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The judgment of the ICTY Appeals Chamber on the merits in the Tadic case

30-09-2000 Article, International Review of the Red Cross, No. 839, by Marco Sassòli, Laura M. Olson

 New horizons for international humanitarian and criminal law?  

    

 Marco Sassòli, LL.D., is registrar at the Swiss Supreme Court. He has previously had various field and headquarters assignments for the ICRC. Laura M. Olson, LL.M., is an ICRC delegate. The views expressed in this article are exclusively those of the authors. – Received for publication: January 2000.  

When Dusko Tadic committed various atrocities on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992 against Bosnian Muslims, he would never have thought that he would — although involuntarily — contribute immensely to the development of international humanitarian law, of international criminal law and of some aspects of general international law. In 1993, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was created [1 ] — the first such tribunal since World War II — which certainly also paved the way for the similar Tribunal created for Rwanda in 1994 [2 ] and for the adoption, in 1998, of the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). [3 ]

In 1994, Dusko Tadic was arrested in Germany and transferred to The Hague. In 1995, the ICTY Appeals Chamber delivered a landmark decision on Dusko Tadic’s interlocutory appeal on jurisdiction. [4 ] In this decision, the Appeals Chamber made findings which are not always uncontroversial but which certainly developed or clarified international law in various respects: that Security Council resolutions are subject to judicial review; that the ICTY was lawf ully established; that the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia were both of an international and of a non-international character; that the concept of war crimes equally applies to non-international armed conflicts; and that an extensive corpus of customary international law applies in the latter conflicts and renders some behaviour a criminal offence. Who would have dared to affirm all this five years earlier?

More recently, on 15 July 1999, the ICTY Appeals Chamber delivered its judgment in the Tadic case. [5 ] This decision is interesting not so much because of the acts of which Dusko Tadic was found guilty, but because of some additional landmark general findings on international humanitarian law and on international criminal law by which the Appeals Chamber overturned those of the Trial Chamber. It adapted — critics will say, blurred — the distinction between international and non-international armed conflicts in

international humanitarian law, and in doing so acted at variance with a judgment of the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.). It updated — critics will say, manipulated — the concept of protected persons in the 1949 Geneva Conventions. It extended the concept of criminal responsibility due to participation in a group with a common purpose beyond what lawyers from some civil law systems know in their penal law. Finally, it clarified the concept of crimes against humanity in relation to two important issues — in one of them contradicting both the UN Security Council and the UN Secretary-General. This article wishes to discuss those findings and place them in a broader context.

 Was the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina an international one and were the Bosnian Muslims “protected persons”?  

The Trial Chamber had sentenced Dusko Tadic for atrocities it qualified as violations of the laws and customs of war under Article 3 o f the ICTY Statute. For those same acts it acquitted him, however, from charges of grave breaches of international humanitarian law in the sense of Article 2 of the ICTY Statute. On cross-appeal by the Prosecution, the Appeals Chamber overturned this finding.

 Grave breaches of international humanitarian law  

Before explaining and commenting on the rather revolutionary reasoning the Chamber adopts, it may be appropriate to recall the concept of “grave breaches” to which Article 2 of the Statute refers. The Geneva Conventions and Protocol I define a certain number of violations as “grave breaches” [6 ] and establish the principle of compulsory universal national jurisdiction over persons who have allegedly committed such crimes. According to the text and the system of the Geneva Conventions and Protocols, the concept of grave breaches does not apply to violations of the law of non-international armed conflicts. Although some diverging views exist, [7 ] this was correctly recognized by the Appeals Chamber in its decision on jurisdiction. [8 ]

First, common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and the entirety of Protocol II, the treaty law applicable to non-international armed conflicts, are indeed silent as to criminalization of violations thereof. Second, the field of application of the provisions on grave breaches is limited by Article 2 common to the Geneva Conventions, as it is for all articles of the Geneva Conventions other than common Article 3, to international armed conflicts. Third, the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I limit the concept of grave breaches to acts “against persons or property protected by the present Convention”, and the term “protected person” is, as far as civilians are concerned, limited to “[p ] ersons… who… find themselves… in the hands of a Party to the conflict… of which they are not nationals”. [9 ] Fourth, grave breaches include some acts w hich are not even prohibited by international humanitarian law if committed by a State against its own nationals. [10 ]

 Qualification of the conflict  

In order to try Dusko Tadic for grave breaches, it was crucial for both the Trial and the Appeals Chambers to qualify the conflict in which Tadic committed his crimes as international. The law of international armed conflicts applies, under Article 2 common to the four Geneva Conventions, to conflicts fought between two or more High Contracting Parties. Many conflicts are of both an international and a non-international character, either because foreign powers intervene in a non-international armed conflict or because international armed conflicts are fought, as they often were during the Cold War, through local proxies. In such mixed conflicts, the law of international armed conflicts applies to the fighting between (the armed forces of) two States and the law of non-international armed conflicts to the fighting between the government and rebel forces. [11 ] According to the general rules of State responsibility, such a fragmentation of a mixed conflict into its components is not necessary when a party to a non-international armed conflict can be considered as the de facto agent of an intervening State, in which case the behaviour of this agent comes under the law of international armed conflicts.

As for the conflict in the Prijedor region, in which Dusko Tadic was involved, the Appeals Chamber had determined in its decision on jurisdiction that “since it cannot be contended that the Bosnian Serbs constitute a State”, it could only be classified as international based on the assumption that the Bosnian Serbs are organs or agents of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). [12 ]

To determine whether that was the case, the ICTY had to establish not only the facts but also the legal standard according to which outside support can render the law of international armed conflicts applicable to the behaviour of rebels. The Trial Chamber considered that the International Court of Justice had clarified this standard when it had to decide whether the violations of international humanitarian law committed by the Nicaraguan contras could be attributed to the United States as the latter’s own behaviour. The I.C.J. held that the U.S. “participation, even if preponderant or decisive, in the financing, organizing, training, supplying and equipping of the contras, the selection of… targets, and the planning of the whole of its operation, is still insufficient in itself… for the purpose of attributing to the United States the acts committed by the contras in the course of their military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua… For this conduct to give rise to legal responsibility of the United States, it would in principle have to be proved that that State had effective control of the military or paramilitary operations in the course of which the alleged violations were committed.” [13 ] This standard is very similar to that suggested by the authors of the ICRC Commentary on the Geneva Conventions, who consider that when a violation has not been committed by an agent of an occupying power but by local authorities, “what is important is to know where the decision leading to the unlawful act was made, where the intention was formed and the order given”. [14 ]

Under this standard, the Trial Chamber decided that after 19 May 1992 (the day on which the Yugoslav Peoples’ Army officially withdrew from Bosnia and Herzegovina), the Bosnian Serb forces could not be considered as de facto organs or agents of the FRY because the latter did not exercise control over the activities of the former. [15 ] Eminent authors, another ICTY Trial Chamber and the Prosecution in its cross-appeal have strongly argued that the test applied by the I.C.J. for the purpose of establishing State responsibility cannot be used to determine whether the “grave breaches” provisions apply. [16 ] The ICTY Appeals Chamber correctly rejects this argument. [17 ] State responsibility and individual responsibility are admittedly different issues, and the I.C.J. did not have to determine in the Nicaragua case whether the law of international or of non-international armed conflicts applied — for the simple reason that it considered the prohibitions of common Article 3 to apply, as a minimum yardstick, to both kinds of conflict. [18 ] In our view the preliminary underlying issues are, however, the same in both cases. Indeed, before State responsibility or individual responsibility can be established in a given case, the rules according to which the State or the individual should have acted have to be clarified. Only if the acts of the Nicaraguan contras had been attributed to the U.S., these acts, as acts of the U.S. against Nicaragua, would have been subject to the law of international armed conflicts. Similarly, that law could apply to acts which Dusko Tadic, a Bosnian Serb, committed against Bosnian Muslims in the course of a conflict with the Bosnian government only if those acts could be legally considered as acts of another State, the FRY.

