Practice Relating to Rule 84. The Protection of Civilians and Civilian Objects from the Effects of Incendiary Weapons
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Protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
Article 1(1) of the 1980 Protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons provides:
“Incendiary weapon” means any weapon or munition which is primarily designed to set fire to objects or to cause burn injury to persons through the action of flame, heat, or a combination thereof, produced by a chemical reaction of a substance delivered on the target.
(a) Incendiary weapons can take the form of, for example, flame throwers, fougasses, shells, rockets, grenades, mines, bombs and other containers of incendiary substances.
(b) Incendiary weapons do not include:
i. Munitions which may have incidental incendiary effects, such as illuminants, tracers, smoke or signalling systems;
ii. Munitions designed to combine penetration, blast or fragmentation effects with an additional incendiary effect, such as armour-piercing projectiles, fragmentation shells, explosive bombs and similar combined-effects munitions in which the incendiary effect is not specifically designed to cause burn injury to persons, but to be used against military objectives, such as armoured vehicles, aircraft and installations or facilities. 
Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons, to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Geneva, 10 October 1980, Article 1(1).

Article 1(5) of the 1980 Protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons provides: “‘Feasible precautions’ are those precautions which are practicable or practically possible taking into account all circumstances ruling at the time, including humanitarian and military considerations.” 
Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons, to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Geneva, 10 October 1980, Article 1(5).

Article 2 of the 1980 Protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons restricts the use of incendiary weapons in order to protect civilians and civilian objects. It provides:
1. It is prohibited in all circumstances to make the civilian population as such, individual civilians or civilian objects the object of attack by incendiary weapons.
2. It is prohibited in all circumstances to make any military objective located within a concentration of civilians the object of attack by air-delivered incendiary weapons.
3. It is further prohibited to make any military objective located within a concentration of civilians the object of attack by means of incendiary weapons other than air-delivered incendiary weapons, except when such military objective is clearly separated from the concentration of civilians and all feasible precautions are taken with a view to limiting the incendiary effects to the military objective and to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.
4. It is prohibited to make forests or other kinds of plant cover the object of attack by incendiary weapons except when such natural elements are used to cover, conceal or camouflage combatants or other military objectives, or are themselves military objectives. 
Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons, to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Geneva, 10 October 1980, Article 2.

Amendment to Article 1 of the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
In 2001, States parties to the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons decided to amend Article 1 of the Convention, governing its scope. This amendment states:
1. This Convention and its annexed Protocols shall apply in the situations referred to in Article 2 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the Protection of War Victims, including any situation described in paragraph 4 of Article I of Additional Protocol I to these Conventions.
2. This Convention and its annexed Protocols shall also apply, in addition to situations referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, to situations referred to in Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. This Convention and its annexed Protocols shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence, and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts.
3. In case of armed conflicts not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each party to the conflict shall be bound to apply the prohibitions and restrictions of this Convention and its annexed Protocols. 
Amendment to Article 1 of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons), Geneva, 21 December 2001.

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Argentina
Argentina’s Law of War Manual (1989) reproduces the content of Article 1(1), (2) and (3) and Article 2 of the 1980 Protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. 
Argentina, Leyes de Guerra, PC-08-01, Público, Edición 1989, Estado Mayor Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas, aprobado por Resolución No. 489/89 del Ministerio de Defensa, 23 April 1990, §§ 4.25 and 4.26.

Australia
Australia’s Commanders’ Guide (1994) states:
Incendiary weapons should only be used against military targets. Incendiaries include weapons such as napalm, flame-throwers, tracer rounds and white phosphorous. Restriction on their use is imposed by the Conventional Weapons Treaty. 
Australia, Law of Armed Conflict, Commanders’ Guide, Australian Defence Force Publication, Operations Series, ADFP 37 Supplement 1 – Interim Edition, 7 March 1994, § 314.

The Guide further restates the definition of incendiary weapons contained in Article 1 of the 1980 Protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, as well as the restrictions contained in Article 2 of the Protocol. 
Australia, Law of Armed Conflict, Commanders’ Guide, Australian Defence Force Publication, Operations Series, ADFP 37 Supplement 1 – Interim Edition, 7 March 1994, §§ 933–934.

Australia’s Defence Force Manual (1994) states:
416. Incendiary weapons include any weapon or munition which is designed to set fire to objects or to cause burn injury to humans through the action of flame, heat or a combination of the two causes by a chemical reaction of a substance delivered on a target. They include flame throwers, shell, rockets, grenades, mines, bombs and other containers of incendiary materials.
417. Incendiary weapons do not include munitions which have incidental incendiary effects such as illuminants, tracers, smoke or signalling devices; nor do they include munitions designed to combine penetration, blast or fragmentation effects with an additional incendiary effect, such as armour piercing projectiles, fragmentation shells, explosive bombs and similar combined effects ammunition in which the incendiary effect is not specifically designed to cause burn injury to humans, but to be used against military objectives such as armoured vehicles, aircraft and installations and facilities.
418. Specific rules prohibit the use of incendiary weapons:
(a) in all circumstances to attack the civilian population, individual citizens or civilian objects with air delivered incendiary weapons;
(b) in all circumstances to make any military objective located within a concentration of civilians the object of attack by air delivered incendiary weapons;
(c) to make any military objective located within a concentration of civilians the object of an attack by other than air delivered incendiary weapons, except where the military objective is clearly separated from the civilians and all feasible precautions are taken to minimise incidental loss of civilian life and damage to civilian objects (separation in this context can mean a barrier (such as an air raid shelter or a hill) or distance; and
(d) on forests or plant cover except when the forests or plant cover are either being used to cover, conceal or camouflage military objectives or are themselves military objectives (if it is necessary to use incendiaries on a forest to clear a field of fire or facilitate an advance or attack against an enemy, the forest has become a military objective and may legitimately be attacked). 
Australia, Manual on Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Force Publication, Operations Series, ADFP 37 – Interim Edition, 1994, §§ 416–418.

Australia’s LOAC Manual (2006) states:
4.31 Incendiary weapons include any weapon or munition which is designed to set fire to objects or to cause burn injury to humans through the action of flame, heat or a combination of the two caused by a chemical reaction of a substance delivered on a target. They include flame throwers, shells, rockets, grenades, mines, bombs and other containers of incendiary materials.
4.32 Incendiary weapons do not include munitions which have incidental incendiary effects such as illuminants, tracers, smoke or signalling devices; nor do they include munitions designed to combine penetration, blast or fragmentation effects with an additional incendiary effect, such as armour piercing projectiles, fragmentation shells, explosive bombs and similar combined effects ammunition in which the incendiary effect is not specifically designed to cause burn injury to humans, but to be used against military objectives such as armoured vehicles, aircraft and installations and facilities.
4.33 Specific rules prohibit the use of incendiary weapons:
• in all circumstances to attack the civilian population, individual citizens or civilian objects with incendiary weapons;
• in all circumstances to make any military objective located within a concentration of civilians the object of attack by air-delivered incendiary weapons;
• to make any military objective located within a concentration of civilians the object of an attack by other than air delivered incendiary weapons, except where the military objective is clearly separated from the civilians and all feasible precautions are taken to minimise incidental loss of civilian life and damage to civilian objects (separation in this context can mean a barrier (such as an air raid shelter or a hill) or distance).
• on forests or plant cover except when the forests or plant cover are either being used to cover, conceal or camouflage military objectives or are military objectives themselves (if it is necessary to use incendiaries on a forest to clear a field of fire or facilitate an advance or attack against an enemy, the forest has become a military objective and may legitimately be attacked). 
Australia, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 06.4, Australian Defence Headquarters, 11 May 2006, §§ 4.31–4.33.

The manual further states: “Attacks on forests or other types of plant cover with incendiary weapons are prohibited, unless such natural elements are used to cover, conceal or camouflage combatants or other military objectives, or are themselves military objectives.” 
Australia, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 06.4, Australian Defence Headquarters, 11 May 2006, § 5.50.

The LOAC Manual (2006) replaces both the Defence Force Manual (1994) and the Commanders’ Guide (1994).
Belgium
Belgium’s Law of War Manual (1983) defines incendiary weapons in accordance with Article 1 of the 1980 Protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and states:
The use of such [incendiary] weapons against persons is prohibited because they cause unnecessary suffering, but their use against military objectives, such as bunkers, tanks, depots, etc. is permitted. However, if these military objectives are located inside a civilian concentration, their use is prohibited, except when the object is clearly separate from the concentration of civilians and all precautions are taken to avoid any loss of life among the civilian population and any damage to civilian objects. Their use against forests is also prohibited, except when they constitute a military objective or are used to conceal combatants or other military objectives. 
Belgium, Droit Pénal et Disciplinaire Militaire et Droit de la Guerre, Deuxième Partie, Droit de la Guerre, Ecole Royale Militaire, par J. Maes, Chargé de cours, Avocat-général près la Cour Militaire, D/1983/1187/029, 1983, p. 38.

Cameroon
Cameroon’s Instructor’s Manual (1992) restates the definition of incendiary weapons found in Article 1 of the 1980 Protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and, with reference to Article 2 of the Protocol, states: “The only restrictions applicable to such arms concern their use against non-military objectives, against the environment and against military objectives located in areas of civilian concentration.” 
Cameroon, Droit international humanitaire et droit de la guerre, Manuel de l’instructeur en vigueur dans les Forces Armées, Présidence de la République, Ministère de la Défense, Etat-major des Armées, Troisième Division, Edition 1992, pp. 123–124, § 441.

Cameroon
Cameroon’s Instructor’s Manual (2006) replicates the definition of incendiary weapons in Article 1 of the 1980 Protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. It further states:
The only restrictions applicable to such weapons concern their use against non-military objectives [civilian objects] …, against the environment and against military objectives situated within civilian areas, except if the distance between the two is very large [clearly separated]. 
Cameroon, Droit des conflits armés et droit international humanitaire, Manuel de l’instructeur en vigueur dans les forces de défense, Ministère de la Défense, Présidence de la République, Etat-major des Armées, 2006, p. 271, § 631.

Canada
Canada’s LOAC Manual (1999) restates the definition of incendiary weapons and the restrictions concerning their application contained in Articles 1 and 2 respectively of the 1980 Protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 1999, p. 5-4, §§ 33, 34 and 36.

Canada’s LOAC Manual (2001) states in its chapter on targeting:
It is prohibited to make forests or other kinds of plant cover the object of attack by incendiary weapons except when such natural elements are used to cover, conceal or camouflage combatants or other military objectives, or are themselves military objectives. 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 13 August 2001, § 446.4.

In its chapter entitled “Restrictions on the use of weapons”, the manual states that “it is prohibited in all circumstances to make the civilian population, individual civilians or civilian objects the object of attack by incendiary weapons”. 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 13 August 2001, § 521.3.

