lethal, toxic or incapacitating substances intended for war purposes, or manufactured in excess of civilian requirements” (Category VI). 
Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers on the one part and Finland on the other part, Paris, 10 February 1947, Annex III.

Article 19 further provides that Finland is obliged to hand over to the Allied Powers or destroy some of such “war material”. 
Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers on the one part and Finland on the other part, Paris, 10 February 1947, Article 19.

Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Hungary
Article 16 of the 1947 Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Hungary provides: “Hungary shall not retain, produce or otherwise acquire, or maintain facilities for the manufacture of, war material in excess of that required for the maintenance of the armed forces.” 
Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers on the one part and Hungary on the other part, Paris, 10 February 1947, Article 16.

According to Annex III of the treaty, “war material” comprises, inter alia, “asphyxiating, lethal, toxic or incapacitating substances intended for war purposes, or manufactured in excess of civilian requirements” (Category VI). 
Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers on the one part and Hungary on the other part, Paris, 10 February 1947, Annex III.

Article 17 further provides that Hungary is obliged to hand over to the Allied Powers or destroy some of such “war material”. 
Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers on the one part and Hungary on the other part, Paris, 10 February 1947, Article 17.

Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Italy
Article 53 of the 1947 Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Italy provides that “Italy shall not manufacture or possess, either publicly or privately, any war material different from, or exceeding in quantity, that required for the forces permitted in” other sections of the treaty. 
Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers on the one part and Italy on the other part, Paris, 10 February 1947, Article 53.

According to the Annex XIII(C) of the treaty, “war material” comprises, inter alia, “asphyxiating, lethal, toxic or incapacitating substances intended for war purposes, or manufactured in excess of civilian requirements” (Category VI). 
Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers on the one part and Italy on the other part, Paris, 10 February 1947, Annex XIII(C).

Article 67 further provides that Italy is obliged to hand over to the Allied Powers or destroy such “war material”. 
Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers on the one part and Italy on the other part, Paris, 10 February 1947, Article 67.

Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Romania
Article 15 of the 1947 Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Romania provides: “Romania shall not retain, produce or otherwise acquire, or maintain facilities for the manufacture of, war material in excess of that required for the maintenance of the armed forces.” 
Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers on the one part and Romania on the other part, Paris, 10 February 1947, Article 15.

According to Annex III of the treaty, “war material” comprises, inter alia, “asphyxiating, lethal, toxic or incapacitating substances intended for war purposes, or manufactured in excess of civilian requirements” (Category VI). 
Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers on the one part and Romania on the other part, Paris, 10 February 1947, Annex III.

Article 16 further provides that Romania is obliged to hand over to the Allied Powers or destroy some of such “war material”. 
Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers on the one part and Romania on the other part, Paris, 10 February 1947, Article 16.

Austrian State Treaty
Article 13(1) of the 1955 Austrian State Treaty provides:
Austria shall not possess, construct or experiment with –

(j) asphyxiating, vesicant or poisonous materials or biological substances in quantities greater than, or of types other than, are required for legitimate civil purposes, or any apparatus designed to produce, project or spread such materials or substances for war purposes. 
State Treaty for the Re-establishment of an Independent and Democratic Austria (with Annexes and Maps), concluded between France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and Austria, accession of Australia, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Mexico, New Zealand, Poland and Yugoslavia, Vienna, 15 May 1955, Article 13(1).

Biological Weapons Convention
The preamble to the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention states that the States party to the Convention are “convinced of the importance and urgency of eliminating from the arsenals of States, through effective measures, such dangerous weapons of mass destruction as those using chemical or bacteriological (biological) agents”. States also recognize that “an agreement on the prohibition of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons represents a first possible step towards the achievement of agreement on effective measures also for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons” and that they are “determined to continue negotiations to that end”. 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened for signature at London, Moscow and Washington, D.C., 10 April 1972, preamble.

US-Soviet Chemical Weapons Agreement
Article 1(1) of the 1990 US-Soviet Chemical Weapons Agreement states:
In accordance with provisions of this Agreement, the Parties undertake:
a. to cooperate regarding methods and technologies for the safe and efficient destruction of chemical weapons;
b. not to produce chemical weapons;
c. to reduce their chemical weapons stockpiles to equal, low levels;
d. to cooperate in developing, testing, and carrying out appropriate inspection procedures; and
e. to adopt practical measures to encourage all chemical weapons-capable states to become parties to the multilateral convention. 
Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Destruction and Non-Production of Chemical Weapons and on Measures to Facilitate the Multilateral Convention on Banning Chemical Weapons, Washington, D.C., 1 June 1990, Article 1(1).

India-Pakistan Declaration on Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
The 1992 India-Pakistan Declaration on Prohibition of Chemical Weapons provides that the governments of India and Pakistan
undertake never under any circumstances:
a) to develop, produce or otherwise acquire chemical weapons;
b) to use chemical weapons;
c) to assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in development, production, acquisition, stockpiling or use of chemical weapons. 
Declaration on the Complete Prohibition of Chemical Weapons between India and Pakistan, New Delhi, 19 August 1992.

Chemical Weapons Convention
Article I of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention provides:
1. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never under any circumstances:
(a) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone;
(b) To use chemical weapons;
(c) To engage in any military preparations to use chemical weapons;
(d) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention;
2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy chemical weapons it owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control …
3. Each State Party undertakes to destroy all chemical weapons it abandoned on the territory of another State Party …
4. Each State Party undertakes to destroy any chemical weapons production facilities it owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control. 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, Paris, 13 January 1993, Article I.

The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention prohibits the use of chemical weapons in any circumstances, including by way of reprisal, and also obliges States parties not to use chemical weapons against non-parties. 
Natalino Ronzitti, “Relations Between the Chemical Weapons Convention and Other Relevant International Norms”, The Convention on the Prohibition and Elimination of Chemical Weapons: a Breakthrough in Multilateral Disarmament, Hague Academy of International Law Workshop, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1994, p. 184.
Article XXII states: “The Articles of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations.” The treaty includes an extensive implementation and verification regime. 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, Paris, 13 January 1993, Article XXII.

ICC Statute
Pursuant to Article 8(2)(b)(xviii) of the 1998 ICC Statute, “[e]mploying asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials or devices” is a war crime in international armed conflicts. 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, 17 July 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9, Article 8(2)(b)(xviii).

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Oxford Manual of Naval War
Article 16(1) of the 1913 Oxford Manual of Naval War prohibits the use of “projectiles the sole object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases”. 
The Laws of Naval War Governing the Relations between Belligerents, adopted by the Institute of International Law, Oxford, 9 August 1913, Article 16(1).

Report of the Commission on Responsibility
Based on several documents supplying evidence of outrages committed during the First World War, the 1919 Report of the Commission on Responsibility lists violations of the laws and customs of war which should be subject to criminal prosecution, including the “use of deleterious and asphyxiating gases”. 
Report submitted to the Preliminary Conference of Versailles by the Commission on Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties, Versailles, 29 March 1919.

ILA Draft Convention for the Protection of Civilian Populations against New Engines of War
Articles 6 and 7 of the 1938 ILA Draft Convention for the Protection of Civilian Populations against New Engines of War provides:
Art. 6. The use of chemical … weapons as against any State, whether or not a party to the present convention, and in any war, whatever its character, is prohibited.
Art. 7. (a) The prohibition of the use of chemical weapons shall apply to the use, by any method whatsoever, for the purpose of injuring an adversary, of any natural or synthetic substance (whether solid, liquid or gaseous) which is harmful to the human or animal organism by reason of its being a toxic, asphyxiating, irritant or vesicant substance.
(b) The said prohibition shall not apply:
I. to explosives that are not in the last-mentioned category;
II. to the noxious substances arising from the combustion or detonation of such explosives, provided that such explosives have not been designed or used with the object of producing such noxious substances;
III. to smoke or fog used to screen objectives or for other military purposes, provided that such smoke or fog is not liable to produce harmful effects under normal conditions of use;
IV. to gas that is merely lachrymatory. 
Draft Convention for the Protection of Civilian Populations against New Engines of War, adopted by the International Law Association, Fortieth Conference, Amsterdam, 29 August–2 September 1938, Articles 6 and 7.

New Delhi Draft Rules
Article 14 of the 1956 New Delhi Draft Rules provides, under the heading “Weapons with uncontrollable effects”:
The use is prohibited of weapons whose harmful effects – resulting in particular from the dissemination of … chemical … agents – could spread to an unforeseen degree or escape, either in space or in time, from the control of those who employ them, thus endangering the civilian population. 
Draft Rules for the Limitation of the Dangers Incurred by the Civilian Population in Time of War, drafted by the International Committee of the Red Cross, September 1956, submitted to governments for their consideration on behalf of the 19th International Conference of the Red Cross, New Delhi, 28 October–7 November, Res. XIII, Article 14.

Mendoza Declaration on Chemical and Biological Weapons
The preamble to the 1991 Mendoza Declaration on Chemical and Biological Weapons states that the parties are “convinced that a complete ban on chemical … weapons will contribute to strengthening the security of all States”. In paragraph 1, the parties declare their “full commitment not to develop, produce, acquire in any way, stockpile or retain, transfer directly or indirectly, or use chemical weapons”. 
Joint Declaration on the Complete Prohibition of Chemical and Biological Weapons, signed by Argentina, Brazil and Chile, Mendoza, 5 September 1991, also known as the Mendoza Accord, annexed to Letter dated 11 September 1991 from the Permanent Representatives of Argentina, Brazil and Chile to the UN addressed to the Secretary-UN General, UN Doc. A/46/463, 12 September 1991, preamble.

Cartagena Declaration on Weapons of Mass Destruction
In December 1991, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela adopted the Cartagena Declaration on Weapons of Mass Destruction and agreed as follows:
1. They welcome the initiative of the Government of Peru concerning the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction in Latin America and the Caribbean as the beginning of a gradual process to strengthen security and mutual trust in the region;
2. They proclaim the commitment of their Governments to renounce the possession, production, development, use, testing and transfer of all weapons of mass destruction, whether nuclear, bacteriological (biological), toxin or chemical weapons, and to refrain from storing, acquiring or holding such categories of weapons, in any circumstances. 
Cartagena Declaration on Renunciation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, signed by Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela, Cartagena de Indias, 4 December 1991, §§ 1–2.

Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and IHL in the Philippines
Article 4(4) of Part IV of the 1998 Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and IHL in the Philippines provides: “Civilian population and civilians … shall be protected … from … the stockpiling near or in their midst, and the use of chemical … weapons.” 
Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front of the Philippines, The Hague, 16 March 1998, Part IV, Article 4(4).

UN Secretary-General’s Bulletin
Section 6.2 of the 1999 UN Secretary-General’s Bulletin provides:
The United Nations force shall respect the rules prohibiting or restricting the use of certain weapons and methods of combat under the relevant instruments of international humanitarian law. These include, in particular, the prohibition on the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases. 
Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law, Secretary-General’s Bulletin, UN Secretariat, UN Doc. ST/SGB/1999/13, 6 August 1999, Section 6.2.

UNTAET Regulation No. 2000/15
The UNTAET Regulation No. 2000/15 establishes panels with exclusive jurisdiction over serious criminal offences, including war crimes. According to Section 6(1)(b)(xviii), “[e]mploying asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials or devices” is a war crime in international armed conflicts.  
Regulation on the Establishment of Panels with Exclusive Jurisdiction over Serious Criminal Offences, UN Doc. UNTAET/REG/2000/15, Dili, 6 June 2000, Section 6(1)(b)(xviii).

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Australia
Australia’s Commanders’ Guide (1994) places chemical weapons under the heading “Prohibited weapons” and refers to the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. 
Australia, Law of Armed Conflict, Commanders’ Guide, Australian Defence Force Publication, Operations Series, ADFP 37 Supplement 1 – Interim Edition, 7 March 1994, § 305.

The manual defines the use of “certain unlawful weapons and ammunition” as “grave breaches or serious war crimes”. 
Australia, Law of Armed Conflict, Commanders’ Guide, Australian Defence Force Publication, Operations Series, ADFP 37 Supplement 1 – Interim Edition, 7 March 1994, § 1305(p).

Australia’s Defence Force Manual (1994) provides: “Asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases are prohibited.” 
Australia, Manual on Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Force Publication, Operations Series, ADFP 37 – Interim Edition, 1994, § 410.

The manual adds:
Chemical weapons, which include toxic chemicals and their precursors (those chemicals which can cause death, permanent harm or temporary incapacity to humans or animals) and munitions or devices designed to carry such chemicals, are banned. 
Australia, Manual on Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Force Publication, Operations Series, ADFP 37 – Interim Edition, 1994, § 412.

The manual defines the use of “certain unlawful weapons and ammunition” as “grave breaches or serious war crimes”. 
Australia, Manual on Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Force Publication, Operations Series, ADFP 37 – Interim Edition, 1994, § 1315(p).

Australia’s LOAC Manual (2006) states in its chapter on “Weapons”: “Both chemical and biological weapons are prohibited because they cause unnecessary suffering and may affect the civilian population in an indiscriminate fashion.” 
Australia, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 06.4, Australian Defence Headquarters, 11 May 2006, § 4.20.

With respect to the use of gas, the manual states:
Asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases are prohibited. Smoke grenades, smoke ammunition from indirect fire weapons and tank smoke ammunition, all primarily used to conceal position or movement or mask a target are not prohibited. 
Australia, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 06.4, Australian Defence Headquarters, 11 May 2006, § 4.14.

With respect to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the manual states that, as a party, Australia undertakes:
never under any circumstances:
to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone;
to use chemical weapons;
to engage in any military preparations to use chemical weapons; and
to assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under the convention. 
Australia, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 06.4, Australian Defence Headquarters, 11 May 2006, § 4.15.

Australia also subscribes to the definition of chemical weapons contained in Article 2 of the Chemical Weapons Convention. 
Australia, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 06.4, Australian Defence Headquarters, 11 May 2006, § 4.16.

The manual further states:
4.17 Permitted uses of chemicals include industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical or other peaceful purposes; purposes directly related to protection against toxic chemicals and chemical weapons; military purposes not connected with the use of chemical weapons and not dependent on the use of the toxic properties of chemicals as a method of warfare; and law enforcement, including domestic riot control purposes.
4.18 The CWC also requires States Parties to destroy existing chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities. It establishes an Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and contains very detailed provisions for verification, including short notice challenge inspections. 
Australia, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 06.4, Australian Defence Headquarters, 11 May 2006, §§ 4.17–4.18.

The LOAC Manual (2006) replaces both the Defence Force Manual (1994) and the Commanders’ Guide (1994).
Belgium
Belgium’s Law of War Manual (1983), with reference to the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol, proscribes “the use of asphyxiating, toxic or similar gases, as well as all liquids, materials or analogous devices”, with a reservation on the first use. 
Belgium, Droit Pénal et Disciplinaire Militaire et Droit de la Guerre, Deuxième Partie, Droit de la Guerre, Ecole Royale Militaire, par J. Maes, Chargé de cours, Avocat-général près la Cour Militaire, D/1983/1187/029, 1983, p. 38.

Bosnia and Herzegovina
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Military Instructions (1992) states: “It is prohibited to use … poisonous gas.” 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Instructions on the Implementation of the International Law of War in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Official Gazette of ABiH, No. 2/92, 5 December 1992, Item 11, § 1.

Burundi
Burundi’s Regulations on International Humanitarian Law (2007) states that “there are weapons whose use is prohibited … [such as] chemical weapons”. 
Burundi, Règlement n° 98 sur le droit international humanitaire, Ministère de la Défense Nationale et des Anciens Combattants, Projet “Moralisation” (BDI/B-05), August 2007, Part I bis, p. 17; see also Part I bis, pp. 2, 33, 53 and 109.

The Regulations also lists “employing toxic weapons” as a “violation of the laws and customs of war”. 
Burundi, Règlement n° 98 sur le droit international humanitaire, Ministère de la Défense Nationale et des Anciens Combattants, Projet “Moralisation” (BDI/B-05), August 2007, Part I bis, p. 27.

Cameroon
Cameroon’s Instructor’s Manual (1992) states on the issue of chemical weapons: “The restrictions here are clear. It is prohibited to use such weapons against enemy combatants as well as against civilian populations.” It also calls for the “total destruction of the existing stockpile”. 
Cameroon, Droit international humanitaire et droit de la guerre, Manuel de l’instructeur en vigueur dans les Forces Armées, Présidence de la République, Ministère de la Défense, Etat-major des Armées, Troisième Division, Edition 1992, p. 124, § 441.

Cameroon
Cameroon’s Instructor’s Manual (2006) states:
Chemical weapons, according to the Paris Convention of 13 January 1993 on the Prohibition, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Certain Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction [1993 Chemical Weapons Convention], are those … used or developed with the aim of killing through the toxic properties of chemicals.

This Convention imposes an absolute prohibition of chemical weapons both during international and internal armed conflicts. 
Cameroon, Droit des conflits armés et droit international humanitaire, Manuel de l’instructeur en vigueur dans les forces de défense, Ministère de la Défense, Présidence de la République, Etat-major des Armées, 2006, p. 272, § 631.

Canada
Canada’s LOAC Manual (1999) prohibits the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases “at all times and under all circumstances”. 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 1999, p. 5-3, § 23.

The manual also bans the use of chemical weapons, “which include toxic chemicals and their precursors (those chemicals which can cause death, permanent harm or temporary incapacity to humans or animals) and munitions or devices designed to carry such chemicals”. 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 1999, p. 5-3, § 26.

The manual defines “using asphyxiating, poisonous and other gases” as a war crime. 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 1999, pp. 16-3 and 16-4, § 21(h).

The manual also provides: “Smoke grenades, smoke ammunition from indirect fire weapons and tank smoke ammunition are not prohibited as long as they are used to conceal position or movement or to mask target.” 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 1999, p. 5-3, § 24.

Canada’s Code of Conduct (2001) provides that the use of chemical weapons is forbidden. 
Canada, Code of Conduct for CF Personnel, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 4 June 2001, Rule 3, § 10(d).

Canada’s LOAC Manual (2001) provides in its chapter entitled “Restrictions on the use of weapons”:
The use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases is prohibited at all times and under all circumstances … However, smoke grenades, smoke ammunition from indirect fire weapons and tank smoke ammunition are not prohibited so long as they are used to conceal position or movement or to mask a target. 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 13 August 2001, § 515.

According to the manual, chemical weapons “which include toxic chemicals and their precursors (those chemicals which can cause death, permanent harm or temporary incapacity to humans or animals) and munitions or devices designed to carry such chemicals” are banned. 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 13 August 2001, § 517.

In its chapter on “War crimes, individual criminal liability and command responsibility”, the manual states that “using asphyxiating, poisonous and other gases” constitutes a war crime. 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 13 August 2001, § 1609.3.h.

Canada’s Code of Conduct (2005) provides that the use of “chemical weapons” is forbidden. 
Canada, Code of Conduct for CF Personnel, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 2005, Rule 3, § 10(d).

Chad
Chad’s Instructor’s Manual (2006) prohibits the use of “chemical … weapons”. 
Chad, Droit international humanitaire, Manuel de l’instructeur en vigueur dans les forces armées et de sécurité, Ministère de la Défense, Présidence de la République, Etat-major des Armées, 2006, p. 79.

Colombia
Colombia’s Basic Military Manual (1995) states that the use of weapons which “cause unnecessary and indiscriminate, extensive, lasting and serious damage to people and the environment” is prohibited. It adds that the use of chemical weapons, as well as their production, possession and importation, is banned. 
Colombia, Basic Derecho Internacional Humanitario – Manual Básico para las Personerías y las Fuerzas Armadas de Colombia, Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, 1995, pp. 49–50.

Côte d’Ivoire
Côte d’Ivoire’s Teaching Manual (2007) provides in Book I (Basic instruction):
The principle of limitation determines permitted means and prohibited means.

- What are the prohibited means and methods of warfare?
- All weapons which cause unnecessary suffering to individuals and excessive damage to populations and their goods,
For example: anti-personnel mines, asphyxiating gases, chemical weapons, etc. 
Côte d’Ivoire, Droit de la guerre, Manuel d’instruction, Livre I: Instruction de base, Ministère de la Défense, Forces Armées Nationales, November 2007, pp. 15–16.

In Book III, Volume 1 (Instruction of first-year trainee officers), the Teaching Manual provides:
In 1925, the League of Nations adopted a protocol prohibiting the use of poisonous gases which today has become part of customary international law and therefore binds all States. This protocol has played an important role in the battle against an especially inhumane weapon. 
Côte d’Ivoire, Droit de la guerre, Manuel d’instruction, Livre III, Tome 1: Instruction de l’élève officier d’active de 1ère année, Manuel de l’élève, Ministère de la Défense, Forces Armées Nationales, November 2007, p. 28.

In Book IV (Instruction of heads of division and company commanders), the Teaching Manual further provides:
II.1.6. Gas
The use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases is prohibited at all times and in all circumstances. …
However, smoke grenades, smoke munitions of high-arcing weapons or assault tanks are not prohibited to the extent that they are used for shielding a position, a movement or an objective.

II.1.8. Chemical weapons
Chemical weapons, which comprise toxic chemicals and their precursors (toxic chemicals which can cause death, permanent harm or temporary incapacitation to animals and humans) as well as devices and munitions intended to transport these toxic chemicals, are banned. 
Côte d’Ivoire, Droit de la guerre, Manuel d’instruction, Livre IV: Instruction du chef de section et du commandant de compagnie, Manuel de l’élève, Ministère de la Défense, Forces Armées Nationales, November 2007, p. 53.

Ecuador
Ecuador’s Naval Manual (1989) states, under the heading “Chemical weapons”: “International law, both customary and treaty-based, prohibits taking the initiative to use lethal chemical weapons during armed conflicts.” 
Ecuador, Aspectos Importantes del Derecho Internacional Marítimo que Deben Tener Presente los Comandantes de los Buques, Academia de Guerra Naval, 1989, § 10.3.
It also provides: “The following acts constitute war crimes: … use of prohibited weapons or ammunition.” 
Ecuador, Aspectos Importantes del Derecho Internacional Marítimo que Deben Tener Presente los Comandantes de los Buques, Academia de Guerra Naval, 1989, § 6.2.5(10).

France
France’s LOAC Summary Note (1992) states that it is prohibited to use combat gases. 
France, Fiche de Synthèse sur les Règles Applicables dans les Conflits Armés, Note No. 432/DEF/EMA/OL.2/NP, Général de Corps d’Armée Voinot (pour l’Amiral Lanxade, Chef d’Etat-major des Armées), 1992, § 4.6.

France’s LOAC Teaching Note (2000) includes chemical weapons in the list of weapons that “are totally prohibited by the law of armed conflict” because of their inhuman and indiscriminate character. 
France, Fiche didactique relative au droit des conflits armés, Directive of the Ministry of Defence, 4 January 2000, annexed to the Directive No. 147 of the Ministry of Defence of 4 January 2000, p. 6.

France’s LOAC Manual (2001) incorporates the content of Article 2 of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention and refers to the 1899 Hague Declaration concerning Asphyxiating Gases and the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol. 
France, Manuel de droit des conflits armés, Ministère de la Défense, Direction des Affaires Juridiques, Sous-Direction du droit international humanitaire et du droit européen, Bureau du droit des conflits armés, 2001, pp. 22 and 23.

The manual also includes chemical weapons in the list of weapons that “are totally prohibited by the law of armed conflict” because of their inhuman and indiscriminate character. 
France, Manuel de droit des conflits armés, Ministère de la Défense, Direction des Affaires Juridiques, Sous-Direction du droit international humanitaire et du droit européen, Bureau du droit des conflits armés, 2001, p. 54.

Germany
Germany’s Soldiers’ Manual (1991) provides: “The use of chemical weapons (for example poisonous gas) … is prohibited.” 
Germany, Taschenkarte, Humanitäres Völkerrecht in bewaffneten Konflikten – Grundsätze, Bearbeitet nach ZDv 15/2, Humanitäres Völkerrecht in bewaffneten Konflikten – Handbuch, Zentrum Innere Führung, June 1991, p. 5.

Germany’s Military Manual (1992) proscribes “the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all analogous liquids, materials or similar devices in war” and refers to the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol and to Article 23(a) of the 1907 Hague Regulations. It adds:
434. The prohibition also applies to the toxic contamination of water supply installations and foodstuffs and the use of irritant agents for military purposes. This prohibition does not refer to unintentional and insignificant poisonous secondary effects of otherwise permissible munitions.
435. The scope of this prohibition is restricted by the fact that, when signing the Geneva Gas Protocol, numerous states declared that this Protocol should cease to be binding in regard to any enemy state whose armed forces fail to respect the prohibition embodied in the Protocol. 
Germany, Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts – Manual, DSK VV207320067, edited by The Federal Ministry of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany, VR II 3, August 1992, English translation of ZDv 15/2, Humanitäres Völkerrecht in bewaffneten Konflikten – Handbuch, August 1992, §§ 434 and 435.

The manual refers to the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention and stresses that it was not in force at the time (1992). However, it declares:
On signing the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and their Destruction on 10 April 1972, the Federal Republic of Germany further declared that, in accordance with its attitude, it would neither develop nor acquire or stockpile under its own control chemical weapons whose manufacture it has already abstained from. This commitment was confirmed under Article 3 of the Treaty on the Final Settlement with respect to Germany of 12 September 1990. 
Germany, Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts – Manual, DSK VV207320067, edited by The Federal Ministry of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany, VR II 3, August 1992, English translation of ZDv 15/2, Humanitäres Völkerrecht in bewaffneten Konflikten – Handbuch, August 1992, §§ 436–437.

Germany’s IHL Manual (1996) states:
International humanitarian law prohibits the use of a number of means of warfare, which are of a nature to violate the principle of humanity and to cause unnecessary suffering, e.g. … chemical means of warfare, e.g. poisonous gases. 
Germany, ZDv 15/1, Humanitäres Völkerrecht in bewaffneten Konflikten – Grundsätze, DSK VV230120023, Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, June 1996, § 305.

Germany’s Soldiers’ Manual (2006) states:
German service men or service women are prohibited from using in particular the following means of combat in armed conflicts:

- chemical weapons (e.g. poisonous gas). 
Germany, Druckschrift Einsatz Nr. 03, Humanitäres Völkerrecht in bewaffneten Konflikten – Grundsätze, Erarbeitet nach ZDv 15/2, Humanitäres Völkerrecht in bewaffneten Konflikten – Handbuch, DSK SF009320187, Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, R II 3, August 2006, p. 5.

Israel
Israel’s Manual on the Laws of War (1998) states: “Today 128 countries are signatories to [the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol], whose provisions are regarded as customary practice, thereby making it binding on all countries, irrespective of whether they signed the Protocol.” 
Israel, Laws of War in the Battlefield, Manual, Military Advocate General Headquarters, Military School, 1998, p. 20.

Israel’s Manual on the Rules of Warfare (2006) states:
In 1925, the countries of the world gathered in an international congress in Geneva and signed a protocol completely banning the use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. All the leading countries in the world signed the Protocol, with the exception of the United States and Japan. Today, 133 countries have signed the Protocol, and its provisions are considered to be overriding, that is to say that they are binding on every country in the world, including those that never signed the Protocol. 
Israel, Rules of Warfare on the Battlefield, Military Advocate-General’s Corps Command, IDF School of Military Law, Second Edition, 2006, p. 18.

The Manual on the Rules of Warfare (2006) is a second edition of the Manual on the Laws of War (1998).
Italy
Italy’s IHL Manual (1991) states: “The use … of asphyxiating, toxic or similar gases … is forbidden in conformity with the international provisions in force.”  
Italy, Manuale di diritto umanitario, Introduzione e Volume I, Usi e convenzioni di Guerra, SMD-G-014, Stato Maggiore della Difesa, I Reparto, Ufficio Addestramento e Regolamenti, Rome, 1991, Vol. I, § 19.

Kenya
Kenya’s LOAC Manual (1997) prohibits the use of “asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, all analogous liquids, materials or devices”. 
Kenya, Law of Armed Conflict, Military Basic Course (ORS), 4 Précis, The School of Military Police, 1997, Précis No. 3, p. 6.

Mexico
Mexico’s IHL Guidelines (2009), in a section titled “Basic rules of conduct in armed conflict”, states: “Do not use … chemical weapons.” 
Mexico, Cartilla de Derecho Internacional Humanitario, Ministry of National Defence, 2009, § 14(k).

Netherlands
The Military Manual (1993) of the Netherlands states: “It is generally accepted that this prohibition [of the use of chemical weapons] applies to States which have not ratified the Gas Protocol; it belongs to customary law.” 
Netherlands, Toepassing Humanitair Oorlogsrecht, Voorschift No. 27-412/1, Koninklijke Landmacht, Ministerie van Defensie, 1993, p. IV-8, § 14.

The Military Handbook (1995) of the Netherlands provides a general prohibition on the use of chemical weapons. 
Netherlands, Handboek Militair, Ministerie van Defensie, 1995, p. 7-39.

The Military Manual (2005) of the Netherlands states:
0452. Under the 1925 [Geneva] Gas Protocol, the use of asphyxiating, toxic or similar gases, liquids and solids is prohibited. Generally this prohibition is also assumed to apply to States which have not ratified the Gas Protocol, because it now belongs to international customary law. A number of States ratified the Gas Protocol with a reservation. Mostly, this reservation means that, when one party to an armed conflict uses a prohibited means of chemical warfare, the adversary is released from the reservation (principle of reciprocity).
0453. A treaty of more recent date is the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, also applicable to the Netherlands. This Convention prohibits the development, production, procurement and storage of chemical weapons. It also expressly prohibits the use of chemical weapons. This prohibition of use also applies to retaliation against an adversary which itself used chemical weapons first.

0454. The Chemical Weapons Convention defines chemical weapons as:
- toxic chemicals, including their precursors, except where intended for purposes not prohibited under the Convention. A “toxic chemical” is here defined as: any chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals. A “precursor” is any chemical reactant which takes part at any stage in the production by whatever method of a toxic chemical, regardless of the method of production;
- munitions and other devices, specifically designed to cause death or other harm through the toxic properties of those toxic chemicals;
- equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of munitions and other devices.

0458. Because of the military significance of modern chemical weapons, many States still allow for the possible use of such weapons.

Iraq’s use of chemical weapons in the war with Iran from 1980 to 1988 unmistakeably breached the Gas Protocol. Furthermore, Iraq had ratified that Protocol in 1931, with the “reciprocity reservation”. 
Netherlands, Humanitair Oorlogsrecht: Handleiding, Voorschift No. 27-412, Koninklijke Landmacht, Militair Juridische Dienst, 2005, §§ 0452–0454 and 0458.

In its chapter on non-international armed conflict, the manual states:
It is prohibited to use weapons causing unnecessary suffering or excessive injury, or that are indiscriminate. This means that biological, chemical, toxic or intoxicating weapons … are forbidden. 
Netherlands, Humanitair Oorlogsrecht: Handleiding, Voorschift No. 27-412, Koninklijke Landmacht, Militair Juridische Dienst, 2005, § 1038.

In its chapter on peace operations, the manual states: “As for the use of resources, the rules of the humanitarian law of war also apply. Thus the use of chemical or biological weapons is prohibited.” 
Netherlands, Humanitair Oorlogsrecht: Handleiding, Voorschift No. 27-412, Koninklijke Landmacht, Militair Juridische Dienst, 2005, § 1217.

New Zealand
New Zealand’s Military Manual (1992) states: “The 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibits the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous and other gases, and bacteriological methods of warfare.” 
New Zealand, Interim Law of Armed Conflict Manual, DM 112, New Zealand Defence Force, Headquarters, Directorate of Legal Services, Wellington, November 1992, §§ 512, 619 and 711.

The manual further includes “using asphyxiating, poisonous and other gases” in a list of “war crimes recognised by the customary law of armed conflict”. 
New Zealand, Interim Law of Armed Conflict Manual, DM 112, New Zealand Defence Force, Headquarters, Directorate of Legal Services, Wellington, November 1992, § 1704(5).

Nigeria
Nigeria’s Manual on the Laws of War includes “using asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all analogous liquids, materials or devices” in its list of war crimes. 
Nigeria, The Laws of War, by Lt. Col. L. Ode PSC, Nigerian Army, Lagos, undated, § 6(18).

Peru
Peru’s IHL Manual (2004) states that “chemical weapons” are prohibited weapons. 
Peru, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario para las Fuerzas Armadas, Resolución Ministerial Nº 1394-2004-DE/CCFFAA/CDIH-FFAA, Lima, 1 December 2004, § 31.b.(2).(d).

The manual also states that war crimes include the “use of prohibited means or methods of warfare ([including] chemical … weapons)”. 
Peru, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario para las Fuerzas Armadas, Resolución Ministerial Nº 1394-2004-DE/CCFFAA/CDIH-FFAA, Lima, 1 December 2004, § 31.a.(7).

Russian Federation
The Russian Federation’s Military Manual (1990) prohibits the use of “projectiles used with the only purpose to spread asphyxiating or poisonous gases … asphyxiating, poisonous or other similar gases and bacteriological means”. 
Russian Federation, Instructions on the Application of the Rules of International Humanitarian Law by the Armed Forces of the USSR, Appendix to Order of the USSR Defence Minister No. 75, 1990, § 6(b) and (e).

The Russian Federation’s Regulations on the Application of IHL (2001) states: “The following shall be prohibited to use in the course of combat operations: … chemical weapons including chemicals as well as projectiles for their use.” 
Russian Federation, Regulations on the Application of International Humanitarian Law by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, Moscow, 8 August 2001, § 9.

Sierra Leone
Sierra Leone’s Instructor Manual (2007) provides: “It is prohibited to … [u]se gas and chemical weapons.” 
Sierra Leone, The Law of Armed Conflict. Instructor Manual for the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF), Armed Forces Education Centre, September 2007, p. 44.

South Africa
South Africa’s LOAC Manual (1996) states: “The use of certain weapons is expressly prohibited by international agreement, treaty or custom (e.g. chemical … and toxic weapons).” 
South Africa, Presentation on the South African Approach to International Humanitarian Law, Appendix A, Chapter 4: International Humanitarian Law (The Law of Armed Conflict), National Defence Force, 1996, § 34(f)(iii). This manual is also included in Chapter 4 of the Draft Civic Education Manual of 1997.

South Africa’s Revised Civic Education Manual (2004) states:
i. Prohibited Weapons. The following weapons have been prohibited:

(3) Gases … Geneva Protocol outlawing their use in 1925. This ban was later strengthened by the adoption of … the Chemical Weapons Convention (1993), which prohibits the development, production, stockpiling and transfer of such weapons. 
South Africa, Revised Civic Education Manual, South African National Defence Force, 2004, Chapter 4, § 56(f)(i).

Spain
Spain’s LOAC Manual (1996) prohibits the use of asphyxiating or poisonous gases. It reproduces the content of Articles I and IV of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. 
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Publicación OR7-004, 2 Tomos, aprobado por el Estado Mayor del Ejército, Division de Operaciones, 18 March 1996, § 3.2.c.(1) and (2).

Spain’s LOAC Manual (2007) states that there is an absolute prohibition on the use of certain weapons, including “[c]hemical weapons” and “[a]sphyxiating, poisonous or other gases”. 
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Tomo 1, Publicación OR7–004, (Edición Segunda), Mando de Adiestramiento y Doctrina, Dirección de Doctrina, Orgánica y Materiales, 2 November 2007, § 3.2.b.

The manual repeats extracts from Articles I and II of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. 
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Tomo 1, Publicación OR7–004, (Edición Segunda), Mando de Adiestramiento y Doctrina, Dirección de Doctrina, Orgánica y Materiales, 2 November 2007, § 3.2.b.(2).

Switzerland
Switzerland’s Teaching Manual (1986) prohibits the use of toxic gases of any kind. 
Switzerland, Droit des gens en temps de guerre, Programme d’instruction fondé sur le Manuel 51.7/III “Lois et coutumes de la guerre”, Cours de base pour recrues de toutes les armes 97.2f, Armée suisse, 1986, p. 41.

Switzerland’s Basic Military Manual (1987) prohibits the use of poison, asphyxiating, toxic or similar gases, or analogous liquids or materials. 
Switzerland, Lois et coutumes de la guerre (Extrait et commentaire), Règlement 51.7/II f, Armée Suisse, 1987, Articles 17 and 22.

Ukraine
Ukraine’s IHL Manual (2004) states that the use of “toxic agents” as a means of warfare is prohibited.  
Ukraine, Manual on the Application of IHL Rules, Ministry of Defence, 11 September 2004, § 1.3.3.

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
The UK Military Manual (1958) provides: “Asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials or devices are forbidden.” 
United Kingdom, The Law of War on Land being Part III of the Manual of Military Law, The War Office, HMSO, 1958, § 111.

A footnote to this passage states that the use of chemical weapons in the First World War was illegal “in so far as it exposed combatants to unnecessary suffering”. 
United Kingdom, The Law of War on Land being Part III of the Manual of Military Law, The War Office, HMSO, 1958, § 111, footnote 1(a).

The manual also provides: “In addition to the ‘grave breaches’ of the 1949 [Geneva] Conventions, … the following are examples of punishable violations of the laws of war, or war crimes: … using asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials or devices.” 
United Kingdom, The Law of War on Land being Part III of the Manual of Military Law, The War Office, HMSO, 1958, § 626(r).

The UK LOAC Pamphlet (1981) states: “The following are prohibited in international armed conflict: … e. the first use of gas and chemical weapons.” 
United Kingdom, The Law of Armed Conflict, D/DAT/13/35/66, Army Code 71130 (Revised 1981), Ministry of Defence, prepared under the Direction of The Chief of the General Staff, 1981, Section 5, p. 20, § 1(e).
(emphasis in original)
The UK LOAC Manual (2004) states:
6.8. Under the Chemical Weapons Convention, states party undertake never under any circumstances:
a. “To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone”;
b. “To use chemical weapons”;
c. “To engage in any military preparations to use chemical weapons”;
d. “To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party” under the Convention.
6.8.1. The Convention contains, for the first time, a definition of chemical weapons as follows:
“‘chemical weapons’ means the following, together or separately:
(a) Toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where intended for purposes not prohibited under this Convention, as long as the types and quantities are consistent with such purposes;
(b) Munitions and devices, specifically designed to cause death or other harm through the toxic properties of those toxic chemicals specified in sub-paragraph (a), which would be released as a result of the employment of such munitions and devices;
(c) Any equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of munitions and devices specified in sub-paragraph (b).”
6.8.2. States party also undertake not to use riot control agents as a method of warfare.
6.8.3. Permitted uses of chemicals include industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical or other peaceful purposes; purposes directly related to protection against toxic chemicals and chemical weapons; military purposes not connected with the use of chemical weapons and not dependent on the use of the toxic properties of chemicals as a method of warfare; and law enforcement, including domestic riot control purposes.
6.8.4. The Convention also requires states party to destroy existing chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities. It establishes an Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and contains very detailed provisions, outside the scope of this work, for verification, including short-notice challenge inspections. In the United Kingdom the responsible authority is the Department of Trade and Industry. 
United Kingdom, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Ministry of Defence, 1 July 2004, §§ 6.8–6.8.4.