While recognizing that the same test applies in both cases, the ICTY Appeals Chamber decides that the test applied by the I.C.J. in the Nicaragua decision is unconvincing even for the purpose of establishing State responsibility, because it is contrary to the very logic of the law of State responsibility and at variance with State and judicial practice. [19 ] In its view, when responsibility for a military organization is in question, overall control by a foreign State over that organization is sufficient to render the foreign State responsible for all acts of that organization and to make international humanitarian law relative to international armed conflicts applicable. [20 ]

First, it may be doubted whether it is appropriate for the ICTY to pr ovide an answer to a question of general international law that differs from the answer given by the I.C.J., the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. [21 ] Even if the theory of the Appeals Chamber is well reasoned, the I.C.J. can be expected to continue to apply its own theory to inter-State disputes worldwide. Double standards will therefore inevitably result. Second, with the exception of a German case concerning the former Yugoslavia, the practice mentioned by the Chamber consists mainly of cases in which a State was held responsible for armed groups acting on its own territory. There, territorial control might have been the decisive factor. The other case mentioned by the Chamber is that of an occupied territory [22 ] where armed forces of the occupying power were actually present. In such a case the Geneva Conventions expressly prescribe that protected persons cannot be deprived of their rights — and the occupying power therefore will not be released from its responsibility — by any change introduced into the institutions of the territory. [23 ] It is debatable whether those precedents can be applied without further arguments to the Tadic case, where a local military group was constituted out of the rest of the army of the former central State, possibly by the former central authorities, on the territory of a State falling apart. Third, concerning the logic of the law of State responsibility, the Appeals Chamber is certainly correct in affirming that a State should not shelter behind a lack of specific instructions so as to disclaim international responsibility for a military group, whether at home or abroad. With regard to a group abroad, however, this argument is convincing only if that group has been entrusted with a certain task. As far as the Bosnian Serbs are concerned, it may be argued that they were carrying out their own self-assigned task. Whether rightly or wrongly, they did not want to join the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Applying the overall control te st to the case of the Bosnian Serbs, the Appeals Chamber comes to the conclusion that they were under such overall control by the FRY. [24 ] It mentions, similarly to the Trial Chamber, impressive circumstantial evidence for the existence of such control. Perhaps it does not give sufficient weight to the particularities of the situation of a State breaking apart into several States, where the armed forces of the former central State necessarily have many links with the former central authorities which are now foreign authorities. As such links are inherent in the situation, they are not necessarily an indication of control. The Appeals Chamber further argues that the FRY had signed the Dayton Peace Agreement for the Bosnian Serbs. With all due respect, this argument is almost contrary to good faith when one recalls that the international community, and particularly the United States, refused to negotiate with the Bosnian Serbs and obliged the FRY to negotiate and sign for them. [25 ]

In any case, there are some risks inherent in the standard the Appeals Chamber applies. First, it implies an unintended form of “judicial ethnic cleansing”. Instead of constituent peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Serbs (and Croats) are considered as “agents” of a foreign State. If their acts can be legally attributed to a foreign State, why should they themselves not be “attributed” to that State, i.e. considered to be foreigners? This is precisely what another ICTY Trial Chamber concluded in the Celebici case, arguing that Bosnian Serbs detained by the Bosnian government were protected persons because they had not accepted the nationality of Bosnia and Herzegovina. [26 ] If those persons are foreigners, their forcible transfer to their “home State” is no longer a war crime, but a favour. [27 ] Today, after the conflict, such theories are not a helpful contribution to peace and reconciliation. During a conflict, it is inconceivable that a military commander could be persuaded to respect certain rules b y arguing that he is an agent of a foreign country and that his home country is his enemy.

Second, in its decision on jurisdiction, the Appeals Chamber had still, in our view correctly, pointed out that to consider the Bosnian Serbs as agents of the FRY would lead to “an absurd outcome”, in that it would place them “at a substantial legal disadvantage vis-à-vis the central authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina”. [28 ] Indeed, atrocities committed by the government army of Bosnia and Herzegovina against Bosnian Serb civilians would traditionally not be regarded as “grave breaches” because those civilians, having the nationality of Bosnia-Herzegovina, would not be regarded as “protected persons” under the Fourth Geneva Convention. Conversely, similar atrocities committed by Bosnian Serbs against Bosnian Muslim civilians would be regarded as “grave breaches” because such civilians would be “protected persons” under the Geneva Convention, in that the Bosnian Serbs would be acting as organs or agents of the FRY of which the Bosnian Muslim civilians would not possess the nationality. It is perhaps to avoid such consequences that the Appeals Chamber also redefines in its judgment, as will be explained below, the concept of “protected persons” under the Fourth Geneva Convention. [29 ] Under the Third Geneva Convention, too, it may be wondered whether Bosnian government forces must and will treat captured members of the Bosnian Serb and Croat forces, “legally considered as agents of Serbia or Croatia”, as prisoners of war? May they “repatriate” them at the end of the conflict to the “country on which they depend”, i.e. deport them abroad?

 Who is a protected person?  

Even if the conflict in which Dusko Tadic committed his acts was an international one, they may be qualified as grave breaches only if their victims were, as explained above, “protected persons”. Even in an internation al armed conflict, atrocities committed against fellow citizens are for that reason traditionally not considered as “grave breaches”. The Trial Chamber had concluded that the Bosnian Muslim victims of Dusko Tadic were not protected persons, as they were not in the hands of a party to the conflict of which they were not nationals, [30 ] but in the hands of Bosnian Serbs, like Dusko Tadic, who had the same nationality as their victims. [31 ] On cross-appeal by the Prosecution and following suggestions to adapt the definition of protected persons “to the principal challenges of contemporary conflicts”, [32 ] the Appeals Chamber abandons this literal interpretation of the definition of protected persons. It replaces the factor of nationality by the factors of allegiance and effective protection. [33 ] The justification provided is very short. On the one hand it cites some cases for which, under explicit provisions (or according to the travaux préparatoires) of the Geneva Conventions, nationality is not decisive, namely for refugees and neutral nationals. [34 ] The victims in the Tadic case were, however, neither neutral nationals nor refugees. On the other hand it refers to the inadequacy of the criterion of nationality for contemporary conflicts and recalls that international humanitarian law must apply according to substantial relations rather than formal bounds. The latter is correct for the law of non-international armed conflicts and for resolving the question whether an armed conflict exists, whereas once the law of international armed conflicts applies, the formal status of a party, a territory or a person is relevant to determine the protective regime applicable. [35 ]

The logical consequence of this theory is that from now on, all victims of international armed conflicts should benefit from the full protected persons status under the Geneva Conventions. Indeed, a State will only rarely abuse those who maintain their allegiance to it and who benefit from its effective protection. It is open to doubt whether, in international armed conflicts, States will be ready to treat their own nationals as protected persons once those persons’ allegiance lies with the enemy. Some acts, such as employing protected persons in military activities or enrolling them into the armed forces, are and can be prohibited only if committed against enemy nationals. [36 ] Allegiance is also difficult to determine in the heat of the conflict. In any case, even if this approach has many advantages de lege ferenda, it is questionable whether it is admissible to reinterpret ex post, in a criminal trial, a constitutive element of a grave breach, i.e. that it must be committed against persons of another nationality.