In defining incendiary weapons, the manual restates the provisions contained in Article 1 of the 1980 Protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons:
1. Incendiary weapons include any weapon or munitions that is designed to set fire to objects or to cause burn injury to humans through the action of flame, heat or a combination of the two caused by a chemical reaction of a substance delivered on a target. Examples of incendiary weapons include napalm, flame-throwers, shells, rockets, grenades, mines, bombs and other containers of incendiary materials.
2. Incendiary weapons do not include:
a. munitions which have incidental incendiary effects (for example, illuminants, tracers, smoke or signalling devices); or
b. munitions designed to combine penetration, blast or fragmentation effects with an additional incendiary effect (for example, armour piercing projectiles, fragmentation shells, explosive bombs and similar combined effects ammunition) in which the incendiary effect is not specifically designed to cause burn injury to humans, but to be used against military objectives such as armoured vehicles, aircraft and installations and facilities. 
Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 13 August 2001, § 521.1–2.
[emphasis in original]
Côte d’Ivoire
Côte d’Ivoire’s Teaching Manual (2007) provides in Book IV (Instruction of heads of division and company commanders):
Chapter 3. Protection

II.2.4. Natural environment

It is prohibited to attack forests or any other plant cover by incendiary weapons except when such natural elements are used to cover, conceal or camouflage combatants or other military objectives, or are themselves military objectives. …

Chapter 4. Methods and means of warfare

II.2.1. Incendiary weapons
Incendiary weapons include any weapon or munition which is designed to set fire to objects or to cause burn injury to human beings through the action of flame, heat, or combination thereof, produced by a chemical reaction of a substance delivered on a target. Examples of incendiary weapons include napalm, flame throwers, shells, rockets, grenades, mines, bombs and other containers transporting incendiary substances.

Incendiary weapons do not include:
- munitions which may have incidental incendiary effects (for example illuminant, tracer, smoke-producing or signalling systems);
- munitions designed to combine penetration, blast or fragmentation effects with an additional incendiary effect (for example armour-piercing projectiles, fragmentation shells, explosive bombs and similar combined-effects munitions).

The use of incendiary weapons against combatants is not prohibited unless that use entails superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. However, it is prohibited in all circumstances to make the civilian population, civilian persons or civilian objects the object of attack by incendiary weapons.

The use of incendiary weapons is prohibited:
- in all circumstances if it makes any legitimate objective located within a concentration of civilians the object of attack by aircraft incendiary weapons;
- if it makes any legitimate objective located within a concentration of civilians the object of attack by incendiary weapons other than aircraft incendiary weapons, except when such objective is clearly separated from civilians and all feasible precautions are taken with a view to reducing to a minimum collateral damage;
- against forests and plant cover, except when they are used to cover, conceal or camouflage legitimate or military objectives. 
Côte d’Ivoire, Droit de la guerre, Manuel d’instruction, Livre IV: Instruction du chef de section et du commandant de compagnie, Manuel de l’élève, Ministère de la Défense, Forces Armées Nationales, November 2007, pp. 31, 38, 45 and 54–55.

Ecuador
Ecuador’s Naval Manual (1989) states:
Incendiary weapons such as tracing ammunition, heat-producing bombs, flame throwers, napalm and any other incendiary weapons or agents, are considered lawful. Persons selecting these weapons for use should employ them in such a way as to minimize uncontrolled and indiscriminate effects on the civilian population, in a manner compatible with the fulfilment of the mission and the security of the forces. 
Ecuador, Aspectos Importantes del Derecho Internacional Marítimo que Deben Tener Presente los Comandantes de los Buques, Academia de Guerra Naval, 1989, § 9-6.

France
France’s LOAC Teaching Note (2000) states: “The use of incendiary weapons is strictly limited to military objectives.” It also states: “It is forbidden to launch an attack with incendiary weapons against military objectives located near or within a concentration of civilians.” 
France, Fiche didactique relative au droit des conflits armés, Directive of the Ministry of Defence, 4 January 2000, annexed to the Directive No. 147 of the Ministry of Defence of 4 January 2000, p. 6.

France’s LOAC Manual (2001) states: “The use of incendiary weapons is strictly limited to military objectives.” It adds: “It is forbidden to launch an attack with incendiary weapons against military objectives located near or within a concentration of civilians.” 
France, Manuel de droit des conflits armés, Ministère de la Défense, Direction des Affaires Juridiques, Sous-Direction du droit international humanitaire et du droit européen, Bureau du droit des conflits armés, 2001, p. 54.

The manual also states:
It is possible to use incendiary weapons when the military target is clearly separated from the civilian concentration and all feasible precautions are taken with a view to limiting the incendiary effects to the military objective, when the tactical situation allows it. 
France, Manuel de droit des conflits armés, Ministère de la Défense, Direction des Affaires Juridiques, Sous-Direction du droit international humanitaire et du droit européen, Bureau du droit des conflits armés, 2001, p. 24.

As regards napalm and flame-throwers, the manual repeats the same provision and quotes Article 1 of the 1980 Protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. 
France, Manuel de droit des conflits armés, Ministère de la Défense, Direction des Affaires Juridiques, Sous-Direction du droit international humanitaire et du droit européen, Bureau du droit des conflits armés, 2001, pp. 86 and 79.

Germany
Germany’s Military Manual (1992) defines incendiary weapons in accordance with the 1980 Protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and states:
422. When incendiary weapons are used, precautions shall be taken which are practicable or practically possible taking into account all circumstances ruling at the time, including humanitarian and military considerations.
423. The civilian population as such, individual civilians and civilian objects shall be granted special protection. They shall never be made the object of attack by incendiary weapons.
424. It is prohibited in all circumstances to make any military objective located within a concentration of civilians the object of attack by incendiary weapons.
425. It is further prohibited to use incendiary weapons against forests or other kinds of plant cover except when such natural elements are used to cover, conceal or camouflage a military objective, or are themselves military objectives. 
Germany, Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts – Manual, DSK VV207320067, edited by The Federal Ministry of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany, VR II 3, August 1992, English translation of ZDv 15/2, Humanitäres Völkerrecht in bewaffneten Konflikten – Handbuch, August 1992, §§ 420–425.

Israel
Israel’s Manual on the Laws of War (1998) states:
Incendiary arms are not banned. Nevertheless, because of their wide range of cover, this protocol of the [Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons] is meant to protect civilians and forbids making a population centre a target for an incendiary weapons attack. Furthermore, it is forbidden to attack a military objective situated within a population centre employing incendiary weapons. The protocol does not ban the use of these arms during combat (for inst ance, in flushing out bunkers).  
Israel, Laws of War in the Battlefield, Manual, Military Advocate General Headquarters, Military School, 1998, p. 16.

Israel’s Manual on the Rules of Warfare (2006) states:
Conflagration weapons (flame-throwers, incendiary-bombs, phosphorous). Means of warfare involving incendiary devices are not prohibited (see discussion on the subject of phosphorous below) in themselves. The extensive range they can cover, however, means that the CCW Protocol [1980 Protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons] has been used to protect civilians and imposes a requirement for caution where conflagration weapons are used to attack a military target located within a concentration of civilians, and it is forbidden to blow up vegetation with incendiary devices, unless it conceals a military target. The Protocol does not forbid the use of these devices in battle (for example, for mopping up bunkers). 
Israel, Rules of Warfare on the Battlefield, Military Advocate-General’s Corps Command, IDF School of Military Law, Second Edition, 2006, p. 16.

The manual further states:
Phosphorous. Is phosphorous a banned weapon? Despite the accepted myths on the subject, phosphorous is not banned under the rules of warfare, because it is not considered to be a chemical weapon. A chemical weapon is a weapon intended to work on the systems of life and is constituted from a substance that causes a chemical reaction in the body expressed in such symptoms as asphyxiation, burning, weeping, etc., whereas phosphorous is an element in nature which reacts to the oxygen in the air by catching fire. In that respect, phosphorous is no different from petrol (gasoline) reacting to a lighted match, and what differentiates it from chemical weapons is that its reaction is not directed against the human physiology in particular, it will burn whatever it touches. 
Israel, Rules of Warfare on the Battlefield, Military Advocate-General’s Corps Command, IDF School of Military Law, Second Edition, 2006, p. 19.

In addition, the manual states: “Phosphorus is permitted for use, as long as its use is directed against combatants and not against civilians.” 
Israel, Rules of Warfare on the Battlefield, Military Advocate-General’s Corps Command, IDF School of Military Law, Second Edition, 2006, p. 50.
(emphasis in original)
The Manual on the Rules of Warfare (2006) is a second edition of the Manual on the Laws of War (1998).
Kenya
Kenya’s LOAC Manual (1997) defines incendiary weapons in accordance with Article 1 of the 1980 Protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and states the “conditions for permitted use”:
Incendiary weapons which are not air-delivered may be used:
(a) when the military objective is clearly separated from a concentration of civilian persons; and
(b) subject to precautions to limit incendiary effects to the military objective, when the tactical situation permits.
Air-delivered incendiary weapons may be so used only in attack against a military objective located outside concentrations of civilian persons. 
Kenya, Law of Armed Conflict, Military Basic Course (ORS), 4 Précis, The School of Military Police, 1997, Précis No. 3, p. 5.

Netherlands
The Military Manual (1993) of the Netherlands defines incendiary weapons in accordance with Article 1 of the 1980 Protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. It further specifies:
The general rules with regard to the protection of the civilian population apply, namely, in the first place, that the civilian population, individual civilians and civilian objects may not be attacked. Furthermore, it is forbidden to attack military objectives located inside a concentration of civilians by air-delivered incendiary weapons. Attacks by incendiary weapons which are not air-delivered are permitted provided two conditions are fulfilled:
– The military objective has to be clearly separated from the concentration of civilians.
– Precautionary measures have to be taken to limit the incendiary effect to the military objective and to avoid collateral damage to civilians and civilian objects. 
Netherlands, Toepassing Humanitair Oorlogsrecht, Voorschift No. 27-412/1, Koninklijke Landmacht, Ministerie van Defensie, 1993, pp. V-13/14, § 11.

The Military Manual (2005) of the Netherlands states:
Section 17 - Incendiary weapons
0472. An incendiary weapon means any weapon or munition primarily designed to set fire to objects or to cause burn injuries to persons through the action of flame, heat or a combination of both. They include: flame throwers, rockets, grenades, mines, bombs and other containers of incendiary substances. One such substance is napalm. It is also important to know which weapons are not incendiary weapons: these are mainly munitions which may have incidental incendiary effects, such as illuminants and tracers. Anti-tank grenades, which have the capacity to pierce armour by developing a very high temperature, are not incendiary weapons. The incendiary effect here is not specifically intended to cause burn injuries to persons.
0473. In the first place, the general rules on protecting the civilian population apply to incendiary weapons. The civilian population, individual civilians and civilian objects may not be attacked.
0474. It is also prohibited to attack military objects located within a concentration of civilians, using air-delivered incendiary weapons. Attacks by means of incendiary weapons which are not air-delivered are permitted, provided that two conditions are met:
- the military objective must be clearly separated from concentrations of civilians;
- precautions must be taken to limit the incendiary effect to the military objective and to avoid collateral injury to the civilian population and damage to civilian objects. 
Netherlands, Humanitair Oorlogsrecht: Handleiding, Voorschift No. 27-412, Koninklijke Landmacht, Militair Juridische Dienst, 2005, §§ 0472–0474.

New Zealand
New Zealand’s Military Manual (1992) restates Article 2 of the 1980 Protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. 
New Zealand, Interim Law of Armed Conflict Manual, DM 112, New Zealand Defence Force, Headquarters, Directorate of Legal Services, Wellington, November 1992, §§ 513 and 620.

Philippines
The Philippine Army Soldier’s Handbook on Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (2006) provides:
During combat operation:

12. Avoid destroying crops, properties and possessions. During military operations, avoid damaging plants and properties along the way. Avoid using incendiary that […] would set fire combustible materials such as “sawali,” “nipa” and other indigenous materials usually used for huts in the village. If unavoidable, pay for the damaged properties as soon as the combat operations are over or else repair or replace the damages.

After an engagement:

15. Do not burn the huts/house[s] and other possessions of civilians. Avoid using incendiary that would set fire combustible materials such as “sawali”, “nipa” and other indigenous materials usually used for huts/houses in the villages. 
Philippines, Philippine Army Soldier’s Handbook on Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, A Practical Guide for Internal Security Operations, 2006, p. 58, § 12, and p. 62, § 15.