In its chapter on internal armed conflict, the manual prohibits the use of “chemical weapons, including riot control agents, as a method of warfare”. 
United Kingdom, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Ministry of Defence, 1 July 2004, § 15.28.

United States of America
The US Field Manual (1956) provides:
Although the language of the 1925 Geneva Protocol appears to ban unqualifiedly the use in war of the chemical weapons within the scope of its prohibition, reservations submitted by most of the Parties to the Protocol, including the United States, have, in effect, rendered the Protocol a prohibition only of the first use in war of materials within its scope. Therefore, the United States, like many other Parties, has reserved the right to use chemical weapons against a state if that state or any of its allies fails to respect the prohibitions of this Protocol. 
United States, Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, US Department of the Army, 18 July 1956, as modified by Change No. 1, 15 July 1976, § 38(d).

The US Air Force Pamphlet (1976) states:
The first use of lethal chemical weapons is now regarded as unlawful in armed conflicts. During World War II President Roosevelt, in response to reports that the enemy was seriously contemplating the use of gas warfare, stated: “Use of such weapons has been outlawed by the general opinion of civilized mankind … We shall under no circumstances resort to the use of such weapons unless they are first used by our enemies.” This United States position has been reaffirmed on many occasions by the United States as well as confirmed by resolutions in various international forums. 
United States, Air Force Pamphlet 110-31, International Law – The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations, US Department of the Air Force, 1976, § 6-4(c), quoting Statement by the President, Use of Poison Gas, 12 June 1943, State Department Bulletin, Vol. 8, 1947, No. 207, p. 507.

The US Air Force Commander’s Handbook (1980) states:
The United States, however, has reserved the right to use chemical weapons against “an enemy State if such State or any of its allies fails to respect the prohibition of the Protocol.” The USSR and the People’s Republic of China have reserved similar rights. 
United States, Air Force Pamphlet 110-34, Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Armed Conflict, Judge Advocate General, US Department of the Air Force, 25 July 1980, § 6-3(a).

The US Operational Law Handbook (1993) states: “The US has renounced first use of chemical weapons.” 
United States, Operational Law Handbook, JA 422, Center for Law and Military Operations and International Law Division, The Judge Advocate General’s School, United States Army, Charlottesville, Virginia 22903-1781, 1993, p. Q-182, § (i).

The US Naval Handbook (1995) states:
The United States considers the prohibition against first use of lethal and incapacitating chemical weapons to be part of customary international law and, therefore, binding on all nations whether or not they are parties to the 1925 Gas Protocol … Consistent with its first-use reservation to the 1925 Gas Protocol, the United States maintained a lethal and incapacitating chemical weapons capability for deterrence and possible retaliatory purposes only. National Command Authorities (NCA) approval was required for retaliatory use of lethal or incapacitating chemical weapons by U.S. forces. Retaliatory use of lethal or incapacitating chemical agents was to be terminated as soon as the enemy use of such agents that prompted the retaliation had ceased and any tactical advantage gained by the enemy through unlawful first use had been redressed. Upon coming into force of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, any use of chemical weapons by a party to that convention, whether or not in retaliation against unlawful first use by another nation, will be prohibited.
[The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention] will, upon entry into force, prohibit the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons, and mandate the destruction of chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities for all nations that are party to it. 
United States, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-2.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7, issued by the Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, US Marine Corps, and Department of Transportation, US Coast Guard, October 1995 (formerly NWP 9 (Rev. A)/FMFM 1-10, October 1989), §§ 10.3.1.1 and 10.3.1.2.

Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal Republic of
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s Military Manual (1988) prohibits the use of chemical agents such as asphyxiating and poisonous gases. 
Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal Republic of, Propisi o Primeri Pravila Medjunarodnog Ratnog Prava u Oruzanim Snagama SFRJ, PrU-2, Savezni Sekretarijat za Narodnu Odbranu (Pravna Uprava), 1988, § 99.

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Algeria
Algeria’s Chemical Weapons Convention Law (2003) provides:
It is prohibited:
(a) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone;
(b) To use chemical weapons;
(c) To engage in any military preparations to use chemical weapons;
(d) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under [the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention]. 
Algeria, Chemical Weapons Convention Law, 2003, Article 3.

Argentina
Argentina’s Chemical Weapons Law (2007) states:
Whoever develops, produces, acquires, stockpiles, retains, transfers, uses, imports or exports chemical weapons, or chemicals listed in Schedules 1, 2 and 3 of the [Chemical Weapons] Convention, for purposes prohibited under this law or that Convention shall be punished by imprisonment for a minimum term of 5 and maximum term of 15 years. 
Argentina, Chemical Weapons Law, 2007, Article 26.

Armenia
Under Armenia’s Penal Code (2003), the development, production, acquisition, sale, use and testing of chemical weapons and weapons of mass destruction constitute crimes against the peace and security of mankind. 
Armenia, Penal Code, 2003, Articles 386 and 387(2).

Australia
Australia’s War Crimes Act (1945), considers “any war crime within the meaning of the instrument of appointment of the Board of Inquiry [set up to investigate war crimes committed by enemy subjects]” as a war crime, including the use of deleterious and asphyxiating gases. 
Australia, War Crimes Act, 1945, Section 3.

Australia’s Chemical Weapons (Prohibition) Act (1994), provides:
A person must not intentionally or recklessly:
(a) develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons or
(b) transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to another person; or
(c) use chemical weapons; or
(d) engage in any military preparations to use chemical weapons; or
(e) assist, encourage or induce, in any way, another person to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under the Convention; or
(f) use riot control agents as a method of warfare.
Penalty: imprisonment for life. 
Australia, Chemical Weapons (Prohibition) Act, 1994, p. 13, Section 12.

The Act also specifies the purposes which are not prohibited under the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention:
(a) industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical or other peaceful purposes;
(b) protective purposes, namely those purposes directly related to protection against toxic chemicals and to protection against chemical weapons;
(c) military purposes not connected with the use of chemical weapons and not dependent on the use of the toxic properties of chemicals as a method of warfare;
(d) law enforcement including domestic riot control purposes. 
Australia, Chemical Weapons (Prohibition) Act, 1994, p. 95, Section 9.

In an amendment to that Act on 16 April 2007, taking into account various amendments up to Act 50 of 2007, the word “recklessly” has been removed from the introduction to the prohibition:
A person must not intentionally:
(a) develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons; or
(b) transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to another person; or
(c) use chemical weapons; or
(d) engage in any military preparations to use chemical weapons; or
(e) assist, encourage or induce, in any way, another person to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under the Convention; or
(f) use riot control agents as a method of warfare.
Penalty: Imprisonment for life. 
Australia, Chemical Weapons (Prohibition) Act, 1994, as amended in 2007, taking into account amendments up to Act 50 of 2007, Part 2, § 12, p.10.

The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, which includes the “Purposes Not Prohibited Under this Convention”, has been incorporated as a Schedule to the Act.
Australia’s Weapons of Mass Destruction (Prevention of Proliferation) Act (1995), as amended in 2003, states:
3 Interpretation

Weapons of Mass Destruction program or WMD program means a plan or program for the development, production, acquisition or stockpiling of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons or missiles capable of delivering such weapons.

9 Prohibition on supplying goods for WMD program
(1) If:
(a) a person supplies any goods to another person; and
(b) the first-mentioned person believes or suspects, on reasonable grounds, that the goods will or may be used in a WMD program; and
(c) the supply of the goods is not authorised by a permit or is in contravention of a condition stated in a permit; and
(d) the Minister has not given a written notice to the first-mentioned person under section 12 stating that the Minister has no reason to believe or suspect that the goods will or may be used in a WMD program;
the first-mentioned person is guilty of an offence punishable on conviction by imprisonment for not more than 8 years.

10 Prohibition on exporting goods for WMD program
(1) If:
(a) a person exports any non-regulated goods; and
(b) the person believes or suspects, on reasonable grounds, that the goods will or may be used in a WMD program; and
(c) the export of the goods is not authorised by a permit or is in contravention of a condition stated in a permit; and
(d) the Minister has not given a written notice to the person under section 12 stating that the Minister has no reason to believe or suspect that the goods will or may be used in a WMD program;
the person is guilty of an offence punishable on conviction by imprisonment for not more than 8 years.

11 Prohibition on providing services for WMD program
(1) If:
(a) a person provides any services to another person; and
(b) the first-mentioned person believes or suspects, on reasonable grounds, that the services will or may assist a WMD program; and
(c) the provision of the services is not authorised by a permit or is in contravention of a condition stated in a permit; and
(d) the Minister has not given a written notice to the first-mentioned person under section 12 stating that the Minister has no reason to believe or suspect that the provision of the services will or may assist a WMD program;
the first-mentioned person is guilty of an offence punishable on conviction by imprisonment for not more than 8 years. 
Australia, Weapons of Mass Destruction (Prevention of Proliferation) Act, 1995, as amended on 23 December 2003, taking into account amendments up to Act 135 of 2003, §§ 3 and 9–11, pp. 3 and 6–7.

Australia’s Criminal Code Act (1995), as amended in 2007, states with respect to serious war crimes that are committed in the course of an international armed conflict:
War crime – employing prohibited gases, liquids, materials or devices
A person (the perpetrator) commits an offence if:
(a) the perpetrator employs a gas or other analogous substance or device; and
(b) the gas, substance or device is such that it causes death or serious damage to health in the ordinary course of events through its asphyxiating or toxic properties; and
(c) the perpetrator’s conduct takes place in the context of, and is associated with, an international armed conflict.
Penalty: Imprisonment for 25 years. 
Australia, Criminal Code Act, 1995, as amended on 1 November 2007, taking into account amendments up to Act No. 177 of 2007, Chapter 8, § 268.56, p. 337.

Australia’s ICC (Consequential Amendments) Act (2002) incorporates in the Criminal Code the war crimes defined in the 1998 ICC Statute, including “employing prohibited gases, liquids, materials or devices” in international armed conflicts. 
Australia, ICC (Consequential Amendments) Act, 2002, Schedule 1, § 268.56.

Bangladesh
Bangladesh’s Chemical Weapons (Prohibition) Act (2006) provides:
Prohibition on the development, etc. of Chemical Weapons
(1) No person shall –
(a) develop, produce, otherwise acquire, or stockpile chemical weapon[s];
(b) transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapon[s] to any one;
(c) use chemical weapon[s];
(d) engage in any military preparation to use chemical weapon[s];
(e) assist, encourage or induce, in any way, any other person to engage in any activity prohibited for the State Party under the Convention. 
Bangladesh, Chemical Weapons (Prohibition) Act, 2006, § 5(1).

Belarus
Belarus’s Criminal Code (1999) provides that “production, acquisition, stockpiling, transport, transfer or sale of weapons of mass destruction prohibited by international treaties binding upon the Republic of Belarus” is a criminal offence, while the use of such weapons is a war crime. 
Belarus, Criminal Code, 1999, Articles 129 and 134.

Belgium
Belgium’s Penal Code (1867), as amended in 2003, provides:
War crimes envisaged in the 1949 [Geneva] Conventions … and in the [1977 Additional Protocols I and II] … , as well as in Article 8(2)(f) of the [1998 ICC Statute], and listed below, … constitute crimes under international law and shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the present title … :

37. employing asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials or devices. 
Belgium, Penal Code, 1867, as amended on 5 August 2003, Chapter III, Title I bis, Article 136 quater, § 1(37).

Belgium’s Law relating to the Repression of Grave Breaches of International Humanitarian Law (1993), as amended in 2003, provides:
War crimes envisaged in the 1949 [Geneva] Conventions … and in the [1977 Additional Protocols I and II] … , as well as in Article 8(2)(f) of the [1998 ICC Statute], and listed below, … constitute crimes under international law and shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the present title … :

23. employing asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials or devices. 
Belgium, Law relating to the Repression of Grave Breaches of International Humanitarian Law, 1993, as amended on 23 April 2003, Article 1 ter, § 1(23).

Belgium’s Law Regulating Economic and Individual Activities with Weapons (2006) provides: “[The following] arms shall be considered as prohibited: … devices which are intended to affect people by means of toxic, asphyxiating … and other similar substances”. 
Belgium, Law Regulating Economic and Individual Activities with Weapons, 2006, Article 3(1)(10).

Bosnia and Herzegovina
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Criminal Code (2003), as amended in 2006, states:
(2) Whoever uses in any way chemical … weapons …
shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of five years or a long-term imprisonment.

(4) Whoever, in time of war or armed conflict, orders the use of chemical … weapons … or whoever uses them,
shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of not less than three years. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Criminal Code, 2003, as amended on 18 June 2006, Article 193a(2) and (4).

Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Chemical Weapons Law (2006) states:
It is prohibited:
(a) to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone;
(b) to use chemical weapons;
(c) to engage in any military preparations to use chemical weapons;
(d) to assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under … [the Chemical Weapons] Convention. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chemical Weapons Law, 2006, Article 3.

Brazil
Brazil’s Chemical Weapons Law (2005) states:
Article 1. Under penalty of administrative or criminal sanctions provided for in the law, and without prejudice to other applicable penalties, no natural or legal person shall:
I - carry out in Brazil an activity prohibited by the [1993] … Chemical Weapons … Convention … ;
II - contribute to carrying out, in Brazil or abroad, an activity prohibited under the … [1993 Chemical Weapons Convention];

Article 4. It is a crime:
I - to use chemical weapons or to carry out in Brazil an activity which involves research, production, stockpiling, acquisition, transfer, importation or exportation of chemical weapons or chemical substances covered by the … [1993 Chemical Weapons Convention] with the aim of producing such weapons;
II - to contribute, directly or indirectly, by action or omission, to the use of chemical weapons or to carrying out, in Brazil or abroad, an activity mentioned in item I[.]
Penalty – imprisonment of between one to ten years. 
Brazil, Chemical Weapons Law, 2005, Articles 1(I)–(II) and 4.

Bulgaria
Bulgaria’s Penal Code (1968), as amended in 1999, provides that “a person who, in violation of the rules of international law for waging war, uses or orders the use of … chemical weapons” commits a war crime. 
Bulgaria, Penal Code, 1968, as amended in 1999, Article 415(1).

Burundi
Burundi’s Law on Genocide, Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes (2003) states:
[The following are] considered as war crimes:

B. Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflicts, within the established framework of international law, namely, any of the following acts:

q) using … asphyxiating, poisonous or similar gases and all analogous liquids, materials or weaponry. 
Burundi, Law on Genocide, Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes, 2003, Article 4(B)(q).

Burundi’s Penal Code (2009) states:
“War crimes” means crimes which are committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes, in particular:

2. … [S]erious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict, within the established framework of international law, namely, any of the following acts:

18°. Employing asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials or devices. 
Burundi, Penal Code, 2009, Article 198(2)(18°).

Canada
Canada’s Chemical Weapons Act (1995) provides:
No person shall
(a) develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain a chemical weapon or transfer, directly or indirectly, a chemical weapon to anyone;
(b) use a chemical weapon;
(c) engage in any military preparations to use a chemical weapon;
(d) assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under the Convention. 
Canada, Chemical Weapons Act, 1995, § 6.

Canada’s Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes Act (2000) provides that the war crimes defined in Article 8(2) of the 1998 ICC Statute are “crimes according to customary international law” and, as such, indictable offences under the Act. 
Canada, Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes Act, 2000, Section 4(1) and (4).

China
China’s Law Governing the Trial of War Criminals (1946) provides that “use of poison gas” constitutes a war crime. 
China, Law Governing the Trial of War Criminals, 1946, Article 3(12).

Colombia
Colombia’s Constitution (1991) prohibits “the manufacture, import, possession, and use of chemical … weapons”. 
Colombia, Constitution, 1991, Article 81.

Colombia’s Decree on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives (1993) provides: “It is prohibited to carry devices manufactured on the basis of poisoned gases, corrosive substances or metal which by the expansion of gas produces fragments.” 
Colombia, Decree on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives, 1993, Article 14.

Congo
The Congo’s Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity Act (1998) defines war crimes with reference to the categories of crimes defined in Article 8 of the 1998 ICC Statute. 
Congo, Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity Act, 1998, Article 4.

Croatia
Under Croatia’s Criminal Code (1997), the manufacture, improvement, production, stockpiling, offering for sale, purchase, interceding in purchasing or sale, possession, transfer, transport, use of, and order to use, chemical weapons are war crimes. 
Croatia, Criminal Code, 1997, Article 163(1) and (2).

Croatia’s Criminal Code (1997), as amended in 2006, imposes a criminal sanction on:
(1) Whoever makes or improves, produces, stores, offers for sale or buys, or intercedes in a purchase or sale, possesses, transfers, or transports chemical … weapons …
(2) Whoever, in time of war or armed conflict, orders the use of chemical … weapons. 
Croatia, Criminal Code, 1997, as amended in June 2006, Article 163(1) and (2).

Czech Republic
The Czech Republic’s Act on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (1997) bans the “development, production, use and handling of chemical weapons”, as well as the “import of chemical weapons to the Czech Republic or their transit”. 
Czech Republic, Act on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 1997, Part 2, § 3.

Denmark
Denmark’s Military Criminal Code (1973), as amended in 1978, provides:
Any person who uses war instruments or procedures the application of which violates an international agreement entered into by Denmark or the general rules of international law, shall be liable to the same penalty [i.e. a fine, lenient imprisonment or up to 12 years’ imprisonment]. 
Denmark, Military Criminal Code, 1973, as amended in 1978, § 25(1).

Denmark’s Military Criminal Code (2005) provides:
Any person who deliberately uses war means [“krigsmiddel”] or procedures the application of which violates an international agreement entered into by Denmark or international customary law, shall be liable to the same penalty [i.e. imprisonment up to life imprisonment]. 
Denmark, Military Criminal Code, 2005, § 36(2).

Denmark’s Executive Order on Weapons and Ammunition (1995) prohibits the importation, development, production, consumption, stockpiling, selling, exportation or possession of chemical weapons. 
Denmark, Executive Order on Weapons and Ammunition, 1995, Section 11.

Ecuador
Ecuador’s National Civil Police Penal Code (1960) states that members of the National Civil Police “who use or order to be used … asphyxiating or poisonous gases” commit a punishable offence. 
Ecuador, National Civil Police Penal Code, 1960, Article 117.4.

Estonia
Estonia’s Penal Code (2001) punishes any “person who designs, manufactures, stores, acquires, hands over, sells or provides or offers for use in any other manner chemical … weapons”. Under the Code, “use of … chemical weapons” is a war crime. 
Estonia, Penal Code, 2001, §§ 93(1) and 103.

Ethiopia
Ethiopia’s Proclamation on the Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (2003) provides:
8. Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
Any person shall not undertake in any circumstances any of the following activities:
1) Developing, producing, acquiring, stockpiling, directly or indirectly transferring chemical weapons to anyone, and using chemical weapons;
2) … engaging in military preparations to use chemical weapons. 
Ethiopia, Proclamation on the Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, 2003, § 8(1)–(2).

Fiji
Fiji’s Chemical Weapons Convention Act (2005) provides:
9. – (1) A person who intentionally or recklessly –
(a) develops, produces, acquires, stockpiles, owns, possesses, or retains chemical weapons or transfers, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to any other person;
(b) uses chemical weapons;
(c) engages in any military preparations to use chemical weapons;
(d) aids, assists, counsels or procures, in any way, any other person to engage in any activity prohibited to State Party under the Convention;

(j) engages in any other activity prohibited to a State Party under the Convention,
commits an offence and is liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding $1,000,000 or to a maximum term of imprisonment for life or both. 
Fiji, Chemical Weapons Convention Act, 2005, § 9.

Finland
Under Finland’s Revised Penal Code (1995), it is a punishable offence to use, develop, produce, otherwise procure, stockpile, possess, transport or participate in military preparations for the use of chemical weapons, in violation of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. 
Finland, Revised Penal Code, 1995, Chapter 11, Section 7a.

Finland’s Criminal Code (1889), as amended in 2008, provides that any person who “uses … chemical … or other prohibited weapons or ordnance” shall be “sentenced for a war crime to imprisonment for at least one year or for life”. 
Finland, Criminal Code, 1889, as amended in 2008, Chapter 11, Section 5(1)(14).
(emphasis in original)
The Criminal Code further states:
Section 8 - Breach of the prohibition of chemical weapons
A person, who in breach of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (Treaties of Finland 19/1979)
(1) uses chemical weapons in a manner not referred to in sections 5–7 of this chapter,
(2) develops, produces, otherwise procures, stockpiles, possesses or transports chemical weapons, or
(3) participates in military preparations for the use of chemical weapons,
shall be sentenced for breach of the prohibition of chemical weapons to imprisonment for at least four months and at most six years.  
Finland, Criminal Code, 1889, as amended in 2008, Chapter 11, Section 8.
[emphasis in original]
France
France’s Law on the Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (1998) prohibits the use of chemical weapons and the development, production, stockpiling, possession, retention, acquisition, assignment, import, export and transfer of such weapons, and selling or trading in them. 
France, Law on the Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, 1998, Article 2.

France’s Code of Defence (2004) states:
Chapter 2
Chemical Weapons

Art. L. 2342-1. – For the application of the present chapter, the words “Paris Convention” refer to the Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction …
Art. L. 2342-2. – … The terms and expressions … “chemical weapons” … “consumption” … “production” … “facility”, “chemical weapons production facility” … “material for the production of chemical weapons” … have the meaning which is given to them by the Paris Convention.
Art. L. 2342-3. – The use of chemical weapons, their development, production, stockpiling, possession, retention, acquisition, transfer, import, export, transit, trade, or brokerage are prohibited.
It is prohibited to undertake any preparations in order to use chemical weapons, as well as to assist, encourage or incite anybody who in whichever way undertakes any activity prohibited by the present chapter.
State authorities are nonetheless authorised, under the conditions established by the present decree, to hold, stockpile or retain chemical weapons for the purposes of their destruction. 
France, Code of Defence, 2004, Articles L. 2342-1 to L. 2342-3; see also Article L. 2342-4 and Articles L. 2342-57 to L. 2342-79.

The Code of Defence also states:
The development, production, acquisition, transfer, use, possession, retention, stockpiling, import, export, transfer, trade, or brokerage of chemical products set out in table 1 annexed to the Paris Convention are prohibited except for medical, pharmaceutical, research or protection purposes and in quantities limited to what can strictly be justified by these purposes. 
France, Code of Defence, 2004, Article L. 2342-8; see also Articles L. 2342-57 to L. 2342-79.

France’s Penal Code (1994), as amended in 2010, states in its section on war crimes related to international armed conflict: “[The following offences] are punishable by life imprisonment: … [u]sing asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials or devices.” 
France, Penal Code, 1994, as amended in 2010, Article 461-23.

Georgia
Under Georgia’s Criminal Code (1999), “the production, acquisition or sale of chemical … or other kinds of weapon of mass destruction prohibited by an international treaty” and the “use during hostilities or in armed conflict of such means and materials or weapons of mass destruction which are prohibited by an international treaty” are crimes. 
Georgia, Criminal Code, 1999, Articles 406 and 413(c).

Germany
Germany’s Law Introducing the International Crimes Code (2002) punishes anyone who, in connection with an international or non-international armed conflict, “employs … chemical weapons”. 
Germany, Law Introducing the International Crimes Code, 2002, Article 1, § 12(1)(2).

Greece
Greece’s Chemical Weapons Convention Act (2002) provides:
2. With incarceration is being punished whoever:
a. develops, constructs, produces, acquires, possesses, stores, maintains or transfers chemical weapons,
b. carries out any types of preparations of military nature whatsoever, with the purpose of using chemical weapons,
c. assists, encourages or motivates in any way, whatsoever, an activity which is prohibited by the Convention,

3. Whoever makes use of chemical weapons is punished with incarceration. 
Greece, Chemical Weapons Convention Act, 2002, §§ 4(2) and (3).

Hungary
Under Hungary’s Criminal Code (1978), as amended in 1998, employing “chemical weapons and chemical instruments of war” as defined in Article II(1) and (7) of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention is a war crime. 
Hungary, Criminal Code, 1978, as amended in 1998, Section 160/A(3)(c).

Iraq
Iraq’s Law of the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal (2005) identifies the following as a serious violation of the laws and customs of war applicable in international armed conflicts: “Using asphyxiating, poisonous or any other gases, as well as any other similar liquids, materials or devices”. 
Iraq, Law of the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal, 2005, Article 13(2)(S).

India
India’s Chemical Weapons Act (2000) provides:
(1) No person shall
(a) develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or use Chemical Weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, any Chemical Weapons to any person;

(c) engage in any military preparations to use Chemical Weapons;
(d) assist, encourage or induce, in any manner, any person to engage in
(i) the use of any riot control agent as a method of warfare
(ii) any other activity prohibited to a State Party under the Convention.
It also prohibits the production, acquisition, retaining or use of toxic chemicals or precursors listed in Schedule 1 of the Annex on Chemicals to the Convention. 
India, Chemical Weapons Act, 2000, Chapter III, §§ 13 and 15.

India’s Weapons of Mass Destruction and their Delivery Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities) Act (2005) states:
4. Definitions. – In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, –

(c) “chemical weapons” means, –
(i) the toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where intended for –
(a) industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical or other peaceful purposes;
(b) protective purposes, namely those purposes directly related to protection against toxic chemicals and to protection against chemical weapons;
(c) military purposes not connected with the use of chemical weapons and not dependent on the use of the toxic properties of chemicals as a method of warfare; or
(d) law enforcement including domestic riot control purposes;
as long as the types and quantities are consistent with such purposes;
(ii) the munitions and devices, specifically designed to cause death or other harm through the toxic properties of those toxic chemicals specified in sub-clause (i), which would be released as a result of the employment of such munitions and devices; and
(iii) any equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of munitions and devices specified in sub-clause (ii).

8. Prohibition relating to weapons of mass destruction

(3) No person shall unlawfully manufacture, acquire, possess, develop or transport a biological or chemical weapon or their means of delivery.
(4) No person shall unlawfully transfer, directly or indirectly, to any one biological or chemical weapons.

11. Prohibition on export. – No person shall export any material, equipment or technology knowing that such material, equipment or technology is intended to be used in the design or manufacture of a biological weapon, chemical weapon, nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device, or in their missile delivery systems. 
India, Weapons of Mass Destruction and their Delivery Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities) Act, 2005, Sections 4(c), 8(3)–(4) and 11.

Ireland
Ireland’s Chemical Weapons Act (1997) provides:
(1) No person shall –
(a) produce, develop, retain, use or transfer, directly or indirectly to anyone, a chemical weapon or assist another person to produce, develop, retain, use or transfer a chemical weapon,
(b) construct, convert, maintain or use any premises or equipment for a purpose referred to in paragraph (a) or assist another person to do any of those things for such a purpose, or
(c) engage in preparations of a military nature to use a chemical weapon. 
Ireland, Chemical Weapons Act, 1997, Article 3.

Italy
Italy’s Law of War Decree (1938), as amended in 1992, in an article dealing with “Bacteriological and chemical means”, provides: “The use … of asphyxiating, toxic or similar gases … is forbidden in conformity with the international provisions in force.” 
Italy, Law of War Decree, 1938, as amended in 1992, Article 51.

Italy’s Law on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (1995) provides:
Production, transfer or receipt, directly or indirectly, acquisition, import, export, transit, retention and use – with the exception of the cases referred to in comma 2 – of the chemicals listed in Schedule 1 of the Annex on Chemicals to the Convention, as well as of any other chemical product which might be exclusively employed for the production of chemical weapons, are prohibited. 
Italy, Law on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 1995, Article 3(1).

Japan
Japan’s Law on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (1995) provides:
1. No person shall manufacture chemical weapons.
2. No person shall possess, assign or take over chemical weapons.
3. No person shall manufacture, possess, assign or take over toxic chemicals or chemicals having toxicity equivalent thereto or raw materials of these chemicals with the aim to supply for the manufacture of chemical weapons.
4. No person shall manufacture, possess, assign or take over parts used exclusively for chemical weapons or machinery and equipment used exclusively in case of the use of chemical weapons, which are provided for by Cabinet Order. 
Japan, Law on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 1995, Chapter 2, Article 3.

Japan’s Law on the Prevention of Personal Injury Caused by Sarin (1995) prohibits the production, importation and use of sarin, and provides for a severe prison sentence for offenders. 
Japan, Law on the Prevention of Personal Injury Caused by Sarin, 1995, Articles 3 and 5.

Kazakhstan
Under Kazakhstan’s Penal Code (1997), “the production, acquisition, or sale of … chemical weapons” and “the use of the weapons of mass destruction prohibited by an international treaty to which the Republic of Kazakhstan is a party” are criminal offences.  
Kazakhstan, Penal Code, 1997, Articles 158 and 159(2).

Liberia
Liberia’s Chemical Weapons Act (2008) states:
Chemical weapon” means the following, together or separately:
(a) toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where intended for purposes not prohibited under the [Chemical Weapons] Convention, as long as the types and quantities are consistent with such purposes;
(b) munitions and devices, specifically designed to cause death or other harm through the toxic properties of those toxic chemicals specified in paragraph (a), which would be released as a result of the employment of such munitions and devices; and
… any equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of munitions and devices specified in paragraph (b). 
Liberia, Chemical Weapons Act, 2008, Section 1.2.1.

The Act also states:
Section 3.1 (General Prohibitions)
A person commits an offence who:
(a) develops, produces, otherwise acquires, stockpiles or retains a chemical weapon;
(b) transfers directly or indirectly, a chemical weapon to another person;
(c) uses a chemical weapon;
(d) engages in any military preparations to use a chemical weapon;

(f) engages in any other activity prohibited to a State Party under the Convention; and
(e) assists, encourages or induces, in any way any person to engage in any activity prohibited under this Act or by a State Party under the Convention. 
Liberia, Chemical Weapons Act, 2008, Section 3.1.

Luxembourg
Luxembourg’s Law on the Approval of the Chemical Weapons Convention (1997) provides that no natural or legal person may:
a. develop, produce or acquire chemical weapons by any other means, stockpile or preserve them in any capacity or for any purpose, or transfer them directly or indirectly to any person;
b. use chemical weapons;
c. undertake any preparatory steps for using chemical weapons;
d. assist, encourage or incite any person by whatever means to undertake any activity prohibited by the Convention and by this law;
e. transfer or receive, subject to the applicable Community provisions, the chemical products defined in Annex 1 to the Convention in circumstances prohibited by the Convention and not authorized by the Licensing Office. 
Luxembourg, Law on the Approval of the Chemical Weapons Convention, 1997, Article 3.

Mali
Under Mali’s Penal Code (2001), “using asphyxiating, toxic or assimilated gases and all analogous liquids, materials or devices” is a war crime in international armed conflicts. 
Mali, Penal Code, 2001, Article 31(i)(18).

Netherlands
The Definition of War Crimes Decree (1946) of the Netherlands includes the “use of deleterious and asphyxiating gases” in its list of war crimes. 
Netherlands, Definition of War Crimes Decree, 1946, Article 1.

According to the Chemical Weapons Act (1995) of the Netherlands, the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retaining, transfer and use of chemical weapons is prohibited. 
Netherlands, Chemical Weapons Act, 1995, Section 2.

Under the International Crimes Act (2003) of the Netherlands, “employing asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all analogous liquids, materials or devices” is a crime, when committed in an international armed conflict. 
Netherlands, International Crimes Act, 2003, Article 5(5)(h).

New Zealand
New Zealand’s Chemical Weapons Act (1996) provides:
(1) Every person commits an offence who intentionally or recklessly
(a) Develops, produces, otherwise acquires, stockpiles or retains chemical weapons; or
(b) Transfers directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to another person; or
(c) Uses chemical weapons; or
(d) Engages in any military preparations to use chemical weapons; or
(e) Assists, encourages, or induces, in any way any person to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under the Convention. 
New Zealand, Chemical Weapons Act, 1996, Section 6, § 1.

Under New Zealand’s International Crimes and ICC Act (2000), war crimes include the crime defined in Article 8(2)(b)(xviii) of the 1998 ICC Statute. 
New Zealand, International Crimes and ICC Act, 2000, Section 11(2).

Norway
Norway’s Penal Code (1902), as amended in 2008, states: “Any person is liable to punishment for a war crime who in connection with an armed conflict … employs … chemical weapons.” 
Norway, Penal Code, 1902, as amended in 2008, § 107(b).

Norway’s Chemical Weapons Act (1994) provides that it is “prohibited to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, transfer … chemical weapons in contravention of the Convention of 13 January 1993”. 
Norway, Chemical Weapons Act, 1994, Article 1.

Pakistan
Pakistan’s Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Ordinance (2000) states:
2. Definitions
(1) In this Ordinance, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, –

(c ) “chemical weapons” means –
(i) a toxic chemical and its precursor, except where intended for permitted purposes, as long as types and quantities are consistent with such purposes;
(ii) a munitions or device, specifically designed to cause death or other harm through the toxic properties of a toxic chemical specified in sub-clause (i), which would be released as a result of the employment of such munition or device; or
(iii) any equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of a munition or device specified in sub-clause (ii).

3. Prohibition on development, etc, of chemical weapons
(1) No person shall –
(a) develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain a chemical weapon, or transfer, directly or indirectly, a chemical weapon to anyone;
(b) use a chemical weapon;
(c) engage in any military preparations to use a chemical weapon;
(d) assist, encourage or induce, in any way, any other person to engage in any activity prohibited to a under the Convention; or
(e) use a riot control agent as a method of warfare. 
Pakistan, Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Ordinance, 2000, Sections 2(1)(c) and 3(1).

Panama
Panama incorporated the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (1998) in its entirety into national law in 1998. 
Panama, Chemical Weapons Law, 1998.

Peru
Peru’s Law on Chemical Weapons (1996) prohibits the use of chemical weapons, as well as their development, production, acquisition and delivery, and makes reference to the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. 
Peru, Law on Chemical Weapons, 1996, Articles 4(b) and 5.

Peru’s Code of Military and Police Justice (2006) states:
A member of the military or police shall be imprisoned for a period of no less than eight and no more than 15 years if he or she in the context of an international or non-international armed conflict:

2. Uses … chemical weapons. 
Peru, Code of Military and Police Justice, 2006, Article 102(2).

This article is no longer in force. Along with certain other articles in this legislation, it was declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court (en banc decision for case file No. 0012-2006-PI-TC, 8 January 2007) because it does not stipulate a crime committed in the line of duty that would fall under the jurisdiction of a military court pursuant to Article 173 of Peru’s Constitution.
Philippines
The Philippines’ Republic Act No. 8438 (1997) provides: “It is the policy of the Cordillera Autonomous Region to prohibit the development, storage, use or transport of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons within the region.” 
Philippines, Republic Act No. 8438, 1997, Section 19.

Poland
Poland’s Penal Code (1997) punishes “any person who uses a means of mass destruction prohibited by international law” and “any person who, against the prohibition by international law or by the provision of law, produces, stockpiles, acquires, sells, retains, transports or sends means of mass destruction or means of combat, or conducts research aimed at the production or use of such means”. 
Poland, Penal Code, 1997, Articles 120 and 121.

Poland’s Law on the Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (2001) states:
Article 4
It is prohibited in the territory of the Republic of Poland, subject to Article 5:
1) development, production, manufacturing, processing, consumption or otherwise acquiring, collecting, stockpiling, sale or transfer to anyone of chemical weapons,
2) use of chemical weapons,
3) engaging in any military preparations to use chemical weapons,
4) use of riot control agents as a method of warfare,
5) abetting or assistance in engaging in the activity prohibited under subparagraphs 1–4 above.

Article 28
1. A person who, without required permit or in contravention of its conditions, for the purposes not prohibited under the Convention, produces, manufactures, processes, acquires, collects, stores, sells, transfers, uses or possesses toxic chemicals or their precursors mentioned in the Schedule 1, shall be sentenced to a fine, limitation of freedom or imprisonment for 3 months up to 5 years. 
Poland, Law on the Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, 2001, Articles 4 and 28(1).

Republic of Korea
The Republic of Korea’s Chemical Weapons Act (1996) provides:
(1) A person who develops, produces, stockpiles, transfers or uses chemical weapons or assists or induces any other person to do so in violation of Article 3(1) shall be punished by life imprisonment or imprisonment for not less than five years or a fine not exceeding 100 million Wons.
(2) A person who causes harm to human life, body or property or disturbs the public peace through the use of chemical weapons shall be punished by the death penalty, life imprisonment or imprisonment for not less than seven years.  
Republic of Korea, Chemical Weapons Act, 1996, Chapter VII, Article 25.

Republic of Korea
The Republic of Korea’s Chemical Weapons Act (2006) provides:
Article 3 (Duty of Prohibition of Chemical Weapons)
(1) No person shall develop, produce, stockpile, transfer or use chemical weapons or assist or induce another person to do so.

Article 25 (Penal Provisions)
(1) A person who develops, produces, stockpiles, transfers or uses chemical weapons or assists or induces any other person to do so in violation of paragraph 1 of Article 3 shall be punished by life imprisonment, imprisonment for not less than 5 years or a fine not exceeding 100 million Wons.
(2) A person who causes harm to human life, body or property or disturbs the public peace through the use of chemical weapons shall be punished by death penalty, life imprisonment or imprisonment for not less than 7 years. 
Republic of Korea, Chemical Weapons Act, 2006, Articles 3(1) and 25.