 Does the law of international armed conflicts always offer better protection than the law of non-international armed conflicts?  

The standards the Appeals Chamber adopts considerably increase the number of cases in which war victims could benefit from the comprehensive and detailed regime laid down in the 1907 Hague Regulations, the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I, rather than from the more summary regime contained in one single article of the Geneva Conventions, namely their common Article 3, and in Protocol II. From a humanitarian point of view such a development cannot but be welcomed if it is applied to all conflicts. However, it rests on the assumption that the law of international armed conflicts offers better protection for the victims. This is not always true. The law of non-international armed conflicts is easier to apply and has a better chance of being respected in many chaotic current conflicts.

The protection offered by the law of international armed conflicts to a person who is in the hands of a belligerent differs greatly according to the nationality of that person, to whether that person is a civilian or a combatant and to the status of the territory on which he or she is found. [37 ] In a non-international armed conflict, it would often be difficult in practical terms to determine who is a “combatant” and who a “civilian”. It would be conceptually well nigh impossible to consider a government or rebels as an “occupying power” over parts of the territory of the country in which they are fighting. Even if a line could be drawn between a party’s own territory and territory it occupies, this would never have the slightest chance of being respected by a party engaged in a non-international armed conflict.

Conversely, the law of non-international armed conflicts protects according to the actual situation of a person. Most of its rules benefit, without any adverse distinction, all persons not or no longer taking an active part in the hostilities. [38 ] Other, additional rules protect persons in particularly risky situations, e.g. those whose liberty has been restricted for reasons related to the armed conflict or who face penal prosecutions. [39 ] It may be that such rules are much more appropriate for the necessarily less formalized and more fluid situations of many contemporary conflicts. Sometimes the rules themselves applicable to non-international armed conflicts are stricter. The abominable practice of “ethnic cleansing”, so widely utilized in the former Yugoslavia, is clearly prohibited by international humanitarian law applicable in international and in non-international armed conflicts if the means used to expel the victims are unlawful as such, e.g. murder, rape, pillage, etc. The law of non-international armed conflicts furthermore prohibits any forced movement of civilians. [40 ] The law of international armed conflicts is weaker on this point, for “[i ] ndividual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons… are prohibited, regardless of their motive” only out of occupied territories. [41 ] Expulsions of “protected civilians”, i.e. foreigners, out of a party’s own territory are not explicitly prohibite d. [42 ]

We are not convinced that it is appropriate to apply one law to a situation for which other law was made. We would instead suggest — as a challenge for the new millennium — creating a new law applicable to all situations. We have, however, to admit that if States as they are today undertook such a codification exercise, the risk that they might reduce the protection foreseen for all armed conflicts would be considerable.

It should finally not be forgotten that in the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere, the distinction between the law of international and of non-international armed conflicts has only a minor bearing upon the real situation of the victims. The problem is not that the wrong set of rules has been respected, but that no rules have been respected. None of the dreadful crimes which have destroyed that region and others would be lawful if only the law of non-international armed conflicts applied. Dusko Tadic and too many others violated even the simple rules of Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions.

 Responsibility of participants in international crimes: were they committed within or beyond the common purpose?  

 Three categories of co-perpetrators  

The Trial Chamber had found that Dusko Tadic had participated within an armed group in “ethnic cleansing” operations in the Prijedor region. Among other things, he removed non-Serb men from the villages of Sivci and Jaskici. In Sivci, no one was killed during such operations, while in Jaskici at least five men were later found to have been killed. There was no evidence that Dusko Tadic actually took part in those killings, and the Trial Chamber therefore concluded that Dusko Tadic could not be sentenced for them. On cross-appeal by the Prosecution, this conclusion was overturned by the Appeals Chamber. First, on the basis of the facts, it found beyond a reasonable doubt that the five victims had been killed by members of the armed group to which Dusko Tadic belonged. [43 ] Second, in law, it held that under the common purpose doctrine, Dusko Tadic could be held responsible for those killings even if they were committed by other members of his group, and even if the killing of inhabitants was not necessarily part of their common plan. According to the Chamber, such responsibility exists as soon as the risk of death became a predictable consequence of the execution of the common plan and the accused was either reckless or indifferent to that risk. [44 ]

Before discussing at length this third category of cases in which co-perpetrators are criminally responsible for acts committed by others, the Appeals Chamber importantly clarifies the other two — uncontroversial — categories of cases. First, there are those in which all co-defendants act pursuant to a common design an d possess the same criminal intent; in such cases a participant who did not personally effect the crime (e.g. kill a civilian or rape a woman), is criminally responsible for the crime if he or she voluntarily participates in one aspect of the common design and intended the criminal result. [45 ] The second category concerns cases of an organized system intended to commit crimes (e.g. in World War II, the Nazi concentration camps). It is correctly seen by the Chamber as a variant of the first. Here, any participation in the enforcement of the system is sufficient as actus reus, while the mens rea requires knowledge of the nature of the system and the intent to further the common concerted design. [46 ] These two categories are a reasonable, useful and important crystallization of international and national precedents and of legal thinking.

 The third category: responsibility of co-perpetrators beyond the common plan  

The third category deserves more detailed discussion. It contains the standard leading to the responsibility of Dusko Tadic for the killings in Jaskici, and covers acts committed by one co-perpetrator which are outside the common design. The Appeals Chamber comes to the conclusion that all other co-perpetrators are responsible for such acts, if it was foreseeable that they might be committed and the accused willingly took that risk. [47 ] This conclusion is not based on a provision of the ICTY Statute or on a rule of international humanitarian law, but on an analysis, by the Chamber, of precedents and national legal systems.

 Review of precedents and practice  

In reviewing precedents leading to its conclusion, the Appeals Chamber finds that British and U.S. military courts in Germany, Italian courts judging World War II events, common law jurisdictions, France and Italy adopt such an approach. It admits, however, that in Germany and the Netherlands, if one of the participants commits a crime not envisaged by the common purpose, he alone is responsible for such crime. The Chamber could have added Switzerland to that list. [48 ]

In this review, the Appeals Chamber to some extent compares apples to oranges, as is inevitable when comparing the answers different legal systems provide for a specific question. In addition, the definition of the third category is not very clear and varies throughout the discussion by the Chamber. In the introduction, it is considered sufficient that the result not covered by the common plan is predictable and that the accused was indifferent to that risk. [49 ] After reviewing the Italian cases, the Chamber concludes that “it would seem that [the Italian Court of Cassation ] either applied the notion of an attenuated form of intent (dolus eventualis) or required a high degree of carelessness (culpa)” . [50 ] In the Italian and in other continental systems dolus eventualis and culpa are, however, clearly not the same thing, while the intermediate category of recklessness does not exist. [51 ] Dolus eventualis entails responsibility for a deliberate crime; culpa is negligence. In the following paragraph of the judgment, though, one reads that “more than negligence… the so-called dolus eventualis is required (also called advertent recklessness in some national legal systems)”. [52 ] If this was the standard, it would correspond to that of Swiss and German law, and no one could object, even when the “common purpose doctrine” in common law tradition is interpreted in this sense. Under this standard, he who knows that a result is inevitably or probably linked to his act and accepts this result is responsible for the deliberate crime, while he who hopes in the same situation that the probable result will not materialize is responsible only of negligence. [53 ] In summing up the whole chapter, the Chamber yet mentions another standard, i.e. that the crime was foreseeable and the accused willingly took that risk. [54 ] But this is less than dolus eventualis, where the result and not only the risk is accepted, and much more than the initially mentioned standard, i.e. that the result is predictable (which includes unconscious negligence) and the accused remains indifferent. [55 ] One may wonder which standard the Chamber finally applies. For systematic reasons, and taking into account how the standard was actually applied to the case of Dusko Tadic, it may be guessed that it is the standard summed up in the conclusion, i.e. that the crime was foreseeable and the accused willingly took that risk.