Russian Federation
The Russian Federation’s Military Manual (1990) prohibits “any weapons which strike indiscriminately or whose use causes superfluous injury and destruction” and specifically refers to the 1980 Protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. 
Russian Federation, Instructions on the Application of the Rules of International Humanitarian Law by the Armed Forces of the USSR, Appendix to Order of the USSR Defence Minister No. 75, 1990, § 6(h).

The Russian Federation’s Regulations on the Application of IHL (2001) states:
The following shall be prohibited to use in the course of combat operations: … incendiary weapons in all circumstances against the civilian population and civilian objects, as well as when used to destroy forests or other kinds of plant cover, except when such natural elements are used by the enemy for military purposes. 
Russian Federation, Regulations on the Application of International Humanitarian Law by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, Moscow, 8 August 2001, § 9.

Sierra Leone
Sierra Leone’s Instructor Manual (2007) states: “The use of incendiary weapons is only permitted against military objectives clearly separated from civilian objects.” 
Sierra Leone, The Law of Armed Conflict. Instructor Manual for the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF), Armed Forces Education Centre, September 2007, p. 44.

South Africa
South Africa’s Revised Civic Education Manual (2004) provides that incendiary weapons “may be used only against military targets, which are clearly separated from concentrations of civilians”. 
South Africa, Revised Civic Education Manual, South African National Defence Force, 2004, Chapter 4, § 56(f)(ii); see also § 56(f)(iv)(3) (on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons).

Spain
Spain’s LOAC Manual (1996) defines incendiary weapons in accordance with Article 1 of the 1980 Protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and restates the restrictions of the use of incendiary weapons contained in Article 2 of the Protocol. 
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Publicación OR7-004, 2 Tomos, aprobado por el Estado Mayor del Ejército, Division de Operaciones, 18 March 1996, § 3.2.a.(3).

Spain’s LOAC Manual (2007) defines incendiary weapons in accordance with Article 1 of the 1980 Protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and restates the restrictions of the use of incendiary weapons contained in Article 2 of the Protocol. 
Spain, Orientaciones. El Derecho de los Conflictos Armados, Tomo 1, Publicación OR7–004, (Edición Segunda), Mando de Adiestramiento y Doctrina, Dirección de Doctrina, Orgánica y Materiales, 2 November 2007, § 3.2.c; see also § 2.4.c.(2).

Sweden
Sweden’s IHL Manual (1991) states:
[The 1980] Protocol III [to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons] contains restrictions applying where incendiary weapons are used. This protocol does not constitute a total prohibition of the use of incendiary weapons – which Sweden and other states had proposed. However, the protocol lays down such heavy restrictions on their use that there is reason to characterize it as a partial prohibition of incendiary weapons.
A great bone of contention has been how incendiary weapons are to be defined. Agreement has now been reached on a definition by which “incendiary weapon” covers any weapon or ammunition primarily designed to set fire to objects or to cause burn injuries to persons through the action of flames, heat or a combination of these. Incendiary weapons do not include those with incidental incendiary effects, such as illuminants or tracers. Nor shall armour-piercing projectiles and explosive shells that act through penetrating, blast or fragmentation effects in combination with the incendiary effect be considered as incendiary weapons.

This new rule [in Article 2 of Protocol III] affords civilians considerably better protection than hitherto against incendiary weapons.

There is a need to supplement the present Protocol III so that the agreement constitutes a complete prohibition of incendiary weapons. In this way, protection of civilians could be further enhanced. 
Sweden, International Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict, with reference to the Swedish Total Defence System, Swedish Ministry of Defence, January 1991, Section 3.3.2, pp. 81–83.
[emphasis in original]
Switzerland
Switzerland’s Basic Military Manual (1987), with reference to the 1980 Protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, states: “It is forbidden to use incendiary weapons against civilian objects or against a military objective that is not clearly separated from a concentration of civilians.” 
Switzerland, Lois et coutumes de la guerre (Extrait et commentaire), Règlement 51.7/II f, Armée Suisse, 1987, Article 23(d).

Ukraine
Ukraine’s IHL Manual (2004) states that the following means of warfare is prohibited:
- incendiary weapons directed against the civilian population or civilian objects as well as forests or other kinds of plant cover unless the use of such weapons is covered by cases indicated in the Primary Requirements of Protocol III [to the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons]. 
Ukraine, Manual on the Application of IHL Rules, Ministry of Defence, 11 September 2004, § 1.3.3.

The manual further states: “If combat is conducted in the forest, it is necessary to take into account the probability of forest fires that are likely to endanger persons and objects protected by international humanitarian law.” 
Ukraine, Manual on the Application of IHL Rules, Ministry of Defence, 11 September 2004, § 2.3.5.4.

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
The UK LOAC Manual (2004) states:
6.12. It is prohibited “in all circumstances to make any military objective located within a concentration of civilians the object of attack by air-delivered incendiary weapons”. Subject to that, the use of incendiary weapons, including incendiary bombs, napalm and flame-throwers, against military objectives is not prohibited under customary or treaty law.

6.12.2. An incendiary weapon is “any weapon or munition which is primarily designed to set fire to objects or to cause burn injury to persons through the action of flame, heat, or a combination thereof, produced by a chemical reaction of a substance delivered on the target”.
6.12.3. Such weapons can take the form of, for example, “flamethrowers, fougasses, shells, rockets, grenades, mines, bombs and other containers of incendiary substances”.
6.12.4. The following are not considered incendiary weapons: “munitions which may have incidental incendiary effects, such as illuminants, tracers, smoke or signalling systems;” nor do they include “munitions designed to combine penetration, blast or fragmentation effects with an additional incendiary effect, such as armour-piercing projectiles, fragmentation shells, explosive bombs and similar combined-effects munitions in which the incendiary effect is not specifically designed to cause burn injury to persons, but to be used against military objectives, such as armoured vehicles, aircraft and installations or facilities”.
6.12.5. A “concentration of civilians” is widely defined to include the inhabited parts of cities or inhabited towns or villages but also temporary concentrations as in camps or columns of refugees or evacuees, or groups of nomads. An attack on a military objective in a concentration of civilians with incendiary weapons other than air-delivered ones may only take place if the military objective is clearly separated from the concentration and all feasible precautions are taken to limit the incendiary effect to the military objective and to avoiding or minimizing incidental loss, injury and damage to civilians. Forests and “other kinds of plant cover” may not be attacked with incendiary weapons unless they are “used to cover, conceal or camouflage combatants or other military objectives, or are themselves military objectives”. 
United Kingdom, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Ministry of Defence, 1 July 2004, §§ 6.12 and 6.12.2–6.12.5.

In its chapter on air operations, the manual further states: “It is in all circumstances prohibited ‘to make any military objective located within a concentration of civilians the object of attack by air-delivered incendiary weapons.’” 
United Kingdom, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Ministry of Defence, 1 July 2004, § 12.53.

United States of America
The US Rules of Engagement for Vietnam (1971) stated: “The use of incendiary type munitions in inhabited or urban areas will be avoided unless friendly survival is at stake or it is necessary for the accomplishment of the commander’s mission.” 
United States, Rules of Engagement for the Employment of Firepower in the Republic of Viet-Nam, US Military Assistance Command Viet-Nam, Directive No. 525-13, May 1971, unclassified contents reprinted in Eleanor C. McDowell, Digest of United States Practice in International Law, 1975, US Department of State Publication 8865, Washington, D.C., 1976, pp. 814–815, § 6(d)(1).

The US Air Force Pamphlet (1976) states:
The potential of fire to spread beyond the immediate target area has also raised concerns about uncontrollable or indiscriminate effects affecting the civilian population or civilian objects. Accordingly, any applicable rules of engagement relating to incendiary weapons must be followed closely to avoid controversy. The manner in which incendiary weapons are employed is also regulated by the other principles and rules regulating armed force … In particular, the potential capacity of fire to spread must be considered in relation to the rules protecting civilians and civilian objects … For example, incendiary weapons should be avoided in urban areas, to the extent that other weapons are available and as effective. 
United States, Air Force Pamphlet 110-31, International Law – The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations, US Department of the Air Force, 1976, § 6-6(c).

The US Naval Handbook (1995) states:
Incendiary devices such as tracer ammunition, thermite bombs, flame throwers, napalm, and other incendiary weapons and agents, are lawful weapons. Where incendiary devices are the weapons of choice, they should be employed in a manner that does not cause incidental injury or collateral damage that is excessive in light of the military advantage anticipated by the attack. 
United States, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-2.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7, issued by the Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, US Marine Corps, and Department of Transportation, US Coast Guard, October 1995 (formerly NWP 9 (Rev. A)/FMFM 1-10, October 1989), § 9.7.

The US Naval Handbook (2007) states:
Incendiary devices, such as thermite bombs, flame throwers, napalm, and other incendiary weapons and agents, are lawful weapons. Where incendiary devices are the weapons of choice, they should be employed in a manner that does not cause incidental injury or collateral damage that is excessive in light of the military advantage anticipated by the attack. 
United States, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-12.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7, issued by the Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, US Marine Corps, and Department of Homeland Security, US Coast Guard, July 2007, § 9.8.

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Denmark
Denmark’s Military Criminal Code (1973), as amended in 1978, provides:
Any person who uses war instruments or procedures the application of which violates an international agreement entered into by Denmark or the general rules of international law, shall be liable to the same penalty [i.e. a fine, lenient imprisonment or up to 12 years’ imprisonment]. 
Denmark, Military Criminal Code, 1973, as amended in 1978, § 25(1).

Denmark’s Military Criminal Code (2005) provides:
Any person who deliberately uses war means [“krigsmiddel”] or procedures the application of which violates an international agreement entered into by Denmark or international customary law, shall be liable to the same penalty [i.e. imprisonment up to life imprisonment]. 
Denmark, Military Criminal Code, 2005, § 36(2).

Estonia
Under Estonia’s Penal Code (2001), “large scale use of incendiary weapons under conditions where the military objective cannot be clearly separated from the civilian population, civilian objects or the surrounding environment” is a war crime. 
Estonia, Penal Code, 2001, § 103.

Hungary
Under Hungary’s Criminal Code (1978), as amended in 1998, employing “incendiary weapons” as defined in the 1980 Protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons is a war crime. 
Hungary, Criminal Code, 1978, as amended in 1998, Section 160/A(3)(b)(3).

Senegal
Senegal’s Penal Code (1965), as amended in 2007, states:
Committing an act or activity prohibited by one of the following conventions or protocols constitutes a crime under international law:

3. the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects … and its Protocol III on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons. 
Senegal, Penal Code, 1965, as amended in 2007, Article 431-5(3).

United States of America
In 2008, the US Senate approved the ratification of the 1980 Protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, subject to a reservation, an understanding and a declaration:
SECTION 1. SENATE ADVICE AND CONSENT SUBJECT TO A RESERVATION, AN UNDERSTANDING, AND A DECLARATION
The Senate advises and consents to the ratification of the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (Protocol III), adopted at Geneva on October 10, 1980 (Treaty Doc. 105-1(B)), subject to the reservation of section 2, the understanding of section 3, and the declaration of section 4.
SECTION 2. RESERVATION
The advice and consent of the Senate under section 1 is subject to the following reservation, which shall be included in the instrument of ratification:
The United States of America, with reference to Article 2, paragraphs 2 and 3, reserves the right to use incendiary weapons against military objectives located in concentrations of civilians where it is judged that such use would cause fewer casualties and/or less collateral damage than alternative weapons, but in so doing will take all feasible precautions with a view to limiting the incendiary effects to the military objective and to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.
SECTION 3. UNDERSTANDING
The advice and consent of the Senate under section 1 is subject to the following understanding, which shall be included in the instrument of ratification:
It is the understanding of the United States of America that any decision by any military commander, military personnel, or any other person responsible for planning, authorizing or executing military action shall only be judged on the basis of that person’s assessment of the information reasonably available to the person at the time the person planned, authorized, or executed the action under review, and shall not be judged on the basis of information that comes to light after the action under review was taken.
SECTION 4. DECLARATION
The advice and consent of the Senate under section 1 is subject to the following declaration:
This Protocol is self-executing. This Protocol does not confer private rights enforceable in United States courts. 
United States, Advice and consent to ratification of the 1980 Protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 2008, Sections 1–4.