The Republic of Korea’s ICC Act (2007) provides for the punishment of anyone who commits the war crime of employing chemical weapons in both international and non-international armed conflicts. 
Republic of Korea, ICC Act, 2007, Article 14(1)(2).

Romania
Romania’s Law on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (1997) provides:
(1) It is prohibited for any person, under any circumstance:
(a) to develop, produce, acquire, retain or transfer chemical weapons, directly or indirectly, to other persons;
(b) to use chemical weapons;
(c) to engage, in any way, in military preparations to use chemical weapons;
(d) to assist, encourage or induce, in any way, other persons to engage in an activity prohibited under this Act;
(2) Persons means any natural or legal person on the territory of Romania including public authorities. 
Romania, Law on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 1997, Article 3.

The Law further provides: “The act of using chemical weapons is considered as a criminal act and is punished.” 
Romania, Law on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 1997, Article 50(1).

Russian Federation
Under the Russian Federation’s Criminal Code (1996), the “use of weapons of mass destruction, prohibited by an international treaty to which the Russian Federation is a party” is a crime against the peace and security of mankind. 
Russian Federation, Criminal Code, 1996, Article 356(2).

Rwanda
Rwanda’s Prime Minister’s Order Establishing the National Authority for the Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (2005) provides:
Article One:
Is hereby established the National Authority for the implementation of the Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and the use of chemical weapons and on their destruction signed in Paris, on 13 January 1993, hereafter referred to as the National Authority.

Article 4:
In general, the National Authority has the following objectives:
a) the regular follow up of the implementation of the Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and the use of chemical weapons and on their destruction signed in Paris, on 13 January 1993,
b) to ensure coordination between national authorities and the Technical Secretariat of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and with the member states of this Organization individually. 
Rwanda, Prime Minister’s Order Establishing the National Authority for the Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, 2005, Articles 1 and 4.

Saudi Arabia
In 2004, in its second periodic report to the Committee on the Rights of the Child, Saudi Arabia stated:
The laws in force in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia … [outlaw] the deployment of chemical and bacteriological weapons during military operations in accordance with the 1925 Geneva [Gas] Protocol and the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 
Saudi Arabia, Second periodic report to the Committee on the Rights of the Child, 21 April 2005, UN Doc. CRC/C/136/Add.1, submitted 12 November 2004, § 275.

Senegal
Senegal’s Penal Code (1965), as amended in 2007, states that the following constitute war crimes:
b) [O]ther serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict, within the established framework of international law, namely, any of the following acts:

15. using … asphyxiating, poisonous or similar gases and all analogous liquids, materials or weaponry. 
Senegal, Penal Code, 1965, as amended in 2007, Article 431-3(b)(15).

Singapore
Singapore’s Chemical Weapons (Prohibition) Act (2000) provides:
Any person who
(a) uses a chemical weapon;
(b) develops or produces a chemical weapon;
(c) acquires, stockpiles or retains a chemical weapon;
(d) transfers, directly or indirectly, a chemical weapon to another person;
(f) knowingly assists, encourages or induces, in any way, another person to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under the Convention;

shall be guilty of an offence and shall on conviction be punished with
(i) imprisonment for a term which may extend to life imprisonment, and
(ii) a fine not exceeding $1 million. 
Singapore, Chemical Weapons (Prohibition) Act, 2000, Section 8.

Slovenia
Slovenia’s National Assembly passed a Chemical Weapons Law through a fast-track procedure in 1999. 
Slovenia, Chemical Weapons Law, 1999.

South Africa
South Africa’s Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act (1993) provides:
The Minister may, by notice in the Gazette, determine the general policy to be followed with a view to:

(d) the imposition of a prohibition, whether for offensive or defensive purposes, on the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, maintenance or transit of any weapons of mass destruction. 
South Africa, Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act, 1993, Section 2(1)(d).

South Africa’s ICC Act (2002) reproduces the war crimes listed in the 1998 ICC Statute, including in international armed conflicts: “employing asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials or devices”. 
South Africa, ICC Act, 2002, Schedule 1, Part 3, § (b)(xviii).

Spain
Spain’s Penal Code (1995), as amended in 2003, states:
1. Any person who manufactures, commercializes or stockpiles weapons or munitions without authorization by law or competent authority shall be punished:
1.° In the case of … chemical weapons … , with five to ten years’ imprisonment for promoters and organizers, and three to five years’ imprisonment in the case of accessories.

3.° The same penalties shall apply, considering the perpetrators’ degree of participation, to the trafficking of … chemical … weapons.
2. The same penalties established for point 1.° in sub-section 1 shall apply to whoever develops or uses chemical … weapons or makes preparations for their use. 
Spain, Penal Code, 1995, as amended on 25 November 2003, Article 566(1)–(2).

The Penal Code also states:
1. … Stockpiling of chemical …weapons is understood as the manufacture, commercialization or possession of these weapons.
2. … Chemical … weapons are understood as defined by the international treaties and covenants to which Spain is a party.
The development of chemical … weapons is understood as any activity comprising scientific or technical research or examination leading to the creation of a new chemical … weapon or the modification of an existing chemical … weapon. 
Spain, Penal Code, 1995, as amended on 25 November 2003, Article 567(1)–(2).

Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka’s Chemical Weapons Convention Act (2007) states:
19. (1) Any person who—
(a) uses a chemical weapon;
(b) develops or produces a chemical weapon;
(c) acquires, stockpiles or retains a chemical weapon;
(d) transfers, directly or indirectly, any chemical weapon to another person;
(e) engages in any military preparations to use a chemical weapon;
(f) knowingly assists, encourages or induces, any prohibited activity; or
(g) uses any riot control agent as a method of warfare;
shall be guilty of an offence under this Act and be punished with imprisonment of either description for a period not exceeding twenty years and a fine not exceeding one million rupees.

47. In this Act unless the context otherwise requires –

“chemical weapon” means the following, together or separately: –
(a) toxic chemical and their precursors, except where intended for purposes not prohibited under the Convention, as long as the types and quantities are consistent with such purposes;
(b) munitions and devices, specifically designed to cause death or other harm through the toxic properties of those toxic chemicals specified in subparagraph (a), which would be released as a result of the employment of such munitions and devices; and
(c) Any equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of munitions and devices specified in subparagraph (b). 
Sri Lanka, Chemical Weapons Convention Act, 2007, Sections 19 and 47.

Sweden
Sweden’s Penal Code (1962), as amended in 1998, provides:
A person who:
1. develops, produces or by other means acquires, stores or holds chemical weapons or directly or indirectly transfers chemical weapons to another person,
2. uses chemical weapons,
3. participates in military preparations for the use of chemical weapons,
… shall be sentenced, if the act is not regarded as a war crime against international law, for unlawful handling of chemical weapons to [punishment]. 
Sweden, Penal Code, 1962, as amended in 1998, Chapter 22, § 6a(1)–(3).
[emphasis in original]
Switzerland
Switzerland’s Military Criminal Code (1927), as amended, punishes “whoever will intentionally endanger somebody’s life or physical integrity by means of … toxic gases”.  
Switzerland, Military Criminal Code, 1927, as amended, Article 162.

Switzerland’s Chemical Weapons Implementation Order (1994) provides:
It shall be prohibited:
a. to develop, produce, acquire, deliver to anyone, import, export, procure the transit of or stockpile chemical weapons within the meaning of Article II of the Chemical Weapons Convention, engage in the brokerage thereof or otherwise dispose of them;
b. to induce anyone to commit an act mentioned under letter a;
c. to facilitate the commission of an act mentioned under letter a. 
Switzerland, Chemical Weapons Implementation Order, 1994, Article 1; see also Federal Law on War Equipment as amended, 1996, Article 7.

Switzerland’s Law on the Support of the Elimination and Non-Proliferation of Chemical Weapons (2003) states: “The present law governs the Confederation’s support of the international efforts [to achieve] the universal and environmentally friendly elimination and non-proliferation of chemical weapons.” 
Switzerland, Law on the Support of the Elimination and Non-Proliferation of Chemical Weapons, 2003, Article 1.

Switzerland’s Ordinance on the Control of Chemical Products (2007), as amended in 2010, states: “The present ordinance … aims at preventing chemical products from being used to make chemical weapons.” 
Switzerland, Ordinance on the Control of Chemical Products, 2007, as amended in 2010, Article 1.

Tajikistan
Tajikistan’s Criminal Code (1998) punishes the
development, production, acquisition, storage, transportation, sending or sale of … chemical … weapons of mass destruction, prohibited by an international treaty, as well as transfer to any other State, which does not possess nuclear weapons, of initial or special fissionable material, technologies, which can knowingly be used to produce weapons of mass destruction, or providing anyone with any other kind of weapons of mass destruction or components necessary for their production, prohibited by an international treaty. 
Tajikistan, Criminal Code, 1998, Articles 397; see also Article 399 (biocide) and Article 405 (use of weapons of mass destruction prohibited by an international treaty).

Trinidad and Tobago
Under Trinidad and Tobago’s Draft ICC Act (1999), it is a punishable offence to commit a war crime as defined in Article 8(2)(b)(xviii) of the 1998 ICC Statute. 
Trinidad and Tobago, Draft ICC Act, 1999, Section 5(1)(a).

Ukraine
Pursuant to Ukraine’s Criminal Code (2001), “the use of weapons of mass destruction prohibited by international instruments consented to be binding by the [parliament] of Ukraine” is a war crime. 
Ukraine, Criminal Code, 2001, Article 439(1).

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
The UK Chemical Weapons Act (1996) provides:
(1) No person shall-
(a) use a chemical weapon;
(b) develop or produce a chemical weapon;
(c) have a chemical weapon in his possession;
(d) participate in the transfer of a chemical weapon;
(e) engage in military preparations, or in preparations of a military nature, intending to use a chemical weapon. 
United Kingdom, Chemical Weapons Act, 1996, Section 2(1).

Under the UK ICC Act (2001), it is a punishable offence to commit a war crime as defined in Article 8(2)(b)(xviii) of the 1998 ICC Statute. 
United Kingdom, ICC Act, 2001, Sections 50(1) and 51(1) (England and Wales) and Section 58(1) (Northern Ireland).

United States of America
The US Chemical Weapons Act (1998) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly
(1) to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, transfer directly or indirectly, receive, stockpile, retain, own, possess, or use, or threaten to use, any chemical weapon; or
(2) to assist or induce, in any way, any person to violate paragraph (1), or to attempt or conspire to violate paragraph (1). 
United States, Chemical Weapons Act, 1998, § 229.

Uruguay
Uruguay’s Law on Cooperation with the ICC (2006) states:
26.2. Persons and objects affected by the war crimes set out in the present provision are persons and objects which international law protects in international or internal armed conflict.
26.3. The following are war crimes:

26. Employing asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials or devices.

46. Using chemical … or other weapons of mass destruction, irrespective of their nature. 
Uruguay, Law on Cooperation with the ICC, 2006, Articles 26.2, 26.3.26 and 26.3.46.

Viet Nam
Viet Nam’s Law on the Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (2005) provides:
Article 3 – Prohibited acts
1. For chemical weapons
a. Developing, producing, otherwise acquiring, stockpiling and using chemical weapons;
b. Exporting, importing chemical weapons directly or indirectly with any organizations or individuals;
c. Participating in any military preparations to use chemical weapons;
d. Supporting, encouraging or inducing, in any way, any organizations or individuals to engage in any activity prohibited under the Convention. 
Viet Nam, Law on the Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, 2005, § 3(1)(a)–(d).

Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal Republic of
Under the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s Penal Code (1976), as amended in 2001, the use of, or the order to use, “means or methods of combat prohibited under the rules of international law, during a war or an armed conflict” is a war crime. 
Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal Republic of, Penal Code, 1976, as amended in 2001, Article 148(1).

The commentary on this provision specifies: “The following weapons and means of combat are considered to be prohibited: … war gases.” 
Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal Republic of, Penal Code, 1976, as amended in 2001, commentary on Article 148(1).

Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe has incorporated the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention into national law by means of the Chemical Weapons Prohibition Act (1998). 
Zimbabwe, Chemical Weapons Prohibition Act, 1998.

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Colombia
In 1995, in a ruling on the constitutionality of the 1977 Additional Protocol II, Colombia’s Constitutional Court stated in relation to the prohibition on the use of weapons of a nature to cause unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury:
Although none of the treaty rules expressly applicable to internal conflicts prohibits indiscriminate attacks or the use of certain weapons, the Taormina Declaration consequently considers that the bans (established partly by customary law and partly by treaty law) on the use of chemical … weapons … apply to non-international armed conflicts, not only because they form part of customary international law but also because they evidently derive from the general rule prohibiting attacks against the civilian population. 
Colombia, Constitutional Court, Constitutional Case No. C-225/95, Judgment, 18 May 1995, § 23.

Japan
In its judgment in the Shimoda case in 1963, Japan’s District Court of Tokyo held that the use of poisonous gases was prohibited. 
Japan, District Court of Tokyo, Shimoda case, Judgment, 7 December 1963, § 11.

Netherlands
In its judgment in the Van Anraat case in 2005, the Hague District Court of the Netherlands stated:
It has been established that the accused, consciously and solely acting in pursuit of gain, has made an essential contribution to the chemical warfare program of Iraq during the nineteen eighties. His contribution has enabled, or at least facilitated, a great number of attacks with mustard gas on defenseless civilians. These attacks represent very serious war crimes. 
Netherlands, Hague District Court, Van Anraat case, Judgment, 23 December 2005, § 17.

In its judgment in 2007, the Hague Court of Appeal stated:
As results from the case file (in the period referred to in the charges), the Iraqi regime carried out multiple attacks with (among others) mustard gas during the war with Iran on places in that country, as well as on the border region between Iraq and Iran, where Kurdish population groups lived that were suspected of collaboration with the Iranian enemy. Those attacks caused the death of at least thousands of civilians (that did not participate in the conflict) and caused permanent and severe health problems to very many persons. It is beyond doubt that the regime in Bagdad by doing so committed extensive and extremely gross violations of the international humanitarian law by using a weapon that was already prohibited by the Geneva (Gas) Protocol of 17 June 1925.
The defendant has made an essential contribution to these violations – at a time that many, if not all other suppliers “pulled out” with regard to the increasing international pressure – by supplying many times in the course of several years (among other matters) very large quantities of a precursor for mustard gas; in doing so the defendant made significant profits. Those supplies enabled the Iraqi regime to (almost) continue their deadly (air) attacks in full force during a number of years. Apparently the defendant did not give his deliberate support to the aforementioned gross violations out of sympathy for the targets of the regime, but – as it should be assumed – the defendant acted exclusively in pursuit of large gains and fully neglected the consequences of his actions. Even today the defendant does not show any sense of guilt or any compassion for the numerous victims of the mustard gas attacks.
The Court recognizes that the proven offences were committed over more than twenty years ago and that the defendant is a man of advanced age, who is to be expected to spend a large part of the remaining years of his life in prison. The Court will only be able to attach limited weight to this slightly mitigating circumstance. In this case the most important aspect concerning the determination of the appropriate sanction – considering the extreme gross violation of the principles of humanitarian law that took place and the important supporting role that was played by the defendant – is to point out to the victims and survivors, as well as to the international legal community, how much value is put on the actions of the defendant and what severe punishment can only be the consequence of these actions. 
Netherlands, Hague Court of Appeal, Van Anraat case, Judgment, 9 May 2007, § 16.

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Afghanistan
At the Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Other Interested States in 1989, Afghanistan expressed its commitment to the non-use of chemical weapons, stating:
Relying on the belief that the production, development, and propagation of chemical weapons should be prevented and that such weapons should be completely eliminated, the Republic of Afghanistan has acquired no chemical weapons of any type whatsoever. It does not and will not in the future seek to acquire such weapons, the use of which it considers a crime against humanity. 
“Foreign Ministry Spokesman Denies Use of Chemical Weapons”, as translated in JPRS-TAC-89-019, 9 May 1989, p. 20.

In a speech delivered to the Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Other Interested States in 1989, the Afghan Foreign Minister stated that Afghanistan, while once again confirming its pledges on the non-use and elimination of chemical weapons, announced that it would never resort to the production, use, development, storage or export of chemical weapons, and that it would not allow any country to pass chemical weapons through Afghan territory. The Foreign Minister added that Afghanistan would sign the convention on halting chemical weapons as soon as it was completed. 
“Foreign Minister Returns From Paris Conference”, Kabul Radio, as translated in FBIS-NES-89-006, 10 January 1989.

Albania
At the Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Other Interested States in 1989, the Albanian Minister of Foreign Affairs stated: “Albania not only is and always has been in favour of banning the production, storage, and use of chemical weapons, but is in favour of their total elimination.” 
“Action To Implement BW Ban Urged”, as translated in JPRS-TAC-89-003, 27 January 1989.

Algeria
At the CDDH, Algeria supported the Philippine amendment (see infra) because “it was a simple reaffirmation of the principles of positive humanitarian law”. 
Algeria, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VI, CDDH/SR.44, 30 May 1977, p. 286, § 37.

In 1992, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly dealing mainly with the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, the negotiation of which had been concluded by the Conference on Disarmament, Algeria expressed “its traditional position” for a complete ban on chemical weapons and their use. 
Algeria, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/ 47/PV.10, 20 October 1992, p. 27.

At the 1992 Session of the Conference on Disarmament, Algeria stated that it “has always been, and remains, in favour of a total ban on chemical weapons and their use”. It added:
Algeria is not developing and does not produce chemical weapons, and it is not seeking to acquire them. It remains profoundly convinced that the best way to curb the threat of these weapons is to banish them once and for all, by means of this international convention. In this regard, it will be Algeria’s honour and duty to be among the original signatories. 
Algeria, Statement before the Conference on Disarmament, UN Doc. CD/ PV.621, 21 May 1992, p. 5.

At the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, Algeria made statements in support of the object and purpose of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. 
Algeria, Statement at the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, 6–23 May 1997.

Argentina
In 1988, in a statement before the Fifteenth Special Session of the UN General Assembly, the President of Argentina confirmed that “Argentina does not possess chemical-weapon arsenals” and that “it will continue to commit all its efforts to the conclusion of a convention on chemical weapons”. 
Argentina, Statement by the President before the Fifteenth Special Session of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/S-15/PV.2, 1 June 1988, § 44.

In 1989, in a reply to a note verbale of the UN Secretary-General on the subject of chemical weapons, Argentina declared that it did not possess chemical weapons. 
Argentina, Reply to a note verbale of the UN Secretary-General, referred to in Report of the Secretary-General on respect for the right to life: elimination of chemical weapons, prepared in accordance with UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1988/27, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/4, 17 August 1989, § 98.

During the 1991 Session of the Conference on Disarmament, Argentina stated that it “does not possess and has never possessed or used chemical weapons”. 
Argentina, Statement before the Conference on Disarmament, UN Doc. CD/PV. 596, 20 June 1991, p. 11.

In a press communiqué issued in 1997, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Argentina stated:
Argentina … does not have any chemical weapons installations or deposits in its territory. Such a declaration clearly conveys to the international community Argentina’s political will to abide by the convention provisions within the framework of its foreign policy, which is committed to disarmament and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 
“Foreign Ministry says no chemical weapons installations on Argentine Territory”, Noticias Argentinas, Buenos Aires, 28 May 1997, as translated in BBC-SWB, 30 May 1997.

Armenia
At the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, Armenia emphasized the importance of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention and stated its commitment and its determination to contribute actively to the realization of the Convention’s aims. It reconfirmed its good intentions by once more emphasizing its commitment to global chemical disarmament. 
Armenia, Statement at the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, 6–23 May 1997.

Australia
In 1966, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Australia supported the principle that international law prohibits the use of chemical weapons as a result of the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol. 
Australia, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/SR.1461, 23 November 1966, p. 202.

In April 1982, in response to a parliamentary question on notice regarding chemical and biological defence research, the Minister for Defence stated: “It is a matter of government policy, stated publicly on a number of occasions, that the development, production or stockpiling of chemical weapons is not undertaken or planned to be undertaken.” 
Australia, House of Representatives, Minister for Defence, Question on Notice: Chemical and Biological Defence Research, Hansard, 21 April 1982.

On 25 March 1988, in response to a Question Without Notice in the Australian Senate in relation to the use of chemical weapons in the Iran–Iraq War, the Minister representing the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade stated:
Australia has repeatedly condemned the use of chemical weapons and stated unequivocally that their use cannot be justified in any circumstances. We share the international community’s concern that violations of the 1925 Geneva [Gas] Protocol constitute a very serious erosion of international norms. 
Australia, Senate, Minister representing the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Question Without Notice: Iran–Iraq War, Hansard, 25 March 1988.

In 1989, Australia co-sponsored a draft resolution in the UN Commission on Human Rights which expressed “grave concern about reports of killing of unarmed Kurdish civilians, in particular by military attacks during 1988 using, inter alia, chemical weapons and causing mass exodus to neighbouring countries”. 
Australia, Draft resolution on the situation of human rights in Iraq, UN Doc. E/CN.4/ 1989/L.82, 3 March 1989, § 2.

In 1995, in a statement in the Senate, Australia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs said that Australia expressly condemned the use of chemical weapons by terrorist groups. 
Australia, Senate, Statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 27 March 1995, Debates, Vol. 170, p. 2107.

In its oral pleadings before the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons case in 1995, Australia stated:
Given the ever present threat of destruction that is inherently associated with nuclear weapons, and the way in which that threat is now so universally understood, Australia submits the attitude of the international community is that there are some weapons the very existence of which is inconsistent with fundamental general principles of humanity. In the case of weapons of this type, international law does not merely prohibit their threat or use. It prohibits even their acquisition or manufacture and by extension their possession. Such an attitude has been manifested in the case of other weapons of mass destruction. Both the 1972 Biological Weapons and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention do not merely prohibit the use of biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction, but prevent their very existence … Clearly, this is a strong international statement that the use of such weapons would be contrary to fundamental general principles of humanity. The approach of both conventions indicates a further conviction that the threats posed by certain types of weapons are so grave that they should be eliminated altogether, with their mere possession by a State made unlawful. 
Australia, Oral pleadings before the ICJ, Nuclear Weapons case, 30 October 1995, Verbatim Record CR 95/22, pp. 49–50, §§ 38–40.

At the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, Australia stated that the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention would serve both the international community’s security and economic interests. It added that it hoped that the Chemical Weapons Convention would lead to a world free from the scourge of chemical weapons. 
Australia, Statement at the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, 6–23 May 1997.

Austria
At the 1986 Session of the Conference on Disarmament, Austria stated: “Austria was among the first Parties that signed the 1925 Geneva [Gas] Protocol. Furthermore, Austria renounced the possession of chemical … weapons in the State Treaty of 1955.” 
Austria, Statement before the Conference on Disarmament, UN Doc. CD/PV.371, 17 July 1986, p. 5.

At a later session in 1988, Austria stated that it “does not possess or produce chemical weapons and has no facilities to produce such weapons”. 
Austria, Statement before the Conference on Disarmament, UN Doc. CD/PV.471, 4 August 1988, p. 4.

In 1991, during a debate in the UN Security Council on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, Austria stated that Resolution 687 was a step “towards the objective of a global ban on chemical weapons”. 
Austria, Statement before the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/PV.2981, 3 April 1991, p. 119–120.

In 1992, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly dealing mainly with the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, the negotiation of which had been concluded by the Conference on Disarmament, Austria stated that the elimination of chemical weapons was important. 
Austria, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/ 47/PV.5, 14 October 1992, p. 10.

Bahrain
In 1991, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Bahrain stated that the Middle East had to be free from chemical weapons. 
Bahrain, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/46 /PV.20, 28 October 1991, p. 32.

At the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, Bahrain expressed support for the goals of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention and stated its full commitment to the provisions in the Convention and promised full cooperation with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. 
Bahrain, Statement at the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, 6–23 May 1997.

Bangladesh
At the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, Bangladesh stated that it welcomed the entry into force of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention and hoped that it would be the first in a series that would eliminate weapons of mass destruction from the face of the earth. 
Bangladesh, Statement at the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, 6–23 May 1997.

Belarus
In 1966, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Belarus supported Hungary’s view that the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol had developed into customary international law and that the use of chemical weapons constituted an international crime. 
Belarus, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/ SR.1454, 15 November 1966, p. 168.

In 1970, in the context of the adoption of UN General Assembly Resolution 2444 (XXIII), Belarus stated:
The need for all States without exception to abide, in any armed conflict, by the existing international conventions defining and limiting the means, ways and methods of waging war assumes particular importance. Among these conventions are … the Geneva Protocol of 1925. 
Belarus, Reply dated 2 March 1970 to the UN Secretary-General regarding the preparation of the study requested in paragraph 2 of General Assembly Resolution 2444 (XXIII), annexed to Report of the Secretary-General on respect for human rights in armed conflicts, UN Doc. A/8052, 18 September 1970, Annex III, p. 118, § 5.

In 1977, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Belarus supported a complete ban on chemical weapons. 
Belarus, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/ 32/PV.29, 11 October 1977, p. 11.

In 1987, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Belarus stated that it was committed to a global ban on chemical weapons. 
Belarus, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/ 42/PV.11, 19 October 1987, p. 36.

In 1993, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Belarus referred to a declaration in which all States emerging from the former Soviet Union expressed their support for chemical disarmament. 
Belarus, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/ 48/SR.8, 22 October 1993, p. 2.

At the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, Belarus pointed out the large amount of work that had already been done by the government of Belarus in the area of chemical weapons destruction. Furthermore, it stated that it was prepared to work closely with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to contribute to the implementation of the provisions of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention and hence to the strengthening of international peace and security. 
Belarus, Statement at the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, 6–23 May 1997.

Belgium
In 1980, in a statement before the Lower House of Parliament, Belgium’s Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that disapproval of the hostile use of chemical agents in combat, as well as the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol, was part of customary law. 
Belgium, Lower House of Parliament, Statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bulletin des Questions et Réponses, 1979–1980 Session, No. 36, 8 August 1980.

In 1987, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Belgium stated that the use of chemical weapons in the Iran–Iraq War against civilian populations was a “particularly shocking violation of the 1925 Geneva [Gas] Protocol”. 
Belgium, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/ 42/PV.6, 15 October 1987, p. 42.

In 1989, Belgium co-sponsored a draft resolution in the UN Commission on Human Rights which expressed “grave concern about reports of killing of unarmed Kurdish civilians, in particular by military attacks during 1988 using, inter alia, chemical weapons and causing mass exodus to neighbouring countries”. 
Belgium, Draft resolution on the situation of human rights in Iraq, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1989/L.82, 3 March 1989, § 2.

At the 1989 Session of the Government-Industry Conference against Chemical Weapons, Belgium stated that it
attaches the greatest importance to the unanimous expression of a willingness to respect the Geneva Gas Protocol on the part of all participants. As we are moving towards a treaty which totally prohibits chemical weapons we all have to contribute to the realization of this goal, the finalization of the draft treaty, universal adherence and confidence in its being respected.
Belgium added:
Belgium has no chemical weapons and has no intention to acquire any. It is taking the necessary steps to eliminate, in optimal conditions, the chemical bombs dating from the First World War which are periodically found on its soil. 
Belgium, Statement at the Government-Industry Conference against Chemical Weapons, Canberra, 12–22 September 1989, Final Record, p. 280, §§ 6 and 8.

Benin
In 1994, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Benin urged the elimination of chemical weapons. 
Benin, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/49/PV.3, 17 October 1994, p. 21.

Botswana
The Report on the Practice of Botswana states that Botswana has no capacity in chemical warfare and that it is opposed to chemical weapons. 
Report on the Practice of Botswana, 1998, Additional information on Chapter 3.4.

Brazil
At the 1985 and 1988 sessions of the Conference on Disarmament, Brazil stated that it “does not possess and does not intend to develop, produce or stockpile” chemical weapons. 
Brazil, Statement before the Conference on Disarmament, UN Doc. CD/PV.323, 23 July 1985; Statement before the Conference on Disarmament, UN Doc. CD/PV.460, 26 April 1988, p. 3.

In 1993, the Permanent Representative of Brazil to the UN in Geneva stated: “Since the time when chemical weapons were first used, the Brazilian Government has consistently argued against the use of these and all other inhumane means of warfare.” He added: “The word ‘inhumane’ is employed here, in accordance with common usage, to mean weapons that cause unnecessary devastation and suffering.” 
Celso L. N. Amorim, “The Chemical Weapons Convention and the Security and the Development Needs of Brazil”, Disarmament, Vol. 16, No. 1, 1993, p. 111.

At the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, Brazil emphasized the importance of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention and stated its commitment and its determination to contribute actively to the realization of the Convention’s aims. It reconfirmed its good intentions by once more emphasizing its commitment to global chemical disarmament. 
Brazil, Statement at the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, 6–23 May 1997.

In 2005, Brazil’s president adopted the National Defence Policy, which states: “Brazil supports an international order based on … the prohibition of chemical … weapons”. 
Brazil, National Defence Policy, approved by decree of the President of the Republic, Decree No. 5.484, 30 June 2005, published in Diário Oficial da União, 1 July 2005, § 4.7.

Brunei Darussalam
In 1989, in a reply to a note verbale of the UN Secretary-General on the subject of chemical weapons, Brunei Darussalam declared that it did not possess chemical weapons. 
Brunei Darussalam, Reply to a note verbale of the UN Secretary-General, referred to in Report of the Secretary-General on respect for the right to life: elimination of chemical weapons, prepared in accordance with UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1988/27, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/4, 17 August 1989, § 98.

Bulgaria
In 1966, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Bulgaria supported Hungary’s view that the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol had developed into customary international law and that the use of chemical weapons constituted an international crime. 
Bulgaria, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/SR.1454, 15 November 1966, p. 165.

In 1977, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Bulgaria stated that chemical weapons had been morally and politically condemned for a long time. 
Bulgaria, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/32/PV.24, 7 October 1977, p. 66.

In 1987, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Bulgaria stated that it was committed to a global ban on chemical weapons.  
Bulgaria, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/42/PV.22, 27 October 1987, p. 12.

During the 1988 and 1990 sessions of the Conference on Disarmament, Bulgaria stated that it did not possess, manufacture or stockpile chemical weapons. 
Bulgaria, Statement before the Conference on Disarmament, UN Doc. CD/PV.457, 14 April 1988, p. 8; Statement before the Conference on Disarmament, UN Doc. CD/1017, 19 July 1990, p. 8.

In 1991, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Bulgaria stated that it neither possessed nor produced chemical weapons. 
Bulgaria, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/46/PV.8, 18 October 1991, p. 35.

In a declaration of 1 February 1996, the Bulgarian government stated: “There have not been stockpiles of chemical … weapons on the territory of Bulgaria in the past 50 years.” The declaration was requested by the 28 member countries of the Australia Group, to which Bulgaria had applied for admission. 
Bulgaria, Government declaration, 1 February 1996, BTA News Agency, Sofia, 9 February 1996, as translated in BBC-SWB, 11 February 1996, reprinted in Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin, Issue No. 31, March 1996.

Burkina Faso
In 1987, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Burkina Faso stated that it was committed to a global ban on chemical weapons. 
Burkina Faso, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/42/PV.30, 3 November 1987, p. 33.

Burma
In 1977, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Burma explained that the elimination of chemical weapons was a goal for the Burma Socialist Party. 
Burma, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/ 32/PV.10, 28 September 1977, p. 2.

At the 1988 Session of the Conference on Disarmament, Burma declared that it “does not possess, develop, produce, stockpile or use chemical weapons. Nor will it do so in the future.” 
Burma, Statement before the Conference on Disarmament, UN Doc. CD/PV.452, 29 March 1988, p. 9.

Cambodia
In 1991, it was reported that in Cambodia “the Phnom Penh government accused the guerrillas of using chemical weapons for the first time in the 12 year-old civil war, by referring to artillery shells containing ‘toxic substances’ being fired”. 
Asian Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 1, 1991, p. 353.

Cameroon
At the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, Cameroon emphasized the importance of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention and stated its commitment to creating a world free of chemical weapons. 
Cameroon, Statement at the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, 6–23 May 1997.

Canada
In 1966, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Canada supported the principle that international law prohibited the use of chemical weapons as a result of the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol. 
Canada, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/ SR.1461, 23 November 1966, p. 203.

At the CDDH, Canada voted against the Philippine amendment (see infra) because “the particular weapons are forbidden by international law and their use, other than by way of reprisal, already constitutes a war crime”. 
Canada, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VI, CDDH/SR.44, 30 May 1977, p. 298.

In 1977, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Canada, while introducing the draft of UN General Assembly Resolution 32/77, stated that the world community “long ago reached consensus that a high priority should be accorded to early agreement on effective measures for the complete prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction”. 
Canada, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/ 32/PV.25, 7 October 1977, p. 51.

In 1989, Canada co-sponsored a draft resolution in the UN Commission on Human Rights which expressed “grave concern about reports of killing of unarmed Kurdish civilians, in particular by military attacks during 1988 using, inter alia, chemical weapons and causing mass exodus to neighbouring countries”. 
Canada, Draft resolution on the situation of human rights in Iraq, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1989/L.82, 3 March 1989, § 2.

At the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, Canada emphasized the importance of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention and stated its commitment and its determination to contribute actively to the realization of the Convention’s aims. It reconfirmed its good intentions by once more emphasizing its commitment to global chemical disarmament. 
Canada, Statement by the Speaker of the Senate at the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, 6–23 May 1997.

Chile
During the 1990 Session of the Conference on Disarmament, Chile stated that it did not produce or possess chemical weapons. 
Chile, Multilateral exchange of data relevant to the Chemical Weapons Convention submitted to the Conference on Disarmament, UN Doc. CD/1042-CD/CW/WP.322 , 3 December 1990.

At the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, Chile emphasized the importance of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention and stated its commitment and its determination to contribute actively to the realization of the Convention’s aims. It reconfirmed its good intentions by once more emphasizing its commitment to global chemical disarmament. 
Chile, Statement at the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, 6–23 May 1997.

China
At the Meeting on Human Environment in 1972, China condemned the United States for causing “unprecedented damage to the human environment” in South Vietnam through the use of “chemical toxic and poisonous gas”. 
China, Address to the Meeting on Human Environment, 10 June 1972, Selected Documents of the Chinese Delegation to the United Nations, 1972, World Knowledge Press, Beijing, pp. 257–258.

In 1986, during a debate in the UN Security Council, China stated that it “consistently opposed the use of chemical and toxic weapons at any place and time”. 
China, Statement before the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/PV.2666, 24 February 1986, pp. 29–30.

In 1987, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, China stated that it had “consistently” stood for the complete prohibition of chemical weapons. 
China, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/ 42/PV.6, 15 October 1987, p. 32.

In 1991, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, China stated that it neither possessed nor produced chemical weapons and that it had always stood for a complete prohibition of chemical weapons. 
China, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/ 46/PV.9, 21 October 1991, pp. 15 and 19.

At the signing ceremony of the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1993, China’s Minister of Foreign Affairs stated: “China consistently supports the absolute ban and total destruction of chemical weapons.” 
China, Address to the signing ceremony of the Chemical Weapons Convention by the Chinese Foreign Minister, 13 January 1993, Chinese Yearbook of International Law, 1994, p. 375.

Before the adoption of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, China unilaterally declared that it would not produce, possess or export chemical weapons. 
China, Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China with regard to the Yinhe Incident, 4 September 1993, Chinese Yearbook of International Law, 1994, p. 397.

In 1997, at the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, China stated that “it always advocated the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical weapons”. 
China, Statement at the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, 6–23 May 1997.

In 2004, in a position paper submitted to the UN General Assembly, China stated:
China stands for complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all kinds of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) including nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and firmly opposes the proliferation of WMDs and their means of delivery.

China supports the purposes and objectives of the Chemical Weapons Convention and has been fulfilling its obligations under the Convention in a serious and strict manner. China calls upon those countries that have not signed or ratified the Convention to do so as soon as possible. The States Parties that possess chemical weapons and those that abandoned such weapons on the territories of other State Parties shall make further efforts to speed up the destruction process. 
China, Position Paper at the 59th Session of the UN General Assembly, 5 August 2004.

In 2004, in a white paper on “China’s National Defense in 2004”, China stated: “China continues to earnestly fulfil its obligations under the [1993 Chemical Weapons Convention].” 
China, White Paper of the Government of the People’s Republic of China: China’s National Defense in 2004, December 2004.

In 2005, in a position paper on UN reforms, China stated:
- China has always stood for the comprehensive prohibition and thorough destruction of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and opposed any forms of proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems …
- China is in favor of strengthening the universality of the BTWC [Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention] and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). 
China, Position Paper of the People’s Republic of China on the United Nations Reforms, 7 June 2005.

In 2005, in a white paper on “China’s Endeavours for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation”, China stated:
China stands for complete prohibition and thorough destruction of biological and chemical weapons and firmly opposes proliferation of such weapons.

China actively participated in the negotiations of the [1993 Chemical Weapons Convention] and had called strongly for addressing the issues of prohibiting the use of chemical weapons and the proper disposal of abandoned chemical weapons within the framework of the Convention, making it an international legal instrument truly for the complete ban of chemical weapons. 
China, White Paper of the Government of the People’s Republic of China: China’s Endeavours for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, 1 September 2005.

In 2006, at the 11th session of the Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, China stated:
China has always been committed to the object and purpose of the [1993 Chemical Weapons Convention], and honoured its obligations under the Convention … For the international community, the Convention carries with it an ideal of a world free of chemical weapons. 
China, Statement by the Permanent Representative of the People’s Republic of China to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons at the 11th Session of the Conference of the States Parties, 5 December 2006.

In 2007, at the 12th session of the Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, China stated:
China has all along supported the object and purpose of the [1993 Chemical Weapons Convention] and fulfilled earnestly its obligations under the Convention.

Early and complete elimination of all weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons, conforms to the common interest of all peoples. 
China, Statement by Permanent Representative of the People’s Republic of China to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons at the 12th Session of the Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, 5 November 2007.

Colombia
In 1977, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Colombia supported a complete ban on chemical weapons. 
Colombia, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/32/PV.21, 5 October 1977, p. 11.

At the 1981 Session of the Government-Industry Conference against Chemical Weapons, Colombia stated:
The Colombian Government, as it represents a country which does not manufacture or possess, nor intends to manufacture or possess, chemical weapons, as well as other weapons of mass destruction, cannot but condemn the production, the possession, transfer and the use of such weapons. 
Colombia, Final Statement at the Government-Industry Conference against Chemical Weapons, GICCW/P/72 (Prov), Canberra, 21 September 1981, pp. 1–3.