 The significance of national practice  

In a statement remarkable from the point of view of the theory of sources, the ICTY Chamber concludes that its overview of national legislation has not shown that there is a gen eral principle of law recognized by the nations of the world in this field. Furthermore, such national legislation, even if it were uniform, could not be seen anyway as domestic law incorporating customary international law, [56 ] as it does not originate from the implementation of international law but rather runs parallel to, and precedes, international regulation. [57 ]

After those two correct remarks, the Chamber nevertheless mysteriously comes to the conclusion that “th e consistency and cogency of the case law and the treaties referred to above, as well as their consonance with the general principles on criminal responsibility laid down both in the Statute and general international criminal law and in national legislation, warrant the conclusion that [that ] case law reflects customary rules of international criminal law”. [58 ] As far as national legislation is concerned, this affirmation is contradicted by the preceding remarks, except if the standard of the Chamber is dolus eventualis. In the latter case, however, the Chamber should have analysed much more thoroughly whether circumstantial evidence allows such a dolus eventualis on the part of Dusko Tadic to be assumed. It may be added that, as the Appeals Chamber correctly mentions in several footnotes, common law jurisdictions increasingly restrict the felony murder doctrine, which is so difficult to accept for continental lawyers. [59 ] Furthermore, it is important to remember that this doctrine refers only to murder, while the Appeals Chamber’s ruling would apply to all crimes foreseen in the Statute.

As for international case law, the British and U.S. military courts in Germany may be considered to have applied international law in the cases before them — because otherwise the principle nullum crimen sine lege would have been violated towards German defendants having acted in Germany. Why does the Chamber, however, consider the very extensively reviewed Italian precedents, unlike the German and Dutch ones, as cases in which international law was applied? Was it because they referred to war events? Yet they were based on an explicit provision of the Italian Penal Code of 1931 and the reasoning used was that which Italian courts use in all other criminal cases. [60 ] As for the international precedents set by the British and U.S. military courts in Germany, it is not clear whether they support the conclusion the Appeals Chamber draws from them. In the Essen Lynching case, civilians were found guilty of murder against prisoners they gathered to insult and ill-treat after a German captain had said loudly that the prisoners should not be protected from the mob and ought to be shot. No individual civilian could be found to have actually killed the prisoners who were thrown, after ill-treatment, from a bridge and then shot. There was no Judge Advocate nor a reasoned judgment in that case. The Prosecution mainly held that the civilians had the intent to kill, but that even if there was no such intent, “every person in that crowd who struck a blow is both morally and criminally responsible for the deaths”. [61 ] Since the civilians were convicted, the Appeals Chamber “assumes” that the prosecution arguments were accepted. It is, however, not clear whether the main argument or the subsidiary argument of the Prosecutor was accepted. For the only other international case it reviews, the Borkum Island case, the Appeals Chamber itself has to admit that it was a clear case of a common design to kill, i.e. of category one distinguished by the Chamber. [62 ] It is not clear why this case is reviewed as a precedent for category three.

 Precedents in treaty law  

As for references to treaties, the Chamber in fact refers to two conventions which are not yet in force. First, it mentions the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing of 15 December 1997, adopted by consensus by the UN Gene ral Assembly, which criminalizes an intentional contribution “either… made with the aim of furthering the general criminal activity or purpose of the group or… made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the offence… concerned”. [63 ] Second, it refers to the Statute of the International Criminal Court which was adopted by an overwhelming majority of the States attending the Rome Diplomatic Conference — but, we would add with regret, with some notable exceptions such as the United States. For the Appeals Chamber, it expresses the opinio juris of the States having adopted the Statute — a very sweeping statement under any theory of sources, but a largely correct one. [64 ] The ICC Statute stipulates in Article 25(3)(d) that a person shall be criminally responsible for a crime if that person in any way (other than aiding and abetting or otherwise assisting in the commission of a crime) “contributes to the commission… of… a crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional and shall either: (i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the group…; or (ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime”. In our view, this wording does not necessarily cover the third category, as it requires the intention of the group to commit the crime, while in the third category, only one member has the intention to commit the additional crime.

 Some caveats  

In conclusion, the third category, under which Dusko Tadic has been sentenced for the Jaksici killings, is perhaps not as firmly established in international law as the Appeals Chamber suggests. Some may there fore question whether its application to Dusko Tadic is compatible with the principle nullum crimen sine lege. Interestingly enough, no one tried to check whether the penal law of the former Yugoslavia followed the US-Italian o r the Dutch-German approach.

The more important question is whether the third category constitutes a sound development of international criminal law. We think it does, subject to some caveats inherent in a requirement the Appeals Chamber mentions in passing for that category, which should not be forgotten: there must be a criminal enterprise and the intention of the co-perpetrator to participate in and further such an enterprise. [65 ]

First, existing international law strictly distinguishes between jus ad bellum, i.e. the law on the (il)legitimacy of conflicts, and jus in bello, i.e. the law on behaviour in conflicts. [66 ] Therefore armed conflicts as such, even wars of aggression, should not be considered as criminal enterprises under this rule with reference to jus in bello.

Second, it should not be forgotten that, unlike criminal gangs in peacetime, membership in armed forces is often not optional and often not driven by criminal motivations, even though it is foreseeable that crimes will be committed. Under the standard the Appeals Chamber adopts, every member of the unfortunately numerous armed forces in countries where State structures have collapsed, a situation often resulting in simple looting, [67 ] would be responsible for any killings which will foreseeably be committed when some of those whose property is looted resist. It will therefore be crucial to take the individual circumstances under which a “co-perpetrator” joined the armed force into account.

Third, in our view, even the systematic and large-scale crimes committed in contemporary conflicts should not be seen as evidence that those conflicts are criminal enterprises in the sense of this rule. We have mentioned that, under some legislation, those who join a criminal group are responsible for foreseeable crimes committed, outside the common purpose, by other members of the “gang”. In wartime, a very specific category of “gangs” exist, namely armed forces. Their members are called combatants. Contrary to criminals, those combatants have a right to participate in hostilities, including the right to kill enemy combatants, but they are bound to respect international humanitarian law. [68 ] They often do not. In this case, they may and must be punished. However, an essential feature of combatant status is immunity from punishment for those who respect that law. This is intended to increase respect for it. A member of armed forces does not lose this immunity because his comrades violate international humanitarian law, but only if he himself violates it. [69 ] A simple soldier should not be considered as a rapist because rape is committed by some of his comrades in the same force, even if this is sadly predictable in some armed forces. An exception might be appropriate only in extreme cases, where war crimes and not the fighting of an armed conflict becomes the main purpose of a given armed force. In practice, such cases are, however, covered by category two mentioned by the Chamber.