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Colombia
In 2007, in the Constitutional Case No. C-291/07, the Plenary Chamber of Colombia’s Constitutional Court stated: “Weapons which because of their indiscriminate effects … [are prohibited] include … incendiary weapons … , which have been prohibited by specific treaty and customary norms applicable in internal armed conflicts”. 
Colombia, Constitutional Court, Constitutional Case No. C-291/07, Judgment of 25 April 2007, pp. 95–96.
[footnote in original omitted]
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Australia
In 1971, in an Australian report on the protection of the civil population against the effects of certain weapons, it was stated:
In respect of napalm and other weapons of an incendiary nature the Army recognises certain complexities of classification. It contemplates no less than three types of weapon:
a. “flame weapons” such as napalm bombs and flame throwers which employ or involve the projection of a flaming (petroleum or other) substance;
b. pure heat weapons; and,
c. electronic/nuclear (sub-atomic) weapons of the nature of laser rays or any development of that general conception.
This is not an exhaustive classification and ignores the atom weapon, whether as a bomb or otherwise.
Presently only napalm bombs and flamethrowers are available or in use. They present problems of economic use. Currently they are not used against any human target but only against structures although their use against structures is possibly less useful if a structure is unmanned by enemy personnel.
Even if not used against human targets flame weapons do present an advantage as a means of generating fear and despondency, even if not of terror and even if no enemy is actually harmed by them or is within range.
Their weight and lack of economy in use is a problem which may cause flame throwers to be discarded in favour of more sophisticated and longer ranging means of dispersing their (napalm) content.
These weapons as presently existing are not held to contravene international law if used in accepted fashion and not indiscriminately against humans or against inanimate targets so as to involve innocent civilians as little as possible. However, it is conceivable that new or “unconventional” uses of these weapons may be alleged to be contrary to law, depending upon interpretation of the Hague Rules and any extension of them. 
Australia, Protection of the Civil Population Against the Effects of Certain Weapons (unknown author), Doc. AA-A1838/267, File No. AA-889/702/7/2 Pt 1, May 1971, pp. 2–3.

At the Preparatory Conference for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons in 1978, Australia and the Netherlands sponsored a draft proposal which divided incendiary weapons into “incendiary” and “flame” munitions and stated: “It is prohibited to make any concentration of civilians the object of attack by means of any incendiary munition.” The proposal further stated that “specific military objectives that are situated within a concentration of civilians” may be attacked with incendiary weapons if “all feasible precautions are taken to limit the incendiary effects to all specific military objectives and to avoid incidental loss of civilian life or injury to civilians”. The final part of the proposal provided that, in order to
reduce to a minimum the risks posed to civilians by the use of flame weapons, it is prohibited to make any specific military objective that is situated within a concentration of civilians the object of aerial attack by means of napalm or other flame munitions unless that objective is located within an area in which combat between ground forces is taking place or appears to be imminent. 
Australia and Netherlands, Draft proposal on incendiary weapons submitted to the Preparatory Conference for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, UN Doc. A/CONF.95/PREP.CONF./L.11, 13 September 1978.

In 1979, towards the end of the Preparatory Conference for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Australia and the Netherlands submitted a further draft proposal on incendiary weapons. The proposal provided:
As a consequence of the rules of international law applicable with respect to the protection of civilians against the effects of hostilities, it is prohibited to make the civilian population as such as well as individual civilians the object of attack by means of incendiary munitions.
It also prohibited aerial attacks with napalm or other flame munitions against military targets situated within concentrations of civilians. Attacks with incendiary munitions against military objectives in civilian concentrations were not prohibited, “provided the attack is otherwise lawful and that all feasible precautions are taken to limit the incendiary effects to the military objective and to avoid incidental loss of civilian life and injury to civilians”. 
Australia and Netherlands, Draft proposal on incendiary weapons submitted to the Preparatory Conference for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, UN Doc. A/CONF.95/PREP.CONF./L.15, 5 April 1979.

At the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons in 1995, Australia stated: “The restrictions laid down in the Convention regarding the use of incendiary devices … were strong and clear.” 
Australia, Statement at the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Vienna, 25 September–13 October 1995, UN Doc. CCW/CONF.I/SR 3, 2 October 1995, § 25.

Brazil
In 1974, during discussions in the Ad Hoc Committee on Conventional Weapons established by the CDDH, Brazil stated: “There were good humanitarian reasons for the international community to agree at least on restricting the use of incendiary weapons against targets which were not exclusively military.” 
Brazil, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. XVI, CDDH/IV/SR.2, 14 March 1974, p. 18, § 7; see also Official Records, Vol. XVI, CDDH/IV/SR.6, 22 March 1974, p. 50, § 18 and Vol. XVI, CDDH/IV/SR.10, 19 February 1975, p. 92, § 5.

Canada
Upon ratification of the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Canada stated:
With respect to Protocol III, it is the understanding of the Government of Canada that the expression “clearly separated” in paragraph 3 of Article 2 includes both spatial separation or separation by means of an effective physical barrier between the military objective and the concentration of civilians. 
Canada, Declaration made upon ratification of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 24 June 1994, § 4.

Denmark
In 1973, in its reply on the report of the UN Secretary-General on napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use, Denmark stated that it wanted to work out an agreement restricting or prohibiting the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons. It added: “The aim of such agreements should be to restrict or prohibit the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons, especially in circumstances where these weapons have an indiscriminate effect against the civilian population.” 
Denmark, Reply of 28 August 1973 sent to the UN Secretary-General, reprinted in Report of the Secretary-General on napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use, UN Doc. A/9207, 11 October 1973, p. 6.

In 1982, at the 7th Extraordinary Session of the UN General Assembly, Denmark expressed its concern on behalf of the European Community over civilian casualties caused by Israel’s use of phosphorous shrapnel during the invasion of Lebanon. 
European Community, Statement by Denmark on behalf of the European Community at the 7th Extraordinary Session of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/ES-7/PV. 26, 17 August 1982, pp. 14–17.

At the Preparatory Conference for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons in 1978, Denmark and Norway presented a proposal which stated: “It is prohibited to make the civilian population or individual civilians the object of attack by incendiary weapons.” It also stated: “It is prohibited to make any military objective located within a concentration of civilians the object of attack by incendiary weapons delivered by aircraft, except when that military objective is clearly separated and distinct from the civilian population.” The final rule contained in the proposal provided:
Whenever an attack is made by incendiary weapons in accordance with the above provisions and other applicable rules of international law, all feasible precautions shall be taken to limit the effects of such attack to the military objective itself with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects. 
Denmark and Norway, Draft proposal on incendiary weapons submitted to the Preparatory Conference for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, UN Doc. A/CONF.95/PREP.CONF./L.12, 13 September 1978.

Egypt
In 1977, during a debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Egypt advocated the prohibition or restriction of incendiary weapons. 
Egypt, Statement before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.1/32/PV.26, 4 November 1977, p. 17.

France
Upon ratification of the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, France declared:
With reference to the scope of application defined in article 1 of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, … it will apply the provisions of the Convention and its three Protocols [I, II and III] to all armed conflicts referred to in articles 2 and 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 [international and non-international armed conflicts]. 
France, Reservations made upon ratification of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 4 March 1988.

In 1987, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs explained that the reasons for which France refused to ratify the 1980 Protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons was the provision relating to the use of incendiary weapons against military objectives located within a concentration of civilians. It considered the provision to be “too imprecise, thus unrealistic”. 
France, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement of 2 December 1987 by the Secretary of State before the National Assembly, excerpt reprinted in Annuaire Français de Droit International, Vol. 34, 1988, p. 900.

In 2002, upon ratification of the 1980 Protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, France stated:
The French Republic accepts the provisions of article 2, paragraphs 2 and 3, insofar as the terms used in these paragraphs do not lead to the assumption that an attack using incendiary weapons launched from an aircraft would involve any greater risk of indiscriminate hits than one launched by any other means.
It is the understanding of the French Republic that the term “clearly separated” used in article 2, paragraph 3, can be interpreted as meaning either a separation in terms of space or a separation by means of a physical barrier between the military target and the concentration of civilians.  
France, Interpretative declarations made upon ratification of the 1980 Protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 18 July 2002.

In 2010, in its objection to the reservation by the United States of America to the 1980 Protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, France stated:
The Government of the French Republic has examined the reservation made by the United States of America upon acceding to the … [1980] Protocol III … to the Convention on … Certain Conventional Weapons …
By this reservation, the United States of America reserves the right to use incendiary weapons against military objectives located in concentrations of civilians where it is judged that such use would cause fewer casualties and/or less collateral damage than alternative weapons.  In so doing, the reservation both excludes the prohibition set out in article 2, paragraph 2, and alters the derogation regime set out in article 2, paragraph 3.
Accordingly, the Government of the French Republic considers this reservation to be contrary to the object and purpose of the Protocol since, despite the assurances given by the United States of America, it cannot guarantee the protection of civilians, which is the raison d'être of the Protocol.  The Government of the French Republic therefore wishes to register an objection to this reservation.  This objection shall not preclude the entry into force of the Protocol between France and the United States of America. 
France, Objection to the Reservation by the United States of America to the 1980 Protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 2 February 2010.

Germany
In 2009, in reply to a Minor Interpellation in the Bundestag (Lower House of Parliament) titled “Investigation of serious violations of international humanitarian law in the recent Gaza war”, Germany’s Federal Government wrote:
14. Can the Federal Government confirm or deny that ammunition with white phosphorous has been used in densely populated areas (e.g. Gaza City) and against civilian installations (e.g. the UN), and how does the Federal Government assess such use under international humanitarian law?
The Federal Government is aware of allegations that Israel has used phosphorous weapons in a way that violated international law. This is the subject of a number of investigations, including by Israel. The Federal Government has no information of its own on whether such weapons were used. Smoke ammunition which includes white phosphorus is not prohibited as such under international humanitarian law. But its use must comply with the general rules of international humanitarian law. Hence a direct use against civilians would be unlawful and an indiscriminate attack which does not distinguish between legitimate objectives and civilians, or an attack against a military objective which must be expected to cause loss of civilian life that is out of proportion to the concrete and direct advantage are all prohibited. 
Germany, Lower House of Federal Parliament (Bundestag), Reply by the Federal Government to the Minor Interpellation by the Members Winfried Nachtwei, Kerstin Müller (Cologne), Jürgen Trittin, other Members and the Parliamentary Group BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, BT-Drs. 16/12673, 20 April 2009, p. 6.