In 1989, in reply to a note verbale of the UN Secretary-General on the subject of chemical weapons, Colombia declared that it did not possess chemical weapons. 
Colombia, Reply to a note verbale of the UN Secretary-General, referred to in Report of the Secretary-General on respect for the right to life: elimination of chemical weapons, prepared in accordance with UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1988/27, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/4, 17 August 1989, § 98.

Côte d’Ivoire
At the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, Côte d’Ivoire made statements in support of the object and purpose of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. 
Côte d’Ivoire, Statement at the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, 6–23 May 1997.

Croatia
At the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, Croatia stated that it “has never possessed or planned to produce chemical weapons nor even contemplated the idea of adhering to any form or method of chemical warfare, either tactical or strategic”. It also stated that it “supports the provisions in the [Chemical Weapons Convention] and is in the middle of incorporating parts of it into its own national law”. 
Croatia, Statement at the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, 6–23 May 1997.

Cuba
In 1977, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Cuba supported a complete ban on chemical weapons. 
Cuba, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/ 32/PV.23, 6 October 1977, p. 61.

In 1991, during a debate in the UN Security Council, Cuba stated that it was in favour of the “universal elimination of … chemical … weapons”. 
Cuba, Statement before the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/PV.2994, 17 June 1991, p. 23.

During the 1991 Session of the Conference on Disarmament, Cuba stated:
For Cuba, a country which does not possess chemical weapons, the conclusion of a non-discriminatory convention which prohibits the development, stockpiling, acquisition, transfer and use of these weapons and makes the necessary provision for the destruction of existing stockpiles, production facilities and launching systems, is not only of crucial importance but is an essential guarantee in its perception of security. 
Cuba, Statement before the Conference on Disarmament, UN Doc. CD/PV.603, 22 August 1991, p. 4.

In 1991, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Cuba stated that it neither possessed nor produced chemical weapons. 
Cuba, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/ 46/PV.10, 21 October 1991, p. 6.

At the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, Cuba stated that it was in favour of global eradication of chemical weapons and stressed the importance of universal adherence to the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. 
Cuba, Statement at the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, 6–23 May 1997.

In 2010, in a statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, the representative of Cuba stated:
Cuba emphasizes its commitment with the strict application of the [1993] Chemical Weapons Convention … . The total destruction of the chemical stockpiles is the most important task of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. This Organization has, in addition, an important role in the promotion of the economic and technological progress of the State Parties, particularly of the less developed ones. 
Cuba, Statement by the representative of Cuba before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, 8 October 2010.

Cyprus
In 1966, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Cyprus supported the principle that international law prohibits the use of chemical weapons as a result of the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol. 
Cyprus, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/ SR.1455, 16 November 1966, p. 175.

Czechoslovakia
In 1966, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Czechoslovakia supported Hungary’s view that the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol had developed into customary international law and that the use of chemical weapons constituted an international crime. 
Czechoslovakia, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/SR.1455, 16 November 1966, p. 172.

In 1989, in reply to a note verbale of the UN Secretary-General on the subject of chemical weapons, Czechoslovakia declared that it did not possess chemical weapons. 
Czechoslovakia, Reply to a note verbale of the UN Secretary-General, referred to in Report of the Secretary-General on respect for the right to life: elimination of chemical weapons, prepared in accordance with UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1988/27, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/4, 17 August 1989, § 98.

At the 1989 Session of the Conference on Disarmament, Czechoslovakia stated:
Two days before the Paris Conference, on 5 January, the Government of Czechoslovakia released a statement on issues concerning the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons. This statement reaffirmed that Czechoslovakia does not possess, manufacture or stockpile on its territory any chemical weapons. Nor does it own facilities for their development or production. All scientific research in this field is oriented exclusively towards protection against the effects of chemical weapons and other peaceful goals. 
Czechoslovakia, Statement before the Conference on Disarmament, UN Doc. CD/PV.488, 21 February 1989, p. 10.

At the 1992 Session of the Conference on Disarmament, Czechoslovakia said that it had repeatedly stated that “it did not possess chemical weapons, and had declared its intention to become an original signatory of the [Chemical Weapons Convention]”. 
Czechoslovakia, Statement before the Conference on Disarmament, UN Doc. CD/1136, UN Doc. CD/CW/WP.389, 27 February 1992, p. 1.

Czech Republic
At the 1996 Session of the Conference on Disarmament, the Czech Republic stated that it “has never possessed or produced chemical weapons and neither have they ever been deployed on its territory. The humane idea of their complete ban and elimination has always had our full support.” 
Czech Republic, Statement before the Conference on Disarmament, UN Doc. CD/PV.733, 28 March 1996, p. 17.

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
In a statement in January 1989, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea stated:
The government of the Republic in the future, too, as in the past, will not test, produce, store and introduce from outside nuclear and chemical weapons and will never permit the passage of foreign … chemical weapons through our territory and territorial waters and air. 
Gordon M. Burck and Charles C. Flowerree, International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation, Greenwood Press, New York, 1991, p. 397.

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
In 1995, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea stated that it was opposed “in principle” to chemical weapons. 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/50/PV.7, 19 October 1995, p. 16.

Democratic Republic of the Congo
At the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, the Democratic Republic of the Congo made statements in support of the object and purpose of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Statement by the Ambassador at the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, 6–23 May 1997.

Denmark
In 1969, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly on the question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the representative of Denmark, with respect to UN General Assembly Resolution 2603 (XXIV), stated:
154. My delegation abstained in the vote on the draft resolution [on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons under discussion] on legal grounds. We cannot accept the concept on which the resolution is based, namely, that there exist generally recognized rules of international law according to which the prohibition in the 1925 Geneva [Gas] Protocol is total. Such a concept implies that there is a general, long-standing, well-established practice, as well as a legal conviction, that the resulting conduct manifested by action or inaction is legally binding; that is to say, there exists an opinio juris. Today’s vote has proved that this is not the case …
155. Having said this, I wish to add that my Government is generally in favour of making the prohibition against chemical and bacteriological weapons as comprehensive as possible. 
Denmark, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/ PV.1717, 10 December 1969, §§ 154–155.

In 1987, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Denmark condemned, on behalf of the European Community, the use of chemical weapons in the Iran–Iraq War and chemical attacks against the civilian population. 
European Community, Statement by Denmark on behalf of the European Community before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/42/PV.4, 13 October 1987, p. 51; European Community, Statement by Denmark on behalf of the European Community before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/42/PV.25, 29 October 1987, p. 13.

In 1988, during a debate in the UN General Assembly, Denmark stated:
Many have been the calls over the years for a ban on chemical weapons. We appreciate the progress made at the Conference on Disarmament. The abhorrent use of chemical weapons has made even more urgent the task of reaching agreement on a global convention prohibiting such weapons. All sides must take an active part in the negotiations toward this end. Denmark has signed the 1925 [Geneva Gas] Protocol without conditions. We do not have any chemical weapons. We do not want any. This has always been our policy and we have declared it openly. It would be a sign of confidence and an important political signal if all countries declared their policy towards chemical weapons and whether or not they possessed those weapons. 
Denmark, Statement before the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/43/PV.7, 27 September 1988, p. 112.

In 1989, Denmark co-sponsored a draft resolution in the UN Commission on Human Rights which expressed “grave concern about reports of killing of unarmed Kurdish civilians, in particular by military attacks during 1988 using, inter alia, chemical weapons and causing mass exodus to neighbouring countries”. 
Denmark, Draft resolution on the situation of human rights in Iraq, UN Doc. E/CN.4/ 1989/L.82, 3 March 1989, § 2.

Ecuador
In 1988, in a statement before the Fifteenth Special Session of the UN General Assembly, Ecuador stated: “Among disarmament measures, Ecuador believes that priority should be given to the following: … a complete ban on the testing or production of new weapons of mass destruction, including chemical [weapons].” 
Ecuador, Statement before the Fifteenth Special Session of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/S-15/PV.2, 1 June 1988, § 158.

In 1989, in reply to a note verbale of the UN Secretary-General on the subject of chemical weapons, Ecuador declared that it did not possess chemical weapons. 
Ecuador, Reply to a note verbale of the UN Secretary-General, referred to in Report of the Secretary-General on respect for the right to life: elimination of chemical weapons, prepared in accordance with UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1988/27, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/4, 17 August 1989, § 98.

In 1991, during a debate in the UN Security Council on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, Ecuador stated:
It is … timely to insist on observance of the international agreements which prohibit the use of asphyxiating and toxic gases and bacterial warfare and which seek the universal elimination of chemical and biological weapons. 
Ecuador, Statement before the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/PV.2981, 3 April 1991, p. 107.

At the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, Ecuador stated that it was in favour of global eradication of chemical weapons and stressed the importance of universal adherence to the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. 
Ecuador, Statement at the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, 6–23 May 1997.

Egypt
Egypt is alleged to have used chemical agents in support of republican forces during the civil war in Yemen in the period between 1963 and 1967. The primary sources of these allegations were journalists, royalist sources opposed to the Egyptian intervention, and the ICRC. On 2 June 1967, the UK Prime Minister informed the House of Commons that he had evidence suggesting that poison gas had been used in Yemen. 
SIPRI, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Vol. VI, The Prevention of CBW, Almqvist & Wiksell, Stockholm, 1975, p. 231.
The Egyptian government denied the allegations concerning the use of chemical agents in Yemen in a communiqué on 1 February 1967, in which the Minister of National Guidance stated: “In the name of the [United Arab Republic] I have been entrusted to affirm once again and in a decisive manner that the [United Arab Republic] has not used poisonous gas at any time and did not resort to using such gas even when there were military operations in Yemen.” 
Egypt, Statement by the Minister for National Guidance, 1 February 1967, reprinted in SIPRI, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Vol. I, The Rise of CB Weapons, Almqvist & Wiksell, Stockholm, 1971, p. 159, footnote 26.

At the CDDH, Egypt expressed “its disappointment at the failure of the Philippine amendment, establishing as a grave breach the use of prohibited weapons, to be adopted” but noted that Article 74 of the draft Additional Protocol I (now Article 85) “as it stands now does cover the use of such weapons through their effects”. 
Egypt, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VI, CDDH/SR.44, 30 May 1977, p. 300.

During the 1988 Session of the Conference on Disarmament, Egypt stated:
Egypt views with deep concern the use of chemical weapons anywhere, and considers that reports to that effect should give further impetus to the speedy conclusion by the Conference of a convention in this connection … Egypt … calls upon all parties to respect international treaties and conventions and reaffirms the importance of adherence to the main principles contained in the 1925 Geneva [Gas] Protocol … Egypt does not produce, develop or stockpile such weapons, which it rightly regards as weapons of mass destruction that should be banned. 
Egypt, Statement before the Conference on Disarmament, UN Doc. CD/PV.459, 21 April 1988, p. 7.

During the 1990 Session of the Conference on Disarmament, Egypt reiterated that it neither possessed nor produced chemical weapons. 
Egypt, Statement before the Conference on Disarmament, UN Doc. CD/958, 23 January 1990, p. 1, § 2.

El Salvador
At the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, El Salvador stated that it was in favour of global eradication of chemical weapons and stressed the importance of universal adherence to the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. 
El Salvador, Statement at the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, 6–23 May 1997.

Ethiopia
In 1977, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Ethiopia supported a complete ban on chemical weapons. 
Ethiopia, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/32/PV.25, 7 October 1977, p. 46.

During the 1989 Session of the Conference on Disarmament, Ethiopia stated that it considered chemical weapons and their complete destruction to be a matter of the utmost priority. Furthermore, it stated that Ethiopia did not produce or stockpile chemical weapons. 
Ethiopia, Statement before the Conference on Disarmament, UN Doc. CD/PV.487, 16 February 1989, p. 11.

At the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, Ethiopia emphasized the importance of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention and stated its commitment to creating a world free of chemical weapons. 
Ethiopia, Statement at the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, 6–23 May 1997.

Finland
At the CDDH, Finland stated that it “attached the greatest importance … to the prohibition of chemical … warfare in the Geneva [Gas] Protocol of 1925”. 
Finland, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VI, CDDH/SR.44, 30 May 1977, p. 285, § 34.

In 1991, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Finland stated that a ban on chemical weapons was an urgent priority. 
Finland, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/46/PV.6, 16 October 1991, p. 21.

At the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, Finland stated that it aligned itself with the position of the European Union and added that it looked forward to “wiping all chemical weapons off the face of the earth”. 
Finland, Statement at the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, 6–23 May 1997.

France
In 1966, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, France stated that it was opposed to a general prohibition of chemical weapons. It wondered “how could States which had not signed or ratified a treaty be required to undertake to observe its provisions?” 
France, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/SR.1461, 23 November 1966, p. 205.

In 1980, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, France stated with respect to Resolution 35/144, which it had sponsored:
In sponsoring [Resolution 35/144], the French delegation had only one concern: the strengthening of the [1925 Geneva Gas Protocol], particularly by use of an inquiry procedure. Information from various sources regarding the possible use of chemical weapons suggested that it was appropriate, indeed even necessary for the international community to take a stand in favour of an impartial investigation into compliance with the provisions of the 1925 Protocol.
The French Government, as a depositary of the Geneva Protocol, felt that special attention had to be given to everything related to respect for commitments entered into in that connexion.

It seems to us that the authority of the Geneva Protocol, the banning of chemical weapons and the means of successfully ensuring that ban are all such important matters that they require and justify a clear affirmation of the will of the international community. 
France, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/ 35/PV.45, 26 November 1980, pp. 26–27.

In 1987, in reply to a question in parliament, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs stated: “France attaches the greatest importance to the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons.” 
France, Reply of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to a question in parliament, 3 August 1987, reprinted in Annuaire Français de Droit International, Vol. 33, 1987, p. 958.

In 1988, the spokesperson for the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned the use by Iraq of chemical gases against the Islamic Republic of Iran. The French authorities reiterated “their absolute condemnation of these practices, in blatant violation of the Geneva [Gas] Protocol of 1925.” 
France, Statement by the spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 24 March 1988, reprinted in Annuaire Français de Droit International, Vol. 34, 1988, pp. 899–900.

In 1989, in reply to a note verbale of the UN Secretary-General on the subject of chemical weapons, France declared that it did not possess chemical weapons. 
France, Reply to a note verbale of the UN Secretary-General, referred to in Report of the Secretary-General on respect for the right to life: elimination of chemical weapons, prepared in accordance with UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1988/27, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/4, 17 August 1989, § 98.

At the 1989 Session of the Conference on Disarmament, France stated:
First of all, there is now a confirmed link between the present prohibition on use and the future [1993 Chemical Weapons Convention], a convention which will prohibit not only the use, but also the production, stockpiling and transfer of chemical weapons … Beyond the differences in legal commitments that exist between States, according to whether or not they are parties to the 1925 [Geneva Gas] Protocol, or whether they have tabled reservations to it, we now know – you now know – that there is a collective conviction on the part [of] 149 States, a conviction that makes it possible to move from the Protocol of 1925 to a global convention: the universal condemnation of the use of chemical weapons …
France possesses no chemical weapons and will not produce any once the [1993 Chemical Weapons Convention] enters into force. 
France, Statement before the Conference on Disarmament, UN Doc. CD/PV.484, 7 February 1989, pp. 30 and 33.

In 1991, during a debate in the UN Security Council on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, France stated that the ban on the Iraqi possession of chemical weapons was carried out from the perspective of regional and global disarmament. 
France, Statement before the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/PV.2981, 3 April 1991, p. 92.

At the 1992 Session of the Conference on Disarmament, France stated that there were no chemical weapons present on its territory, nor did it hold such weapons in the territory of another State. It also stated that it had no chemical weapons production facilities. 
France, Provision of data relevant to the Chemical Weapons Convention submitted to the Conference on Disarmament, UN Doc. CD/1141-CD/CW/WP.390, 3 March 1992, p. 3, Appendix 1.

A French Government publication issued in 2005 and entitled “Fighting Proliferation, Promoting Arms Control and Disarmament: France’s Contribution” provides:
Chemical weapons
The use of chemicals as a significant weapon of war began at Ypres on 22 April 1915, the first large-scale attack using chlorine gas. In total, chemical weapons caused 90,000 deaths during the First World War. More recently, Iraq used chemical weapons against Iran in the 1980s, and against its Kurdish population in Halabja. The sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway in 1995 also demonstrated that movements and groups which used terrorist methods were capable of using chemical weapons against the civilian population.
The techniques for producing toxic chemical agents are in some cases dual in nature: certain civilian industries (pesticides, petroleum, etc.) use methods that can be diverted to military applications. Their means of delivery are highly diversified, ranging from artillery shells to missile warheads to drones.
France’s approach
France has consistently sought to strengthen the fight against chemical weapons. It is the depositary of the 1925 Protocol on the Prohibition of the Use in War of Chemical and Bacteriological Weapons. In 1996, France removed the reserves it had appended to the Protocol at the time of ratifying on the possible use of such weapons in reprisal.
French policy is founded above all on the recognition of the particular nature of chemical weapons, and this is put into concrete effect by simultaneous action to combat proliferation and to promote disarmament. In parallel, France ensures that it has the means to defend itself against the consequences of a chemical attack by studying protective measures against such weapons and their effects, so as to ensure the health and safety of the civilian population and its armed forces.
The CWC: a unique instrument
The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which was signed in Paris in 1993 and ratified on 2 March 1995, constitutes the cornerstone of French policy towards chemical non-proliferation and disarmament. It is a document unique in the field of disarmament: the only international convention providing a structure for both the total eradication of an entire category of weapons of mass destruction, chemical weapons, and a stringent system of verification (declarations, inspections, etc.) enabling action to be taken in pursuit of non-proliferation. The CWC is thus a comprehensive instrument whose goal is to combat the chemical threat in all its forms.

Pursuit of its univerzalisation is the main challenge faced at the present time by the CWC, to which 167 states have already adhered. This must be accompanied by domestic national measures for enforcement to enable its full implementation. The first Review Conference in 2003 adopted two action plans intended to speed up progress toward these twin objectives.
In parallel with these efforts, France has played an active part in putting in place controls on exports of dual-use (civilian and military) goods; this action has been channelled primarily through an informal body, the Australia Group.

France and the OPCW
In the field of chemical weapons, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) oversees the implementation of the CWC, and is tasked with supervising compliance by the States Parties with their disarmament obligations. Only six states (Russia, United States, India, South Korea, Albania and, more recently, Libya) have acknowledged on signing the Convention that they were possessors of chemical weapons.
By the time the Convention came into force, France, which on 2 March 1995 became the first permanent member of the United Nations Security Council to ratify the CWC, had already fulfilled all its obligations with regard to the prohibition of chemical weapons (prohibition of the possession, manufacture and stockpiling of such weapons….). France has fully satisfied to date its obligations to declare to the OPCW all military and civilian sites subject to international verification, and is the fifth biggest contributor to the organisation’s budget.
France, which does not possess chemical weapons, has already fielded over thirty inspection missions conducted on its territory by the OPCW, such missions being a core activity of the organisation’s technical secretariat. Under the terms of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the OPCW must not only verify the destruction of chemical weapons held by possessor states, but must also assure itself that chemicals listed because of their dual nature are actually being used for authorised civilian purposes. The inspections conducted on a regular basis in various French industrial facilities have invariably demonstrated that France is complying meticulously with the commitments it has given under the CWC.
Processing old chemical weapons
Old chemical weapons (manufactured before 1925), a legacy of the First World War, continue to be unearthed on a regular basis in northern and north-eastern France, especially during agricultural work. These old weapons, which have to be destroyed, are collected and stored under the responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior. Their destruction is carried out under the aegis of the Ministry of Defence in a facility provided for this purpose. They are specifically declared to the OPCW.
Recognised and shared expertise in the field of chemical disarmament
The expertise France possesses in the chemical weapons field has in the past enabled it to contribute to the training of OPCW inspectors. CEFFIAC [Centre français de formation pour l’interdiction des armes chimiques], the French training centre for the prohibition of chemical weapons, was set up for this purpose.
This expertise is also used to provide assistance for the destruction of chemical weapons. For example, France decided at the Kananaskis G8 Summit (June 2002), within the framework of the Global Partnership, to begin practical cooperation with Russia in order to conduct jointly the staged destruction of the stockpile of 40,000 tonnes of Russian chemical weapons declared to the OPCW. 
France, Government, Fighting Proliferation, Promoting Arms Control and Disarmament: France’s Contribution, 2005, pp. 28–30 and 72.

In a white paper on “Defence and National Security” published in 2008, France’s Ministry of Defence stated:
The fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery will indeed continue to be a priority …
In order to be efficient, the fight against proliferation must be based on … the universalization and full implementation of the international conventions signed by the vast majority of States ( … [including the] Chemical Weapons Convention, or CWC).

The Proliferation Security Initiative or PSI … initially comprised 11 States. It now includes almost 90 signatories. It aims at improving operational cooperation among governmental actors in order to identify and prohibit the transfer of materials or equipment that may contribute to programmes on chemical … weapons and their means of delivery.

In December 2003, the European Union adopted … an action plan against the proliferation of CBRN weapons [chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons], which covers all aspects of the fight against proliferation. In particular, the EU made the implementation of its commercial or cooperation agreements with third countries conditional on the latter’s respect for their international commitments regarding non-proliferation.

Chemical … weapons are [a] point of concern. All Western countries have renounced their programmes in this domain, and have continued only with the activities [needed] for protection against potential attacks.
The [CWC] was adopted in January 1993 and entered into force in 1997. It has so far been signed by 183 States …
… The objective of destruction of chemical warfare agents by 2012 provided for by the [CWC] will probably not be achieved. For these reasons, the effective implementation of this Convention must become a collective priority.

… France will continue to contribute to the initiative against proliferation … as well as to the application of the [CWC]. In general, [France] will develop its military and technical expertise that can eventually serve in the detection and repression of the trafficking in material and equipment for the conception and production of these weapons [chemical weapons].
Basic and applied research in these fields will be funded, as well as work conducted by French scientific laboratories. An effort regarding the training in clandestine programmes will be undertaken for the customs officers who are in charge of controlling war-related material as well as objects of both civilian and military use.

[Carrying out] missions for the fight against proliferation and the control over disarmament agreements will be among the objectives of both the armed forces and civil security, taking into account the predictable increase in control activities. Priority will be given to means of safely destroying illegal … chemical … installations, as well as to the means of defence and protection …

[France] will be particularly active in the fight against the proliferation of … chemical weapons, as well as of missiles that could deliver them. 
France, Ministry of Defence, Defence and National Security: The White Paper, 17 June 2008, pp. 117–120, 161–162 and 315.
[emphasis in original]
Gambia
At the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, the Gambia made statements in support of the object and purpose of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. 
Gambia, Statement at the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, 6–23 May 1997.

Germany, Federal Republic of
In 1987, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, the Federal Republic of Germany noted that the world had called for the elimination of chemical weapons. 
Germany, Federal Republic of, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/ 42/PV.5, 14 October 1987, p. 52.

In 1987, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, the Federal Republic of Germany proposed a chemical weapons free zone in Europe. 
Germany, Federal Republic of, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/ 42/PV.16, 22 October 1987, pp. 19–20.

In 1989, the Federal Republic of Germany co-sponsored a draft resolution in the UN Commission on Human Rights which expressed “grave concern about reports of killing of unarmed Kurdish civilians, in particular by military attacks during 1988 using, inter alia, chemical weapons and causing mass exodus to neighbouring countries”. 
Germany, Federal Republic of, Draft resolution on the situation of human rights in Iraq, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1989/L.82, 3 March 1989, § 2.

German Democratic Republic
In 1977, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, the German Democratic Republic said that the socialist States had demanded a comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons in 1972. 
German Democratic Republic, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/ 32/PV.14, 30 September 1977, pp. 23–25.

In 1980, during a debate in the UN General Assembly, the German Democratic Republic stated with respect to Resolution 35/144:
A number of delegations referred to reports concerning the use of chemical agents in the ongoing conflict between Iran and Iraq. Some delegations referred to reports concerning the use of chemical agents by Israel against the Arab population of Jerusalem or the use of chemical agents by the South African racists against the population of Namibia. Were those statements by delegations taken into account in the drafting of the report on the administrative and financial implications? 
German Democratic Republic, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/ 35/PV.46, 28 November 1980, p. 12.

Germany
In 1988, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the German parliament stated that it was afraid that poison gas could be used by Iraqi forces against the Kurdish population in northern Iraq. The Committee rejected in particular the line of argument that the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol applied only to international armed conflicts. It called upon the German government to investigate the alleged involvement of German companies in the production of chemical weapons for Iraq and stated: “In the opinion of the German Parliament, on the way to a universal outlawing of chemical weapons, any use of poison gas must meet the determined resistance of the international community.” 
Germany, Lower House of Parliament, Recommendation for a decision by the Foreign Affairs Committee concerning the use of poisoned gas by the government of Iraq against Kurds living in Iraq, BT-Drucksache 11/2962, 23 September 1988, pp. 1–2.

In its Annual Disarmament Report 2003, submitted to the Bundestag (Lower House of Parliament)in 2004, Germany’s Federal Government reported:
The Federal Republic of Germany does not possess chemical weapons according to the definition of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The chemical weapons produced before 1946 are defined by the Chemical Weapons Convention as “old chemical weapons”, which also must be destroyed. This therefore also applies to the chemical weapons produced by the German Reich before 1945. This concerns munitions found.
… The continuous destruction of the old chemical weapons is undertaken at the incineration plant at Munster. 
Germany, Federal Government, Annual Disarmament Report 2003, 14 May 2004, p. 34.

In its Annual Disarmament Report 2004, submitted to the Bundestag (Lower House of Parliament) in 2005, Germany’s Federal Government stated:
The Federal Republic of Germany does not possess chemical weapons according to the definition of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The chemical weapons produced before 1946 are defined by the Chemical Weapons Convention as “old chemical weapons”, which also must be destroyed. This therefore also applies to the chemical weapons produced by the German Reich before 1945. This concerns munitions found.
… The continuous destruction of the old chemical weapons is undertaken at the incineration plant at Munster. 
Germany, Federal Government, Annual Disarmament Report 2004, 17 June 2005, pp. 33–34.

In its Annual Disarmament Report 2005, submitted to the Bundestag (Lower House of Parliament) in 2006, Germany’s Federal Government stated:
Germany does not possess chemical weapons according to the definition of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Chemical weapons produced before 1946 are defined by the Chemical Weapons Convention as “old chemical weapons”, which also must be destroyed. This therefore also applies to the chemical weapons produced by the German Reich before 1945. This concerns munitions found.
… The continuous destruction of the old chemical weapons is undertaken at the incineration plant … at Munster. 
Germany, Federal Government, Annual Disarmament Report 2005, 12 May 2006, p. 26.

In 2006, in a white paper on German security policy and the future of the Bundeswehr, Germany’s Federal Ministry of Defence stated:
Among the treaties on the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction, the CWC [Chemical Weapons Convention] is of exemplary importance. This is the first and so far the only multilateral disarmament treaty to obligate the parties to the treaty to destroy an entire category of weapons of mass destruction within set time limits and under international monitoring. The Federal Government therefore advocates the full and timely implementation of the destruction regulations in particular, as well as the universal application of this Convention. 
Germany, Federal Ministry of Defence, White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr, 25 October 2006, p. 46.

In its Annual Disarmament Report 2006, submitted to the Bundestag (Lower House of Parliament) in 2007, Germany’s Federal Government stated:
Germany does not possess chemical weapons according to the definition of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Chemical weapons produced before 1946 are defined by the Chemical Weapons Convention as “old chemical weapons”, which also must be destroyed. This therefore also applies to the chemical weapons produced by the German Reich before 1945. This concerns munitions found.
… The continuous destruction of the old chemical weapons is undertaken at the incineration plant … at Munster. 
Germany, Federal Government, Annual Disarmament Report 2006, 27 April 2007, p. 25.

In its Annual Disarmament Report 2008, submitted to the Bundestag (Lower House of Parliament), Germany’s Federal Government stated:
Germany does not possess chemical weapons as defined in the CWC [the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention]. Chemical weapons produced before 1946 are defined by the CWC as “old chemical weapons”, which must also be destroyed. This therefore applies to the chemical weapons produced by the German Reich before 1945. The last remaining grenades of the stockpile of old chemical weapons were destroyed in 2007 in the presence of the director general of the OPCW [Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons]. … Single chemical weapons ammunitions which have since been found (e.g. during construction work) are retrieved and transported to a destruction facility in a timely way. 
Germany, Federal Government, Annual Disarmament Report 2008, 21 January 2009, p. 16.

In 2010, in its Annual Disarmament Report 2009, submitted to the Bundestag (Lower House of Parliament), Germany’s Federal Government stated:
Germany does not possess chemical weapons as defined by the CWC [1993 Chemical Weapons Convention]. The chemical weapons produced by the German Reich before 1945 are defined by the CWC as old chemical weapons and must also be destroyed. The last remaining grenades of the stockpile of old chemical weapons were destroyed in 2007 in the presence of the Director General of the OPCW [Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons]. Single chemical weapons ammunitions which have since been found, e.g. during construction work, were retrieved and transported to a destruction facility in a timely way. 
Germany, Federal Government, Annual Disarmament Report 2009, 13 January 2010, p. 17.

Ghana
In 1968, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Ghana supported the view that all chemical weapons should be prohibited. 
Ghana, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/PV.1614, 21 November 1968, p. 6.

In 1987, during a debate in the UN Security Council, Ghana expressed the opinion that the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol was no longer effective and needed to be reviewed. 
Ghana, Statement before the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/PV.2750, 20 July 1987, p. 38.

At the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, Ghana made statements in support of the object and purpose of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. 
Ghana, Statement at the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, 6–23 May 1997.

Greece
In 1966, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Greece supported the principle that international law prohibits the use of chemical weapons as a result of the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol. 
Greece, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/ SR.1457, 17 November 1966, p. 187.

In 1987, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Greece proposed a chemical weapons free zone in the Balkans. 
Greece, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/ 42/PV.14, 21 October 1987, p. 8.

Guinea
In 1992, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly dealing mainly with the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, the negotiation of which had been concluded by the Conference on Disarmament, Guinea proposed that Africa become a continent free from chemical weapons. 
Guinea, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/ 47/PV.3, 12 October 1992, p. 59.

Haiti
In 1987, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Haiti stated that it was committed to a global ban on chemical weapons. 
Haiti, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/ 42/PV.17, 22 October 1987, p. 26.

At the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, Haiti stated that it was in favour of global eradication of chemical weapons and stressed the importance of universal adherence to the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. 
Haiti, Statement at the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, 6–23 May 1997.

Honduras
At the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, Honduras stated that it was in favour of global eradication of chemical weapons and stressed the importance of universal adherence to the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. 
Honduras, Statement at the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, 6–23 May 1997.

Hungary
In 1966, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Hungary stated:
33. … Fascist Italy had used gas in the 1935–1936 war against Ethiopia, although both parties had accepted the provisions of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. Fascist Germany had used gas with unsurpassed savagery in a campaign of mass genocide. Chemical … weapons were being produced in the present armaments race and some of them were actually being used in the war in Viet-Nam. In a report published by the South Viet-Nam National Liberation Front on 22 July 1966, the Committee for the Denunciation of War Crimes Perpetrated in South Viet-Nam by the United States of America had noted that the 406th mobile unit of the United States Bacterial and Chemical Warfare Institute had been transferred from Japan to South Viet-Nam, and that the number of people killed and poisoned in some of the areas affected by the chemicals used had risen by 30 per cent …
34. … A leading authority on international law [Lassa Oppenheim] had stated that the cumulative effect of customary law, and of the existing instruments such as the 1925 [Geneva Gas] Protocol, was probably such as to render the prohibition legally effective upon practically all States …
35. … Indeed, the use of such mass weapons verged upon genocide …

37. … Accordingly, [the Hungarian] delegation had submitted a draft resolution … in which the General Assembly, after recalling that the Geneva [Gas] Protocol of 1925 had been recognized by many States, would declare that the use of chemical … weapons for the purpose of destroying human beings and the means of their existence constituted an international crime. 
Hungary, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/SR.1451, 11 November 1966, §§ 33–35 and 37.

India
In 1987, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, India stated that its efforts to ban chemical weapons predated the birth of the UN. 
India, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/ 42/PV.32, 4 November 1987, p. 33.

In 1989, in reply to a note verbale of the UN Secretary-General on the subject of chemical weapons, India declared that it did not possess chemical weapons. 
India, Reply to a note verbale of the UN Secretary-General, referred to in Report of the Secretary-General on respect for the right to life: elimination of chemical weapons, prepared in accordance with UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1988/27, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/4, 17 August 1989, § 98.

At the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, India welcomed the entry into force of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention and offered its wholehearted cooperation. It stated that it hoped that the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention would lead to the total elimination of chemical weapons. 
India, Statement at the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, 6–23 May 1997.

Indonesia
During the 1988 Session of the Conference on Disarmament, the Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that Indonesia was a “country which has never possessed chemical weapons”. 
Indonesia, Statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs before the Conference on Disarmament, UN Doc. CD/PV.437, 4 February 1988, p. 5.

At the Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Other Interested States in 1989, the Indonesia stated that it “never had and never will acquire chemical weapons”. 
Gordon M. Burck and Charles C. Flowerree, International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation, Greenwood Press, New York, 1991 p. 429.

At the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, Indonesia emphasized the importance of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention and stated its commitment and its determination to contribute actively to the realization of the Convention’s aims. 
Indonesia, Statement at the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, 6–23 May 1997.

Iraq
At the CDDH, Iraq supported the Philippine amendment (see infra), since “the use of … gas had been prohibited for a very long time but the user was not liable to criminal proceedings. It was high time that the use of such appalling weapons was made a grave offence.” 
Iraq, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VI, CDDH/SR.44, 30 May 1977, p. 284, § 24.

In 1990, the Iraqi President, halfway through a long speech at a military award ceremony broadcast the next day on Baghdad Radio, stated: “We do not need an atomic bomb. We have the binary chemical [al-kimawi al-muzdawij]. Let them take note of this. We have the binary chemical.” 
Iraq, Speech by President Saddam Hussein at a ceremony honouring the Iraqi Minister of Defence, the Minister of Industry and Military Industrialization and members of the Armed Forces General Command on 1 April 1990, as in the “full recording” broadcast on Baghdad domestic radio, 2 April 1990, as translated from the Arabic in FBIS-NES-90-064, 3 April 1990, pp. 32–36.

In 1991, during a debate in the UN Security Council, Iraq stated that it had “undertaken the unconditional obligation not to use, develop, manufacture or acquire any material referred to in [Security Council Resolution 687 (1991)]”. 
Iraq, Statement before the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/PV.2994, 17 June 1991, p. 6.

Ireland
In 1987, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Ireland condemned the use of chemical weapons against civilians. 
Ireland, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/42/PV.26, 30 October 1987, p. 21.

Islamic Republic of Iran
In 1987, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, the Islamic Republic of Iran stated that it had never retaliated with chemical weapons against Iraq, even though the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol only prohibited first use. It complained that the world community had not reacted to Iraq’s breach of the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol. 
Islamic Republic of Iran, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/ 42/PV.17, 22 October 1987, pp. 8 and 39–40.

At the Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Other Interested States in 1989, after the ceasefire with Iraq, the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs declared that the Islamic Republic of Iran “never resorted to chemical weapons use, even in retaliation”. 
Islamic Republic of Iran, Statement at the Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol, Paris, 7–11 January 1989, referred to in Gordon M. Burck and Charles C. Flowerree, International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation, Greenwood Press, New York, 1991, p. 239.

At the 1989 Session of the Government-Industry Conference against Chemical Weapons, the Islamic Republic of Iran declared in its plenary statement that during the war its chemical industry “never took any measure to divert its products for production of chemical weapons”. 
Islamic Republic of Iran, Plenary statement at the Government-Industry Conference against Chemical Weapons, Doc. GICCW/P/36 (Prov), Canberra, 12–22 September 1989, p. 258.

In 1991, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, the Islamic Republic of Iran stated that it wanted the fourth preambular paragraph and the third operative paragraph of Resolution 46/35 B to not only deplore and call for the elimination of the threat of chemical weapons, but also their use. 
Islamic Republic of Iran, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/46/PV.33, 11 November 1991, p. 63.

At the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, the Islamic Republic of Iran stated its commitment to the goals and provisions of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention but also said it understood why some of the Arab States had not signed or ratified the Convention on the grounds that Israel refused to get rid of its nuclear weapons. 
Islamic Republic of Iran, Statement at the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, 6–23 May 1997.

According to the Report on the Practice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, during the war with Iraq, the Islamic Republic of Iran continuously objected to the use of chemical weapons and asked for the condemnation of Iraq’s use of these weapons. In its protests, the Islamic Republic of Iran did not confine itself to the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol, but stated that such use should be condemned by all the countries of the world, irrespective of whether they were parties to the Protocol or not. 
Report on the Practice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1997, Chapter 3.4.

Israel
In 1987, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Israel condemned the use of chemical weapons in the Iran–Iraq War and chemical attacks against the civilian population and expressed alarm that the Syrian Arab Republic had developed chemical weapons and that the Islamic Republic of Iran had used them.  
Israel, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/42/PV.16, 22 October 1987, p. 22.

In 1991, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Israel stated that it wanted the Middle East to be a zone free from chemical weapons. 
Israel, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/46/PV.19, 28 October 1991, p. 23.

In 1995, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Israel stated that it had repeatedly called for the elimination of chemical weapons. 
Israel, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/50/PV.8, 20 October 1995, p. 5.

At the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, Israel stated that, although it had not yet ratified the Convention because virtually none of its Arab neighbours had done so, it was nonetheless “strongly committed to the fundamental goal of the Convention, that is, the total elimination of the scourge of chemical weapons from the face of the earth”. 
Israel, Statement at the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, 6–23 May 1997.

Italy
Italy is said to have used gas in the war against Abyssinia. 
SIPRI, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Vol. I, The Rise of CB Weapons, Almqvist & Wiksell, Stockholm, 1971, pp. 142–146; Wil D. Verwey, Riot Control Agents and Herbicides in War, A. W. Sijthoff, Leyden, 1977, pp. 182–183.