Indeed, the very basis of international criminal law and its civilizing contribution to the enforcement of international law is that criminal responsibility is individual. Compared to sanctions against States — the traditional enforcement method in the international community — punishment of individuals has a greater preventive and stigmatizing effect. It is decided in a formalized, fair procedure, without veto powers and much less influenced by political considerations than the decision-making process of the UN Security Council. Most importantly, punishment leads to the individualization of responsibility and repression. It makes clear that the horrific crimes witnessed by our century were not collectively committed by “the Serbs”, “the Germans”, “the Croats” or “the Hutus”, but by criminal individuals. As long as the responsibility remains attributed to a State or a people, there will conversely be the seeds for future wars. It is th erefore in our opinion crucial that certain concepts in international criminal law, such as the common purpose doctrine, should not lead to a re-collectivization of responsibility. It may certainly be considered that all those who fight unjust or genocidal wars or support inhumane regimes are morally and politically co-responsible for the violations of international humanitarian law committed in such contexts. In our view, this should not, however, lead to criminal responsibility based on simple membership of the group and knowledge of the policy of that group. Such a concept would in fact water down the criminal responsibility of the actual perpetrators and their leaders and create a net of solidarity around them. This in turn would not increase protection for the victims, nor would it facilitate the actual implementation of international criminal justice.

 Understanding of “related to attacks on the civilian population”: may crimes against humanity be committed for purely personal motives?  

 Elements of crimes against humanity  

In identifying the elements which must be satisfied for a conviction for crimes against humanity, the Trial Chamber found it necessary to prove the existence of an armed conflict and a nexus between the act and the armed conflict. The Trial Chamber went on to clarify that the nexus requirement comprised two caveats: 1) the act must “be linked geographically as well as temporally with the armed conflict” [70 ] and 2) the act must “not be unrelated to the armed conflict” [71 ] or, as the Appeals Chamber rephrases it, the act and the conflict must be related. The issue for the Appeals Chamber arises in the Trial Chamber’s further requirement that the second caveat above involves two conditions: 1) “the perpetrator must know of the broader context in which the act occurs” [72 ] and 2) “the act must not have been carried out for purely personal motives of the perpetrator”. [73 ] On cross-appeal by the Prosecution, the Appeals Chamber overturns the Trial Chamber’s insistence upon the second condition of this second caveat.

 (Ir)relevance of “purely personal motives”  

We believe that the Appeals Chamber rightly upheld the clarification by the Prosecution in its appeal that “the words ‘committed in armed conflict’ in Article 5 of the Statute require nothing more than the existence of an armed conflict at the relevant time and place”. [74 ] Such a requirement is merely a jurisdictional element, not a substantive element of the mens rea of crimes against humanity. [75 ] Also remaining uncontroversial is the Appeals Chamber’s clarification that no nexus is required between the accused’s acts and the armed conflict. The nexus need only be established between the actions of the accused and the attack on the civilian population. [76 ]

Yet in our view the Appeals Chamber goes too far when it eliminates the consideration of the purely personal reasons or motives for which the act may have been committed. The Chamber stipulates that the necessary elements merely require that the accused’s actions “must comprise part of a pattern of widespread or systematic crimes directed against a civilian population and that the accused must have known that his acts fit into such a pattern”. [77 ] The individual motives of the accused for committing the act are now irrelevant. Are these remaining requirements indicated by the Appeals Chamber enough to establish sufficient culpability for an accused to be convicted of a crime against humanity?

The difficulty arises with the extent of the Appeals Chamber’s understanding of what is meant by “related” to an attack on the civilian population. According to the Appeals Chamber, “taking advantage o f an attack on the civilian population by a regime to harm someone for reasons unrelated to the policy of that regime” is included in the meaning of the term “related”. Why should it be simple murder if a man kills his Jewish neighbour in Nazi Germany with a gun because he coveted his wife — whereas it is a crime against humanity if he obtains the same result for the same motive, but simply chooses the regime’s genocidal apparatus as his weapon (thus knowing that his act would fit into such a pattern)? [78 ]

It is highly unlikely that anyone would argue that those convicted of crimes against humanity in the cases cited by the Appeals Chamber [79 ] did not commit crimes for which punishment should be prescribed. However, were they international crimes — in this case, crimes against humanity? In that regard the Trial Chamber’s approach, setting the dual requirement that the act must be related to an attack on the civilian population and must not have been effected for the purely personal motives of the perpetrator, [80 ] not only curbs dilution of the definition of crimes against humanity but also ensures justice for the individual accused, i.e. that when acting for purely personal reasons not connected to the attack on the civilian population he or she is not prosecuted for a crime against humanity.

 Review of precedents and practice  

The precedents cited from World War II by the Appeals Chamber in favour of its approach go very far, and perhaps they also go too far. These cases may be distinguished as the defendants had done: “in all cases cited the defendants were linked to the system of extermination which formed the underlying predicate of crimes against humanity, and therefore did not commit their crimes for purely personal motives”, [81 ] as the activities were linked to the pogroms against the Jews. Yet such a distinction is not completely satisfactory, for some o f the reasons the Appeals Chamber expounds. [82 ]

Perhaps more compelling is the recollection that these World War II precedents were set by courts in an occupied territory. For Germany may also be considered, at least at that time, as having been governed by the Allies, leaving Germany no longer capable of acting. [83 ] Therefore, the courts the Allies established and which set the World War II precedents were domestic courts empowered to also try acts not constituting international crimes. This may be one reason why the courts at that time were not so concerned with making the distinction sought in the Trial Chamber’s decision.

 Motives do matter  

One final remark must be made in response to the Appeals Chamber’s declaration that one need not even ask what are “purely personal motives”, because they “do not acquire any relevance” [84 ] for establishing commission of the crime and are “generally irrelevant in criminal law”. [85 ] This position contradicts criminal law in both civil and common law systems, in which many crimes are defined by the motive behind them or receive a higher or lower penalty according to it; for instance, to convince or assist someone to commit suicide is punishable only if committed for egoistic motives [86 ] and fraud is a crime only if committed with the motive of enrichment. [87 ]

The Appeals Chamber does at least clarify that motives are relevant at the sentencing stage. Yet it fails in its attempt to argue reductio ad absurdum concerning the “inscrutability of motives”. [88 ] Differentiations can in fact be made between motives. Taking the two examples the Appeals Chamber mentions, the SS official who personally hates Jews has a mens rea of a crime against humanity, whereas the woman denouncing her landlord because of disagreements about the cost of rent did not hate or want to eliminate all critics of the Nazis . [89 ] In other words the following distinction can be drawn: a woman denouncing her neighbour because she personally does not like Jews commits a crime against humanity, whereas a woman who does so to get her neighbour’s husband does not commit a crime against humanity. [90 ] International justice, universal jurisdiction and international law are not necessary to cope with the latter.