In 2010, in its objection to the reservation by the United States of America to the 1980 Protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Germany stated:
The Federal Republic of Germany has examined the reservation submitted by the United States of America on 21 January 2009 concerning Protocol III on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW) [in which the United States of America reserves the right to use incendiary weapons against military objectives located in concentrations of civilians where it is judged that such use would cause fewer casualties and/or less collateral damage than alternative weapons, but in so doing will take all feasible precautions with a view to limiting the incendiary effects to the military objective and to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects] and raises an objection to it.
The Federal Republic of Germany understands that the intention of the reservation submitted by the United States of America is to cause fewer casualties and/or less collateral damage.
However, the Federal Republic of Germany is of the opinion that the reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the CCW and Protocol III and that it would leave the decision of whether or not the respective norms of the Protocol should be applied to the discretion of a military commander.
This objection does not preclude the entry into force of Protocol III between the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States of America. 
Germany, Objection to the Reservation by the United States of America to the 1980 Protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 1 February 2010.

India
In 1973, in its reply on the report of the UN Secretary-General on napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use, India stated that possible agreement could only be found on restrictions of use against civilian objects. It stated that it would “take an active interest in, and promote” a prohibition of all inhumane weapons, including incendiary weapons, against civilian targets, with due regard for the principles of reciprocity and right of retaliation. 
India, Reply of 16 October 1973 sent to the UN Secretary-General, reprinted in Report of the Secretary-General on napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use, UN Doc. A/9207, 11 October 1973, p. 9.

At the Third Preparatory Committee for the Second Review Conference of States Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons in 2001, India stated that it “fully supported the idea of expanding the scope of the [Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons] to cover armed internal conflicts”. 
India, Statement of 24 September 2001 at the Third Preparatory Committee for the Second Review Conference of States Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Geneva, 24–28 September 2001.

Indonesia
At the Preparatory Conference for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons in 1978, Indonesia submitted a draft proposal, which developed the proposal it had submitted during the CDDH. 
Indonesia, Proposal concerning incendiary weapons submitted to the Ad Hoc Committee established by the CDDH, Vol. XVI, Official Records, CDDH/IV/223 within CDDH/IV 226, 21 April 1977, p. 578.

The proposal prohibited the use of incendiaries, except against
military objects other than personnel, provided that these objects are not within civilian population centres and against combatants holding positions in field fortifications such as bunkers and pillboxes where the use of alternate weapons will inevitably render more casualties. 
Indonesia, Draft proposal on incendiary weapons submitted to the Preparatory Conference for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, UN Doc. A/CONF.95/PREP.CONF./L.13, 22 March 1979.

Ireland
In 2010, in its objection to the reservation by the United States of America to the 1980 Protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Ireland stated:
The Government of Ireland has examined the reservation made on 21 January 2009 by the United States of America to Article 2, paragraphs 2 and 3 of Protocol III to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects upon notification of its consent to be bound thereby [in which the United States of America reserves the right to use incendiary weapons against military objectives located in concentrations of civilians where it is judged that such use would cause fewer casualties and/or less collateral damage than alternative weapons, but in so doing will take all feasible precautions with a view to limiting the incendiary effects to the military objective and to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects].
The provisions to which the aforesaid reservation refers prohibit, with one exception, the use of incendiary weapons against military objectives located within concentrations of civilians. The Government of Ireland regards the reservation made by the United States of America as invalid, inasmuch as it is incompatible with the object and purpose of Protocol III.
The Government of Ireland therefore objects to the aforesaid reservation made by the United States of America.
This objection shall not preclude the entry into force of Protocol III between Ireland and the United States of America. 
Ireland, Objection to the reservation by the United States of America to the 1980 Protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 4 February 2010.

Israel
Upon accession to the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Israel stated:
With reference to the scope of application defined in article 1 of the Convention, the Government of the State of Israel will apply the provisions of the Convention and those annexed Protocols to which Israel has agreed [I, II and III] to become bound to all armed conflicts involving regular forces of States referred to in article 2 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, as well as to all armed conflicts referred to in article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. 
Israel, Declarations and statements of understanding made upon accession to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 22 March 1995, § a.

In 2009, in a report on Israeli operations in Gaza between 27 December 2008 and 18 January 2009 (the “Gaza Operation”, also known as “Operation Cast Lead”), Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated:
Use of Munitions Containing White Phosphorous
406. During the Gaza Operation, IDF [Israel Defense Forces] forces used munitions containing white phosphorous, which is in common use by militaries worldwide. In particular, IDF used two different types of munitions containing white phosphorous – exploding munitions and smoke projectiles.
407. Exploding munitions containing white phosphorous. A small number of exploding munitions containing white phosphorous were used by the IDF during the Operation as mortar shells fire by ground forces and as rounds from naval vessels. These munitions were fired only at open unpopulated areas and were used only for marking and signalling rather than in an anti-personnel capacity. … No exploding munitions containing white phosphorous were used in built-up areas of the Gaza Strip or for anti-personnel purposes. The restrictions on the use of incendiary weapons under Protocol III (relating to Incendiary Weapons) to the [1980] Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (“CCW Protocol III”) were observed at all times, even though Israel is not a party to the Protocol (for further elaboration, see below).
408. None of the instances in which exploding munitions containing white phosphorous were used by the IDF during the Gaza Operation has given rise to particular criticism. Still, on 7 January 2009, although not required under international law, it was decided as a precautionary measure, in order to minimise the risk to civilians, that the IDF would cease to use such exploding munitions during the Gaza Operation. IDF forces fighting in Gaza were instructed to act accordingly.
409. Smoke projectiles containing white phosphorous. The second and main type of munitions containing white phosphorous employed by the IDF during the Gaza Operation was smoke screening projectiles. …
410. … [S]moke-screening projectiles are designed to create a protective smoke screen for battlefield purposes, and were used exclusively for this purpose by the IDF during the Gaza Operation. The smoke projectiles may, on occasion, produce incidental incendiary effects, but this does not make them incendiary weapons for purposes of international law.
International Law Applicable to the use of Incendiary Weapons
411. The use of munitions containing white phosphorous is not prohibited by any international treaty, including CCW Protocol III. Article I of CCW Protocol III defines “incendiary weapon” as “…any weapon or munition which is primarily designed to set fire to objects or to cause burn injury to persons through the action of flame, heat, or combination thereof, produced by a chemical reaction of a substance delivered on the target.” Article I further expressly excludes from its purview: “… Munitions which may have incidental incendiary effects, such as illuminants, tracers, smoke or signalling systems.”
412. Accordingly, although Israel is not a party to CCW Protocol III, it is clear that the use of munitions containing white phosphorous as a smokescreen is not regulated nor prohibited by it.

414. Although the use of weapons containing white phosphorous for smoke-screening purposes is not prohibited by any international treaty, it is still subject to the applicable norms of the Law of Armed Conflict, including the principles of distinction and proportionality, which regulate the employment of any types of weapons during an armed conflict. 
Israel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Operation in Gaza 27 December 2008–18 January 2009: Factual and Legal Aspects, 29 July 2009, §§ 406–412 and 414.
[footnotes in original omitted]
In January 2010, in an update of its July 2009 report on Israeli operations in Gaza between 27 December 2008 and 18 January 2009, Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated:
117. This investigation dealt with the use of weapons containing phosphorous by IDF forces during the Gaza Operation. The investigation focused on the different types and number of weapons containing phosphorous used during the Operation, the purposes for which they were used, the applicable professional instructions and rules of engagement, and the extent of compliance with those instructions and rules. …
118. The Military Advocate General reviewed the entire record of the special command investigation. With respect to exploding munitions containing white phosphorous, the Military Advocate General concluded that the use of this weapon in the operation was consistent with Israel’s obligations under international law.
119. With respect to smoke projectiles, the Military Advocate General found that international law does not prohibit use of smoke projectiles containing phosphorous. Specifically, such projectiles are not “incendiary weapons,” within the meaning of the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons [1980 Protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons] because they are not primarily designed to set fire or to burn. The Military Advocate General further determined that during the Gaza Operation, the IDF used such smoke projectiles for military purposes only, for instance to camouflage IDF armour forces from Hamas’s antitank units by creating smoke screens. 
Israel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Gaza Operation Investigations: An Update, 29 January 2010, §§ 117–119.
[footnotes in original omitted]
In July 2010, in a second update of its July 2009 report on Israeli operations in Gaza between 27 December 2008 and 18 January 2009, Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated:
The use of smoke-screening munitions containing phosphorus during the Gaza Operation was also addressed in a special command investigation dedicated to the issue. This investigation determined that the policy of using such munitions was consistent with Israel’s obligations under the Law of Armed Conflict. Nonetheless, following that investigation, the Chief of the General Staff ordered the implementation of the lessons learned from the investigation, particularly with regard to the use of such munitions near populated areas and sensitive installations. As a consequence, the IDF is in the process of establishing permanent restrictions on the use of munitions containing white phosphorus in urban areas. 
Israel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Gaza Operation Investigations: Second Update, 19 July 2010, § 97.

Italy
In 2005, in reply to a question concerning the use of chemical weapons by US armed forces in Iraq, the Italian Under-Secretary of State for Defence stated:
[A]s regards the field of conventional weapons, the definition of incendiary weapons adopted by the Third Protocol to the Convention of 1980, […] not yet ratified by the United States, on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (Carrying Concealed Weapons), does not seem to include ammunition having incendiary effects only in accidental ways, as for example flaring, tracing, smoke-making or signalling systems. 
Italy, Chamber of Deputies, Statement by the Under-Secretary of State for Defence, 17 November 2005, published in Italian Yearbook of International Law, vol. XV, 2005, p. 380.

In 2006, in reply to a question concerning the use of white-phosphorous weapons in Iraq, the Italian Under-Secretary of State to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers stated:
As concerns the area of conventional weapons, the definition of “incendiary weapons” adopted by Additional Protocol III to the 1980 Convention on prohibitions and restrictions on the use of conventional weapons whose effects could be indiscriminate or excessively toxic (carrying concealed weapons) … does not seem to include ammunition having only incidental incendiary effects such as, for instance, illuminants, tracers, smoke or signalling systems. 
Italy, Chamber of Deputies, Statement by the Under-Secretary of State to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, 20 January 2006, published in Italian Yearbook of International Law, vol. XVI, 2006, pp. 362–363.

Japan
In 1976, during discussions in the Ad Hoc Committee on Conventional Weapons established by the CDDH, Japan stated:
21. A consensus had been reached at the first session of the Conference of Government Experts that attacks in which incendiary weapons were used against cities with a concentration of civilians were indiscriminate and should be prohibited.
22. The working paper on incendiary weapons … submitted by eleven countries, including Japan, had been intended to start the prohibition or restriction of the use of such weapons from the point at which a minimum consensus had been reached, and had therefore been completely realistic. 
Japan, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. XVI, CDDH/IV/SR.27, 19 May 1976, p. 278, §§ 21–22.

At the Preparatory Conference for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons in 1978, Japan declared that while it “was not sure it would be practicable to ban completely weapons of that kind [incendiaries] other than those which employed yellow phosphorus, it would be useful to prohibit their use in indiscriminate attacks on cities or populated areas”. 
Japan, Statement at the Preparatory Conference for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, UN Doc. A/CONF.95/PREP.CONF./I/ SR.12, 12 September 1978, p. 2, § 3.

Jordan
In 1992, prior to the adoption of UN General Assembly Resolution 47/37 on the protection of the environment in times of armed conflict, Jordan and the United States submitted a memorandum entitled “International Law Providing Protection to the Environment in Times of Armed Conflict”, which stated:
For States parties the following principles of international law, as applicable, provide additional protection for the environment in times of armed conflict:
Article 2(4) of [the 1980 Protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons] prohibits States parties from making forests or other kinds of plant cover the object of attack by incendiary weapons except when such natural elements cover, conceal or camouflage combatants or other military objectives, or are themselves military objectives. 
Jordan and United States, International Law Providing Protection to the Environment in Times of Armed Conflict, annexed to Letter dated 28 September 1992 to the Chairman of the Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.6/47/3, 28 September 1992, § 2(d).