Representatives of Abyssinia complained repeatedly to the Council of the League of Nations about alleged use of gas by the Italian army, and on 30 June 1936, the Emperor of Abyssinia himself protested against and denounced the use of gas by the Italian army before the League of Nations. 
League of Nations, Official Journal, Special Supplement No. 151, Records of the Sixteenth Assembly, Eighteenth Plenary Meeting, 30 June 1936, pp. 22–25.

The League condemned the use of gas and imposed sanctions against Italy. 
SIPRI, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Vol. IV, CB Disarmament Negotiations, 1920–1970, Almqvist & Wiksell, Stockholm, 1971, pp. 175–189.

In 1966, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Italy supported the principle that international law prohibits the use of chemical weapons as a result of the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol, but expressed reservations about the resolution’s bias against the West. 
Italy, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/SR.1457, 17 November 1966, p. 187.

At the CDDH, Italy abstained in the vote on the Philippine amendment (see infra) stating: “It would not be useful because it dealt with means and methods of warfare which were already prohibited by the existing law.” 
Italy, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VI, CDDH/SR.44, 30 May 1977, p. 285, § 30.

In 1987, during a debate in the UN Security Council, Italy called the prohibition of chemical weapons “a great and precious accomplishment of our civilization”. 
Italy, Statement before the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/PV.2750, 20 July 1987, p. 31.

In 1987, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Italy stated that it was committed to a global ban on chemical weapons. 
Italy, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/ 42/PV.18, 23 October 1987, p. 8.

In 1990, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Italy stated, on behalf of the European Community, that it supported “the goal of a total chemical-weapons ban”. 
European Community, Statement by Italy on behalf of the European Community before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/45/PV.3, 15 October 1990, p. 22.

Japan
According to a commentator, gas was allegedly used by Japan in the Sino-Japanese War (1937–1943), even though Japan has never admitted this. 
Wil D. Verwey, Riot Control Agents and Herbicides in War, A. W. Sijthoff, Leyden, 1977, pp. 183–184.
China protested several times to the Council of the League of Nations about these breaches of international law. 
SIPRI, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Vol. I, The Rise of CB Weapons, Almqvist & Wiksell, Stockholm, 1971, pp. 147–152; League of Nations, Official Journal, May–June 1938, 101st Session of the Council, Second Meeting, pp. 306–308; League of Nations, Official Journal, November 1938, 101st Session of the Council, Fourth Meeting, pp. 863–865.

In 1968, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Japan argued in favour of prohibiting not only the use of chemical weapons, but also their production and stockpiling. 
Japan, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/PV.1616, 22 November 1968, p. 8.

In 1987, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Japan stated that it was committed to a global ban on chemical weapons. 
Japan, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/ 42/PV.6, 15 October 1987, p. 6.

In 1988, in a statement before the Fifteenth Special Session of the UN General Assembly, Japan stated:
Chemical weapons, in particular, are weapons of mass destruction which kill and injure people with their potent toxicity. They are also extremely dangerous because they are easy to produce and use. It is profoundly regrettable that these heinous weapons have actually been used, for example, in the conflict between Iran and Iraq, despite the prohibition of their use in war under an international convention … In order to prevent totally the use of these weapons, it is essential that their stockpiling and production be prohibited and, indeed, that they be eliminated globally. 
Japan, Statement before the Fifteenth Special Session of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/S-15/PV.2, 1 June 1988, § 115.

In 1993, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Japan stated that it “attached great importance to the prohibition of chemical weapons”. 
Japan, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/48/SR.4, 19 October 1993, p. 6.

In its oral pleadings before the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons case in 1995, Japan referred to the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol when stating: “The use of weapons of mass destruction … is prohibited by international declarations and binding agreements. These principles serve the foundation for the concept of humane treatment.” 
Japan, Oral pleadings before the ICJ, Nuclear Weapons case, 7 November 1995, Verbatim Record CR 95/27, p. 30.

At the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, Japan stated: “In order to effectively achieve the objectives of the Convention to eliminate chemical weapons, it is essential to ensure the universality of this Convention.” For this reason, Japan urged the urgent participation of as many countries as possible in the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. It further reconfirmed its good intentions by once more emphasizing its commitment to global chemical disarmament. 
Japan, Statement at the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, 6–23 May 1997.

Jordan
At the CDDH, Jordan supported the principle behind the Philippine amendment (see infra) but stated: “It would be more generally acceptable if it were amended to apply only to the first user of weapons prohibited by international conventions.” 
Jordan, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VI, CDDH/SR.44, 30 May 1977, p. 283, § 21.

According to the Report on the Practice of Jordan, Jordan does not use, manufacture or stockpile chemical weapons and it does not plan to do so in the future. 
Report on the Practice of Jordan, 1997, Chapter 3.4.

Kampuchea
In 1980, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kampuchea deplored the fact that “the Vietnamese army is increasingly resorting to toxic chemical products. In addition to the air-spreadings of these toxic chemical products, the Vietnamese army has conducted the systematic shellings of poison gas in every place.” 
Kampuchea, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement of 5 February 1980 on the intensification by Hanoi in using chemical weapons and committing other criminal activities to exterminate the Kampuchean people, Press Release of the Permanent Mission of Kampuchea to the United Nations in Geneva, No. 21/2/80/E, 21 February 1980.

In 1987, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Democratic Kampuchea stated that it was committed to a global ban on chemical weapons. 
Democratic Kampuchea, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/42/PV.13, 20 October 1987, p. 33.

Kenya
In 1966, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Kenya supported the principle that international law prohibits the use of chemical weapons as a result of the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol. 
Kenya, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/SR.1456, 16 November 1966, p. 179.

In 1987, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Kenya maintained that “all States should co-operate in efforts to prevent the use of chemical weapons, in accordance with the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol of 1925” until a general convention prohibiting chemical weapons was enacted. 
Kenya, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/42/PV.27, 30 October 1987, p. 6.

At the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, Kenya made statements in support of the object and purpose of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. 
Kenya, Statement at the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, 6–23 May 1997.

Kuwait
In an article published in a military review, a member of the Kuwaiti armed forces stated that, during war, belligerents must
respect restrictions and limits provided for in international conventions, such as restrictions of the use of some weapons, and prohibition of using others, e.g. chemical … weapons … This is in application of well-established principles in war, such as considerations of military honour and humanitarian considerations. 
Fellah Awad Al-Anzi, “The Law of War”, Homat Al-Watan, No. 168, p. 57.

At the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, Kuwait expressed support for the goals of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention and stated its full commitment to the provisions in the Convention and promised full cooperation with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. 
Kuwait, Statement at the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, 6–23 May 1997.

Lao People’s Democratic Republic
At the Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Other Interested States in 1989, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic stated that it would accede to the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol and noted: “Laos does not produce chemical weapons and does not intend to.” 
Gordon M. Burck and Charles C. Flowerree, International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation, Greenwood Press, New York, 1991, p. 430.

At the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic emphasized the importance of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention and stated its commitment and its determination to contribute actively to the realization of the Convention’s aims. 
Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Statement at the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, 6–23 May 1997.

Lebanon
In 1977, during a debate in the UN General Assembly, Lebanon stated: “The Lebanese spirit has always stood against such [chemical] weapons.” 
Lebanon, Statement before the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/51/PV.100, 22 May 1997, p. 3.

The Report on the Practice of Lebanon states that Lebanon’s refusal to sign the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention does not imply that it opposes a prohibition on chemical weapons. 
Report on the Practice of Lebanon, 1998, Chapter 3.4, referring to Speech by advisor to Lebanon’s delegation to the UN, 22 May 1997.

Lesotho
In its written statement submitted to the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons case in 1995, Lesotho stated: “Any use of nuclear weapons, even in self-defense, would violate international humanitarian law, including the Hague and Geneva Conventions, which prohibit as practices of war … the use of poisonous gases, liquids and analogous substances.” 
Lesotho, Written statement submitted to the ICJ, Nuclear Weapons case, 20 June 1995, p. 2.

At the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, Lesotho made statements in support of the object and purpose of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. 
Lesotho, Statement at the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, 8 May 1997.

Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
The day before his address to the Conference of State Parties to the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol in 1989, the Libyan Minister of Foreign Affairs told a French interviewer: “Despite the fact that the production of chemical weapons is not banned by the Geneva agreement, Libya has decided of its own free will that it will not produce, and furthermore does not intend to produce, chemical weapons.” 
Gordon M. Burck and Charles C. Flowerree, International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation, Greenwood Press, New York, 1991, p. 268.

In 1991, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya expressed its belief that there was a “need to protect the human race from chemical warfare”. 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/46/PV.22, 29 October 1991, p. 34.

In 1992, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly dealing mainly with the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, the negotiation of which had been concluded by the Conference on Disarmament, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya supported an Egyptian initiative for a Middle Eastern zone free of weapons of mass destruction. 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/47/PV.10, 20 October 1992, pp. 9–10.

Liechtenstein
At the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, Liechtenstein reconfirmed its good intentions by once more emphasizing its commitment to global chemical disarmament. 
Liechtenstein, Statement at the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, 6–23 May 1997.

Luxembourg
In 1989, Luxembourg co-sponsored a draft resolution in the UN Commission on Human Rights which expressed “grave concern about reports of killing of unarmed Kurdish civilians, in particular by military attacks during 1988 using, inter alia, chemical weapons and causing mass exodus to neighbouring countries”. 
Luxembourg, Draft resolution on the situation of human rights in Iraq, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1989/L.82, 3 March 1989, § 2.

At the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, Luxembourg reconfirmed its good intentions by once more emphasizing its commitment to global chemical disarmament. 
Luxembourg, Statement at the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, 6–23 May 1997.

Malaysia
In 1995, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Malaysia supported a total ban on chemical weapons. 
Malaysia, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/50/PV.3, 16 October 1995, p. 24.

In its written statement submitted to the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons (WHO) case in 1995, Malaysia stated: “Chemical weapons have been banned.” 
Malaysia, Written statement submitted to the ICJ, Nuclear Weapons (WHO) case, 19 June 1995, p. 2.
In a part entitled “Principle of Non-Toxicity”, it also referred to the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol and the 1956 New Delhi Draft Rules. 
Malaysia, Written statement submitted to the ICJ, Nuclear Weapons (WHO) case, 19 June 1995, pp. 23–24.

Malaysia made the same reference in its oral pleadings in the Nuclear Weapons case in 1995. 
Malaysia, Oral pleadings before the ICJ, Nuclear Weapons case, 7 November 1995, Verbatim Record CR 95/27, p. 57.

At the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, Malaysia welcomed the entry into force of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention and expressed the hope that it would lead to “a world free of the scourge of chemical weapons and global and regional security for all”. 
Malaysia, Statement at the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, 6–23 May 1997.

Mali
In 1966, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Mali supported the principle that international law prohibits the use of chemical weapons as a result of the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol. 
Mali, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/SR.1456, 16 November 1966, p. 179.

Malta
In 1989, in reply to a note verbale of the UN Secretary-General on the subject of chemical weapons, Malta declared that it did not possess chemical weapons. 
Malta, Reply to a note verbale of the UN Secretary-General, referred to in Report of the Secretary-General on respect for the right to life: elimination of chemical weapons, prepared in accordance with UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights Res. 1988/27, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/4, 17 August 1989, § 98.

At the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, Malta referred to the enactment of a bill that unanimously authorized the ratification of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention and stated that it was “a tangible attestation of Malta’s unwavering commitment to ensure that our society lives in a tranquil and safe environment free from the menace of chemical weapons”. 
Malta, Statement at the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, 6–23 May 1997.

Mauritius
At the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, Mauritius made statements in support of the object and purpose of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. 
Mauritius, Statement at the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, 6–23 May 1997.

Mexico
In 1989, in reply to a note verbale of the UN Secretary-General on the subject of chemical weapons, Mexico declared that it did not possess chemical weapons. 
Mexico, Reply to a note verbale of the UN Secretary-General, referred to in Report of the Secretary-General on respect for the right to life: elimination of chemical weapons, prepared in accordance with UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1988/27, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/4, 17 August 1989, § 98.

In 1992, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly dealing mainly with the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, the negotiation of which had been concluded by the Conference on Disarmament, Mexico stated that it was very important that the international community was at the point of totally banning a category of weapons which, despite the restrictions on their use, had been used in several conflicts by States party to the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol. For Mexico, this proved that those countries that possessed these kinds of weapons were really willing to rid the world of these weapons by signing this new international treaty. 
Mexico, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/ 47/PV.3, 12 October 1992, p. 16.

At the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, Mexico stated that it was in favour of global eradication of chemical weapons and stressed the importance of universal adherence to the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. 
Mexico, Statement at the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, 6–23 May 1997.

In 2008, during the Second Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the permanent representative of Mexico stated:
11. If we were lucid and decisive enough to create the OPCW [Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons], it was because chemical weapons stockpiles do exist and because we were and are convinced that their existence hinders the attainment of general and complete disarmament. Mexico therefore firmly believes that destruction is the condition sine qua non.

13. Although the immense majority of States Parties does not possess chemical weapons, we are nonetheless committed and decided to contribute to their total elimination, first and foremost, through national implementation measures as stipulated under Article VII of the Convention, specifically through the setting up of the national authorities, and through the drafting and passage of legislation that complies fully with the above mentioned article. 
Mexico, Statement by the permanent representative of Mexico to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons at the Second Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, 8 April 2008, §§ 11 and 13.

In 2010, at the fifteenth session of the Conference of States Parties to the Convention on Chemical Weapons, the permanent representative of Mexico stated:
[W]e should not forget, not for a single moment, that the destruction of chemical weapons is a standing and unrenounceable obligation and, therefore, the possessor States Parties must complete the destruction of their stockpiles irrespective of the solution we may agree on. 
Mexico, Statement by the permanent representative of Mexico at the Fifteenth Session of the Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on Chemical Weapons, 29 November 2010, C015/NAT.5, p. 2.

Mongolia
In 1968, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Mongolia deplored the use of chemical weapons in South Africa. 
Mongolia, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/PV.1612, 19 November 1968, p. 3.

In 1987, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Mongolia stated that it was committed to a global ban on chemical weapons. 
Mongolia, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/42/PV.11, 19 October 1987, p. 47.

Morocco
At the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, Morocco made statements in support of the object and purpose of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. 
Morocco, Statement at the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, 6–23 May 1997.

Nepal
In 1987, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Nepal stated that it was committed to a global ban on chemical weapons. 
Nepal, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/42/PV.9, 16 October 1987, p. 6.

Netherlands
In 1969, during the debate in the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly on Resolution 2597 (XXIV) reaffirming Resolution 2444 (XXIII), the Netherlands stated that it was “essential to update and broaden … the Geneva [Gas] Protocol and to extend [its] application to cover armed conflicts which are not international in character”. 
Netherlands, Statement before the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.1733, 11 December 1969, p. 1.

In 1986, in a letter on the Iran–Iraq War submitted on behalf of the European Community to the UN Secretary-General, the Netherlands stated that the European Community member States were “particularly alarmed by renewed violations of humanitarian law and other laws of armed conflict, including the use of chemical weapons, and they condemn such violations wherever they occur”. 
European Community, Letter dated 26 February 1986 from the Netherlands on behalf of the European Community to the UN Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/17867, 26 February 1986.

In 1989, in reply to a note verbale of the UN Secretary-General on the subject of chemical weapons, the Netherlands declared that it did not possess chemical weapons. 
Netherlands, Reply to a note verbale of the UN Secretary-General, referred to in Report of the Secretary-General on respect for the right to life: elimination of chemical weapons, prepared in accordance with UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1988/27, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/4, 17 August 1989, § 98.

In 1989, the Netherlands co-sponsored a draft resolution in the UN Commission on Human Rights which expressed “grave concern about reports of killing of unarmed Kurdish civilians, in particular by military attacks during 1988 using, inter alia, chemical weapons and causing mass exodus to neighbouring countries”. 
Netherlands, Draft resolution on the situation of human rights in Iraq, UN Doc. E/CN.4/ 1989/L.82, 3 March 1989, § 2.

In 1991, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, the Netherlands expressed, on behalf of the European Community, “the hope that States will make their commitment to the future Chemical Weapon Convention unambiguously clear” and declared: “It is important that [chemical] weapons be banned everywhere and forever.” 
European Community, Statement by the Netherlands on behalf of the European Community before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/46/PV.30, 7 November 1991, p. 22.

In an explanatory memorandum submitted to the Dutch parliament in 1993 in the context of the ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Government of the Netherlands stated: “The absolute prohibition of the use of chemical weapons (Article 1 § b) should fall within the laws and customs of war, as mentioned in article 8 of the Criminal Law in Wartime Act.” It went on to say: “Thus, the use of chemical weapons during armed conflict is at all times a violation of article 8, and prosecutions and adjudication of such a violation will therefore take place in accordance with its provisions.” 
Netherlands, Lower House of Parliament, Explanatory memorandum on the ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention, 13 January 1993, 1994–1995 Session, Doc. 23 910 (R 1515) No. 3, pp. 34 and 57.

At the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, the Netherlands stated, on behalf of the European Union: “Member states of the Union have worked actively to promote the universality of the Convention. We are committed to ensuring … that the treaty is universal.” It reconfirmed its good intentions by once more emphasizing its commitment to global chemical disarmament. 
European Union, Statement by the Netherlands on behalf of the European Union at the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, 6–23 May 1997. (The Member States of the European Union, the Associated Countries from Central and Eastern Europe, the Associated Country Cyprus, as well as Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein aligned themselves with this statement.)

New Zealand
In 1980, during a debate in the UN General Assembly, New Zealand stated with respect to Resolution 35/144, which it had sponsored:
Of course, … no territorial limitations [for the investigations to be carried out by the UN Secretary-General into the alleged use of chemical weapons] are proposed. The Secretary-General is simply asked to look, with the assistance of qualified medical and technical experts, into all complaints of the alleged use of chemical weapons in military operations and to examine the evidence brought to his attention with a view to ascertaining the facts. 
New Zealand, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/35/PV.45, 26 November 1980, p. 21.

In 1987, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, New Zealand condemned the use of chemical weapons against civilians. 
New Zealand, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/42/PV.14, 21 October 1987, p. 34.

In 1989, in reply to a note verbale of the UN Secretary-General on the subject of chemical weapons, New Zealand declared that it did not possess chemical weapons. 
New Zealand, Reply to a note verbale of the UN Secretary-General, referred to in Report of the Secretary-General on respect for the right to life: elimination of chemical weapons, prepared in accordance with UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1988/27, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/4, 17 August 1989, § 98.

In its written statement submitted to the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons case in 1995, New Zealand stated, with reference to customary IHL: “It is prohibited to use asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all analogous materials.” 
New Zealand, Written statement submitted to the ICJ, Nuclear Weapons case, 20 June 1995, § 72.

At the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, New Zealand emphasized the importance of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention and stated its commitment and its determination to contribute actively to the realization of the Convention’s aims. 
New Zealand, Statement at the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, 6–23 May 1997.

Nigeria
In 1991, a Nigerian national newspaper reported that the Nigerian Ministry of Defence had organized a seminar in the 1990s “with the aim of sensitising the developing world to the adverse effects of a total ban on the production, storage and use of chemical weapons as advocated by the developed nations”. 
“We Need Chemical Weapons”, National Concord, Lagos, 6 September 1991.

In 1995, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Nigeria stated that it was committed to the total prohibition of chemical weapons. 
Nigeria, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/50/PV.9, 25 October 1995, p. 18.

Norway
In 1989, Norway co-sponsored a draft resolution in the UN Commission on Human Rights which expressed “grave concern about reports of killing of unarmed Kurdish civilians, in particular by military attacks during 1988 using, inter alia, chemical weapons and causing mass exodus to neighbouring countries”.  
Norway, Draft resolution on the situation of human rights in Iraq, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1989/L.82, 3 March 1989, § 2.

At the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, Norway reconfirmed its good intentions by once more emphasizing its commitment to global chemical disarmament. 
Norway, Statement at the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, 6–23 May 1997.

In 2009, in a statement on “Other Weapons of Mass Destruction” made before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Norway’s Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs stated:
Firstly, if we want to achieve a world free of chemical weapons we must continue working to universalise this instrument.
Secondly, it is imperative that existing stocks of chemical weapons are destroyed within agreed time limits. We encourage countries concerned to do their outmost in this respect. 
Norway, Statement on “Other Weapons of Mass Destruction” made before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, 16 October 2009.

Oman
At the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, Oman expressed support for the goals of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention and stated its full commitment to the provisions in the Convention and promised full cooperation with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. 
Oman, Statement at the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, 6–23 May 1997.

Pakistan
At the 1986 Session of the Conference on Disarmament, Pakistan declared that it “neither possesses chemical weapons nor desires to acquire them”. 
Pakistan, Statement before the Conference on Disarmament, UN Doc. CD/PV.339, 13 February 1986, p. 9.

In 1987, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Pakistan stated that it was committed to a global ban on chemical weapons. 
Pakistan, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/42/PV.26, 30 October 1987, p. 48.

Pakistan accused India of using chemical weapons in the Jammu and Kashmir region in 1999. 
Dawn, “India using chemical weapons: PTV”, Karachi, 13 June 1999; Scott McDonald from Islamabad for Reuter, “Pakistan says India using ‘chemical’ shells”, 13 June 1999; Reuter from Islamabad, “Chemical weapons charge”, as in International Herald Tribune, 14 June 1999, p. 4.
The allegation was vigorously denied by India, which called it “totally absurd”. 
“India denies Pakistan charge chemical weapons used in Kashmir”, AFP, 13 June 1999; “Kashmiri groups condemn alleged use of chemical weapons”, AFP, 14 June 1999; “Pakistan investigates India’s reported use of chemical weapons”, AFP, 14 June 1999; “Indian army gains in Kashmir”, Doordarshan television, New Delhi, 14 June 1999, as in BBC-SWB, 14 June 1999; “Indian army recovers gas masks from Pakistani soldiers”, Times of India, Mumbai, Internet version, 15 June 1999; “US rejects Pak claim on chemical arms”, The Hindu, New Delhi, 17 June 1999.

Panama
In 1989, in reply to a note verbale of the UN Secretary-General on the subject of chemical weapons, Panama declared that it did not possess chemical weapons. 
Panama, Reply to a note verbale of the UN Secretary-General, referred to in Report of the Secretary-General on respect for the right to life: elimination of chemical weapons, prepared in accordance with UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1988/27, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/4, 17 August 1989, § 98.

Peru
In 1977, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Peru supported a complete ban on chemical weapons. 
Peru, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/32/PV.16, 3 October 1977, p. 22.

In 1989, in reply to a note verbale of the UN Secretary-General on the subject of chemical weapons, Peru declared that it did not possess chemical weapons. 
Peru, Reply to a note verbale of the UN Secretary-General, referred to in Report of the Secretary-General on respect for the right to life: elimination of chemical weapons, prepared in accordance with UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1988/27, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/4, 17 August 1989, § 98.

In 1991, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Peru stated that it had invited the countries of the Rio Group to reach an agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons. 
Peru, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/ 46/PV.8, 18 October 1991, p. 48.

In an official communiqué in 1995, Peru denied having used toxic chemical gases in its conflict with Ecuador. 
Peru, Joint Command of the Armed Forces, Official communiqué No. 011 CCFFAA, Lima, 24 February 1995.

Philippines
At the CDDH, the Philippines proposed an amendment to include “the use of weapons prohibited by international Convention, namely: … asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials or devices” in the list of grave breaches in Article 74 of the draft Additional Protocol I (now Article 85). 
Philippines, Proposal of amendment to Article 74 of the draft Additional Protocol I submitted to the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. III, CDDH/418, 26 May 1977, p. 322.

The proposal was rejected because it failed to obtain the necessary two-thirds majority (41 votes in favour, 25 against and 25 abstentions). 
CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VI, CDDH/SR.44, 30 May 1977, pp. 288–289. (Against: Australia, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, India, Luxembourg, Monaco, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Ukraine, USSR, United Kingdom, United States and Zaire. Abstaining: Brazil, Cameroon, Cyprus, Cuba, Greece, Guatemala, Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mauritania, Morocco, Nigeria, Norway, Romania, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda and Viet Nam.)

In 1991, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, the Philippines stated that it neither possessed nor produced chemical weapons. 
Philippines, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/46/PV.15, 24 October 1991, p. 24.

At the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, Philippines emphasized the importance of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention and stated its commitment and its determination to contribute actively to the realization of the Convention’s aims. 
Philippines, Statement at the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, 6–23 May 1997.

The Report on the Practice of the Philippines states with reference to the prohibition of chemical weapons: “The Philippines is against the use, production, and stockpiling of … chemical weapons. In fact, it adheres to peaceful, non-military approaches to conflict and renounces the use of … chemical weapons.” 
Report on the Practice of Philippines, 1997, Answers to additional questions on Chapter 3, referring to Statement by the Department of Foreign Affairs, Office of United Nations and International Organizations (UNIO), Manila, 6 March 1998.

Poland
In 1966, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Poland supported Hungary’s view that the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol had developed into customary international law and that the use of chemical weapons constituted an international crime. 
Poland, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/ SR.1455, 16 November 1966. p. 174.

Portugal
In 1989, Portugal co-sponsored a draft resolution in the UN Commission on Human Rights which expressed “grave concern about reports of killing of unarmed Kurdish civilians, in particular by military attacks during 1988 using, inter alia, chemical weapons and causing mass exodus to neighbouring countries”. 
Portugal, Draft resolution on the situation of human rights in Iraq, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1989/L.82, 3 March 1989, § 2.

Qatar
In 1989, in reply to a note verbale of the UN Secretary-General on the subject of chemical weapons, Qatar declared that it did not possess chemical weapons. 
Qatar, Reply to a note verbale of the UN Secretary-General, referred to in Report of the Secretary-General on respect for the right to life: elimination of chemical weapons, prepared in accordance with UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1988/27, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/4, 17 August 1989, § 98.

In 1992, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly dealing mainly with the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, the negotiation of which had been concluded by the Conference on Disarmament, Qatar stated that the Arab States were especially concerned with the elimination of chemical weapons. 
Qatar, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/47/PV.8, 16 October 1992, p. 13.

Republic of Korea
In 1989, in reply to a note verbale of the UN Secretary-General on the subject of chemical weapons, the Republic of Korea declared that it did not possess chemical weapons. 
Republic of Korea, Reply to a note verbale of the UN Secretary-General, referred to in Report of the Secretary-General on respect for the right to life: elimination of chemical weapons, prepared in accordance with UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1988/27, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/4, 17 August 1989, § 98.

In 1994, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, the Republic of Korea stated that it was dedicated to the elimination of chemical weapons. 
Republic of Korea, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/49/PV.6, 19 October 1994, p. 12.

At the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, the Republic of Korea emphasized the importance of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention and stated its commitment and its determination to contribute actively to the realization of the Convention’s aims. 
Republic of Korea, Statement at the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, 6–23 May 1997.

According to the Report on the Practice of the Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea is of the view that the prohibition on the use of chemical weapons is customary. 
Report on the Practice of the Republic of Korea, 1997, Chapter 3.4.

Romania
In 1966, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Romania supported Hungary’s view that the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol had developed into customary international law and that the use of chemical weapons constituted an international crime. 
Romania, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/ SR.1453, 15 November 1966, p. 161.

In 1991, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Romania stated that it neither possessed nor produced chemical weapons. 
Romania, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/46/PV.8, 18 October 1991, p. 66.

At the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, Romania reconfirmed its good intentions by once more emphasizing its commitment to global chemical disarmament. 
Romania, Statement at the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, 6–23 May 1997.

Russian Federation
Use of chemical weapons by the Russian Federation was alleged during the two conflicts in Chechnya in 1994–1996 
ITAR-TASS from Moscow, 14 December 1994, as translated from the Russian in FBIS-SOV-94-241, 15 December 1994, p. 38; Oleh Kruk for UNIAN (Kiev), 21 December 1994, as translated from the Ukrainian in FBIS-SOV-94-246, 22 December 1994, pp. 25–26; Ekho Moskvy radio (Moscow), 22 July 1996, as translated from the Russian in BBC-SWB, Part 1, EE/D2672/B, 24 July 1996.
and in 1999. 
“Chechen envoy says Russia used chemical arms”, Reuter, Istanbul, 9 December 1999; Representative Office of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria in Azerbaijan, Press Release, “Chechen office in Azerbaijan reports Russia’s use of chemical weapons”, Baku, 8 December 1999, as in BBC-SWB, 8 December 1999; (For example: Chechens charge Russian troops used chemical arms in Grozny, AFP, Geneva, 8 December 1999; Ian Bruce, “Illegal chemical weapon onslaught to flatten city”, Herald, Glasgow, 8 December 1999, p. 13; Opening statement by the Director-General to the Eighteenth Session of the Executive Council, 15 February 2000, via Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons website as of 22 February 2000; Oleg Stulov, “Chemical spill in Chechnya: was it Maskhadov who spilled something extremely toxic in Chechnya?”, Kommersant-daily, Moscow, 11 December 1999, p. 3; “Pro-Chechen web site reports chemical attack on capital”, Kavkaz-Tsentr website, 11 December 1999, as translated from the Russian in BBC-SWB, 11 December 1999; “Chechen web site reports Russians preparing to use chemical weapons”, Kavkaz-Tsentr website, 23 December 1999, as translated from the Russian in BBC-SWB, 23 December 1999; “Pro-Chechen web site says Russians sprayed gas over Chechen positions”, Kavkaz-Tsentr website, 30 December 1999, as translated from the Russian in BBC-SWB, 31 December 1999; “Pro-Chechen web site reports Russians using napalm, chemical weapons”, Kavkaz-Tsentr website, 31 December 1999, as translated from the Russian in BBC-SWB, 31 December 1999; “Pro-Chechen web site says about 180 Russians killed in capital”, Kavkaz-Tsentr website, 8 January 2000, as translated from the Russian in BBC-SWB, 8 January 2000; “Chechens report fierce fighting for capital, Russians using chemical weapons”, Kavkaz-Tsentr website, 18 January 2000, as translated from the Russian in BBC-SWB, 18 January 2000.

These allegations were, however, categorically denied by Russian officials. 
ITAR-TASS from Moscow, 15 December 1994, as in FBIS- SOV-94-241, 15 December 1994, pp. 40–41; Anatoliy Yurkin from Moscow for ITAR-TASS world service (Moscow), 23 July 1996, as translated from the Russian in BBC-SWB, Part 1, EE/D2672/B, 24 July 1996; “Rebels claim victory over Russians in southwestern village of Bamut”, Radio Russia, Moscow, 24 July 1996, as reported in BBC-SWB, 25 July 1996; “Russian Defence Ministry denies using chemical weapons in Chechnya”, ITAR-TASS, Moscow, 9 December 1999, as in BBC-SWB, 9 December 1999; “Claims that Russia uses chemical weapons in Chechnya lies”, ITAR-TASS, Moscow, 10 December 1999; Russian Federation, Statement of the official representative of the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation, 10 December 1999, Diplomaticheskii vestnik, No. 1, January 2000.

At the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, the Russian Federation stated that, although it had not yet ratified the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, it “intends to refrain from any action that would deprive the Convention of its object and purpose”. It further stated:
After we signed the Convention we have been honouring and will continue to honour the commitments regarding the non-development and non-production of chemical weapons; their non-transfer, directly or indirectly, to anyone; the non-use of chemical weapons; the renunciation of engaging in any military preparations to use them, of providing assistance, encouraging or inducing in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited by the convention. 
Russian Federation, Statement at the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, 6–23 May 1997.

Rwanda
According to the Report on the Practice of Rwanda, there is no obvious evidence of a Rwandan opinio juris on the issue of chemical weapons. However, it states that, in practice, these types of weapons are not employed in Rwanda. 
Report on the Practice of Rwanda, 1997, Chapter 3.4.

Saudi Arabia
In 1966, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Saudi Arabia “whole-heartedly supported [a] Hungarian draft resolution” according to which the UN General Assembly would declare that “the use of chemical … weapons for the purpose of destroying human beings and the means of their existence constituted an international crime”. 
Saudi Arabia, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/SR.1451, 11 November 1966, § 38.

In 1968, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Saudi Arabia advocated a total prohibition on the use and production of chemical weapons. 
Saudi Arabia, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/PV.1608, 14 November 1968, p. 7.

In 1969, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly on the question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on what was to become Resolution 2603 (XXIV), the representative of Saudi Arabia stated:
107. … Stockpiles of chemical weapons [should] be destroyed by all who have them in their arsenals. I would go further: they should not even be manufactured, let alone stockpiled …
108. The [1925 Geneva Gas Protocol] is unequivocal in considering the use of all poison gases and toxic chemical agents to be prohibited …

110. … I hope that in the future the United Nations will consider the use of any gas or germ as a criminal act. 
Saudi Arabia, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/PV.1717, 10 December 1969, §§ 107–108 and 110.

In 1995, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Saudi Arabia stated that it supported “all treaties and conventions that aim at eliminating all types of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons”. 
Saudi Arabia, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/50/PV.9, 25 October 1995, p. 12.

At the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, Saudi Arabia stated its commitment to the goals and provisions of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, but also said it understood why some of the Arab States had not signed or ratified the Convention on the grounds that Israel refused to get rid of its nuclear weapons. 
Saudi Arabia, Statement at the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, 6–23 May 1997.

Slovenia
At the Fifth Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 2000, Slovenia stated:
In 1999 Slovenia adopted the Penal Code which regulates punishment for offences connected with violations of the Convention on Chemical Weapons and the Law on Chemical Weapons, which stipulates the obligations, interdictions and restrictions regarding chemical weapons in line with the Convention and lays down the basis for adoption of regulations by which this matter will be finally dealt on a legal basis in Slovenia. To Slovenia, as a country which has never had chemical weapons, the Convention on Chemical Weapons is of great importance. 
Slovenia, Statement at the Fifth Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, May 2000.

Solomon Islands
In its written statement submitted to the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons case in 1995, Solomon Islands stated: “International law prohibits the use of weapons which: – are chemical.” 
Solomon Islands, Written statement submitted to the ICJ, Nuclear Weapons case, 19 June 1995, p. 62, § 3.77.

South Africa
At the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, South Africa emphasized the importance of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention and stated its commitment to creating a world free of chemical weapons. It reconfirmed its good intentions by once more emphasizing its commitment to global chemical disarmament. 
South Africa, Statement at the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, 6–23 May 1997.

According to the Report on the Practice of South Africa, South Africa considers chemical weapons to be among “certain weapons … expressly prohibited by international agreement, treaty or custom”. 
Report on the Practice of South Africa, 1997, Chapter 3.4.

Spain
In 1995, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Spain expressed support, on behalf of the European Union, for the strengthening of the prohibition against chemical weapons. 
European Union, Statement by Spain on behalf of the European Union before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/50/PV.3, 16 October 1995, p. 12.

Sri Lanka
In 1975, during discussions in the Ad Hoc Committee on Conventional Weapons established by the CDDH, Sri Lanka stated that it “had consistently stood for total and complete disarmament and for a ban on all weapons of mass destruction, including … chemical weapons”. 
Sri Lanka, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. XVI, CDDH/IV/SR.16, 12 March 1975, p. 154, § 5.

In 1977, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Sri Lanka supported a complete ban on chemical weapons.  
Sri Lanka, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/32/PV.20, 5 October 1977, p. 56.

At the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, Sri Lanka emphasized the importance of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention and stated its commitment and its determination to contribute actively to the realization of the Convention’s aims. 
Sri Lanka, Statement at the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, 6–23 May 1997.

At the Fifth Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 2000, Sri Lanka stated that it neither possessed chemical weapons, nor had a chemical industry which could produce them. 
Sri Lanka, Statement at the Fifth Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, May 2000.

Sudan
The Sudan has been accused of using chemical weapons on towns in the south of the country. 
Chege Mbitiru, “Sudanese rebels accuse government of using chemical or biological bombs”, AP from Nairobi, 30 July 1999.

This alleged use has, however, never been officially verified and has always been denied by the Sudanese government. 
“Sudan denies using biological or chemical weapons”, Akhbar Al-Youm, Khartoum, 1 August 1999, as quoted by AP from Khartoum, 1 August 1999.

There are some reports by independent institutes or NGOs, but these, too, are contradictory. 
“Confirmed chemical bombing in southern Sudan”, Norwegian People’s Aid, 2 August 1999, as posted on ReliefWeb, www.reliefweb.int, version current on 14 December 1999; “UN sends doctors to treat survivors of toxic chemicals”, IPS from Nairobi, 5 August 1999; MSF, Living under aerial bombardments: Report of an investigation in the Province of Equatoria, Southern Sudan, Geneva, February 2000; Marjatta Rautio and Paula Vanninen, from Helsinki, “Analysis of samples from Sudan”, 20 June 2000, as in ASA Newsletter, No. 79, 31 August 2000, p. 14.

Sweden
In 1968, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Sweden proposed that the UN begin a process leading to a total prohibition of the use, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. 
Sweden, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/PV.1609, 18 November 1968, p. 11.

In 1969, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly on the question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on what was to become Resolution 2603 (XXIV), Sweden agreed that “there should be a total ban on the use of chemical and biological weapons”. 
Sweden, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/PV.1717, 10 December 1969, § 76.

In 1970, during a debate in the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly, Sweden stated that: The rationale for a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons in international armed conflicts would seem to be equally valid in internal armed conflicts. At all events, there should be no hesitation in imposing a complete ban, in internal conflicts.” 
Sweden, Statement before the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.1784, 10 November 1970, p. 273.

In 1971, during a debate in the Fourth Committee of the UN General Assembly, Sweden stated that the use of chemical weapons was “contrary to the generally recognized rules of international law as embodied in the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925”. 
Sweden, Statement before the Fourth Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.1961, 3 December 1971, p. 249.

In 1988, in a statement before the Fifteenth Special Session of the UN General Assembly, Sweden stated:
89. The large-scale use of chemical weapons against the city of Halabja was a flagrant violation of the 1925 Geneva [Gas] Protocol and of customary international law prohibiting the use of chemical weapons. Such attacks must be universally condemned.
90. … The early conclusion of a convention which bans the production, storing and use of all chemical weapons should now be a high priority. All States should commit themselves to adhere to this treaty, thus eliminating the growing threat from chemical weapons. 
Sweden, Statement at the Fifteenth Special Session of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/S-15/PV.2, 1 June 1988, §§ 89–90.