The Prosecution’s declarations that the Trial Chamber’s holding permits the claim of personal motives to be a defence

for every accused, and that there exist difficulties of proof establishing that the action was not committed for purely personal motives, are not entirely convincing. The Appeals Chamber clarifies that the evidentiary burden is not at issue here. [91 ] There furthermore remain no insurmountable difficulties of proof in distinguishing between the two cases. Every day, motives, knowledge, will and mens rea are deduced in courts from circumstantial evidence presented. In American jurisdictions, for example, legislation has even classified murder by degrees depending upon the knowledge or intent (in contrast with recklessness or negligence) of the accused: a deliberate murder does not receive the same punishment (nor is it even the same crime) as an accidental one caused by negligence. [92 ] Even in armed conflicts no one suggests abolishing the defences of self-defence or duress, even though they may give rise to difficulties of proof. As with the issues discussed above, the Appeals Chamber seems to continue to distance itself and the law both from the significance of the accused’s particular thoughts (motive, mens rea) and actions (actus reus), and from the relevant armed conflict.

 Further clarification of the elements of crimes against humanity: do all such crimes require a discriminatory intent?  

 Elements of crimes against humanity  

Interestingly, the fourth ground of cross-appeal by the Prosecution, like the third ground of cross-appeal, need not have been taken up by the Appeals Chamber at all. [93 ] In its answer to the fourth ground of cross-appeal by the Prosecution, the Appeals Chamber further refines the definition of crimes against humanity. Overturning the Trial Chamber’s holding, the Appeals Chamber clarifies that a discriminatory intent is necessary only for “persecution type” crimes against humanity, not for all crimes against humanity enumerated in Article 5 of the ICTY Statute. [94 ]

A clarification is certainly welcome to facilitate the application of international penal law, as much of the present law is mixed. [95 ] Some may have doubts, similar to those we expressed concerning the Appeals Chamber’s decision on the third ground of cross-appeal by the Prosecution discussed in the previous section of this article, as to whether such a clarification actually marks a positive step for international penal law or whether it risks detracting from the seriousness of crimes against humanity by making them seem commonplace.

The Appeals Chamber mentions that its clarification prevents lacunae, whereas the Trial Chamber’s interpretation would fail “to protect victim groups not covered by the listed discriminatory grounds”. [96 ] Those policy arguments are pertinent. However, much of the same issue raised in the previous section of this article is also applicable here. The Appeals Chamber explains that, for example, if a discriminatory intent were required, random violence intended to terrorize the civilian population would not be penalized as a crime against humanity. The Chamber provides further examples of groups that would not be covered by the discriminatory intent grounds listed in Article 5(h) or by those stated in the Report of the Secretary- General: [97 ] in Nazi Germany, crimes targeting those with physical or mental disability or because of age, infirmity or sexual preference; the “class enemies” exterminated during the 1930s in the Soviet Union; or, in Cambodia, the urban educated deported under the Khmer Rouge between 1975-1979. [98 ] Yet should a policeman who simply imprisons a civilian during an armed conflict to obtain information or, as personal motives do not exclude a crime against humanity, to take revenge in a family dispute be accused of a crime against humanity, even if he had no intention of discriminating against one group or another?

 Interpreting the Statute: (ir)relevance of the travaux préparatoires  

The method of interpreting the Statute undertaken by the Appeals Chamber, i.e. giving effect to the text’s natural and ordinary meaning, making comparisons to customary international law and only then assessing the intentions of its drafters, remains in and of itself not so controvertible. Nevertheless, two points regarding its interpretation of the text of Article 5 must be mentioned. First, the Appeals Chamber expresses the wish to apply the Statute according to its ordinary meaning and, in doing so, explains that because the article does not specifically mention discriminatory intent it must not be intended and a contrary reading would render Article 5(h) concerning “persecutions” superfluous. Yet if that is the case, what is the explanation for the conflicting interpretations of the law, in view of the fact that in previous texts crimes against humanity were similarly defined? [99 ] It might also be argued that Article 5(h) has a sense as a subsidiary clause covering persecutions by means other than those listed in subparagraphs (a) to (g) and (i), such as making the life of a discriminated group economically impossible. Second, it is quite logical that when interpreting an article of a treaty or statute, the interpreting body would do as the Appeals Chamber di d here and seek to understand the “goals of the framers of the Statute”. [100 ] Here, the Appeals Chamber considers that the framers wanted to make all crimes against humanity punishable. However, it is of interest to note, as will be explained later, that in doing so the Appeals Chamber proceeds, in fact, to justify discarding some of the travaux préparatoires of the Statute on the basis of its own interpretation of Article 5.

One observation must also be made concerning the Appeals Chamber’s analysis of customary international law. It is, mainly, that to substantiate its point the Appeals Chamber cites the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, [101 ] an instrument not yet adopted, and again [102 ] the Statute of the International Criminal Court, [103 ] a treaty not yet in force. The Appeals Chamber uses the Statute of the International Criminal Court as an expression of the opinio juris of the signatory States, but here, too, it must be remembered that several influential States unfortunately have not signed the Statute. Applying the same logic used when it interpreted Article 5 of its own Statute, the Appeals Chamber infers from the absence of wording specifically requiring discriminatory intent in Article 7, paragraph 1, of the ICC Statute that this element is not required. But once again, this absence of a specific mention of such a requirement is no different from past definitions of crimes against humanity. [104 ]

The aspect of the Appeals Chamber’s analysis, however, that arouses the most interest from the point of view of general international law is its regard, or rather disregard, for the travaux préparatoires of its creating body. In its analysis, the Chamber eliminates the relevance of these sources. [105 ] This dismissal of the travaux préparatoires began in the Chamber’s initial interpretation of Article 5 of the Statute, [106 ] as was mentioned above, and continued in subsequent sections of its decision devoted solely t o the relevance of these documents.

The Appeals Chamber admits that its decision contradicts both the Report of the Secretary-General [107 ] and three statements made by the United States, France and the Russian Federation in the Security Council [108 ] prior to the adoption of the Statute. [109 ] Nonetheless, the Chamber explains that the Report of the Secretary- General does not have the same legal standing as the Statute, as it was only “approved” by the Security Council and the Security Council only intended it to be an explanatory document for the Statute; thus, if the Report manifestly contradicts the Statute, the Statute prevails. [110 ] Yet the Appeals Chamber then goes on to state another requirement concerning the Report — that it must “sufficiently indicate” that the Security Council intended to deviate from customary international law. It concludes that the Report does not provide this “sufficient indication” of the intention that " Article 5 should deviate from customary international law by requiring a discriminatory intent for all crimes against humanity”. [111 ] Therefore, although the Appeals Chamber admits that a discrepancy between the will of the drafters and the text does exist (under the Appeals Chamber’s interpretation of Article 5), it concludes that the provision is so clear it should prevail. [112 ] Of course, the Chamber relies on its own interpretation of Article 5 in order to diminish the value of the Report of the Secretary-General. [113 ]

In its discussion of the statements made by some Security Council members, the Appeals Chamber declares that it “rejects the notion that these three statements — at least as regards the issue of discriminatory intent — may be considered as part of the ‘context’ of the Statute, to be taken into account for the purpose of interpretation of the Statute…” [114 ] So can these statements be used for other points… when it suits the Appeals Chamber? That appears to be the case, as the Appeals Chambe r itself refers to its previous, favourable appraisal and use of these documents to support its interpretation of the Statute beyond its wording. [115 ] It is to be hoped that the Appeals Chamber has not adopted a pick-and-choose approach in its use of sources from its creator in interpreting the Statute. However, the fact that it has used precisely this same Report of the Secretary-General, as well as the same statements by Security Council members, to support a previous interpretation of the Statute gives cause for apprehension.