Netherlands
In 1973, in its reply on the report of the UN Secretary-General on napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use, the Netherlands supported restrictions on the use of incendiary weapons, especially to protect civilians. 
Netherlands, Reply of 30 August 1973 sent to the UN Secretary-General, reprinted in Report of the Secretary-General on napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use, UN Doc. A/9207, 11 October 1973, p. 13.

In an annex to a working paper on incendiary weapons submitted by Australia, Denmark and the Netherlands to the Ad Hoc Committee on Conventional Weapons established by the CDDH, the Netherlands proposed the following rules:
2. Rules
(a) As a consequence of the rules of international law applicable with respect to the protection of the civilian population against the effects of hostilities, it is prohibited to make any city, town, village or other area containing a concentration of civilians the object of attack by means of any incendiary munition.
(b) Specific military objectives that are within such an area may be made the object of attack by means of incendiary munitions, provided that the attack is otherwise lawful and that all feasible precautions are taken to limit the incendiary effects to the specific military objectives and to avoid incidental loss of civilian life or injury to civilians.
(c) In order to reduce to a minimum the risks posed to civilians by the use of flame weapons, it is prohibited to make any specific military objective that is within such an area the object of aerial attack by means of napalm or other flame munition unless that objective is located within an area in which combat between ground forces is taking place or is imminent. 
Netherlands, Proposal annexed to a working paper on incendiary weapons submitted by Australia, Denmark and Netherlands to the Ad Hoc Committee on Conventional Weapons established by the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. XVI, CDDH/IV/206 within CDDH/IV/226, 12 May 1976, pp. 562–563.

This proposal was later subject to slight revision. 
Netherlands, Revised proposal annexed to a working paper on incendiary weapons submitted by Australia, Denmark and Netherlands to the Ad Hoc Committee on Conventional Weapons established by the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. XVI, CDDH/IV/206 (Rev. 1) within CDDH/IV/226, 11 May 1977, pp. 564–565.

At the Preparatory Conference for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons in 1978, Australia and the Netherlands sponsored a draft proposal which divided incendiary weapons into “incendiary” and “flame” munitions and stated: “It is prohibited to make any concentration of civilians the object of attack by means of any incendiary munition.” The proposal further stated that “specific military objectives that are situated within a concentration of civilians” may be attacked with incendiary weapons if “all feasible precautions are taken to limit the incendiary effects to all specific military objectives and to avoid incidental loss of civilian life or injury to civilians”. The final part of the proposal provided that, in order to
reduce to a minimum the risks posed to civilians by the use of flame weapons, it is prohibited to make any specific military objective that is situated within a concentration of civilians the object of aerial attack by means of napalm or other flame munitions unless that objective is located within an area in which combat between ground forces is taking place or appears to be imminent. 
Australia and Netherlands, Draft proposal on incendiary weapons submitted to the Preparatory Conference for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, UN Doc. A/CONF.95/PREP.CONF./L.11, 13 September 1978.

In 1979, towards the end of Preparatory Conference for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Australia and the Netherlands submitted a further draft proposal on incendiary weapons. The proposal provided:
As a consequence of the rules of international law applicable with respect to the protection of civilians against the effects of hostilities, it is prohibited to make the civilian population as such as well as individual civilians the object of attack by means of incendiary munitions.
It also prohibited aerial attacks with napalm or other flame munitions against military targets situated within concentrations of civilians. Attacks with incendiary munitions against military objectives in civilian concentrations were not prohibited, “provided the attack is otherwise lawful and that all feasible precautions are taken to limit the incendiary effects to the military objective and to avoid incidental loss of civilian life and injury to civilians”.  
Australia and Netherlands, Draft proposal on incendiary weapons submitted to the Preparatory Conference for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, UN Doc. A/CONF.95/PREP.CONF./L.15, 5 April 1979.

New Zealand
At the Preparatory Conference for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons in 1979, New Zealand stated that “it shared the view expressed by the overwhelming majority of delegations concerning the need for stronger provisions for the protection of civilians and civilian centres against all incendiary weapons”. 
New Zealand, Statement at the Preparatory Conference for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, UN Doc. A/CONF.95/ PREP.CONF/II/SR.27, 18 April 1979, p. 8, § 72.

Norway
Norway submitted a “Draft Protocol Relative to the Prohibition of the Use of Incendiary Weapons” to the Ad Hoc Committee on Conventional Weapons established by the CDDH which read, inter alia, as follows:
Article 1 – Field of application
The present Protocol shall apply in the situations referred to in articles 2 and 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 for the Protection of War Victims.

Article 4 – Protection of the civilian population
Any use of incendiary weapons is subject to article 46 of [the Additional Protocol I].
In any city, town, village or other area containing a concentration of civilians, incendiary weapons may be used only provided that combat between ground forces is taking place in that area, or the military objective is clearly separated from the civilian population. 
Norway, Draft protocol relative to the prohibition of the use of incendiary weapons submitted to the Ad Hoc Committee on Conventional Weapons established by the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. XVI, CDDH/IV/207 within CDDH/IV/226, 12 May 1976, pp. 567–569.

At the Preparatory Conference for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons in 1978, Denmark and Norway presented a proposal which stated: “It is prohibited to make the civilian population or individual civilians the object of attack by incendiary weapons.” It also stated:
It is prohibited to make any military objective located within a concentration of civilians the object of attack by incendiary weapons delivered by aircraft, except when that military objective is clearly separated and distinct from the civilian population.
The final rule contained in the proposal provided:
Whenever an attack is made by incendiary weapons in accordance with the above provisions and other applicable rules of international law, all feasible precautions shall be taken to limit the effects of such attack to the military objective itself with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects. 
Denmark and Norway, Draft proposal on incendiary weapons submitted to the Preparatory Conference for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, UN Doc. A/CONF.95/PREP.CONF./L.12, 13 September 1978.

In 2010, in its objection to the reservation by the United States of America to the 1980 Protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Norway stated:
The Government of the Kingdom of Norway has examined the Declaration made by the Government of the United States of America at the time of its consent to be bound by the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III) to the 1980 UN Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects [in which the United States of America reserves the right to use incendiary weapons against military objectives located in concentrations of civilians where it is judged that such use would cause fewer casualties and/or less collateral damage than alternative weapons, but in so doing will take all feasible precautions with a view to limiting the incendiary effects to the military objective and to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects].
The Government of the Kingdom of Norway considers the declaration made by the Government of the United States of America to be a reservation that seeks to limit the scope of the Protocol on a unilateral basis in a way that is contrary to its object and purpose, namely by limiting the application of the prohibition on the use of incendiary weapons in those situations governed by paragraphs 2 and 3 of its Article 2, to which the declaration refers.
The Government of the Kingdom of Norway recalls that, according to customary international law, as codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a reservation incompatible with the object and purpose of the Protocol shall not be permitted.
The Government of the Kingdom of Norway objects to the aforesaid reservation by the Government of the United States of America to the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III) to the United Nations Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. However, this objection shall not preclude the entry into force of the Protocol in its entirety between the two States, without the United States of America benefiting from its reservation. 
Norway, Objection to the Reservation by the United States of America to the 1980 Protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 2 February 2010.

Russian Federation
At the International Conference on the Protection of War Victims in 1993, the Russian Federation declared: “In order to protect the civilian population against indiscriminate weapons … incendiary weapons … should be completely banned in internal conflicts.” 
Russian Federation, Statement at the International Conference for the Protection of War Victims, Geneva, 30 August–1 September 1993.

Spain
In 2010, in its objection to the reservation by the United States of America to the 1980 Protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Spain stated:
The Government of the Kingdom of Spain has examined the reservation to article 2, paragraphs 2 and 3, of the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons, presented by the United States of America at the time of its ratification of the Protocol [in which the United States of America reserves the right to use incendiary weapons against military objectives located in concentrations of civilians where it is judged that such use would cause fewer casualties and/or less collateral damage than alternative weapons, but in so doing will take all feasible precautions with a view to limiting the incendiary effects to the military objective and to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects].
The Government of the Kingdom of Spain considers that the said reservation, in the terms in which it was formulated, runs counter to the prohibitions contained in article 2, paragraphs 2 and 3, and is therefore incompatible with the object and purpose of Protocol III.
Consequently, the Government of the Kingdom of Spain objects to the reservation presented by the United States of America to article 2, paragraphs 2 and 3, of the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons.
This objection shall not preclude the entry into force of the Protocol between the Kingdom of Spain and the United States of America. 
Spain, Objection to the Reservation by the United States of America to the 1980 Protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 5 February 2010.

Syrian Arab Republic
At the Preparatory Conference for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons in 1979, during the debate on the second proposal made by Australia and the Netherlands, the Syrian Arab Republic criticized the proposal, stating that “in its present form, the proposal left serious doubts regarding the precautions taken to limit the incendiary effects and to avoid loss of human lives” and that “it had not been proved that napalm was more dangerous than other incendiary weapons”. 
Syrian Arab Republic, Statement at the Preparatory Conference for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, UN Doc. A/CONF.95/PREP.CONF/II/ SR.23, 6 April 1979, p. 3, §§ 6–7.

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Upon ratification of the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the United Kingdom stated:
The United Kingdom accepts the provisions of article 2(2) and (3) on the understanding that the terms of those paragraphs of that article do not imply that the air-delivery of incendiary weapons, or of any other weapons, projectiles or munitions, is less accurate or less capable of being carried out discriminately than all or any other means of delivery. 
United Kingdom, Declarations made upon ratification of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 13 February 1995, § d.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
At the Preparatory Conference for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons in 1979, the USSR stated that it was “regrettable” that no agreement on restricting the use of incendiary weapons had been reached. It felt that the
draft revised at the second session extended the scope of the prohibition of the use of incendiary weapons, particularly against military objectives situated within a concentration of civilians, and might constitute a good point of departure for the future work of the Conference. 
USSR, Statement at the Preparatory Conference for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, UN Doc. A/CONF.95/PREP.CONF/II/ SR.24, 9 April 1979, p. 5, § 16.

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
At the Preparatory Conference for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons in 1979, the United Kingdom stated:
The exchange of views in the past week had proved disappointing because some delegations had adopted extreme positions. These positions were doubtless dictated by humanitarian considerations which could in no sense be criticised. However, if agreement was to be reached on anything specific that would be an advance over the present state of the law, the objective would plainly have to be a more limited one. The text of the proposal submitted by Australia and the Netherlands met precisely that need. 
United Kingdom, Statement at the Preparatory Conference for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, UN Doc. A/CONF.95/PREP.CONF/II/ SR.23, 6 April 1979, p. 2.

In 2009, in response to a question in the House of Common, the UK Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs wrote:
We are very concerned about reports of white phosphorus ammunition being used by the Israeli defence force in Gaza. We have made this clear directly to both the Foreign Ministry and Defence Ministry in Tel Aviv.
I have also made clear to the House [of Commons] that Gaza is an exceptionally densely populated area where white phosphorus used as an air burst is liable to cause particularly horrific injuries to non-combatants. We consider such use in these circumstances unacceptable. 
United Kingdom, House of Commons, Written Statement by the Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Hansard, 26 February 2009, Vol. 488, Written Statements, col. 951W.