In 1989, Sweden co-sponsored a draft resolution in the UN Commission on Human Rights which expressed “grave concern about reports of killing of unarmed Kurdish civilians, in particular by military attacks during 1988 using, inter alia, chemical weapons and causing mass exodus to neighbouring countries”. 
Sweden, Draft resolution on the situation of human rights in Iraq, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1989/L.82, 3 March 1989, § 2.

At the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, Sweden emphasized the importance of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention and stated its commitment and its determination to contribute actively to the realization of the Convention’s aims. 
Sweden, Statement at the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, 6–23 May 1997.

Switzerland
At the CDDH, Switzerland voted in favour of the Philippine amendment (see supra) because:
It would be a step forward to state expressly that any violation of The Hague Declaration of 1899 and the Geneva [Gas] Protocol of 1925 would constitute a grave breach. The rules laid down in those two instruments were undisputed and indisputable, and the amendment would have a deterrent effect on any State tempted to violate them, by exposing the members of its armed forces to the penalties applicable under the Geneva Conventions. 
Switzerland, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VI, CDDH/SR.44, 30 May 1977, p. 281, § 9.

In 1988, in a note on the prohibition on the use of chemical weapons issued, the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs stated: “The 1925 [Geneva Gas] Protocol declares a custom:” It added: “The 1925 [Geneva Gas] Protocol and custom prohibit the first use of chemical weapons and accept the lawfulness of second use only in the case of reprisals in kind.” 
Switzerland, Note of the Directorate for Public International Law of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 15 December 1988, reprinted in Annuaire Suisse de Droit International, Vol. 46, 1989, pp. 244 and 247.

At the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, Switzerland emphasized the importance of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention and stated its commitment to creating a world free of chemical weapons. 
Switzerland, Statement at the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, 6–23 May 1997.

Syrian Arab Republic
In 1977, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, the Syrian Arab Republic supported a complete ban on chemical weapons. 
Syrian Arab Republic, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/ 32/PV.15, 30 September 1977, pp. 11 and 16.

In 1987, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, the Syrian Arab Republic denied that it was developing chemical weapons. 
Syrian Arab Republic, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/ 42/PV.17, 22 October 1987, p. 41.

Thailand
At the Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Other Interested States in 1989, Thailand stated that it was strongly opposed to the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons in any circumstances for whatever reasons. 
Gordon M. Burck and Charles C. Flowerree, International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation, Greenwood Press, New York, 1991, p. 435.

In 1991, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Thailand stated that it neither possessed nor produced chemical weapons. 
Thailand, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/46/PV.19, 28 October 1991, p. 13.

In 1995, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Thailand stated that the world community desired a complete elimination of chemical weapons. 
Thailand, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/50/PV.5, 17 October 1995, p. 16.

At the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, Thailand stated its full commitment to the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention and emphasized the importance of establishing an effective mechanism to ensure universal compliance with the Convention. 
Thailand, Statement at the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, 6–23 May 1997.

Tunisia
In 1991, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Tunisia advocated a complete ban on chemical weapons. 
Tunisia, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/ 46/PV.11, 22 October 1991, p. 7.

Turkey
In 1977, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Turkey supported a complete ban on chemical weapons. 
Turkey, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/ 32/PV.15, 30 September 1977, p. 21.

At the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, Turkey emphasized the importance of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention and stated its commitment and its determination to contribute actively to the realization of the Convention’s aims. 
Turkey, Statement at the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, 6–23 May 1997.

There have been allegations of the use of chemical weapons by Turkey against the country’s Kurdish population; the use has not been verified and the allegations were denied by the Turkish government. 
“Spokesman denies manufacture, use of chemical weapons”, Anatolia news agency, Ankara, 28 October 1999, as translated from the Turkish in BBC-SWB, 30 October 1999; “German TV reports chemical weapons laboratory for Turkey”, ddp/ADN (Allgemeiner Deutscher Nachrichtendienst) news agency, Berlin, 26 October 1999, as translated from the German in BBC-SWB, 27 October 1999; “Chemical weapons lab aid for Turkey from German military”, DPA from Berlin, 27 October 1999; “Türkei beim Aufbau von C-Waffen-Labor unterstützt”, Der Spiegel online 43/1999, 27 October 1999; “Spokesman denies manufacture, use of chemical weapons”, Anatolia news agency, Ankara, 28 October 1999, as translated from the Turkish in BBC-SWB, 30 October 1999.

Ukraine
In 1966, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Ukraine supported Hungary’s view that the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol had developed into customary international law and that the use of chemical weapons constituted an international crime. 
Ukraine, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/ SR.1452, 14 November 1966, p. 154.

In 1977, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Ukraine also referred to the 1972 initiative and stated that the elimination of chemical weapons was one of the most important measures of disarmament. 
Ukraine, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/ 32/PV.23, 6 October 1977, p. 2.

In 1987, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Ukraine proposed a chemical weapons free zone in Europe. 
Ukraine, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/ 42/PV.28, 2 November 1987, p. 17.

In 1991, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Ukraine stated that it neither possessed nor produced chemical weapons. 
Ukraine, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/ 46/PV.3, 14 October 1991, p. 86.

In 1994, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Ukraine stated that it wanted to “rid the densely populated European continent, as well as other regions, of these deadly [chemical] weapons by the beginning of next century”. 
Ukraine, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/ 49/PV.7, 20 October 1994, p. 17.

At the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, Ukraine stated: “It must be our general aim to give this document a universal stamp.” It further offered its full cooperation with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and promised to ratify the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention as soon as possible. 
Ukraine, Statement at the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, 6–23 May 1997.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
In 1970, in the context of the adoption of UN General Assembly Resolution 2444 (XXIII), the USSR stated:
The use of asphyxiating, poisonous and tear gases and other gases of a similar nature … was prohibited by the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925. The United States signed that Protocol, but did not ratify it. However, that does not mean that the prohibition of the use of poisonous substances does not extend to the United States. That prohibition has become a generally recognized rule of international law, and countries which violate it must bear responsibility before the international community. 
USSR, Reply dated 30 December 1969 to the UN Secretary-General regarding the preparation of the study requested in paragraph 2 of General Assembly Resolution 2444 (XXIII), annexed to Report of the Secretary-General on respect for human rights in armed conflicts, UN Doc. A/8052, 18 September 1970, Annex III, p. 120.

In 1970, during a debate in the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly, the USSR stated that the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol was fully applicable in situations where freedom fighters struggled for liberation against colonial powers. 
USSR, Statement before the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.3/ SR.1786, 12 November 1970, p. 284.

At the CSCE review meeting in Madrid in 1982, when the US delegation accused the USSR of violating the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol, the Soviet delegation rejected the charges as “monstrous accusations, false from beginning to end” and denied that the USSR had ever used chemical weapons “anywhere under any circumstances or by any means”. 
Julian Perry Robinson, “Chemical and biological warfare: developments in 1982”, SIPRI Yearbook 1983: World Armaments and Disarmament, Taylor & Francis, London, 1983, p. 393.

In 1987, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, the USSR strongly supported the global elimination of chemical weapons. 
USSR, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/ 42/PV.23, 27 October 1987, pp. 16–30.

In 1989, in reply to a note verbale of the UN Secretary-General on the subject of chemical weapons, the USSR declared: “It had never used chemical weapons or stockpiled them on foreign territories. It had stopped production of chemical weapons.” 
USSR, Reply to a note verbale of the UN Secretary-General referred to in Report of the Secretary-General on respect for the right to life: elimination of chemical weapons, prepared in accordance with UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1988/27, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/4, 17 August 1989, §§ 98 and 105.

In 1991, during a debate in the UN Security Council on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, the USSR stated with respect to Resolution 687 (1991):
The most acute issue is that of creating an effective barrier against the use of weapons of mass destruction in that region. From that viewpoint, of great importance are the provisions in the resolution regarding Iraq’s destruction of chemical … weapons … and in the context of Iraq’s confirmation of its obligations of the Geneva [Gas] Protocol of 1925 to bring into play the International Atomic Energy Agency … It is also important that all Middle Eastern countries accede to … those international agreements prohibiting chemical … weapons. 
USSR, Statement before the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/PV.2981, 3 April 1991, pp. 101–102.

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
In 1966, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, the United Kingdom supported the principle that international law prohibits the use of chemical weapons as a result of the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol. 
United Kingdom, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/ SR.1454, 15 November 1966, p. 167.

At the CDDH, the United Kingdom voted against the Philippine amendment (see supra) because:
A significant number of the States party to the Geneva [Gas] Protocol of 1925 had entered a reservation thereto; for those States the Protocol contained no absolute prohibition on the use of the weapons mentioned in it, but rather a prohibition on the first use only. Nor was it convincing to state that the Geneva [Gas] Protocol of 1925 represented no more than the existing customary law of war; ever since the adoption of resolution XXVIII by the XXth International Conference of the Red Cross (Vienna 1965), States had been urged in United Nations resolutions to accede to that Protocol in accordance with its express terms. Such a situation was entirely inconsistent with the contention made in debate that the Geneva [Gas] Protocol of 1925 reflected existing customary international law. That contention could not be supported. 
United Kingdom, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VI, CDDH/SR.44, 30 May 1977, p. 282, § 17.

In 1977, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, the United Kingdom supported a complete ban on chemical weapons. 
United Kingdom, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/32/PV.23, 6 October 1977, p. 21.

In 1983, in reply to a question in the House of Lords on the subject of the use of chemical weapons in South-East Asia, the UK Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, stated: “The use of chemical weapons is a flagrant contradiction of the civilized standards reflected in the 1925 [Geneva Gas] Protocol.” 
United Kingdom, House of Lords, Reply by the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Hansard, 7 June 1983, Vol. 431, col. 92.

In 1987, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, the United Kingdom stated that it and its allies were committed to a global ban on chemical weapons. 
United Kingdom, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/ 42/PV.5, 14 October 1987, p. 62.

At a press conference held on 30 March 1988, a spokesperson for the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office stated that the Iraqi use of chemical weapons against Kurdish civilians in Halabja “represents a serious and grave violation of the 1925 Geneva [Gas] Protocol and international humanitarian law. The UK condemns unreservedly this and all other uses of chemical weapons.” 
United Kingdom, Statement by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Spokesperson at a Press Conference, 30 March 1988, reprinted in BYIL, Vol. 59, 1988, p. 579.

In 1989, the United Kingdom co-sponsored a draft resolution in the UN Commission on Human Rights which expressed “grave concern about reports of killing of unarmed Kurdish civilians, in particular by military attacks during 1988 using, inter alia, chemical weapons and causing mass exodus to neighbouring countries”. 
United Kingdom, Draft resolution on the situation of human rights in Iraq, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1989/L.82, 3 March 1989, § 2.

In 1990, during a debate in the UN Security Council on a peaceful and just post-Cold War world, the United Kingdom stated that, under paragraph 13 of Resolution 670 (1990), individuals were held responsible for grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and that “we should also hold personally responsible those involved in violations of the laws of armed conflict, including the prohibition against initiating the use of chemical … weapons contrary to the Geneva [Gas] Protocol of 1925, to which Iraq is a party”. 
United Kingdom, Statement before the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/PV.2963, 29 November 1990, § 78.

In 1991, during a debate in the House of Commons on the Gulf crisis, the UK Prime Minister stated:
Chemical weapons, already used by Saddam Hussein against his own people, have been deployed. Contrary to international agreements, Iraq has produced and threatened to use both chemical and biological weapons, the use of which would be wholly contrary to international agreements. 
United Kingdom, House of Commons, Statement by the Prime Minister, Hansard, 15 January 1991, Vol. 183, col. 735.

In 1991, in a report submitted to the UN Security Council on operations in the Gulf War, the United Kingdom stated: “The Iraqi Ambassador [to the United Kingdom] was also reminded of Iraq’s obligations under the 1925 Geneva [Gas] Protocol in respect of chemical … weapons. The United Kingdom would take the severest view of any use of these weapons by Iraq.”  
United Kingdom, Letter dated 21 January 1991 to the President of the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/22117, 21 January 1991, p. 1; see also Statement by Foreign and Commonwealth Office spokesperson, 21 January 1991, reprinted in BYIL, Vol. 62, 1991, p. 680.

In 1991, during a debate in the House of Commons on the Gulf crisis, the UK Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, stated: “We have always recognised that Saddam Hussein possesses chemical weapons and judging from his track record, he may well use them. To do so would be a breach of the 1925 [Geneva Gas Protocol]. It would be a gross crime.” 
United Kingdom, House of Commons, Statement by the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Hansard, 22 February 1991, Vol. 186, col. 576.

In 1991, during a debate in the UN Security Council on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, the United Kingdom stated with respect to Resolution 687 (1991):
The resolution contains tough provisions for the destruction of Iraqi chemical and biological weapons … It is surely right to do so. For Iraq alone in the region has not only developed many of these weapons, it has actually used them both against a neighbouring State and against its own population, and it has made the threat of their use part of the daily discourse of its diplomacy as it has attempted to bully and coerce its neighbours … But action against Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction must clearly not be the end of the affair, a one-off operation, and that is why the resolution so clearly situates this action within the wider framework of work towards a whole region free of weapons of mass destruction and, indeed, towards even wider actions – for example to outlaw chemical weapons worldwide. 
United Kingdom, Statement before the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/PV.2981, 3 April 1991, pp. 113–114.

In 1993, during a debate in the House of Commons, the UK Secretary of State for Defence stated:
We would view with the gravest concern any evidence revealed to the United Nations – which is studying the situation in southern Iraq – that might give it reason to believe that chemical weapons might have been used in that part of the country. Clearly, the use of such weapons is contrary to Iraq’s international obligations; moreover, it gives rise to a particular sense of abhorrence which is felt not only by all hon. Members but by the international community as a whole. 
United Kingdom, House of Commons, Statement by the Secretary of State for Defence, Hansard, 19 November 1993, Vol. 233, col. 181.

In 1998, in reply to a question in House of Commons about the United Kingdom’s position on chemical and biological weapons and nuclear weapons at a meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, the UK Prime Minister stated:
The UK delegation supported proposals to include within the jurisdiction of the ICC war crimes under existing customary international law. For that reason, the delegation supported the inclusion of the use of methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering; these included … chemical weapons as referred to in the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. 
United Kingdom, House of Commons, Reply by the Prime Minister, Hansard, 20 January 1998, Vol. 304, Written Answers, col. 477.

According to the Report on UK Practice, an IFOR restricted document (Legal Standard Operating Procedures) provides for “no use of chemical weapons – other than tightly controlled use in riot control situations”. 
Report on UK Practice, 1997, Chapter 3.4.

In 2003, in a written reply to a question in the House of Commons, the UK Minister of State for the Home Office wrote:
The Government are fully committed to meeting our obligations under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, which was implemented under the Biological Weapons Act 1974. More recently, we took new powers to deal with noxious substances. Sections 54 and 55 of the Terrorism Act 2000 (as amended in Section 120 of the Anti-terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001) make it an offence to provide, receive or invite another to receive instruction or training in the making or use of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons. In addition, section 113 of the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 makes it an offence to use any noxious substance or thing with the intention of causing serious harm to public or property, and section 114 creates an offence of hoaxing using alleged noxious substances. My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary has taken forward initiatives – including the Green Paper laid before the House in April 2002 – intended to strengthen international efforts, and mechanisms, to counter proliferation. 
United Kingdom, House of Commons, Written answer by the Minister of State, Home Office, Hansard, 5 February 2003, Vol. 399, Written Answers, cols. 320W–321W.

In 2003, in a written reply to a question in the House of Commons, the UK Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, wrote:
The Government’s policy towards the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) is to work towards their universal adoption and universal compliance with their obligations.
The United Kingdom abandoned its offensive chemical and biological weapons programmes in the 1950s. Subsequently we have played a leading role in the negotiations both of the BWC of 1975, for which we are a depositary government, and the CWC which entered into force in 1997. We are fully compliant with our obligations under both Conventions and continue to press for their full and effective implementation. To this end, both nationally and with our EU partners, we have conducted a series of demarches world-wide, with particular attention to regions of tension such as the Middle East.
The United Kingdom was instrumental in securing a successful outcome to the BWC Review Conference in November 2002, which saw agreement on a three year work programme of practical measures to deal with the BW threat. At the forthcoming CWC Review Conference (28 April–9 May 2003) the UK will be presenting a number of important technical and scientific papers. The strength of our political support and commitment to both Conventions, as well as the technical expertise we contribute, are second to none. 
United Kingdom, House of Commons, Written answer by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Hansard, 24 February 2003, Vol. 400, Written Answers, col. 49W.

In 2003, in a written reply to a question in the House of Commons, the UK Secretary of State for Defence, Mr Hoon, stated:
Lynne Jones: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make it his policy to withdraw British troops from military action where an ally uses (a) biological and (b) chemical weapons.
Mr. Hoon: Our NATO allies are State Parties to both the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and have renounced the use of such weapons. 
United Kingdom, House of Commons, Written answer by the Secretary of State for Defence, Hansard, 3 March 2003, Vol. 400, Written Answers, col. 812W.

In 2003, in a written reply to a question in the House of Commons, the UK Secretary of State for Defence, Mr Hoon, stated:
Dr. Cable: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what assessment he has made of the compatibility of disabling nerve agents with international obligations governing chemical weapons.
Mr. Hoon: The Chemical Weapons Convention prohibits the development, production and use of all toxic chemicals (both lethal and incapacitating) and their precursors, except where they are intended for purposes not prohibited under the Convention, as long as the type and quantities are consistent with such purposes. 
United Kingdom, House of Commons, Written answer by the Secretary of State for Defence, Hansard, 13 March 2003, Vol. 401, Written Answers, col. 382W.

In 2003, during a debate in the House of Commons, the UK Prime Minister replied to a question by a Member:
Mr. Duncan Smith: The House will have seen pictures confirming that Iraqi troops have been issued with chemical weapons protection equipment and will have read reports that they have access to chemical and biological weapons. Is it not essential that we make it clear to every Iraqi commander that the use of such weapons is a war crime, that obeying orders is no defence and that anyone guilty of such crimes will be prosecuted after the war?
The Prime Minister: Yes, that is important. We are making it clear to Iraqi commanders in the field that if they use chemical or biological weapons, they will be deservedly prosecuted with the utmost severity. There are increasing reports about the distribution of equipment to Iraqi forces. It is difficult to be sure of their accuracy, but we have obviously been prepared for such an eventuality from the outset. 
United Kingdom, House of Commons, Statement by the Prime Minister, Hansard, 26 March 2003, Vol. 402, Debates, col. 283.

In 2003, during a debate in the House of Commons, the UK Secretary of State for Defence stated:
As yet, we have not made significant finds of weapons of mass destruction, but as I have told the House before, we have made discoveries of extensive protective clothing issued to Iraqi forces, which we believe could have been issued only in preparation for their own use of chemical weapons. No coalition forces have such weapons and we would certainly never use them. 
United Kingdom, House of Commons, Statement by the Secretary of State for Defence, Hansard, 3 April 2003, Vol. 402, Debates, col. 1075.

In 2003, in a written reply to a question in the House of Commons, the UK Secretary of State for Defence, Mr Hoon, stated:
Dr. Cable: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether British troops in the Gulf are equipped with disabling nerve agents; and under what circumstances they can be used.
Mr. Hoon: No. As a State Party to the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, the United Kingdom has undertaken never to develop, produce or use chemical weapons. 
United Kingdom, House of Commons, Written answer by the Secretary of State for Defence, Hansard, 28 April 2003, Vol. 404, Written Answers, col. 48W.

In 2003, in a Written Ministerial Statement in the House of Commons, the UK Minister of State for the Armed Forces, Ministry of Defence, wrote:
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’s chemical protection programme is designed to protect against the use of chemical weapons. Such a programme is permitted by the Chemical Weapons Convention, with which the UK is fully compliant. Under the terms of the Convention, we are required to provide information annually to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). In accordance with the Government’s commitment to openness, I am placing in the Library of the House a copy of the summary that has been provided to the Organisation outlining the UK’s chemical protection programme for 2002. To increase transparency, the format of this year’s summary has been revised and for the first time information on civil protection is included. 
United Kingdom, House of Commons, Written ministerial statement by the Minister of State for the Armed Forces, Ministry of Defence, Hansard, 29 April 2003, Vol. 404, Written Ministerial Statements, col. 12WS.

In 2003, in a written answer to a question concerning the use of non-lethal chemical agents by UK forces, the UK Minister of State for Defence stated:
The Chemical Weapons Convention prohibits the development, production and use of all toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where they are intended for purposes not prohibited under the Convention, as long as the type and quantities are consistent with such purposes. “Purposes not prohibited” includes protective purposes related to protection against chemical weapons, as well as “law enforcement including domestic riot control purposes”. United Kingdom armed forces comply with the UK’s obligations under international law. We therefore would only carry, and would only use, non-lethal chemical agents for protective purposes related to protection against chemical weapons and for “law enforcement including domestic riot control purposes”.  
United Kingdom, House of Commons, Written answer by the Minister of State for Defence, Hansard, 20 November 2003, Vol. 413, Written Answers, col. 1271W.

United Republic of Tanzania
In 1966, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, the United Republic of Tanzania supported Hungary’s view that the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol had developed into customary international law and that the use of chemical weapons constituted an international crime. 
United Republic of Tanzania, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/SR.1457, 17 November 1966, p. 184.

In 1974, during discussions in the Ad Hoc Committee on Conventional Weapons established by the CDDH, the United Republic of Tanzania supported a ban on chemical weapons. 
United Republic of Tanzania, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. XVI, CDDH/IV/SR.2, 14 March 1974, p. 22, § 26.

United States of America
In 1966, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, the United States, in reply to allegations made by Hungary that the United States were using chemical weapons in Viet Nam, stated: “Allegations that the United States was using poison gas in Viet-Nam were completely unfounded.” 
United States, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/ SR.1451, 11 November 1966, § 41.

In 1966, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, the United States stated that it supported the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol, even though it had not ratified it. 
United States, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/ SR.1452, 14 November 1966, p. 158.

In 1970, during a debate in the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly, the United States was criticized by different States for using chemical weapons in Viet Nam in violation of the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol. It rejected the allegations and proclaimed “its intention to abide strictly by [the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol] terms” even though it was not a party. 
United States, Statement before the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.3/ SR.1789, 12 November 1970, p. 289.

At the CDDH, the United States voted against the Philippine amendment (see supra) because:
Grave breaches were meant to be the most serious type of crime; Parties had an obligation to punish or extradite those guilty of them. Such crimes should therefore be clearly specified, so that a soldier would know if he was about to commit an illegal act for which he could be punished. The amendment, however, was vague and imprecise … The amendment would also make it unlawful to use certain gases in retaliation, whereas under Protocol I only first use of such gases was unlawful. It would also punish those who used the weapons, namely, the soldiers, rather than those who made the decision as to their use, namely, Governments. 
United States, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VI, CDDH/SR.44, 30 May 1977, pp. 280–281, § 7.

In 1980, in a memorandum of law on the “Reported Use of Chemical Agents in Afghanistan, Laos, and Kampuchea”, a legal adviser of the US Department of State stated:
The prohibition of the first use in war of chemical weapons has, by reason of the practice and affirmations of states, become a part of the rules of customary international law which are binding on all states; and neither the limitations of the [1925 Geneva Gas] Protocol text nor reservations to it can detract from these obligations. Therefore, all states should be regarded as being bound to refrain from such first use, whether or not they or their opponents are parties to the Protocol.

In theory, an attempt might also be made to justify the use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan as a lawful reprisal against violations of the general laws of war by Afghan insurgents (such as the summary execution of Soviet prisoners). However, such an argument would face several serious problems. First, the prohibition in the [1925 Geneva Gas] Protocol and in customary international law apparently itself precludes use of chemical weapons in reprisal except in response to enemy use of weapons prohibited by the [1925 Geneva Gas] Protocol. 
United States, Department of State, Memorandum of law by a Legal Adviser on the “Reported Use of Chemical Agents in Afghanistan, Laos, and Kampuchea”, 9 April 1980, reprinted in Marian Nash Leich, Digest of United States Practice in International Law, 1980, Department of State Publication 9610, Washington, D.C., 1986, pp. 1027 and 1041, footnote 38.

The Department of State noted: “The Afghan conflict seems clearly to be an external invasion and occupation to which the rules of international armed conflict, including the rules against first use of chemical weapons, apply.” It added:
The [1925 Geneva Gas] Protocol itself does not apply to the Afghan conflict, because Afghanistan has never adhered to the Protocol … However, … the prohibition on the first use of chemical weapons in war has become a part of customary international law binding on all states, whether or not parties to the Protocol.
With respect to the conflict in Laos, the memorandum stated: “The customary law prohibition [has] generally been described as rules applying in international armed conflicts … There are at this time no strong precedents establishing that the prohibition on chemical weapons would be regarded as applying to a conflict of this character.” 
United States, Department of State, Memorandum of law by a Legal Adviser on the “Reported Use of Chemical Agents in Afghanistan, Laos, and Kampuchea”, 9 April 1980, reprinted in Marian Nash Leich, Digest of United States Practice in International Law, 1980, Department of State Publication 9610, Washington, D.C., 1986, pp. 1033 and 1036.

In 1986, during a debate in the UN Security Council, the United States stated: “The use of chemical weapons is a serious violation of international law.” 
United States, Statement before the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/PV.2666, 24 February 1986, p. 27.

In 1987, during a debate in the UN Security Council, the United States stated that chemical weapons were not capable of distinguishing between combatants and civilians. 
United States, Statement before the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/PV.2750, 20 July 1987, p. 18.

In an executive order issued in 1990, the US President stated: “The proliferation of chemical … weapons constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.” The order also provided for the possibility of imposing sanctions against foreign persons and governments found to have “knowingly and materially” contributed to efforts to “use, develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire chemical … weapons”. 
United States, Executive Order 12735, Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation, 16 November 1990, preamble and Section 4(b)(1), Federal Register, Vol. 55, 1990, p. 48587.

In 1991, in a diplomatic note to Iraq concerning operations in the Gulf War, the United States stated that it “expects the Government of Iraq to respect its obligations under the Geneva [Gas] Protocol of 1925 not to use chemical … weapons”. 
United States, Department of State, Diplomatic Note to Iraq, Washington, 19 January 1991, annexed to Letter dated 21 January 1991 to the President of the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/22122, 21 January 1991, Annex I, p. 2.

In 1991, during a debate in the UN Security Council, the United States supported the resolution on the elimination of Iraq’s chemical weapons in order to keep the region secure. 
United States, Statement before the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/PV.2981, 3 April 1991, pp. 86–87.

In 1991, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, the United States stated that a ban on chemical weapons was a top priority in its foreign policy. 
United States, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/ 46/PV.4, 15 October 1991, p. 34.

In 1993, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, the United States stated that it had worked for the elimination of chemical weapons. 
United States, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/ 48/SR.5, 19 October 1993, p. 10.

At the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, the United States stated: “The United States recognises the importance of our full participation in the chemical weapons convention at entry into force.” It added: “The United States stands committed to stopping the spread of weapons of mass destruction and to ensuring that the Chemical Weapons Convention is implemented effectively.” It further reconfirmed its good intentions by once more emphasizing its commitment to global chemical disarmament. 
United States, Statement at the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, 6–23 May 1997.

In 1998, in a legal review of Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) pepper spray, the Deputy Assistant Judge Advocate General of the US Department of the Navy stated:
Like the Biological Weapons Convention, the [1993 Chemical Weapons Convention] is an arms control treaty and is not limited to application during international armed conflict (i.e., it applies at all times and under all circumstances unless the treaty indicates otherwise) …
… The chemical, of course, must be potentially toxic, i.e., have harmful chemical action on life processes. Furthermore, the toxicity must affect humans or animals. 
United States, Department of the Navy, Deputy Assistant Judge Advocate General, International and Operational Law Division, Legal Review of Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) Pepper Spray, 19 May 1998, § 6(c), pp. 11–12.

In 1998, CNN alleged that the United States used chemical weapons (sarin) to kill defectors in the Vietnam War. The US State Department responded that it had not used sarin in the operation, and that “the US policy since World War II has prohibited the use of lethal chemical agents, including sarin, unless first used by the enemy”. 
United States, Department of Defense, Review of allegations concerning “Operation Tailwind”, 21 July 1998.

Later, the CNN President apologised for the report and stated: “There is insufficient evidence that sarin or any other deadly gas was used.” 
United States, American Forces Press Service, “DoD Welcomes CNN Retraction, Apology for Sarin Report”, July 1998.

In April 2006, the US Permanent Representative to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons issued a statement requesting a US extension of the final chemical weapons destruction deadline to 29 April 2012. In that statement, he reiterated US dedication to the success of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC):
The United States is dedicated to the success of the Chemical Weapons Convention. We played a leading role in negotiating it. In fact, the basis for the CWC text finally opened for signature in Paris was a draft presented to the Conference on Disarmament by former president George H. W. Bush. We played a leading role in the Preparatory Commission. And we have played an active, constructive role since the treaty entered into force. We began destroying our chemical weapons stockpile years even before the Convention entered into force. And we have provided funding and assistance to other States Parties seeking to destro y chemical weapons stockpiles. Our commitment to the Chemical Weapons Convention is deep, and it is long-standing.
The United States possesses the second largest chemical weapons stockpile in the world. Safely and effectively destroying more than 27 thousand metric tons of assorted chemical weapons is an enormous challenge – one we have made strenuous efforts to meet. We expect to spend over $32 billion before we are finished. We have made every effort to ensure that our chemical weapons are destroyed safely, without harm to people or the environment; verifiably, under the eyes of OPCW inspectors; and as rapidly as feasible. 
United States, US Permanent Representative to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Eric Javits, Statement Concerning Request to Extend the United States’ Destruction Deadline Under the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, The Netherlands, 20 April 2006.

Uruguay
At the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, Uruguay emphasized the importance of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention and stated its commitment and its determination to contribute actively to the realization of the Convention’s aims. 
Uruguay, Statement at the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, 6–23 May 1997.

Venezuela
In 1989, in reply to a note verbale of the UN Secretary-General on the subject of chemical weapons, Venezuela declared that it did not possess chemical weapons. It furthermore stated:
In order to ensure strict compliance with the principles and objectives of the Geneva [Gas] Protocol of 1925, it was essential that the countries which had entered reservations to the 1925 Protocol should withdraw them, because the purpose of most of these reservations was to allow the States that had made them to retain the possibility of using chemical weapons in retaliation, should the need arise. As a result of these reservations, the Geneva [Gas] Protocol, which was conceived as an instrument to prohibit the use of chemical weapons, had become an instrument of non-first use. 
Venezuela, Reply to a note verbale of the UN Secretary-General, referred to in Report of the Secretary-General on respect for the right to life: elimination of chemical weapons, prepared in accordance with UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1988/27, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/4, 17 August 1989, §§ 98 and 103.
[emphasis in original]
At the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, Venezuela stated that it was in favour of global eradication of chemical weapons and stressed the importance of universal adherence to the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. 
Venezuela, Statement at the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, 6–23 May 1997.

Viet Nam
In 1981, in a letter to the UN Secretary-General in reaction to US allegations that Viet Nam was “using Soviet-supplied toxic chemicals in Laos and Kampuchea”, Viet Nam stated:
The US is … supplying toxic chemicals to [others] to be used against the peoples of other countries as is the case in Afghanistan … [The charges made by the United States are] aimed at covering the crime of the United States of using toxic chemicals on a large scale and for more than ten years during [US activities] against Viet Nam … The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam completely rejects the above [charges made by the United States]. 
Viet Nam, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement of 17 September 1981 by a spokesperson, reprinted in Letter dated 22 September 1981 to the UN Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/36/549, 23 September 1981, pp. 1–2.

In 1987, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Viet Nam stated that it was committed to a global ban on chemical weapons. 
Viet Nam, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/ 42/PV.29, 2 November 1987, p. 18.

At the 1989 Session of the Conference on Disarmament, Viet Nam stated: “On the one hand, Viet Nam has been the victim of the use of chemical weapons on an enormous scale, while on the other it neither produces nor holds any chemical weapon.” 
Viet Nam, Statement before the Conference on Disarmament, UN Doc. CD/PV.498, 28 March 1989, p. 11.

Yemen
In 1991, during a debate in the UN Security Council, Yemen stated that it supported the eradication of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, but that the unilateral disarmament of Iraq would create imbalance in the region. 
Yemen, Statement before the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/PV.2981, 3 April 1991, p. 42.

Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal Republic of
In 1977, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia supported a complete ban on chemical weapons. 
Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal Republic of, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/32/PV.13, 29 September 1977, p. 62.

Yugoslavia, Federal Republic of
It was reported that in 1999, Serb forces used nerve gas against Kosovar Albanians; these claims were under investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 
Richard Norton-Taylor and Lucy Ward, “Serbs used chemical weapons”, The Guardian, London, 24 August 1999; “Reports indicate Serbs using chemical weapons against UCK”, Zeri i Popullit, Tirana, 23 April 1999, p. 14, as translated from Albanian in FBIS-EEU-1999-0424; “Kosovo rebels accuse Serbs of using nerve gas in recent fighting”, Kosovapress news agency website, 22 April 1999, as in BBC-SWB, 22 April 1999; “Yugoslav Army denies having chemical weapons”, TANJUG, Belgrade, 24 April 1999, as excerpted in BBC-SWB, 26 April 1999; United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence briefing, 27 April 1999; M. Binyon, “Volunteers for Kosovo face a grim death”, The Times, London, 28 April 1999; David Thompson, “Serb killers gassed KLA: Milošević launches chemical warfare attacks in Kosovo”, Scottish Daily Record, Glasgow, 28 April 1999, pp. 16–17; “Doctor claims to have treated refugees for Serb blister agent attack”, AFP from Washington, 28 April 1999; “Serbia: Kosovo rebels report use of chemical weapons”, Kosovapress news agency website, 3 May 1999, as in BBC-SWB, 4 May 1999; “UCK accuses Serbs of using nerve gas in Kosovo”, AFP from Kukes, Albania, 7 May 1999, as in FBIS-EEU-1999-0507; ATA news agency (Tirana) in English, 8 May 1999, as in BBC-SWB, 8 May 1999; Barbara Demick (from Blace, Macedonia), “Refugees say Serbs rout rebels, possibly with gas”, Philadelphia Inquirer, Philadelphia, 5 May 1999; Anne Swardson (from Cegrane, Macedonia), with John Ward Anderson (from Kukes) and Steven Pearlstein (from Brussels), “Serbs alleged to have used gas: refugees, KLA sources describe attacks on two villages”, Washington Post, Washington, D.C., 23 May 1999, p. A24.

According to the Report on the Practice of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, there are unconfirmed reports of the use of chemical weapons by the Yugoslav People’s Army during the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. 
Report on the Practice of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 1997, Chapter 3.4.
Bosnian Muslim forces 
“Chemical weapons claims probed”, Jane’s Defence Weekly, London, 21 August 1993, p. 5; “Muslims accused again of using CW rounds”, Jane’s Defence Weekly, London, 23 October 1993, p. 8.
and Serb forces 
Radio Bosnia-Hercegovina, Sarajevo, 12 February 1993, as in BBC-SWB, 15 February 1993; Radio Bosnia-Hercegovina, Sarajevo, 30 January 1993, as abstracted in BBC-SWB, 1 February 1993; Radio Bosnia-Hercegovina, Sarajevo, 31 January 1993, as translated in BBC-SWB, 2 February 1993; TANJUG from Belgrade in English, 31 January 1993, as excerpted in BBC-SWB, 2 February 1993; Radio Bosnia-Hercegovina, Sarajevo, 11 February 1993, as translated from the Serbo-Croat in FBIS-EEU-93-027, 11 February 1993, p. 33. (For example, the photograph by Kevin Weaver in The Independent, London, 26 February 1993, p. 10; Radio Bosnia-Hercegovina, Sarajevo, 13 March 1993, as translated in BBC-SWB, 15 March 1993; Radio Bosnia-Hercegovina, Sarajevo, 14 March 1993, as translated in BBC-SWB, 16 March 1993; Radio Bosnia-Hercegovina, Sarajevo, 15 March 1993, as translated in BBC-SWB, 17 March 1993; SRNA telephone service, 14 March 1993, as translated from Serbo-Croat in BBC-SWB, 16 March 1993.)
were also alleged to have used chemical weapons during the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
TANJUG Belgrade, 20 June 1994, as in BBC-SWB; “Bosnians said to be using chemical grenades in War”, Reuters, UN, 21 October 1993; “UN says non-lethal gas shells fired in Sarajevo”, Reuters, UN, 28 July 1993; TANJUG Belgrade, 22 October 1993; Radio Bosnia-Hercegovina, 29 July 1993, as in BBC-SWB; “Bosnia Chief threatens to use poison gas”, The Houston Chronicle, Houston, 31 October 1992; “2000 Bosnian Serb shells, toxic gas hit Teocak”, AFP, Radio Sarajevo, 12 June 1993; “Bosnian Serb Commander charges Moslems make chemical arms”, AFP, TANJUG, Belgrade, 12 January 1993; SRNA Review of Evening News, 25 August 1995; Major Garrett, “Mesic to tell senators of gas attacks on Croats”, Washington Times, Washington, D.C., 27 September 1991, p. A3; Bill Gertz, “Report: Army gassed Croats”, Washington Times, Washington, D.C., 26 September 1991, pp. A1 and A11; “Yugoslav president warns of CW use”, MEDNews, Paris, Vol. 4, No. 24, 30 September 1991, p. 5; TANJUG, Belgrade, 26 September 1991, as translated from Serbo-Croat in BBC-SWB, 28 September 1991; TANJUG from Belgrade in English, 27 September 1991, as excerpted in BBC-SWB, 30 September 1991; Mirko Hunjadi from Vinkovici on Radio Croatia (Zagreb), 28 September 1991, as translated from the Serbo-Croat in FBIS-EEU-91-189, 30 September 1991, p. 39; Radio Croatia (Zagreb), 30 September 1991, as excerpted in BBC-SWB, 4 October 1991.

Zaire
In 1977, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Zaire supported a complete ban on chemical weapons. 
Zaire, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/32/PV.28, 11 October 1977, p. 4.