A fundamental issue underlying this discussion is whether international law is based on the will of States or on something else. But even those who do not have a voluntarist theory of the source of international law — and those who do not have a positivist approach at all — will note with interest that the Appeals Chamber not only correctly considers that the Security Council is not legibus solutus; [116 ] it does not appear to matter at all what it thought. The Appeals Chamber’s action will certainly play a part in future considerations as to how much weight should be given to the intentions of the creating body and the travaux préparatoires.

The possible establishment of the International Criminal Court should be eagerly anticipated by the international community as a distinct step forward for international penal law. If it is established, it will certainly also face issues concerning the interpretation of its own Statute. With this precedent set by the Appeals Chamber, the future ICC would likewise be justified in disregarding the intentions of its creators. Will States wish to accept the jurisdiction of a court, knowing that it too may and can disregard their will, expressed not only in the Statute but also the travaux préparatoires? As for politics, with such opinions the Appeals Chamber puts the acceptance of the ICC at risk. Finally, the approach of the Appeals Chamber does not add to the predictability of international justice, which is an important feature of any criminal justice system and its fairness towards the accused.

 Conclusion  

    

Like previous decisions, the ICTY Appeals Chamber’s judgment on the merits of the Tadic case has certainly refined and developed international humanitarian law and international criminal law. Many of the Chamber’s legal findings are sound interpretations of existing law on important issues which deserved a first, authoritative clarification. Other points, upon which we focused in this article in order to continue scholarly discussion, raise more doubts. The blurring of the traditional distinction between international and non-international armed conflicts and the concomitant redefinition of the concept of protected persons contra legem are well meant, but perhaps not entirely thought through to their final consequences. The affirmation that the responsibility of participants in international crimes goes beyond the common purpose closes gaps in criminal responsibility and corresponds to an important moral imperative. It is, however, based on a disputable comparative analysis and on a mysterious theory of sources, and may therefore be questioned under the principle nullum crimen sine lege. To include crimes committed for purely personal motives among crimes against humanity makes life easier for prosecutors and is not contrary to natural justice. It risks, however, making crimes against humanity seem commonplace and thus less significant, and is based on legal arguments which are not entirely convincing. Not to require a discriminatory intent for all crimes against humanity may in the final analysis be reasonable, but is based on arguments completely emancipating the Chamber from its creators, which may make States afraid to accept jurisdiction of international courts over their citizens.

If some criticism is expressed in this article with regard to the legal theories developed by the ICTY Appeals Chamber, it is not because we sympathize with war criminals, but because we believe that international justice for war victims can continue its breathtaking evolution only if it is based on sound legal thinking and if it exclusively applies rules we would like to see applied and which everybody is willing to apply. Any manipulation of the law has to be avoided, even if it is done for a just cause. To give genuine protection to war victims everywhere and to foster reconciliation in the Balkans, the jurisprudence of the ICTY has to be perceived as fair even by the accused, not only procedurally but also because of the substantive rules it applies.

International law has, for sure, to be changed and adapted to social needs while being applied to real-life events. For customary law, this is the traditional way to develop. We would, however, expect a criminal tribunal, because of the principle nullum crimen sine lege, to exercise particular restraint when developing the law in sentencing crimes or applying theories which did not exist under the law as it stood before it was developed by the Tribunal (and before the Tribunal even came into being). In this and other respects we have some doubts whether the very innovative and imaginative solutions applied by the ICTY Appeals Chamber to several issues discussed in this article are fair to the accused. They were certainly not necessary to repress the terrible crimes he had committed. In this respect, one sometimes has the impression that the ICTY is comparable to an elderly person wanting to clarify as many questions as possible before dying, while ordinary courts build up their jurisprudence by crossing each bridge when they come to it.

The new solutions worked out by the Appeals Chamber may point in the right direction for future developments. We are afraid, however, that th ey may not encourage States to ratify the Statute of the International Criminal Court, as imaginative and innovative solutions are precisely what some States fear. Even apart from diplomatic considerations, any justice system — and in particular criminal justice — gains authority if the decisions of its courts are, unlike scholarly articles, predictable.

Our answer to the question asked in the title of this article therefore remains hesitant. The reason may also be that our feelings as international lawyers differ from those of criminal lawyers, and that a civil law training leads to sensibilities other than those resulting from a common law training. International criminal justice, by definition, must continue to reconcile and harmonize those different approaches.

 Notes  

 1 The International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 (hereinafter: ICTY) was established through Security Council Resolution 827 of 25 May 1993. Its Statute was originally published as an Annex to the Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to para. 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), UN Doc. S/25704 (1993).

 2 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994, established through Security Council Resolution 955 of 8 November 1994.

 3 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court on 17 July 1998, A/CONF.183/9 (1998), hereinafter: ICC Statute.

 4 Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, ICTY Appeals Chamber, 2 October 1995 (hereinafter: Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Jurisdiction). For a comment on this decision, see Marco Sassòli, “La première décision de la chambre d’appel du Tribunal pénal international pour l’ex-Yougoslavie: Tadic (compétence)”, Revue générale de droit international public, Vol. 100, 1996, pp. 101-134.

 5 Judgment, The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, ICTY Appeals Chamber, 15 July 1999 (hereinafter: Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Judgment).

 6 First Geneva Convention, Art. 50; Second Geneva Convention, Art. 51; Third Geneva Convention, Art. 130; Fourth Geneva Convention, Art. 147; and Protocol I, Arts 11(4), 85 and 86.

 7 See Separate Opinion of Judge Georges Abi-Saab in the decision of the Appeals Chamber on Jurisdiction, Chapter IV, Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Jurisdiction, loc. cit. (note 4), and amicus curiae brief presented by the United States, 17 July 1995, pp. 35-36.

 8 Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Jurisdiction, loc. cit. (note 4), paras 79-83.

 9 Fourth Geneva Convention, Art. 4.

 10 Thus, “compelling a protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile Power” is a grave breach (Third Geneva Convention,

Art. 130, and Fourth Geneva Convention, Art. 147), while in a non-international armed conflict civilians, although protected by the applicable law, may be under a legal obligation to serve in the governmental armed forces, even if they consider them as hostile.

 11 See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicaragua v. United States of America), I.C.J. Reports 1986, para. 219; Dietrich Schindler, “The different types of armed conflicts according to the Geneva Conventions and Protocols”, Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de droit international, Vol. 163/ii, 1979, p. 150.

 12 Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Jurisdiction, loc. cit. (note 4), para. 76.

 13 Loc. cit. (note 11), paras 110-115.

 14 Jean S. Pictet (ed.), Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Commentary, International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, 1958, p. 212.

 15 The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Opinion and Judgment, Case No. IT-94-1-T, ICTY Trial Chamber II, 7 May 1997, paras 578-607 (hereinafter: Tadic, Trial Chamber, Judgment).

 16 See William Fenrick, “The development of the law of armed conflict through the jurisprudence of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia”, in Schmitt and Green (eds), The Law of Armed Conflict: into the Next Millennium, International Law Studies, US Naval War College, Newport, 1998, pp. 85-92; Theodor Meron, “Classification of armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia: Nicaragua’s fallout”, Am. J. Int’l L., Vol . 92, 1998, pp. 236-242; and The Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic et al.