In 2010, in its objection to the reservation by the United States of America to the 1980 Protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the United Kingdom stated:
[T]his reservation [in which the United States of America reserves the right to use incendiary weapons against military objectives located in concentrations of civilians where it is judged that such use would cause fewer casualties and/or less collateral damage than alternative weapons, but in so doing will take all feasible precautions with a view to limiting the incendiary effects to the military objective and to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects] appears to be contrary to the object and purpose of the [1980] Protocol [III to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons] insofar as the object and purpose of the Protocol is to prohibit/restrict the use of incendiary weapons per se. On this reading, the United Kingdom objects to the reservation as contrary to the object and purpose of the Protocol.
The United States has, however, publicly represented that the reservation is necessary because incendiary weapons are the only weapons that can effectively destroy certain counter-proliferation targets, such as biological weapons facilities, which require high heat to eliminate the biotoxins. The United States has also publicly represented that the reservation is not incompatible with the object and purpose of the Protocol, which is to protect civilians from the collateral damage associated with the use of incendiary weapons. The United States has additionally stated publicly that the reservation is consistent with a key underlying principle of international humanitarian law, which is to reduce risk to the civilian population and civilian objects from harms flowing from armed conflict.
On the basis that (a) the United States reservation is correctly interpreted as a narrow reservation focused on the use of incendiary weapons against biological weapons, or similar counter-proliferation, facilities that require high heat to eliminate the biotoxins, in the interests of preventing potentially disastrous consequences for the civilian population, (b) the United States reservation is not otherwise intended to detract from the obligation to take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimising incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects, and (c) the object and purpose of the Protocol can properly be said to be to protect civilians from the collateral damage associated with the use of incendiary weapons, the United Kingdom would not object to the reservation as contrary to the object and purpose of the Protocol. 
United Kingdom, Objection to the Reservation by the United States of America to the 1980 Protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 4 February 2010.

In 2010, in a written answer to a question in the House of Lords about the status of weapons containing white phosphorus under international law and their use in densely populated civilian areas, a UK Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, stated:
White phosphorous … [is] not prohibited under international law when used appropriately. However, Protocol III of the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons prohibits or restricts the use of incendiary weapons against civilian populations and the use of air-delivered incendiary weapons against military objectives located in areas where there is a concentration of civilians, for those countries (including the UK) who are signatories to the protocol. 
United Kingdom, House of Lords, Written Answer by a Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Hansard, 30 March 2010, Vol. 718, Written Answers, col. WA370.

United States of America
In 1976, during discussions in the Ad Hoc Committee on Conventional Weapons established by the CDDH, the representative of the United States stated:
36. … The United States delegation could not accept any proposal which would have the effect of precluding the use of napalm or similar weapons in close-combat situations. It could therefore not accept total prohibition of the use of such weapons or prohibition of their anti-personnel use.
37. Her delegation recognized, however, that special limitations were appropriate in areas populated by civilians. It had carefully studied the proposal in the working paper submitted to the Lugano Conference [of Government Experts on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons] by the Netherlands experts and introduced again in the Ad Hoc Committee [as an annex to a working paper, see supra] that the use of air delivered flame weapons should be prohibited in populated areas, except for the zone in which combat between ground forces was taking place or was imminent. Such a prohibition would preclude the use of air-delivered napalm against military targets in cities, towns or villages, such as ammunition and supply dumps, vehicle parks, convoys and barracks. Acceptance of that proposal would involve the abandonment of lawful uses of napalm against legitimate military targets. In view, however, of the concern that the use of air-delivered napalm in populated areas might prove dangerous to civilians, the United States delegation was prepared to accept the Netherlands proposal as a basis for serious negotiation, and was also prepared to consider any other proposals for protecting the civilian population from the effects of incendiary weapons. 
United States, Statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol. XVI, CDDH/IV/SR.27, 19 May 1976, p. 281, §§ 36–37.

At the Preparatory Conference for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons in 1979, the United States explained that it
could not accept a total ban on the use of incendiary weapons, because the weapons substituted for them would, in certain situations, be more destructive and consequently more injurious, and would thus be contrary to the spirit of article 57 of the Protocol on International Armed Conflict [Additional Protocol I].
The United States went on to say that, while it could not accept a restriction on the use of incendiaries against combatants,
an agreement on limiting the use of incendiaries in areas containing civilian concentrations was appropriate and possible … The [Australia/Netherlands] proposal was the maximum that some of the principal interested parties at the Conference would be prepared to accept. 
United States, Statement at the Preparatory Conference for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, UN Doc. A/CONF.95/PREP.CONF/II/ SR.28, 18 April 1979, pp. 2–3, §§ 5–6.

With respect to the decision by the United States whether or not to use incendiary weapons during a strategic bombing campaign against North Korean industrial areas during the Korean War, it is reported:
At the Target Selection Committee meeting General Weyland pointed out that someone would have to decide whether or not the B-29’s could use incendiary munitions, and within a few days FEAF [Far Eastern Air Force] got the answer to this question – in the negative. Washington was very hesitant about any air action which might be exploited by Communist propaganda and desired no unnecessary civilian casualties which might result from fire raids. General Stratemeyer consequently directed General O’Donnell not to employ incendiaries without specific approval. 
Robert F. Futrell, The US Air Force in Korea 1950–1953, Office of Air Force History, US Air Force, Washington, D.C., Revised edition, 1983, p. 187.

In transmitting the Protocols to the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons to the US Senate, the US President stated:
The United States must retain its ability to employ incendiaries to hold high priority military targets such as those at risk in a manner consistent with the principle of proportionality which governs the use of all weapons under existing law. 
United States, Message from the US President transmitting Protocols II, III and IV to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons to the Senate for consent to ratification, Treaty Doc. 105-1, Washington, 7 January 1997, Tab (B), p. 4.

In November 2005, the US Department of Defense issued a transcript of a news briefing given jointly by the US Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Peter Pace, regarding the war in Iraq. The following extract from the transcript relates to the use of incendiary weapons:
Q: [Referring to a recent article in the New York Times] But in its final paragraph or so, it takes particular issue with the use of white phosphorus in urban areas. And based on what we have learned so far, have you banned the use of “Willy Pete” or are you considering banning it? Or will it continue to be used?
SEC. RUMSFELD: General Pace.
GEN. PACE: White phosphorus is a legitimate tool of the military. It is used for two primary purposes. One is to mark a location for strike by an aircraft, for example. The other is to be used – because it does create white smoke – to be used as a screening agent so that you can move your forces without being seen by the enemy.
It is not a chemical weapon, it is an incendiary (sic) [The transcript added a statement: “It is not an incendiary weapon as defined by the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons”], and it is well within the law of war to use those weapons as they are being used for marking and for screening.
Q: But you and I have both seen the results of “Willy Pete” in Vietnam. And when it’s on the skin, it doesn’t stop burning until it goes all the way through or runs out of oxygen. It’s a pretty tough weapon. Do you want to use it in urban areas such as Fallujah?
GEN. PACE: No armed force in the world goes to greater effort than your armed force to protect civilians and to be very precise in the way we apply our power. A bullet goes through skin even faster than white phosphorus does. So I would rather have the proper instrument applied at the proper time as precisely as possible to get the job done in a way that kills as many of the bad guys as possible and does as little collateral damage as possible. That is just the nature of warfare. 
United States, Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), News Transcript, News Briefing with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Gen. Peter Pace, 29 November 2005.

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UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1972 on general and complete disarmament, the UN General Assembly:
Conscious that incendiary weapons have always constituted a category of arms viewed with horror and that the International Conference on Human Rights, held at Teheran in 1968, in its resolution XXIII on human rights in armed conflicts considered napalm bombing to be among the methods and means that erode human rights,
Noting that complete proposals for both elimination and non-use of incendiary weapons were advanced at the disarmament negotiations in 1933 and that proposals have recently been made to prohibit or restrict their use,

Noting that the report of the Secretary-General entitled Napalm and Other Incendiary Weapons and All Aspects of Their Possible Use concludes that the massive spread of fire through incendiary weapons is largely indiscriminate in its effects on military and civilian targets,
Noting further the conclusion that burn injuries, whether sustained directly from the action of incendiaries or as a result of fires initiated by them, are intensely painful and require exceptional resources for their medical treatment that are by far beyond the reach of most countries,
Noting finally the conclusion that the rapid increase in the military use of these weapons is but one aspect of the more general phenomenon of the increasing mobilization of science and technology for purposes of total war, alongside which the long-upheld principle of the immunity of the non-combatant appears to be receding from the military consciousness, and that these trends have grave implications for the world community,
1. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General entitled Napalm and Other Incendiary Weapons and All Aspects of Their Possible Use and expresses appreciation to him for having submitted it without delay;
2. Takes note of the views expressed in the report regarding the use, production, development and stockpiling of napalm and other incendiary weapons;
3. Deplores the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons in all armed conflicts. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 2932 A (XXVII), 29 November 1972, preamble and §§ 1–3, voting record: 99-0-15-18.

In a resolution adopted in 1973 on napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use, the UN General Assembly:
Considering that the efficacy of these general principles [of international law prohibiting the use of weapons which are likely to cause unnecessary suffering and means and methods of warfare which have indiscriminate effects] could be further enhanced if rules were elaborated and generally accepted prohibiting or restricting the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons, as well as other specific conventional weapons which may cause unnecessary suffering or have indiscriminate effects,

1. Invites the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts to consider – without prejudice to its examination of the draft submitted to it by the International Committee of the Red Cross – the question of the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons, as well as other specific conventional weapons which may be deemed to cause unnecessary suffering or to have indiscriminate effects, and to seek agreement on rules prohibiting or restricting the use of such weapons.  
UN General Assembly, Res. 3076 (XXVIII), 6 December 1973, preamble and § 1, voting record: 103-0-18-14.

UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1974 on napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use, the UN General Assembly:
Invites the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts to continue … its search for agreement on possible rules prohibiting or restricting the use of [incendiary] weapons. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 3255 A (XXIX), 9 December 1974, § 3, voting record: 108-0-13-17.

UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1974 on napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use, the UN General Assembly:
1. Condemns the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons in armed conflicts in circumstances where it may affect human beings or may cause damage to the environment and/or natural resources;
2. Urges all States to refrain from the production, stockpiling, proliferation, and use of such weapons pending the conclusion of agreements on the prohibition of these weapons. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 3255 B (XXIX), 9 December 1974, §§ 1 and 2, voting record: 98-0-27-13.

UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1976 on incendiary and other specific conventional weapons which may be the subject of prohibitions or restrictions of use for humanitarian reasons, the UN General Assembly:
Convinced that the work of the fourth session of the Diplomatic Conference [on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts] should be inspired by a sense of urgency and the wish to attain concrete results which was stressed in the appeal by the Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Colombo from 16 to 19 August 1976, concerning particularly the prohibition of the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons,

2. Invites the Diplomatic Conference to accelerate its consideration of the use of specific conventional weapons, including any which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects, and to do its utmost to agree for humanitarian reasons on possible rules prohibiting or restricting the use of such weapons. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 31/64, 10 December 1976, preamble and § 2, adopted without a vote;

In a resolution adopted in 1977 on incendiary and other specific conventional weapons which may be the subject of prohibitions or restrictions of use for humanitarian reasons, the UN General Assembly:
Decides to convene in 1979 a United Nations conference with a view to reaching agreements on prohibitions or restrictions of the use of specific conventional weapons, including those which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects, taking into account humanitarian and military considerations. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 32/152, 19 December 1977, § 2, voting record: 115-0-21-13.

UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1980 on the UN Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN General Assembly welcomed the successful conclusion of the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and its Protocols and commended the Convention and the three annexed Protocols to all States “with a view to achieving the widest possible adherence to these instruments”. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 35/153, 12 December 1980, § 4, adopted without a vote.

UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1981 on the UN Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Recalling the successful conclusion of the United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, which resulted in a Convention and three Protocols, adopted by the Conference on 10 October 1980,

1. Urges those States which have not yet done so to exert their best endeavours to sign and ratify the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects and the Protocols annexed thereto as early as possible so as to obtain its entry into force, and ultimately its universal adherence. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 36/93, 9 December 1981, preamble and § 1, adopted without a vote.

In a resolution adopted in 1982 on the UN Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Recalling with satisfaction the adoption, on 10 October 1980, of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects,

1. Urges those States that have not yet done so to exert their best endeavours to become parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects and the Protocols annexed thereto, as early as possible, so as to obtain their entry into force and, ultimately, their universal adherence. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 37/79, 9 December 1982, preamble and § 1, adopted without a vote.

UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1983 on the UN Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Urges all States which have not yet done so to exert their best endeavours to become parties to the Convention [on Certain Conventional Weapons] and the Protocols annexed thereto, as early as possible, so as to obtain ultimately universal adherence. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 38/66, 15 December 1983, § 3, adopted without a vote.

In a resolution adopted in 1984 on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Urges all States that have not yet done so to exert their best endeavours to become parties to the Convention [on Certain Conventional Weapons] and the Protocols annexed thereto as early as possible, so as ultimately to obtain universality of adherence. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 39/56, 12 December 1984, § 3, adopted without a vote.

In a resolution adopted in 1985 on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Urges all States that have not yet done so to exert their best endeavours to become parties to the Convention [on Certain Conventional Weapons] and Protocols annexed thereto as early as possible, so as ultimately to obtain universality of adherence. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 40/84, 12 December 1985, § 3, adopted without a vote.

In a resolution adopted in 1986 on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Urges all States that have not yet done so to exert their best endeavours to become parties to the Convention [on Certain Conventional Weapons] and the Protocols annexed thereto as early as possible, so as ultimately to obtain universality of adherence. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 41/50, 3 December 1986, § 3, adopted without a vote.

In a resolution adopted in 1987 on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Urges all States that have not yet done so to exert their best endeavours to become parties to the Convention [on Certain Conventional Weapons] and the Protocols annexed thereto as early as possible, so as ultimately to obtain universality of adherence. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 42/30, 30 November 1987, § 3, adopted without a vote.

In a resolution adopted in 1988 on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Urges all States that have not yet done so to exert their best endeavours to become parties to the Convention [on Certain Conventional Weapons] and the Protocols annexed thereto as early as possible, so as ultimately to obtain universality of adherence. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 43/67, 7 December 1988, § 3, adopted without a vote.

In a resolution adopted in 1990 on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Urges all States that have not yet done so to exert their best endeavours to become parties to the Convention [on Certain Conventional Weapons] and the Protocols annexed thereto as early as possible, so as ultimately to obtain universality of adherence. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 45/64, 4 December 1990, § 3, adopted without a vote.

UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1990 on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Urges all States that have not yet done so to exert their best endeavours to become parties to the Convention [on Certain Conventional Weapons] and the Protocols annexed thereto as early as possible, so as ultimately to obtain universality of adherence. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 45/64, 4 December 1990, § 3, adopted without a vote.

UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1991 on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Urges all States that have not yet done so to exert their best endeavours to become parties to the Convention [on Certain Conventional Weapons] and the Protocols annexed thereto as early as possible, so as ultimately to obtain universality of adherence. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 46/40, 6 December 1991, § 3, adopted without a vote.

In a resolution adopted in 1992 on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Urges all States that have not yet done so to exert their best endeavours to become parties to the Convention [on Certain Conventional Weapons] and the Protocols annexed thereto as early as possible, as well as successor States to take appropriate action so as ultimately to obtain universality of adherence. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 47/56, 9 December 1992, § 3, adopted without a vote.

In a resolution adopted in 1994 on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Urgently calls upon all States that have not yet done so to take all measures to become parties, as soon as possible, to the Convention [on Certain Conventional Weapons] and upon successor States to take appropriate measures so that ultimately access to this instrument will be universal. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 49/79, 15 December 1994, § 3, adopted without a vote.

In resolution adopted in 1994 on the situation of human rights in the former Yugoslavia, the UN General Assembly condemned “the use of … napalm bombs on civilian targets by Croatian Serb and Bosnian Serb forces”.  
UN General Assembly, Res. 49/196, 23 December 1994, § 7, voting record: 150-0-14-21.

In a resolution adopted in 1995 on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Urgently calls upon all States that have not yet done so to take all measures to become parties, as soon as possible, to the Convention [on Certain Conventional Weapons] and its Protocols and upon successor States to take appropriate measures so that ultimately access to these instruments will be universal. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 50/74, 12 December 1995, § 3, adopted without a vote.

UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1996 on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Urgently calls upon all States that have not yet done so to take all measures to become parties, as soon as possible, to the Convention [on Certain Conventional Weapons] and its Protocols, and upon successor States to take appropriate measures so that ultimately adherence to these instruments will be universal. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 51/49, 10 December 1996, § 3, adopted without a vote.

UN General Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1997 on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Urgently calls upon all States that have not yet done so to take all measures to become parties, as soon as possible, to the Convention [on Certain Conventional Weapons] and the Protocols thereto, and in particular to amended Protocol II, with a view to achieving the widest possible adherence to this instrument at an early date, and calls upon successor States to take appropriate measures so that ultimately adherence to these instruments will be universal. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 52/42, 9 December 1997, § 2, adopted without a vote.

In a resolution adopted in 1998 on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN General Assembly:
Urgently calls upon all States that have not yet done so to take all measures to become parties, as soon as possible, to the Convention [on Certain Conventional Weapons] and the Protocols thereto, and particularly to amended Protocol II, with a view to achieving the widest possible adherence to this instrument at an early date, and calls upon successor States to take appropriate measures so that ultimately adherence to these instruments will be universal. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 53/81, 4 December 1998, § 5, adopted without a vote

In a resolution adopted in 1999, the UN General Assembly:
Urgently calls upon all States that have not yet done so to take all measures to become parties, as soon as possible, to the Convention [on Certain Conventional Weapons] and the Protocols thereto, and in particular to the amended Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II), with a view to achieving the widest possible adherence to this instrument at an early date, and calls upon successor States to take appropriate measures so that ultimately adherence to these instruments will be universal. 
UN General Assembly, Res. 54/58, 1 December 1999, § III(3), adopted without a vote.

UN Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 1995, the UN Commission on Human Rights condemned “the use of … napalm bombs against civilian targets by Bosnian and Croatian Serb forces”. 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 1995/89, 8 March 1995, § 5, voting record: 44-0-7.

UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights
In a resolution adopted in 1997, the UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights declared: “The use on civilian population of napalm and fuel-air bombs violates Protocol III … of the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons.” 
UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights, Res. 1997/36, 28 August 1997, preamble.

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Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly
In a resolution adopted in 1996, the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly invited,
in particular, the governments of the member states of the Council of Europe, of the states whose parliaments enjoy or have applied for special guest status with the Assembly, of the states whose parliaments enjoy observer status, namely Israel, and of all other states to:

b. ratify, if they have not done so, … the United Nations Convention of 1980 on the prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons and its protocols …
j. promote extension of the aforesaid United Nations Convention of 1980 to non-international armed conflicts, and inclusion in its provisions of effective procedures for verification and regular inspection. 
Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Res. 1085, 24 April 1996, § 8b and j.

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Preparatory Conference for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
Towards the end of the Preparatory Conference for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons in 1979, Austria, Egypt, Ghana, Jamaica, Mexico, Romania, Sweden, Venezuela, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Zaire, which had earlier sponsored a proposal which called for a total ban, submitted a proposal which restricted the ban on the use of incendiary weapons to use against civilians, military objectives located within a concentration of civilians and unprotected combatants. 
Draft protocol on Prohibition or Restrictions on the Use of incendiary Weapons submitted to the Conference on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons by Austria, Egypt, Ghana, Jamaica, Mexico, Romania, Sweden, Venezuela, Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Zaire, UN Doc. A/CONF.95/CW/L.1, 27 September 1979, pp. 1–2

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Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
In the case concerning the events at La Tablada in Argentina before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in 1997, the petitioners held that the military attack to retake the barracks was a “legal violation of all current legislation on this subject” and especially mentioned that the military had used white phosphorus or incendiary bombs. 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Case 11.137 (Argentina), Report, 18 November 1997, §§ 9–10.
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights stated:
The Commission must note that even if it were proved that the Argentine military had used such weapons, it cannot be said that their use in January 1989 violated an explicit prohibition applicable to the conduct of internal armed conflicts at that time. In this connection, protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons cited by petitioners, was not ratified by Argentina until 1995. Moreover and most pertinently, Article 1 of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons states that the Incendiary Weapons Protocol applies only to interstate armed conflicts and to a limited class of national liberation wars. As such, this instrument did not directly apply to the internal hostilities at the Tablada. In addition, the Protocol does not make the use of such weapons per se unlawful. Although it prohibits their direct use against peaceable civilians, it does not ban their deployment against lawful military targets, which include civilians who directly participate in combat. 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Case 11.137 (Argentina), Report, 18 November 1997, § 187.

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ICRC
To fulfil its task of disseminating IHL, the ICRC has delegates around the world teaching armed and security forces the definition of incendiary weapons in accordance with Article 1 of the 1980 Protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and that:
934. Incendiary weapons which are not air-delivered may be used:
a) when the military object is clearly separated from a concentration of civilian persons; and
b) subject to precautions to limit incendiary effects to the military objective, when the tactical situation permits.
935. Air-delivered incendiary weapons may be so used only in attack against a military objective located outside concentrations of civilian persons. 
Frédéric de Mulinen, Handbook on the Law of War for Armed Forces, ICRC, Geneva, 1987, §§ 931–935.

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International Institute of Humanitarian Law
The Rules of International Humanitarian Law Governing the Conduct of Hostilities in Non-international Armed Conflicts, adopted in 1990 by the Council of the International Institute of Humanitarian Law, states:
In application of the general rules listed in Section A above, especially those on the distinction between combatants and civilians and on the immunity of the civilian population, incendiary weapons may not be directed against the civilian population as such, against individual civilians or civilian objects, nor used indiscriminately. 
International Institute of Humanitarian Law, Rules of International Humanitarian Law Governing the Conduct of Hostilities in Non-international Armed Conflicts, Rule B5, IRRC, No. 278, 1990, p. 402.

Moscow Times
A journalist of the Moscow Times reported that in Grozny in 2000:
Incendiary bombs, incendiary cluster bombs and containers were extensively used to torch enemy-occupied objects and to destroy enemy manpower concentrations. At the time of these air raids there were several thousand Chechen fighters in Grozny and up to 100,000 civilians … Concrete evidence has been gathered by journalists and human rights groups on the use of different air-delivered incendiary weapons, including “vacuum” or “fuel” bombs against Grozny and other Chechen towns and villages. There is also concrete evidence that hundreds of civilians, including women and children, have been killed by such weapons.
The journalist went on to say:
The use of prohibited incendiary weapons in violation of international agreements is a much more serious war crime than the abuse of civilians by troops and bombardments by “ordinary” bombs or shells. The Russian military knows that the use of incendiary weapons is severely limited by international agreements. Such weapons are not part of the normal inventory of Russian units. Military sources say the orders to forgo internationally outlawed air-delivered incendiary weapons and attack towns and villages “came from the highest authorities”. It is a legal fact that by using incendiary weapons Russia as a state committed a war crime.
Lastly, the journalist stated that “[General] Zolotov agreed with me that attacking Grozny with incendiary weapons was a terrible war crime”. 
Pavel Felgenhauer, “Endorsing War Crimes”, Moscow Times, 12 July 2001, p. 6 (citing an article by Russian General Leonid Zolotov).