Zimbabwe
At the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, Zimbabwe made statements in support of the object and purpose of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. 
Zimbabwe, Statement at the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, 6–23 May 1997.

According to the Report on the Practice of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe’s acceptance of the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons as part of customary international law may be deduced from its stance in international fora. 
Report on the Practice of Zimbabwe, 1998, Chapter 3.4.

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League of Nations Council
In 1938, with respect to the alleged use of gas by Japan during the Sino-Japanese War (1937–1943) and Chinese protests against this use, the League of Nations recalled: “The use of gas is a method of warfare condemned by international law.” 
League of Nations, 101st Session of the Council, Eighth Meeting, Official Journal, May–June 1938, pp. 378–379; 102nd Session of the Council, Fourth Meeting, Official Journal, November 1938, p. 881.

League of Nations Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1938 on the protection of civilian populations against air bombardment in case of war, the Assembly of the League of Nations reaffirmed: “The use of chemical … methods in the conduct of war is contrary to international law.”  
League of Nations, Assembly, Resolution adopted on 30 September 1938, § II, Official Journal, Special Supplement No. 182, Records of the 19th Ordinary Session of the Assembly, pp. 15–17.

UN Security Council
In a resolution adopted in 1986, the UN Security Council deplored the use of chemical weapons in the Iran–Iraq War. 
UN Security Council, Res. 582, 24 February 1986, § 2, voting record: 15-0-0.

In a resolution adopted in 1987, the UN Security Council denounced the use of chemical weapons. 
UN Security Council, Res. 598, 20 July 1987, preamble, voting record: 15-0-0.

In a resolution adopted in 1988 on the use of chemical weapons in the Iran–Iraq War, the UN Security Council:
Dismayed by the mission’s [i.e. the Mission Dispatched by the UN Secretary-General to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Conflict between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq] conclusions that chemical weapons continue to be used in the conflict and that their use has been on an ever more intensive scale than before,
1. Affirms the urgent necessity of strict observance of the [1925 Geneva Gas Protocol];
2. Condemns vigorously the continued use of chemical weapons in the conflict between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq contrary to obligations under the Geneva Protocol;
3. Expects both sides to refrain from the future use of chemical weapons in accordance with their obligations under the Geneva Protocol;
4. Calls upon all States to continue to apply or to establish strict control of the export to the parties to the conflict of chemical products serving for the production of chemical weapons. 
UN Security Council, Res. 612, 9 May 1988, preamble and §§ 1–4, voting record: 15-0-0.

In a resolution adopted in 1988, the UN Security Council expressed its concern over the possible use of chemical weapons in the future and its determination to “intensify its efforts to end all use of chemical weapons in violation of international obligations now and in the future”. The meaning of “international obligations” was explained in the second operative paragraph, which encourages the UN Secretary-General to investigate alleged breaches of “the 1925 Geneva [Gas] Protocol or other relevant rules of customary law”. 
UN Security Council, Res. 620, 26 August 1988, preamble and § 2, voting record: 15-0-0.

In Resolution 687 adopted in 1991 following the cessation of hostilities in the Gulf War, the UN Security Council recalled:
Iraq has subscribed to the Final Declaration adopted by all States participating in the Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Other Interested States, held in Paris from 7 to 11 January 1989, establishing the objective of universal elimination of chemical and biological weapons. 
UN Security Council, Res. 687, 3 April 1991, preamble, voting record: 12-1-2.

In Part C of the resolution, the Security Council:
7. Invites Iraq to reaffirm unconditionally its obligations under the [1925 Geneva Gas Protocol] …
8. Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of:
(a) All chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities related thereto. 
UN Security Council, Res. 687, 3 April 1991, Part C, §§ 7–8, voting record: 12-1-2.
[emphasis in original]
In a resolution adopted in 2004 on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the UN Security Council:
Affirming that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Decides that all States shall refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery;
2. Decides also that all States, in accordance with their national procedures, shall adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-State actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes, as well as attempts to engage in any of the foregoing activities, participate in them as an accomplice, assist or finance them. 
UN Security Council, Res. 1540, 28 April 2004, preamble and §§ 1–2, voting record: 15-0-0.

UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1966 on the question of general and complete disarmament, the UN General Assembly:
Considering that weapons of mass destruction constitute a danger to all mankind and are incompatible with the accepted norms of civilization,

1. Calls for strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and condemns all acts contrary to those objectives;
2. Invites all States to accede to the Geneva [Gas] Protocol of 17 June 1925. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 2162 (XXI) B, 5 December 1966, preamble and § 1, voting record: 91-0-4-26.

In a resolution adopted in 1969 on the question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Considering that chemical and biological methods of warfare have always been viewed with horror and been justly condemned by the international community,
Considering that these methods of warfare are inherently reprehensible because their effects are often uncontrollable and unpredictable and may be injurious without distinction to combatants and non-combatants, and because any use of such methods would entail a serious risk of escalation,
Recalling that successive international instruments have prohibited or sought to prevent the use of such methods of warfare,
Noting specifically in this regard that:
(a) The majority of States then in existence adhered to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925,
(b) Since then, further States have become parties to that Protocol,
(c) Still other States have declared that they will abide by its principles and objectives,
(d) These principles and objectives have commanded broad respect in the practice of States,
(e) The General Assembly, without any dissenting vote, has called for the strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Geneva [Gas] Protocol [in Resolution 2162 B (XXI) of 5 December 1966],
Recognizing therefore, in the light of all the above circumstances, that the Geneva [Gas] Protocol embodies the generally recognized rules of international law prohibiting the use in international armed conflicts of all biological and chemical methods of warfare, regardless of any technical developments,

Declares as contrary to the generally recognized rules of international law, as embodied in the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, the use in international armed conflicts of:
(a) Any chemical agents of warfare – chemical substances, whether gaseous, liquid or solid – which might be employed because of their direct toxic effects on man, animals or plants. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 2603 A (XXIV), 16 December 1969, preamble and § (a) , voting record: 80-3-36-7. (The resolution was adopted by 80 votes in favour, 3 against) (Australia, Portugal and United States) and 36 abstentions (Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Canada, Chile, China, Denmark, El Salvador, France, Greece, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Paraguay, Philippines, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Africa, Swaziland, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, Uruguay and Venezuela), UN Doc. A/PV.1836, 16 December 1969, p. 4.

The large number of States which abstained in the vote on the resolution (36) was partly due to disagreement on the scope of the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol. Other States thought that the UN General Assembly should not interpret multilateral treaties. 
Debates in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/PV.1716, 9 December 1969; UN Doc. A/C.1/PV.1717, 10 December 1969.

In a resolution adopted in 1968 on respect for human rights in armed conflicts, the UN General Assembly called upon “all States which have not yet done so to become parties to … the Geneva [Gas] Protocol of 1925”. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 2444 (XXIII), 19 December 1968, § 5, voting record: 111-0-0-15.

In a resolution adopted in 1968 on the question of general and complete disarmament, the UN General Assembly:
Reaffirming the recommendations contained in its resolution 2162 B (XXI) of 5 December 1966 calling for strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating Poisonous or Other Gases, and Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, condemning all actions contrary to those objectives and inviting all States to accede to that Protocol,

6. Reiterates its call for strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and invites all States to accede to that Protocol. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 2454 (XXIII) A, 20 December 1968, preamble and § 6, voting record: 107-0-2-17.

In a resolution adopted in 1969 on chemical weapons, the UN General Assembly invited “all States which have not yet done so to accede or ratify the Geneva [Gas] Protocol in the course of 1970”. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 2603 (XXIV) B, 16 December 1969, § I(2) , voting record: 120-0-1-5.

In a resolution adopted in 1970 on the question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Conscious of the need to maintain inviolate the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and to ensure its universal applicability,
Conscious of the urgent need for all States that have not already done so to accede to the Geneva [Gas] Protocol,
1. Reaffirms its resolution 2162 B (XXI) of 5 December 1966 and calls anew for the strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925,
2. Invites all States that have not already done so to accede to or ratify the Geneva [Gas] Protocol;

5. Commends the following basic approach, contained in the joint memorandum, for reaching an effective solution to the problem of chemical and bacteriological (biological) methods of warfare:
(a) It is urgent and important to reach agreement on the problem of chemical and bacteriological (biological) methods of warfare;
(b) Both chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons should continue to be dealt with together in taking steps towards the prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling and their effective elimination from the arsenals of all States;
(c) The issue of verification is important in the field of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, and verification should be based on a combination of appropriate national and international measures, which would complement and supplement each other, thereby providing an acceptable system that would ensure the effective implementation of the prohibition. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 2662 (XXV), 7 December 1970, §§ 1, 2 and 5 , voting record: 113-0-2-12.

In a resolution adopted in 1970 on respect for human rights in armed conflicts, the UN General Assembly:
Considers that the principles of the Geneva [Gas] Protocol of 1925 and the Geneva Conventions of 1949 should be strictly observed by all States and that States violating these international instruments should be condemned and held responsible to the world community. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 2674 (XXV), 9 December 1970, § 3, voting record: 77-2-36-12.

In a resolution adopted in 1970 on respect for human rights in armed conflicts, the UN General Assembly:
Calls upon all parties to any armed conflict to observe the rules laid down in … the Geneva [Gas] Protocol of 1925 … and invites those States which have not yet done so to adhere to [that] instrument[]. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 2677 (XXV), 9 December 1970, § 1, voting record: 111-0-4-12.

In a resolution adopted in 1970 on the question of Territories under Portuguese administration, the UN General Assembly:
Calls upon the Government of Portugal not to use chemical and biological methods of warfare against the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau), contrary to the generally recognized rules of international law embodied in the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and to General Assembly resolution 2603 (XXIV) of 16 December 1969. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 2707 (XXV), 14 December 1970, § 9, voting record: 94-6-16-11. The resolution was adopted by 94 votes in favour, 6 against and 16 abstentions. The votes against and abstaining appear to have been linked to the colonial question rather than to the evaluation of the value of the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol as such.

In a resolution adopted in 1971 on the question of Territories under Portuguese administration, the UN General Assembly:
Deeply concerned about any use of chemical substances by Portugal in its colonial wars against the peoples in the Territories under its domination,

6. Calls upon the Government of Portugal to refrain from the use of chemical substances in its colonial wars against the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau), as such practice is contrary to the generally recognized rules of international law embodied in the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and to General Assembly resolution 2707 (XXV) of 14 December 1970. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 2795 (XXVI), 10 December 1971, preamble and § 6, voting record: 105-8-5-14.

In a resolution adopted in 1971 on the question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Recalling that the General Assembly has repeatedly condemned all actions contrary to the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925,

4. Urges Governments to take all steps that may contribute to a successful outcome of the negotiations of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and that could facilitate early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and the elimination of such weapons from the arsenals of all States;
5. Reaffirms its resolution 2162 B (XXI) of 5 December 1966 and calls anew for the strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and Bacteriological Methods of Warfare;
6. Invites all States that have not already done so to accede to or ratify the [1925 Geneva Gas] Protocol. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 2827 (XXVI) A, 16 December 1971, preamble and §§ 4–6, voting record: 110-0-1-21.

In a resolution adopted in 1971 on the question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Urges all States to undertake, pending agreement on the complete prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction, to refrain from any further development, production or stockpiling of those chemical agents for weapons purposes which, because of their degree of toxicity, have the highest lethal effects and are not usable for peaceful purposes. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 2827 (XXVI) B, 16 December 1971, voting record: 101-0-10-21.

In a resolution adopted in 1971 on respect for human rights in armed conflict, the UN General Assembly:
Calls again upon all parties to any armed conflict to observe the rules laid down in … the Geneva [Gas] Protocol of 1925 … and invites those States which have not yet done so to adhere to [that] instrument[]. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 2852 (XXVI), 20 December 1971, § 1, voting record: 110-1-5-16.

In a resolution adopted in 1971 on respect for human rights in armed conflicts, the UN General Assembly:
Reiterates its call upon all parties to any armed conflict to observe the rules laid down in … the Geneva [Gas] Protocol of 1925 … and invites those States which have not yet done so to adhere to [that] instrument[]. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 2853 (XXVI), 20 December 1971, § 1, voting record: 83-15-14-20.

In a resolution adopted in 1972 on the question of Territories under Portuguese administration, the UN General Assembly condemned “the ruthless use of napalm and chemical substances in Angola, Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde and Mozambique”. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 2918 (XXVII), 14 November 1972, preamble, voting record: 98-6-8-20.

In a resolution adopted in 1972 on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Recalling that the General Assembly has repeatedly condemned all actions contrary to the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925,
Reaffirming the need for the strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of that Protocol,

1. Reaffirms the recognized objective of effective prohibition of chemical weapons;

3. Stresses the importance of working towards the complete realization of the objective of effective prohibition of chemical weapons as set forth in the present resolution and urges Governments to work towards that end;

5. Invites all States that have not yet done so to accede to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare of 17 June 1925 and/or ratify this Protocol, and calls anew for the strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives contained therein. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 2933 (XXVII), 29 November 1972, preamble and §§ 1, 3 and 5, voting record: 113-0-2-17.

In a resolution adopted in 1972 on respect for human rights in armed conflicts, the UN General Assembly:
Calls upon all parties to armed conflicts to observe the international humanitarian law rules which are applicable, in particular … the Geneva [Gas] Protocol of 1925, and, to this end, to provide instruction concerning these rules to their armed forces and information concerning the same rules to the civilian population. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 3032 (XXVII), 18 December 1972, § 2, voting record: 103-0-25-4.

In a resolution adopted in 1973 on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Considering that chemical and bacteriological (biological) methods of warfare have always been viewed with horror and been justly condemned by the international community,
Recalling that the General Assembly has repeatedly condemned all actions that are contrary to the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925,
Reaffirming the need for the strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of that Protocol,

1. Reaffirms the recognized objective of effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and of their elimination from the arsenal of all States;

5. Invites all States that have not yet done so to accede to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare of 17 June 1925 and/or ratify this Protocol, and calls anew for the strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives contained therein. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 3077 (XXVIII), 6 December 1973, preamble and §§ 1 and 5, voting record: 118-0-0-17.

In a resolution adopted in 1973 on respect for human rights in armed conflicts, the UN General Assembly:
Reaffirming the urgent need to ensure full and effective application by all parties to armed conflicts of existing legal rules relating to such conflicts, in particular … the Geneva [Gas] Protocol of 1925 …

4. Calls upon all parties to armed conflicts to acknowledge and to comply with their obligations under the humanitarian instruments and to observe the international humanitarian law rules which are applicable, in particular … the Geneva [Gas] Protocol of 1925. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 3102 (XXVIII), 12 December 1973, preamble and § 4, voting record: 107-0-6-22.

In a resolution adopted in 1973 on the question of Territories under Portuguese administration, the UN General Assembly:
Condemns in the strongest possible terms the persistent refusal of the Government of Portugal to comply with the provisions of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations and, in particular, the intensified armed repression by Portugal of the peoples of the Territories under its domination, including … the ruthless use of napalm and chemical substances. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 3113 (XXVIII), 12 December 1973, § 3, voting record: 105-8-16-6.

In a resolution adopted in 1974 on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Recalling that it has repeatedly condemned all actions that are contrary to the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925,
Reaffirming the need for the strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of that Protocol,

1. Reaffirms the objective of reaching agreement on the effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their elimination from the arsenals of all States;

5. Invites all States that have not yet done so to accede to or ratify the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, in the course of 1975 in commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of its signing, and calls anew for the strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives contained therein. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 3256 (XXIX), 9 December 1974, preamble and §§ 1 and 5, adopted without a vote.

In a resolution adopted in 1974 on the Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed Conflict, the UN General Assembly stated:
The use of chemical and bacteriological weapons in the course of military operations constitutes one of the most flagrant violations of the Geneva [Gas] Protocol of 1925, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the principles of international humanitarian law and inflicts heave losses on civilian populations, including defenceless women and children, and shall be severely condemned. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 3318 (XXIX), 14 December 1974, § 2, voting record: 110-0-14-14.

In a resolution adopted in 1974 on respect for human rights in armed conflicts, the UN General Assembly:
Calls upon all parties to armed conflicts to acknowledge and to comply with their obligations under the humanitarian instruments and to observe the international humanitarian rules which are applicable, in particular … the Geneva [Gas] Protocol of 1925. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 3319 (XXIX), 14 December 1974, § 3, adopted without a vote.

In a resolution adopted in 1975 on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Recalling that it has repeatedly condemned all actions contrary to the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and reaffirming the necessity of strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of that Protocol,

1. Reaffirms the objective of reaching early agreement on the effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their elimination from the arsenals of all States;

5. Invites all States that have not yet done so to accede to or ratify the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, in the course of 1975 in commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of its signing, and calls again for strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of that Protocol. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 3465 (XXX), 11 December 1975, preamble and §§ 1 and 5, adopted without a vote.

In a resolution adopted in 1975 on respect for human rights in armed conflicts, the UN General Assembly:
Calls upon all parties to armed conflicts to acknowledge and to comply with their obligations under the humanitarian instruments and to observe the international humanitarian rules which are applicable, in particular … the Geneva [Gas] Protocol of 1925. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 3500 (XXX), 15 December 1975, § 1, adopted without a vote.

In a resolution adopted in 1976 on respect for human rights in armed conflicts, the UN General Assembly:
Calls upon all parties to armed conflicts to acknowledge and to comply with their obligations under the humanitarian instruments and to observe the international humanitarian rules which are applicable, in particular … the Geneva [Gas] Protocol of 1925. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 31/19, 24 November 1976, § 1, adopted without a vote.

In a resolution adopted in 1976 on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Reaffirming the necessity of strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925,

1. Reaffirms the objective of reaching early agreement on the effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their elimination from arsenals of all States;

4. Invites all States that have not yet done so … to accede to or ratify the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and calls again for strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of [that] instrument[]. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 31/65, 10 December 1976, preamble and §§ 1 and 4, adopted without a vote.

In a resolution adopted in 1977 on respect for human rights in armed conflict, the UN General Assembly:
Calls upon all parties to armed conflicts to acknowledge and to comply with their obligations under the existing instruments of international humanitarian law and to observe the international humanitarian rules which are applicable, in particular … the Geneva [Gas] Protocol of 1925. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 32/44, 8 December 1977, § 6, adopted without a vote.

In a resolution adopted in 1977 on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Reaffirming the necessity of strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925,

1. Urges all States to reach early agreement on the effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction;

3. Invites all States that have not yet done so … to accede to or ratify the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and calls again for the strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of [that] instrument[]. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 32/77, 12 December 1977, preamble and §§ 1 and 3, adopted without a vote.

In 1978, in the Final Document of its Tenth Special Session, the UN General Assembly stated:
72. All States should adhere to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925.

75. The complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction represents one of the most urgent measures of disarmament. Consequently, the conclusions of a convention to this end, on which negotiations have been going on for several years, is one of the most urgent tasks of multilateral negotiations. After its conclusion, all States should contribute to ensuring the broadest possible application of the convention through its early signature and ratification. 
UN General Assembly, Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, UN Doc. A/S-10/2, 30 June 1978, III. Programme of Action, §§ 72 and 75.

In a resolution adopted in 1978 on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Reaffirming the necessity of strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925,

1. Urges all States to reach early agreement on the effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction;

4. Invites all States that have not yet done so … to accede to or ratify the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and calls again for strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of [that] instrument[]. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 33/59 A, 14 December 1978, preamble and §§ 1 and 4, adopted without a vote.

In a resolution adopted in 1979 on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Reaffirming also the necessity of strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, …

1. Expresses its regret that the agreement on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction has not yet been elaborated. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 34/72, 11 December 1979, preamble and § 1, adopted without a vote.

In a resolution adopted in 1980 on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Reaffirming also the necessity of strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925,

2. Expresses its regret that an agreement on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction has not yet been elaborated. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 35/144 B, 12 December 1980, preamble and § 2, adopted without a vote.

In a resolution adopted in 1980 on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Recalling the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, which was signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925 and entered into force on 8 February 1928,

Noting that the Protocol does not provide for the establishment of any machinery for investigating reports about activities prohibited under the Protocol,
Believing that the continued authority of the Protocol and relevant rules of customary international law require that full and proper attention be given to all reports regarding the alleged use of chemical weapons and to their harmful effects, both immediate and long-term, to humans and to the environment of the victim countries,
Noting reports alleging that chemical weapons have been used in recent wars and certain military operations in various regions of the world,
Noting recent reports from certain States concerning the use of chemical weapons on their territories,
Noting also the statements of various international organizations, in particular of the International Committee of the Red Cross, concerning these reports,

Urging all States to refrain from the development, production and deployment of new types of chemical munitions, in particular binary and multicomponent munitions,
Believing it necessary for all States, in particular militarily significant States, to refrain from any action which could impede multilateral negotiations on banning chemical weapons,
Convinced of the need to ascertain the facts pertaining to these reports and, in particular, to determine the harmful effects of the use of chemical weapons to human beings and the environment of the victim countries,
1. Calls upon all States parties to the 1925 Protocol for Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and Bacteriological Methods of Warfare to reaffirm their determination strictly to observe all their obligations under the Protocol;
2. Calls upon all States which have not yet done so to accede to the Protocol;
3. Appeals to all States to comply with the principles and objectives of the Protocol;
4. Decides to carry out an impartial investigation to ascertain the facts pertaining to the reports regarding the alleged use of chemical weapons and to assess the extent of the damage caused by the use of such weapons. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 35/144 C, 12 December 1980, preamble and § 1–4, voting record: 78-17-36-23.

In a resolution adopted in 1981 on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Reaffirming also the necessity of strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925,

2. Expresses its regret that an agreement on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction has not yet been elaborated. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 36/96 A, 9 December 1981, preamble and § 2, voting record: 147-0-1-9.

In a resolution adopted in 1981 on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Convinced of the need for the earliest conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction, which would contribute to general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Expressing profound concern over the production of new types of chemical weapons and other actions that would intensify the chemical arms race and compromise international efforts on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction,
1. Reaffirms the necessity of the earliest elaboration and conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction;

5. Calls upon all States to refrain from any action which would impede negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons and specifically to refrain from production and deployment of binary and other new types of chemical weapons, as well as from stationing chemical weapons in those States where there are no such weapons at present. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 36/96 B, 9 December 1981, preamble and §§ 1 and 5, voting record: 109-1-33-14.

In a resolution adopted in 1982 on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Convinced of the need for the earliest conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction, which would significantly contribute to general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Expressing profound concern at the production and deployment of binary chemical weapons,

1. Reaffirms the necessity of the earliest elaboration and conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction;

5. Reiterates its call to all States to refrain from any action that could impede negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons and specifically to refrain from the production and deployment of binary and other new types of chemical weapons, as well as from stationing chemical weapons on the territory of other States. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 37/98 A, 13 December 1982, preamble and §§ 1 and 5, voting record: 95-1-46.

In a resolution adopted in 1982 on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Reaffirming the necessity of strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, …

2. Expresses its regret that an agreement on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction has not yet been elaborated. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 37/98 B, 13 December 1982, preamble and § 2, adopted without a vote.

In a resolution adopted in 1982 on provisional procedures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol, the UN General Assembly:
Recalling the provisions of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, which entered into force on 8 February 1928,

Noting also that the Protocol does not provide for the establishment of procedures for investigating reports concerning activities prohibited by the Protocol,
Noting further that the Committee on Disarmament is currently engaged in the negotiation of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, which should contain provisions to ensure its effective verification,
Believing it conducive to the continued authority of the Protocol that, pending eventual formal arrangements, procedures be established to make possible prompt and impartial investigation of information concerning possible violations of the provisions of the Protocol,
1. Calls upon all States that have not yet done so to accede to the 1925Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare;
2. Calls upon all States to comply with the provisions of the Protocol;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to investigate, with the assistance of qualified experts, information that may be brought to his attention by any Member State concerning activities that may constitute a violation of the Protocol or of the relevant rules of customary international law in order to ascertain thereby the facts of the matter, and promptly to report the results of any such investigation to all Member States and to the General Assembly;

7. Further requests the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified consultant experts, to devise procedures for the timely and efficient investigation of information concerning activities that may constitute a violation of the Geneva [Gas] Protocol or of the relevant rules of customary international law and to assemble and organize systematically documentation relating to the identification of signs and symptoms associated with the use of such agents as a means of facilitating such investigations and the medical treatment that may be required. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 37/98 D, 13 December 1982, preamble and §§ 1, 2, 4 and 7, voting record: 86-119-33-19. This resolution was adopted in the context of the East–West conflict over the alleged use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan, Kampuchea and Laos. Although the debates were strongly partisan in relation to the actual allegations, there was strong support for the norm prohibiting the use of chemical weapons. UN Doc. A/37/PV.101, 13 December 1982, pp. 1667–1680.

In a resolution adopted in 1982 on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Recalling that the use of chemical and biological weapons has been declared incompatible with the accepted norms of civilization,

2. Calls anew for strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare and condemns all actions that are contrary to those objectives. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 37/98 E, 13 December 1982, preamble and § 2, voting record: 83-22-33-29.

In a resolution adopted in 1983 on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Convinced of the need for the earliest conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction, which would significantly contribute to general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Expressing profound concern at the intended production and deployment of binary chemical weapons,

1. Reaffirms the necessity of the speediest elaboration and conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction;

4. Reiterates its call to all States to refrain from any action that could impede negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons and specifically to refrain from the production and deployment of binary and other new types of chemical weapons, as well as from stationing chemical weapons on the territory of other States. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 38/187 A, 20 December 1983, preamble and §§ 1 and 4, voting record: 98-1-49-10.

In a resolution adopted in 1983 on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Reaffirming the necessity of strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, …

2. Expresses its regret that an agreement on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction has not yet been elaborated. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 38/187 B, 20 December 1983, preamble and § 2, adopted without a vote.

In a resolution adopted in 1984 on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Reaffirming the urgent necessity of strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, …
Noting that it has been reported that such weapons have been used,
Noting also international efforts under way to strengthen relevant international prohibitions, including efforts to develop appropriate fact-finding mechanisms,
Rededicating its efforts to protect mankind from chemical and biological warfare,
1. Calls for strict observance of existing international obligations regarding prohibitions on chemical and biological weapons and condemns actions that contravene them;
2. Welcomes the ongoing efforts to ensure the most effective prohibitions possible on chemical and biological weapons;
3. Urges the Conference on Disarmament to accelerate its negotiations on a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 39/65 A, 12 December 1984, preamble and §§ 1-3, voting record: 118-16-14-11.

In a resolution adopted in 1984 on the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Convinced of the need for the earliest conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction, which would significantly contribute to general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Expressing profound concern at the intended production and deployment of binary chemical weapons,

1. Reaffirms the necessity of the speediest elaboration and conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction;

4. Reaffirms its call to all States to conduct serious negotiations in good faith and to refrain from any action that could impede negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons and specifically to refrain from the production and deployment of binary and other new types of chemical weapons, as well as from stationing chemical weapons on the territory of other States. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 39/65 B, 12 December 1984, preamble and §§ 1 and 4, voting record: 84-1-62-12.

In a resolution adopted in 1984 on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Reaffirming the urgent necessity of strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, …

2. Expresses its regret and concern that an agreement on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction has not yet been elaborated. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 39/65 C, 12 December 1984, preamble and § 2, adopted without a vote.

In a resolution adopted in 1985 on the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Convinced of the need for the earliest conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction, which would significantly contribute to general and complete disarmament under effective international control,
Stressing the continuing importance of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed sixty years ago at Geneva,
Determined, for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of the use of chemical weapons, through the earliest conclusion and implementation of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all types of chemical weapons and on their destruction, thereby complementing the obligations assumed under the Geneva [Gas] Protocol of 17 June 1925,

Expressing profound concern at recent decisions on the production of binary chemical weapons, as well as at their intended deployment,

1. Reaffirms the necessity of the speediest elaboration and conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction;

4. Reaffirms its call to all States to conduct serious negotiations in good faith and to refrain from any action that could impede negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons and specifically to refrain from the production and deployment of binary and other new types of chemical weapons, as well as from stationing chemical weapons on the territory of other States;
5. Calls upon all States that have not yet done so to become parties to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 40/92 A, 12 December 1985, preamble and §§ 1 and 4–5, voting record: 93-15-41-10.

In a resolution adopted in 1985 on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Reaffirming the urgent necessity of strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, …

2. Expresses again its regret and concern that an agreement on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction has not yet been elaborated. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 40/92 B, 12 December 1985, preamble and § 2, adopted without a vote.

In a resolution adopted in 1985 on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Reaffirming the urgent necessity of strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, …
Noting with concern reports that chemical weapons have been used, as well as indications of their emergence in an increasing number of national arsenals,
Expressing concern at the increasing risk that chemical weapons may be resorted to again,

Rededicating its efforts to protect mankind from chemical and biological warfare,
1. Reaffirms the need for strict observance of existing international obligations regarding prohibitions on chemical and biological weapons and condemns all actions that contravene those obligations. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 40/92 C, 12 December 1985, preamble and § 1, voting record: 112-16-22-9.

In a resolution adopted in 1986 on the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Convinced of the urgency of the earliest conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction, which would significantly contribute to general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Stressing the continuing importance of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925,
Determined, for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of the use of chemical weapons, through the earliest conclusion and implementation of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all types of chemical weapons and on their destruction, thereby complementing the obligations assumed under the Geneva [Gas] Protocol of 17 June 1925,

Emphasizing the need to stop a further increase of arsenals of chemical weapons and to refrain from the deployment of such weapons on the territories of other countries, as well as the necessity of withdrawing chemical weapons deployed abroad to within the national boundaries of States to which they belong,
Expressing profound concern at decisions on the production of new types of chemical weapons, as well as at their intended deployment,

1. Reaffirms the necessity for the speediest elaboration and conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction;

3. Reaffirms its call to all States to conduct serious negotiations in good faith and to refrain from any action that could impede negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons and specifically from the production of new types of chemical weapons, as well as from deploying chemical weapons on the territory of other States;

5. Calls upon all States that have not yet done so to become parties to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 41/58 B, 3 December 1986, preamble and §§ 1, 3 and 5, voting record: 100-11-43-5.

In a resolution adopted in 1986 on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Reaffirming the urgent necessity of strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, …
Reiterating its concern over reports that chemical weapons have been used and over indications of their emergence in an increasing number of national arsenals, as well as over the growing risk that they may be used again,

Reaffirming its dedication to protecting mankind from chemical and biological warfare,
1. Calls for compliance with existing international obligations regarding prohibitions on chemical and biological weapons, and condemns all actions that contravene those obligations. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 41/58 C, 3 December 1986, preamble and § 1, voting record: 137-0-14-8.

In a resolution adopted in 1986 on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Reaffirming the urgent necessity of strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, …

2. Expresses again none the less its regret and concern that notwithstanding the progress made in 1986 a convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction has not yet been elaborated. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 41/58 D, 3 December 1986, preamble and § 2 , adopted without a vote.

In a resolution adopted in 1987 on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Reaffirming the urgent necessity of strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, …

2. Expresses again none the less its regret and concern that notwithstanding the progress made in 1987, a convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction has not yet been elaborated. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 42/37 A, 30 November 1987, preamble and § 2, adopted without a vote.

In a resolution adopted in 1987 on measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol and to support the conclusion of a chemical weapons convention, the UN General Assembly:
Recalling the provisions of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and other relevant rules of customary international law,

Reiterating its concern about reports that chemical weapons have been used and over indications of their emergence in an increasing number of national arsenals, as well as about the growing risk that they may be used again,

Noting also that prompt and impartial investigation of reports of possible use of chemical and bacteriological weapons would further enhance the authority of the Geneva [Gas] Protocol,

1. Renews its call to all States to observe strictly the principles and objectives of the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, and condemns all actions that violate this obligation;
2. Urges all States to be guided in their national policies by the need to curb the spread of chemical weapons;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to carry out investigations in response to reports that may be brought to his attention by any Member State concerning the possible use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons that may constitute a violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol or other relevant rules of customary international law in order to ascertain the facts of the matter, and to report promptly the results of any such investigation to all Member States;
5. Requests the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified experts provided by interested Member States, to develop further technical guidelines and procedures available to him for the timely and efficient investigation of such reports of the possible use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons;
6. Also requests the Secretary-General, in meeting the objectives set forth in paragraph 4 above, to compile and maintain lists of qualified experts provided by Member States whose services could be made available at short notice to undertake such investigations, and of laboratories with the capability to undertake testing for the presence of agents the use of which is prohibited;
7. Further requests the Secretary-General, in meeting the objectives of paragraph 4 above:
(a) To appoint experts to undertake investigation of the reported activities;
(b) Where appropriate, to make the necessary arrangements for experts to collect and examine evidence and to undertake such testing as may be required;
(c) To seek, in any such investigation, assistance as appropriate from Member States and the relevant international organizations;
8. Requests Member States and the relevant international organizations to co-operate fully with the Secretary-General in the above-mentioned work. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 42/37 C, 30 November 1987, preamble and §§ 1, 2 and 4–8, adopted without a vote.

In a resolution adopted in 1988 on measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol and to support the conclusion of a chemical weapons convention, the UN General Assembly:
Reaffirming its dedication to protecting humanity from chemical and biological warfare,
Expressing deep dismay at the use of chemical weapons in violation of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and other relevant rules of customary international law, at indications of their emergence in an increasing number of national arsenals and at the growing risk that they may be used again,
Recalling the provisions of the 1925 Geneva [Gas] Protocol and other relevant rules of customary international law,

Noting that prompt and impartial investigation of reports of possible use of chemical and bacteriological weapons would further enhance the authority of the Geneva [Gas] Protocol,

1. Renews its call to all States to observe strictly the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, and condemns vigorously all actions that violate this obligation;
2. Calls upon all States that have not yet done so to accede to the 1925 Geneva [Gas] Protocol;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to carry out promptly investigations in response to reports that may be brought to his attention by any Member State concerning the possible use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons that may constitute a violation of the Geneva [Gas] Protocol or other rules of customary international law in order to ascertain the facts of the matter, and to report promptly the results of any such investigation to all Member States, in accordance with procedures established by the General Assembly in its resolution 42/37 C. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 43/74 A, 7 December 1988, preamble and §§ 1, 2 and 5, adopted without a vote.

In a resolution adopted in 1988 on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Reaffirming the urgent necessity, particularly following recent United Nations reports, of strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and taking note with satisfaction of the proposal to convene a conference to that effect,

2. Expresses again none the less its regret and concern that, notwithstanding the progress made in 1988, a convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction has not yet been elaborated. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 43/74 C, 7 December 1988, preamble and § 2, adopted without a vote.

In a resolution adopted in 1989 on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Reaffirming the urgent necessity, particularly following recent United Nations reports, of strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925,
Welcoming the broad participation in and the positive results of the Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva [Gas] Protocol and Other Interested States on the prohibition of chemical weapons, held in Paris from 7 to 11 January 1989, and noting with satisfaction the resulting additional accession of States to the 1925 Protocol,
Endorsing the Final Declaration adopted at the Paris Conference as an important contribution to the aim of the total elimination of chemical weapons,

2. Notes, while regretting that a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction has not yet been concluded, that there exists an ever-growing will to resolve the pending problems at the earliest possible date. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 44/115 A, 15 December 1989, preamble and § 2, adopted without a vote.

In a resolution adopted in 1989 on measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol and to support the conclusion of a chemical weapons convention, the UN General Assembly:
Recalling also the provisions of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and of other rules and principles of international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict,

Expressing deep dismay at the use and the risk of use of chemical weapons as long as such weapons remain and are spread,
Acknowledging that prompt and impartial investigation of reports of possible use of chemical and bacteriological weapons will further enhance the authority of the 1925 Geneva [Gas] Protocol,

1. Renews its call to all States to observe strictly the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare and condemns vigorously all actions that violate that obligation;
2. Calls upon all States that have not yet done so to accede to the 1925 Geneva [Gas] Protocol;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to carry out promptly investigations in response to reports that may be brought to his attention by any Member State concerning the possible use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons that may constitute a violation of the 1925 Geneva [Gas] Protocol or other relevant rules of customary international law in order to ascertain the facts of the matter, and to report promptly the results of any such investigation to all Member States. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 44/115 B, 15 December 1989, preamble and §§ 1–2 and 4, adopted without a vote

In a resolution adopted in 1990 on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Reaffirming the urgent necessity, particularly in the light of the past use of and recent threats to use chemical weapons, of strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925,
Welcoming again in this regard the reaffirmation in the Final Declaration of the Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva [Gas] Protocol and Other Interested States, held in Paris from 7 to 11 January 1989, of the importance and continuing validity of the 1925 Protocol,

1. Renews its call to all States to observe strictly the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, and to abide by the commitments undertaken in the Final Declaration of the Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva [Gas] Protocol and Other Interested States, held in Paris in January 1989;

3. Expresses its regret and concern that a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction has not yet been concluded. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 45/57 A, 4 December 1990, preamble and §§ 1 and 3, adopted without a vote.

UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1990 on measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol, the UN General Assembly:
Deploring the use and threat of use of chemical weapons,
1. Condemns vigorously all actions that violate or threaten to violate the obligations assumed under the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and other relevant provisions of international law;
2. Renews its call to all States to observe strictly the principles and objectives of the 1925 Geneva [Gas] Protocol and reaffirms the vital necessity of upholding its provisions. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 45/57 C, 4 December 1990, preamble and §§ 1–2, adopted without a vote.

UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1991 on measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol, the UN General Assembly:
Reaffirming the importance and the continuing validity of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925,

Deploring all threats, including especially those made most recently, of use of chemical weapons,
1. Condemns vigorously all actions that violate or threaten to violate the obligations assumed under the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, and other relevant provisions of international law;
2. Renews its call to all States to observe strictly the principles and objectives of the Geneva [Gas] Protocol, and reaffirms the vital necessity of upholding its provisions;
3. Welcomes, in this context, recent decisions, declarations and initiatives of the United Nations and, in particular, the Security Council aimed at upholding the authority of the Geneva [Gas] Protocol and removing the threat of chemical weapons use. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 46/35 B, 6 December 1991, preamble and §§ 1–3, adopted without a vote.

In a resolution adopted in 1991 on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Reaffirming the urgent necessity, particularly in the light of the past use of and recent threats to use chemical weapons, of strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925,

1. Renews its call to all States to observe strictly the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 46/35 C, 6 December 1991, preamble and § 1, adopted without a vote.

In a resolution adopted in 1991 on the situation of human rights in Iraq, the UN General Assembly stated that it was “deeply concerned by the fact that chemical weapons have been used on the Kurdish civilian population”.  
UN General Assembly, Res. 46/134, 17 December 1991, preamble, voting record: 129-1-17-19. The resolution was adopted by 129 votes in favour, one against (Iraq) and 17 abstentions (Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, China, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Indonesia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Malaysia, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania and Zimbabwe).

In a resolution adopted in 1992 on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Recalling the long-standing determination of the international community to achieve the effective prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons, and their destruction, as well as the continuing support for measures to uphold the authority of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, as expressed by consensus in many previous resolutions,

Bearing in mind the Final Declaration of the Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva [Gas] Protocol and Other Interested States, held in Paris from 7 to 11 January 1989, in which participating States stressed their determination to prevent any recourse to chemical weapons by completely eliminating them,

Convinced, therefore, of the urgent necessity of a total ban on chemical weapons, so as to abolish an entire category of weapons of mass destruction, and thus to eliminate the risk to mankind of renewed use of these inhumane weapons,
1. Commends the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, as contained in the report of the Conference on Disarmament;
2. Requests the Secretary-General, as depositary of the Convention, to open it for signature in Paris on 13 January 1993;
3. Calls upon all States to sign and, thereafter, according to their respective constitutional processes, to become parties to the Convention at the earliest possible date, thus contributing to its rapid entry into force and to the early achievement of universal adherence. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 47/39, 30 November 1992, preamble and §§ 1–3, adopted without a vote.

In a resolution adopted in 1996 on measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol, the UN General Assembly:
Recalling the long-standing determination of the international community to achieve the effective prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical and biological weapons as well as the continuing support for measures to uphold the authority of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, as expressed by consensus in many previous resolutions,

Welcoming also the recent initiatives by some States parties to withdraw their reservations to the 1925 Geneva [Gas] Protocol,
1. Renews its previous call to all States to observe strictly the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and reaffirms the vital necessity of upholding its provisions;
2. Calls upon those States that continue to maintain reservations to the 1925 Geneva [Gas] Protocol to withdraw those reservations. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 51/45 P, 10 December 1996, preamble and §§ 1–2, voting record: 165-0-7-13.

In a resolution adopted in 1996 on the status of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, the UN General Assembly:
Determined to achieve the effective prohibition of the development, production, acquisition, transfer, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and their destruction,
Convinced of the urgent necessity of universal adherence to the Convention so as to abolish an entire category of weapons of mass destruction, and thus eliminate the risk to mankind of renewed use of these inhumane weapons,
1. Welcomes the fact that the required sixty-five instruments of ratification have now been deposited and that the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction will therefore enter into force on 29 April 1997;
2. Stresses the importance to the Convention that all possessors of chemical weapons, chemical weapons production facilities or chemical weapons development facilities should be among the original parties to the Convention and, in this context, the importance of the United States of America and the Russian Federation, having declared possession of chemical weapons, being among the original States parties to the Convention;
3. Also stresses that this would promote the full realization and effective implementation of the Convention;
4. Calls upon all States that have not yet done so to sign and/or ratify the Convention without delay. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 51/45 T, 10 December 1996, preamble and §§ 1–4, adopted without a vote

In a resolution adopted in 1997 on the status of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, the UN General Assembly:
Determined to achieve the effective prohibition of the development, production, acquisition, transfer, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and their destruction,
1. Welcomes the fact that the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction entered into force on 29 April 1997 with eighty-seven original States parties as well as the fact that seventeen States have subsequently become States parties to the Convention;

3. Emphasizes the necessity of universal adherence to the Convention, and calls upon all States that have not yet done so to become States parties to the Convention without delay;
4. Stresses the vital importance of full and effective implementation of, and compliance with, all provisions of the Convention. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 52/38 T, 9 December 1997, preamble and §§ 1 and 3–4, adopted without a vote.

In a resolution adopted in 1998 on measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol, the UN General Assembly:
Recalling the long-standing determination of the international community to achieve the effective prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical and biological as well as the continuing support for measures to uphold the authority of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, as expressed by consensus in many previous resolutions,

Welcoming also the initiatives by some States parties to withdraw their reservations to the 1925 Geneva [Gas] Protocol,
1. Renews its previous call to all States to observe strictly the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and reaffirms the vital necessity of upholding its provisions;
2. Calls upon those States that continue to maintain reservations to the 1925 Geneva [Gas] Protocol to withdraw those reservations. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 53/77 L, 4 December 1998, preamble and §§ 1–2, voting record: 168-0-5-12.

In a resolution adopted in 1998 on the implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, the UN General Assembly:
Determined to achieve the effective prohibition of the development, production, acquisition, transfer, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and their destruction,

5. Emphasizes the necessity of universal adherence to the Convention, and calls upon all States that have not yet done so to become States parties to the Convention without delay. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 53/77 R, 4 December 1998, preamble and § 5, adopted without a vote

In a resolution adopted in 1999 on the implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, the UN General Assembly:
Determined to achieve the effective prohibition of the development, production, acquisition, transfer, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and their destruction,

5. Emphasizes the necessity of universal adherence to the Convention, and calls upon all States that have not yet done so to become States parties to the Convention without delay. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 54/54 E, 1 December 1999, § 5, adopted without a vote.

In a resolution adopted in 2000 on the implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, the UN General Assembly:
Determined to achieve the effective prohibition of the development, production, acquisition, transfer, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and their destruction,

1. Emphasizes the necessity of universal adherence to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, and calls upon all States that have not yet done so to become parties to the Convention without delay. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 55/33 H, 20 November 2000, preamble and § 1, adopted without a vote.

In a resolution adopted in 2003 on the implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, the UN General Assembly:
1. Emphasizes that the universality of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction is fundamental to the achievement of its objective and purpose;

4. Emphasizes the necessity of universal adherence to the Convention, and calls upon all States that have not yet done so to become parties to the Convention without delay. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 58/52, 8 December 2003, §§ 1 and 4, adopted without a vote.

In a resolution adopted in 2004 on measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol, the UN General Assembly:
Recalling the long-standing determination of the international community to achieve the effective prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical and biological weapons as well as the continuing support for measures to uphold the authority of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, as expressed by consensus in many previous resolutions,

Welcoming the recent initiatives by three more States Parties to withdraw their reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol,

2. Renews its previous call to all States to observe strictly the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, and reaffirms the vital necessity of upholding its provisions;
3. Calls upon those States that continue to maintain reservations to the 1925 Geneva [Gas] Protocol to withdraw them. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 59/70, 3 December 2004, preamble and §§ 2–3, voting record: 179-0-5-7.

In a resolution adopted in 2004 on the implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, the UN General Assembly:
Recalling its previous resolutions on the subject of chemical weapons, in particular resolution 58/52 of 8 December 2003, adopted without a vote, in which it noted with appreciation the ongoing work to achieve the objective and purpose of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction,
Determined to achieve the effective prohibition of the development, production, acquisition, transfer, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and their destruction,
Noting with satisfaction that, since the adoption of resolution 58/52, nine additional States have ratified the Convention or acceded to it, bringing the total number of States parties to the Convention to one hundred and sixty-seven,
Reaffirming the importance of the outcome of the First Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, including the Political Declaration, in which the States parties reaffirmed their commitment to achieving the objective and purpose of the Convention, and the final report, which addressed all aspects of the Convention and made important recommendations on its continued implementation,
1. Emphasizes that the universality of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction is fundamental to the achievement of its objective and purpose, and acknowledges progress made in the implementation of the action plan for the universality of the Convention, and calls upon all States that have not yet done so to become parties to the Convention without delay;
2. Underlines that the Convention and its implementation contribute to enhancing international peace and security, and emphasizes that its full, universal and effective implementation will contribute further to that purpose by excluding completely, for the sake of all humankind, the possibility of the use of chemical weapons;
3. Stresses that the full and effective implementation of all provisions of the Convention is in itself an important contribution to the efforts of the United Nations in the global fight against terrorism in all its forms and manifestations;
4. Also stresses the importance to the Convention that all possessors of chemical weapons, chemical weapons production facilities or chemical weapons development facilities, including previously declared possessor States, should be among the States parties to the Convention, and welcomes progress to that end;
5. Notes that the effective application of the verification system builds confidence in compliance with the Convention by States parties;
6. Stresses the importance of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in verifying compliance with the provisions of the Convention as well as in promoting the timely and efficient accomplishment of all its objectives;
7. Urges all States parties to the Convention to meet in full and on time their obligations under the Convention and to support the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in its implementation activities;
8. Reaffirms the undertaking of the States parties to foster international cooperation for peaceful purposes in the field of chemical activities of the States parties and the importance of that cooperation and its contribution to the promotion of the Convention as a whole;
9. Notes with appreciation the ongoing work of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to achieve the objective and purpose of the Convention, to ensure the full implementation of its provisions, including those for international verification of compliance with it, and to provide a forum for consultation and cooperation among States parties, and also notes with appreciation progress made in the implementation of the plan of action regarding the implementation of article VII obligations;
10. Welcomes the cooperation between the United Nations and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons within the framework of the Relationship Agreement between the United Nations and the Organization, in accordance with the provisions of the Convention. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 59/72, 3 December 2004, preamble and §§ 1–10, adopted without a vote.

In a resolution adopted in 2005 on the implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, the UN General Assembly:
Determined to achieve the effective prohibition of the development, production, acquisition, transfer, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and their destruction,

1. Emphasizes that the universality of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction is fundamental to the achievement of its objective and purpose … and calls upon all States that have not yet done so to become parties to the Convention without delay. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 60/67, 8 December 2005, preamble and § 1, adopted without a vote.

In a resolution adopted in 2006 on measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol, the UN General Assembly:
Recalling the long-standing determination of the international community to achieve the effective prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical and biological weapons as well as the continuing support for measures to uphold the authority of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, as expressed by consensus in many previous resolutions,

2. Renews its previous call to all States to observe strictly the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, and reaffirms the vital necessity of upholding its provisions;
3. Calls upon those States that continue to maintain reservations to the 1925 Geneva [Gas] Protocol to withdraw them. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 61/61, 6 December 2006, preamble and §§ 2–3, voting record: 173-0-4-15.

In a resolution adopted in 2006 on the implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, the UN General Assembly:
Emphasizes that the universality of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction is fundamental to the achievement of its objective and purpose and acknowledges progress made in the implementation of the action plan for the universality of the Convention, and calls upon all States that have not yet done so to become parties to the Convention without delay. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 61/68, 6 December 2006, § 1, adopted without a vote.

In a resolution adopted in 2007 on the implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, the UN General Assembly:
Determined to achieve the effective prohibition of the development, production, acquisition, transfer, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and their destruction,

1. Emphasizes that the universality of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction is fundamental to the achievement of its objective and purpose, acknowledges progress made in the implementation of the action plan for the universality of the Convention, and calls upon all States that have not yet done so to become parties to the Convention without delay. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 62/23, 5 December 2007, preamble and § 1, adopted without a vote.

UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 1988, the UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights stated that it was “deeply concerned” by reports of the increased use of chemical weapons and called upon all States to “observe strictly the principles and objectives” of the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol. 
UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights, Res. 1988/27, 1 September 1988, preamble and § 1.

In a resolution adopted in 1989, the UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights stated that the use of chemical weapons was “also incompatible with the prohibition against any form of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”. It called upon all States “to abide by their international obligations in this field”. 
UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights, Res. 1989/39, 1 September 1989, preamble and § 1.

In a resolution adopted in 1996, the UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights stated that chemical weapons were “weapons of mass destruction or had indiscriminate effects”. It also stated that the use of these weapons was “incompatible with human rights and humanitarian law”. 
UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights, Res. 1996/16, 29 August 1996, § 1 and preamble.

UN Secretary-General
In 1969, in a report on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and the effects of their possible use, the UN Secretary-General urged all UN Member States to accede to the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol, to affirm that the prohibition covered all sorts of chemical weapons and to reach an agreement on the elimination of chemical weapons. 
UN Secretary-General, Report on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and the effects of their possible use, UN Doc. A/7575, 1 July 1969, p. xii, §§ 1–3.

In 1981 and 1982, the UN Secretary-General produced reports on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons which included the reports of the Group of Experts to Investigate Reports on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolutions 35/144 C (1980) and 36/96 C (1981). 
UN Secretary-General, Report on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, UN Doc. A/36/613, 20 November 1981; Report on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, UN Doc. A/37/259, 1 December 1982.

In 1984, in a message to the Presidents of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq, the UN Secretary-General stated: “It is a deplorable fact that chemical weapons have been used in contravention of the Geneva [Gas]Protocol of 1925 … This drew widespread international condemnation. It is imperative that resort to such weapons should not occur.” 
UN Secretary-General, Messages dated 29 June 1984 to the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran and to the President of Iraq, UN Doc. S/16663, 6 July 1984, p. 1.

In 1988, in a note with regard to a report of the Mission Dispatched by the UN Secretary-General to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Conflict between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq, the UN Secretary-General stated:
It is with a sense of dismay and deep regret that the Secretary-General informs the Security Council that, despite many international appeals and world-wide condemnations, chemical weapons continue to be used in the conflict between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq in violation of the [1925 Geneva Gas Protocol] and that, indeed, the use of such weapons may have intensified. This, regrettably, is the conclusion of the mission of the medical specialist which the Secretary-General dispatched recently to the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq to investigate the allegations lodged by both Governments of the use of chemical weapons. 
UN Secretary-General, Note on the report of the mission dispatched by the Secretary-General to investigate allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the conflict between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq, UN Doc. S/19823, 25 April 1988, p. 1, § 1; see also the subsequent notes by the UN Secretary-General on the same matter such as UN Doc S/20060, 20 July 1988, p. 1, § 1, UN Doc. S/20063, 25 July 1988, p. 1, § 1, UN Doc. S/20134, 19 August 1988, p. 1, § 1 and Julian Perry Robinson, “The Negotiations on the Chemical Weapons Convention: A Historical Overview”, in Michael Bothe, Natalino Ronzitti and Allan Rosas (eds.), The New Chemical Weapons Convention: Implementation and Prospects, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 1998, pp. 19 and 34.

UN Commission on Human Rights (Special Rapporteur)
In 2001, in a report on violence against women perpetrated and/or condoned by the State during times of armed conflict, the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights on Violence against Women, Its Causes and Consequences stated:
Modern warfare has often entailed the deployment of chemical weapons, the use of which is now clearly banned by the Rome Statute of the ICC. Use of such weapons is a war crime and a crime against humanity. The Special Rapporteur has recently received a number of testimonies of victims of the use of chemical weapons, especially from Vietnam. The victims have suffered disabilities related to their reproductive organs and have given birth to children with severe disabilities. The consequences resulting from the use of chemical weapons can be devastating, not only for the victim concerned but also for the next generation, unborn at the time of the armed conflict. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, Report on violence against women perpetrated and/or condoned by the State during times of armed conflict (1997–2000), UN Doc. E/CN.4/2001/73, 23 January 2001, § 46.

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ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly
In a resolution on chemical weapons adopted in 1996, the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly noted that the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention “prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, circulation and use of chemical weapons, thereby helping to safeguard peace and international security”. It called upon all members to ratify the Convention as soon as possible. 
ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution on chemical weapons, 22 March 1996, Official Journal, No. C 254, 1996, Item 4.

Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1985 on the war between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq, the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly called upon all member States to support efforts to put an end to the use of chemical weapons. 
Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 849, 30 September 1985, pp. 103–104, § 10(v).

In 1985, in a report on the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan, the Rapporteur of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly stated: “According to several concordant accounts, … chemical substances and incendiary bombs producing gases of various colours have been discharged.” In this respect, he added that the report of the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights deserved mention. 
Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Rapporteur, Report on the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan, Doc. 5495, 15 November 1985, pp. 7–8, § 16(e).
In that report, the UN Special Rapporteur had recommended that “the parties to the conflict, namely government and opposition forces, should be reminded that it is their duty to apply fully the rules of international humanitarian law without discrimination”. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan, Report, Recommendations, reprinted in Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Doc. 5495, Appendix 1, 15 November 1985, p. 11, § 190.

European Economic Community
The preamble to EEC Regulation No. 428/89 of 20 February 1989 concerning the export of certain chemical products recalls that, at the 1989 international conference in Paris, the European Economic Community strongly condemned the use of chemical weapons. 
EEC, Regulation No. 428/89, Official Journal of European Community, No. L50, 20 February 1989, p. 1.

GCC Supreme Council
In the Final Communiqué of its 12th Session in 1991, the GCC Supreme Council confirmed “the necessity of making the whole Middle East region free of all sorts of weapons of mass destruction, including … chemical … weapons”. 
GCC, Supreme Council, 12th Session, Kuwait, 23–25 December 1991, Final Communiqué, annexed to Letter dated 30 December 1991 from Kuwait to the UN Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/46/833-S/23336, 30 December 1991.

In the Final Communiqué of its 16th Session in 1995, the GCC Supreme Council expressed “its great regret that the Iraqi government continues to produce … chemical and radioactive weapons which are … dangerous and destructive”. It called for a zone free of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons, and confirmed “the importance of considering the process of removing Iraqi weapons of mass destruction as a step towards evacuating the whole region of such destructive weapons”. It further called for a “ban on the spreading of technology related to the research on weapons of mass destruction and their production in the Gulf region”. 
GCC, Supreme Council, 16th Session, Muscat, 4–6 December 1995, Final Communiqué, annexed to Letter dated 29 December 1995 from Oman to the UN Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/51/56-S/1995/1070, 29 December 1995.

League of Arab States Council
In a resolution adopted in 1970, the League of Arab States Council invited
the Arab Member States that did not adhere to the 1925 [Geneva Gas Protocol] to adhere to it with the following reservations

(b) If there is a breach of the prohibition provided by the protocol, under any form and by any entity, the adhering State would be freed of its commitment to its provisions. 
League of Arab States, Council, Res. 2676, 15 September 1970.

Organization of the Islamic Conference
In 1994, the Organization of the Islamic Conference expressed its deep concern that “UNPROFOR authorities allowed the Serbs from the UNPA’s in the Republic of Croatia to have at their disposal internationally prohibited weapons such as … poisonous gases used for mass killing of civilians”. 
Organization of the Islamic Conference, Declaration of the Enlarged Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Contact Group of the OIC and OIC States Contributing Troops to UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Geneva, 6 December 1994, § 6.

Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
In its report on the implementation of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention in the year 2001, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons stated:
3. The year 2001 saw a number of significant milestones relating to the destruction of chemical weapons in all chemical weapons possessor States Parties – India, the Russian Federation, the United States of America, and a fourth State Party.
4. During 2001 India and the United States of America completed the destruction of 20% of their Category 1 chemical weapons ahead of the Convention’s timeline of 29 April 2002.
5. The destruction of Category 2 chemical weapons was well underway in 2001 in both India and the Russian Federation. No Category 2 chemical weapons were declared by the United States of America and the fourth chemical weapons possessor State Party.
6. India and the Russian Federation also completed the destruction of all their Category 3 chemical weapons in 2001. Another State Party had completed the destruction of these weapons in 1999. By the end of 2001 the United States of America had completed the destruction of over 99% of its Category 3 chemical weapons. 
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Report on the Implementation of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention in the Year 2001, Doc. C-7/3, 10 October 2002, Introduction and Overview, §§ 3–6.

The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons further stated:
Between [the entry into force of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention] and 31 December 2001, [Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons] inspectors confirmed the destruction of a total of 6,518 metric tonnes of chemical agent contained in 2,098,013 munitions items (including 4,878 one-ton containers) in the four chemical weapons possessor States Parties [i.e. India, Russian Federation, United States and a fourth State Party]. 
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Report on the Implementation of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention in the Year 2001, Doc. C-7/3, 10 October 2002, § 2.15.

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International Conference of the Red Cross (1965)
The 20th International Conference of the Red Cross in 1965 adopted a resolution on the protection of civilian populations against the dangers of indiscriminate warfare which expressly invited “all Governments who have not yet done so to accede to the Geneva Gas Protocol of 1925 which prohibits the use of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases, all analogous liquids, materials or devices”. 
20th International Conference of the Red Cross, Vienna, 2–9 October 1965, Res. XXVIII.

Tehran International Conference on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 1968 on human rights in armed conflicts, the Tehran International Conference on Human Rights emphasized that “the widespread violence and brutality of our times, including … the use of chemical … means of warfare … erode human rights and engender counter-brutality”. 
International Conference on Human Rights, Tehran, 22 April–13 May 1968, Res. XXIII, 12 May 1968, preamble.

International Conference of the Red Cross (1969)
The 21st International Conference of the Red Cross in 1969 adopted a resolution on weapons of mass destruction in which it appealed to States to accede to the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol and “to comply strictly with its provisions”. The Conference further urged governments “to conclude as rapidly as possible an agreement banning the production and stockpiling of chemical … weapons”. 
21st International Conference of the Red Cross, Istanbul, 6–13 September 1969, Res. XIV.

International Conference of the Red Cross (1986)
The 25th International Conference of the Red Cross in 1986 adopted a resolution on protection of the civilian population in armed conflicts in which it deplored “the use of prohibited weapons such as chemical weapons … in violation of the laws and customs of war” and was “deeply concerned by information that prohibited weapons, including chemical weapons, have been used in some conflicts”. 
25th International Conference of the Red Cross, Geneva, 23–31 October 1986, Res. I, preamble, and Res. VIII, preamble.

Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Other Interested States
The Final Declaration of the Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Other Interested States in 1989, adopted by consensus of the 149 participating States, stated:
1. The participating States … are determined to prevent any recourse to chemical weapons by completely eliminating them. They solemnly affirm their commitments not to use chemical weapons and condemn such use …
2. The participating States recognize the importance and continuing validity of the [1925 Geneva Gas Protocol]. The States Parties to the Protocol solemnly reaffirm the prohibition as established in it. They call upon all States which have not yet done so to accede to the Protocol.
3. The participating States stress the necessity of concluding, at an early date, a Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons, and on their destruction. This Convention shall be global and comprehensive and effectively verifiable. It should be of unlimited duration … In order to achieve as soon as possible the indispensable universal character of the Convention, they call upon all States to become parties thereto as soon as it is concluded.  
Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Other Interested States, Paris, 7–11 January 1989, Final Declaration, 11 January 1989, §§ 1–3, annexed to letter dated 19 January 1989 from France to the UN Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/44/88, 20 January 1989.

Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (First Session)
During the First Session of the Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, States parties widely acknowledged “a need for greater universality” and emphasized “the importance of ratification by the Russian Federation, States in ‘regions of tension’, and States with significant chemical industries’”. 
Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, First Session, The Hague, 6–23 May 1997, Yearbook of the United Nations, New York, 1997, Vol. 51, p. 500.

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International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
In the Tadić case in 1995, the ICTY discussed the use of chemical weapons in internal conflicts. The Court of Appeal stated that the use of chemical weapons was prohibited in both international and non-international armed conflicts. 
ICTY, Tadić case, Interlocutory Appeal, 2 October 1995, § 120.

The basis of the Tribunal’s finding was the reaction to the Iraqi use of gas against Kurdish villages. The world community reacted to it with condemnation. The 12 member States of the European Community had called for respect for IHL, including the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol and UN Security Council Resolutions 612 and 620. Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States had individually condemned the use of chemical weapons as being a breach of international law. Iraq had denied the allegations. This implied, in the view of the Tribunal, an acceptance that the prohibition also applied to internal conflicts. The Tribunal concluded:
It is therefore clear that, whether or not Iraq really used chemical weapons against its own Kurdish nationals … there undisputedly emerged a general consensus in the international community on the principle that the use of those weapons is also prohibited in internal armed conflicts. 
ICTY, Tadić case, Interlocutory Appeal, 2 October 1995, § 124.

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ICRC
To fulfil its task of disseminating IHL, the ICRC has delegates around the world teaching armed and security forces that the use of “asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases [and] all analogous liquids, materials or devices” is prohibited. 
Frédéric de Mulinen, Handbook on the Law of War for Armed Forces, ICRC, Geneva, 1987, § 919(a) and (b).

In a statement issued on 31 January 1967, the ICRC referred to the “alleged use of poison gas” by Egypt in support of republican forces during the civil war in Yemen and appealed urgently to all parties to “observe the rules of international morality and law”. 
ICRC, Note d’Information No. 91, L’actualité de la Croix-Rouge, 8 February 1967, reprinted in SIPRI, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Vol. VI, The Prevention of CBW, Almqvist & Wiksell, Stockholm, 1975, p. 230, footnote 18.

On 2 June 1967, an ICRC press release noted that a medical team in North Yemen had “collected various indications pointing to the use of poison gas”. The statement went on to say that the ICRC was “extremely disturbed and concerned by these methods of warfare which are absolutely forbidden by codified international and customary law” and that it had “communicated its delegates’ reports to all authorities concerned in the Yemen conflict, requesting them to take the solemn engagement not to resort in any circumstance whatsoever to the use of asphyxiating gases or any other similar toxic substance”. 
ICRC, Press Release No. 829b, The ICRC and the Yemen Conflict, 2 June 1967, reprinted in SIPRI, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Vol. VI, The Prevention of CBW, Almqvist & Wiksell, Stockholm, 1975, p. 233, footnote 27.

Council of Delegates (1987)
At its Rio de Janeiro Session in 1987, the Council of Delegates adopted a resolution on the formal commitment by the Movement to obtain the full implementation of the 1949 Geneva Conventions in which it requested the ICRC “to take all necessary steps to enable it to protect and assist … victims of the use of prohibited weapons such as chemical weapons”. 
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, Council of Delegates, Rio de Janeiro Session, 27 November 1987, Res. 5, § 2.

ICRC
In a press release issued in 1988 in the context of the Iran–Iraq War, the ICRC stated:
In a new and tragic escalation of the Iran–Iraq conflict, chemical weapons have been used, killing a great number of civilians in the province of Sulaymaniyah. The use of chemical weapons, whether against military personnel or civilians, is absolutely forbidden by international law and is to be condemned at all times. 
ICRC, Press Release No. 1567, Iran–Iraq conflict: The ICRC condemns the use of chemical weapons, 23 March 1988.

In a Memorandum on the Applicability of International Humanitarian Law sent in 1990 to all States party to the Geneva Conventions in the context of the Gulf War, the ICRC stated: “The use of chemical … weapons is prohibited (1925 Geneva [Gas] Protocol); the rules of the law of armed conflict also apply to weapons of mass destruction.” 
ICRC, Memorandum on the Applicability of International Humanitarian Law, 14 December 1990, § II, IRRC, No. 280, 1991, p. 25.

In a press release issued in 1991 in the context of the Gulf War, the ICRC reminded the parties:
The use of chemical … weapons is prohibited under international humanitarian law … Weapons of mass destruction having indiscriminate effects generally cause irreparable damage among the civilian population, which must be kept out of the fighting. 
ICRC, Press Release No. 1658, Gulf War: ICRC reminds States of their obligations, 17 January 1991, IRRC, No. 280, 1991, p. 26.

National Society (Slovenia)
In a letter to the ICRC in 1991, the Slovene Red Cross protested against “the use of chemical weapons in Croatia by the Yugoslav army”. 
Slovene Red Cross, Protest and appeal of the Slovene Red Cross, 22 September 1991.

National Society (Croatia)
In a letter to the ICRC in 1991, the Croatian Red Cross stated that it had “received information from the battlefields that poisonous gas was applied against the defence forces of Croatia and civilians”. 
Croatian Red Cross, Appeal by the Croatian Red Cross, 24 September 1991.

ICRC
At the conference to mark the entry into force of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention and the establishment of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in 1997, the ICRC noted: “Despite the occurrence of several hundred conflicts since 1918 the use of chemical weapons has been confirmed in only a few cases, including in one instance by the ICRC.” After retracing the history of the prohibition on the use of chemical weapons, a prohibition which has been observed in the rules of warfare of “diverse moral and cultural systems”, the ICRC concluded: “Both the law and public abhorrence have undoubtedly played a role in making poison warfare unacceptable.” The ICRC called upon States to adhere to the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, to work towards its universal application and to withdraw any reservations that they might have to the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol. 
ICRC, Statement at the First Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, 6–23 May 1997.

In 1994, in a Memorandum on Respect for International Humanitarian Law in Angola, the ICRC stated: “In particular, the use of chemical … weapons … is prohibited.” 
ICRC, Memorandum on Respect for International Humanitarian Law in Angola, 8 June 1994, § II, IRRC, No. 320, 1997, p. 504.

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Thomas and Thomas
It is reported that Germany used mustard gas on a large scale in the second Battle of Ypres in April 1915. UK forces reportedly retaliated with gas in September the same year. Approximately 1,000,000 injuries and 91,198 deaths in the First World War were gas-related. 
Ann van Wynen Thomas and A. J. Thomas, Jr., Legal Limits on the Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, Southern Methodist University Press, Dallas, 1970, p. 138.

Robinson
The USSR is reported to have used gas during its incursion into Sinkiang in clashes with the Tungan Mujahideen in 1934. 
Julian Perry Robinson, “The changing status of chemical and biological warfare: recent technical, military and political developments”, SIPRI Yearbook 1982: World Armaments and Disarmament, Taylor & Francis, London, 1982, p. 336.

International Institute of Humanitarian Law
The Rules Governing the Conduct of Hostilities in Non-international Armed Conflicts, adopted in 1990 by the Council of the International Institute of Humanitarian Law, states: “The customary rule prohibiting the use of chemical weapons, such as those containing asphyxiating or vesicant agents, … is applicable in non-international armed conflicts.” 
International Institute of Humanitarian Law, Rules of International Humanitarian Law Governing the Conduct of Hostilities in Non-international Armed Conflicts, Rule B1, IRRC, No. 278, 1990, p. 395.

Turku Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards
The Turku Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards, adopted by an expert meeting convened by the Institute for Human Rights of Åbo Akademi University in Turku/Åbo, Finland in 1990, states: “Weapons or other material or methods prohibited in international armed conflicts must not be employed in any circumstances.” 
Turku Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards, adopted by an expert meeting convened by the Institute for Human Rights, Åbo Akademi University, Turku/Åbo, 30 November–2 December 1990, Article 5(3), IRRC, No. 282, 1991, p. 332.

Middle East Watch
In 1990, in a report on human rights in Iraq, Middle East Watch stated with respect to the alleged use by Iraq of chemical weapons against the Kurdish minority in northern Iraq:
Iraq’s defenders argue that it did not literally violate the Geneva [Gas] Protocol of 1925 when it used chemical weapons against its Kurdish population. The language of the Protocol simply bans the use of chemical weapons “in war”. Based on the intent of the drafters, some jurists take the view that the Protocol applies only to international armed conflict, since that was the concern at the time of the states that drew it up. The Arab League ambassador to the United Nations … sought to use this legal loophole in Iraq’s defence when the United States, Britain, and others condemned Iraq’s use of chemical weapons against the Kurds in August and September 1988. The Arab League envoy pointed out that the 1925 Protocol prohibited the use of chemical weapons only between States and did not say anything about the use of such weapons within sovereign borders. He objected strongly to the United Nations being called upon “to investigate a matter within the prerogatives of sov ereignty”. On the other hand, a leading expert on international humanitarian law [Theodor Meron] consulted by Middle East Watch expressed the view that the prohibition on poison-gas attacks had assumed the status of customary international law, and thus would be prohibited in all circumstances, despite the limited scope of the Protocol.  
Middle East Watch, Human Rights in Iraq, 1990, Yale University Press, New Haven, pp. 82–83.

União Nacional para Independência Total de Angola (UNITA)
On various occasions between 1990 and 1999, UNITA accused Angolan government forces of using chemical weapons against it. 
Voice of the Resistance of the Black Cockerel, 13 June 1993, as translated from the Portuguese in BBC-SWB, 14 June 1993; Voice of the Resistance of the Black Cockerel, 23 June 1993, as translated from the Portuguese in BBC-SWB, 25 June 1993; RDP Antena 1 (Lisbon), 27 June 1993, as translated from the Portuguese in JPRS-TND-93-021, 7 July 1993, p. 1; Carols Verism from Brussels on RDP Antena 1 (Lisbon), 19 July 1994, as excerpted from the Portuguese in BBC-SWB, 22 July 1994; “UNITA claims army is testing chemical weapons”, AFP from Luanda, 27 July 1994; Radio Nacional (Luanda), 27 July 1994, as translated from the Portuguese in FBIS-AFR-94-145, 28 July 1994, pp. 9–10; Chris Gordon (from Luanda), “Angolan bombs destroy UNITA stronghold”, Mail & Guardian website, Johannesburg, 4 October 1999, as in FBIS-AFR-1999-1004; “Fighting razes town in Angola, kills hundreds: rebel spokesman”, AFP from Lisbon, 26 September 1999; “Angolan army ‘takes key town’ “, BBC World News website, 26 September 1999; “Angolan army in major offensive against rebel-held Bailundo”, SAP-AFP from Luanda, 27 September 1999; “Angola: UNITA denies Bailundo stronghold fallen into government hands”, RDP Antena 1 radio (Lisbon), 27 September 1999, as translated from the Portuguese in BBC-SWB, 27 September 1999.

Many of these allegations were not, however, substantiated. The only form of verification of use came from a private European medical team that visited Angola for eight days in 1990 and afterwards announced that the team’s “clinical and toxicological study shows clearly that the chemical bombs have gassed the population in this region”. The validity of these conclusions is, however, uncertain. 
“Chemical War”, The Independent, London, 22 February 1990, p. 14; “Heyndrickx brengt blitz-bezoek aan Angola”, De Morgen, Brussels, 22 February 1990, p. 10; G. Freilinger, Unofficial Commission for exploration and verification of war gas injuries in the Angola war: preliminary report, Vienna, 3 March 1990; “Dispuut over ‘gasoorlog’ in Angola houdt aan”, De Standaard, Brussels, 15 March 1990, p. 4. (See, for example, “Observers evidence use of chemical weapons”, Diary de Notices, Lisbon, 9 March 1990, p. 14, as translated from the Portuguese in FBIS-AFR-90-077, 20 April 1990, pp. 32–33; “Savimbi, l’Unita et Angola”, Jeune Afrique Economie, Hors Série, April 1996, collection Marchés nouveau, p. 75.)

United Tajik Opposition
In 1996, the United Tajik Opposition accused the government of Tajikistan of wanting to use chemical weapons against it, stating: “According to reliable information from the sources close to the Dushanbe regime leadership, the authorities approached the Russian Federation with a request to apply chemical weapons in Tavildara to physically eliminate every living being in the region.” 
Declaration of the leadership of the United Tajik Opposition addressed to the UN Secretary-General, 5 June 1996.

Lauterpacht Research Centre for International Law
In 1998, the participating experts at a Workshop on International Criminalisation of Biological and Chemical Weapons at the Lauterpacht Research Centre for International Law of Cambridge University formulated a Draft Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Developing, Producing, Acquiring, Stockpiling, Retaining, Transferring or Using Biological and Chemical Weapons. The Draft Convention makes it an international criminal offence to use chemical weapons. 
Workshop on International Criminalisation of Biological and Chemical Weapons, Lauterpacht Research Centre for International Law, Cambridge, 1–2 May 1998, Draft Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Developing, Producing, Acquiring, Stockpiling, Retaining, Transferring or Using Biological and Chemical Weapons, reprinted in The CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 42, December 1998, pp. 1–5.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
It is reported that “in 1999 three of the four states parties that have declared [chemical weapons] stockpiles to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons – India, Republic of Korea and the USA – began destroying these weapons. Russia has not begun the destruction of its [chemical weapons] stockpiles largely owing to a lack of sufficient funding.” 
Jean Pascal Zanders and Maria Wahlberg, “Chemical and biological weapon developments and arms control”, in SIPRI Yearbook 2000: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000, p. 513.

It is reported that Iraq destroyed chemical agents under UNSCOM supervision. 
Maria Wahlberg, Milton Leitenberg and Jean Pascal Zanders, “The future of chemical and biological weapon disarmament in Iraq: from UNSCOM to UNMOVIC”, in SIPRI Yearbook 2000: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000, p. 570.

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
An article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in 1997 listed the following States as allegedly possessing chemical weapons: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Burma, China, Egypt, France, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, India, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, Taiwan, United States, Viet Nam and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The same article alleged that Burma, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya had used chemical weapons. 
E. J. Hogendoorn, “A Chemical Weapons Atlas”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 53, No. 5, September/October 1997, pp. 35–39.

The CBW Conventions Bulletin
Employment of chemical weapons by at least four States parties has been alleged since the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention entered into force for those countries: India, 
During the conflict in Jammu and Kashmir, see “8 September 1999”, The CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 46, December 1999, p. 27.
the Russian Federation, 
During the conflict in Chechnya in 1999, see “5 December 1999”, The CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 47, March 2000, p. 30.
the Sudan 
In southern Sudan in July and August 1999, see “31 December 1999”, The CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 47, March 2000, p. 35.
and Turkey. 
When CS munitions were allegedly used by the Turkish army in an attack on a PKK position in south-eastern Turkey on 11 May 1999 that reportedly resulted in the deaths of 20 Kurdish fighters: see “28 October 1999” (Turkey), The CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 46, December 1999, p. 41.

The allegations remain unresolved in the public record, notwithstanding the verification capacity maintained by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. 
Julian Perry Robinson, Item 383 of 3 April 2000, “Effectiveness of the international treaties against chemical and biological armament, and experiences worth sharing”, Pugwash Meeting No. 254, Oegstgeest, 8–9 April 2000, p. 3.

Center for Nonproliferation Studies
According to the Center for Nonproliferation Studies collecting information from open sources, in 2002 Algeria, Cuba, Sudan and Viet Nam were possible possessors of chemical weapons. Probable possessors of chemical weapons were China, Egypt, Ethiopia, Israel, Myanmar, Pakistan and Taiwan. Known possessors, according to this source, were the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Russian Federation and Syrian Arab Republic. 
Monterey Institute of International Studies, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Chemical and Biological Weapons: Possession and Programs Past and Present, last updated in 2002.