(the Celebici case), Judgment, ICTY Trial Chamber, Case No. IT-96-21-T, 16 November 1998, paras 230-231 (hereinafter: The Celebici Judgment).

 17 Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, loc. cit. (note 5), paras 103-105.

 18 Loc. cit. (note 11), para. 219. One wonders why the ICTY could not use the same line of argument. It could thus have avoided many legal controversies.

 19 Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, loc. cit. (note 5), paras 115-145.

 20 Earlier a Trial Chamber of the ICTY had already come to a similar conclusion in the Celebici case. Because of the continuing involvement of the FRY, it applied the law of international armed conflicts to the detention of Bosnian Serbs by Bosnian Muslims, considering that the Nicaragua test was not applicable to the question of individual responsibility. See The Celebici Judgment, loc. cit. (note 16), paras 233 and 234.

 21 UN Charter, Art. 92.

 22 See the decision of the European Court for Human Rights in the case Loizidou v. Turkey, Reports of Judgments and Decisions, 1996, pp. 2,216 ff., paras 56 and 57.

 23 Fourth Geneva Convention, Art. 47.

 24 Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, loc. cit. (note 5), paras 146-162. Earlier, the Trial Chambers had come to similar conclusions: Review of Indictment pursuant to Rule 61, The Prosecutor v. Dr agan Nikolic, Case No. IT-94-2-I, ICTY Trial Chamber, 20 October 1995, para. 30.; trial of Bosnian Muslims and Croats in the Celebici case, loc. cit. (note 16),

paras 233 and 234; and concerning the involvement of Croatia in the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Review of the Indictment pursuant to Rule 61, The Prosecutor v. Ivica Rajic, Case No. IT-95-12-R61, ICTY Trial Chamber, 13 September 1996, para. 25.

 25 See Richard Holbrooke, To End A War, Random House, New York, 1998, pp. 4, 5, 99, 105-107, 139, 140, 148-151, 197, 243, 255, 256, 310 and 341-343.

 26 See The Celebici Judgment, loc. cit. (note 16), paras 250-266, and, in particular, para. 259. It did not explain why the will of persons in a disintegrating State should be decisive in determining their nationality, although the Bosnian Serbs were not allowed to choose the State in which they wanted to live.

 27 Infra note 42.

 28 Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Jurisdiction, loc. cit. (note 4), para. 76.

 29 Infra note 33 and accompanying text.

 30 Supra note 9 and accompanying text.

 31 Tadic, Trial Chamber, Judgment, loc. cit. (note 5), paras 584-608. The Trial Chamber did not make clear whether it considered all of them to be nationals of Bosnia and Herzegovina or still citizens of the former Yugoslavia.

 32 See Meron, op. cit. (note 16), pp. 238-242; Christopher Greenwood, “International h umanitarian law and the Tadic case”, Eur. J. Int’l L., Vol. 7, 1996, pp. 273-274; Fenrick, op. cit. (note 16), pp. 91 - 92; and The Celebici Judgment, loc. cit. (note 16), paras 245-266.

 33 Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, loc. cit. (note 5), paras 163-169.

 34 See Fourth Geneva Convention, Arts 4(2), 44 and 70(2).

 35 Full protection as “protected persons” is afforded to enemy and certain third country nationals (Fourth Geneva Convention, Art. 4), while a party’s own nationals benefit from much more limited, fundamental guarantees (ibid., Arts 13-26, and Protocol I, Art. 75). Combatants may be interned without any further reason until the end of active hostilities, while civilians may only be interned in exceptional circumstances (Third Geneva Convention, Arts 21 and 118, and Fourth Geneva Convention, Arts 41-43 and 78). Protected civilians benefit from much more extensive guarantees in occupied territories than on enemy national territory (compare Fourth Geneva Convention, Arts 35-46 with Arts 47-78).

 36 Third Geneva Convention, Arts 50 and 130, and Fourth Geneva Convention, Arts 40, 51 and 147.

 37 Supra note 35.

 38 Art. 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions, and Protocol II, Art. 4.

 39 Protocol II, Arts 5 and 6 respectively.

 40 Ibid., Art. 17.

 41 Fourth Geneva Convent ion, Art. 49(1).

 42 Article 35 of the Fourth Convention regulates only their right to leave the territory. The ICRC Commentary, loc. cit. (note 14),

p. 235, considers that “the right of expulsion has been retained”.

 43 Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, loc. cit. (note 5), paras 178-184.

 44 Ibid., para. 204.

 45 Ibid., paras 196-201.

 46 Ibid., paras 202 and 203.

 47 Ibid., paras 204-226.

 48 See the practice of the Swiss Supreme Court, last in Arrêts du Tribunal Fédéral Suisse, Recueil Officiel, Vol. 118, Part IV,

pp. 227 ff., consideration 5d/cc, p. 232.

 49 Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, loc. cit. (note 5), para. 204.

 50 Ibid., para. 219.

 51 See Ferrando Mantovani, Diritto penale, Parte generale, 3rd ed., Padova, CEDAM, 1992, pp. 320-323 (containing a reference in note 21 to the German, Danish, Chilean and Argentinian law providing for the same distinction). See also infra note 53, for the German and Swiss law.

 52 Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, loc. cit. (note 5), para. 220.

 53 For the difficult distinction between dolus eventualis and culpa in Germany, see Claus Roxin, Strafrecht, Allgemeiner Teil,

Vol. 1, 3rd ed., Beck, München, 1997, pp. 372-400, and, for Swiss law, Günter Stratenwerth, Schweizerisches Strafrecht, Allgemeiner Teil I: Die Straftat, 2nd ed., Staempfli, Bern, 1996, pp. 183-187.

 54 Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, loc. cit. (note 5), para. 228.

 55 Ibid., para. 204.

 56 Such law has been vaguely suggested by the UN Secretary-General as a subsidiary source for the ICTY, see Report of the Secretary-General, op. cit. (note 1), para. 36.

 57 Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, loc. cit. (note 5), para. 225.

 58 Ibid., para. 226.

 59 Ibid., paras 224, notes 287-291, and Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th ed., 1991, pp. 428 f.

 60 See the frequently criticized Art. 116(1) of the Codice penale (adopted in 1930, during the Fascist period, and still in force); Mantovani, op. cit. (note 51), pp. 538-541; Giuseppe Zuccalà (ed.), Commentario breve al codice penale, Complemento giurisprudenziale, 3rd ed., Padova, CEDAM, 1994, pp. 339-344; Mario Romano and Giovanni Grasso, Commentario sistematico del codice penale, Vol. II, 2nd ed., Milano, Giuffrè, 1996, pp. 217-224.

 61 Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, loc. cit. (note 5), para. 208.

 62 Ibid., pa ras 210-213.

 63 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing, 15 December 1997, G.A. Res. 52/164.

 64 See Marco Sassòli, “Bedeutung von ‘Travaux préparatoires’ zu Kodifikationsverträgen für das allgemeine Völkerrecht”, Österreichische Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, Vol. 41, 1990, pp. 109-149.

 65 Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, loc. cit. (note 5), para. 220. 

 66 This fundamental distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello is recognized in the preambular para. 5 of Protocol I. See Marco Sassòli and Antoine Bouvier, How Does Law Protect in War?, ICRC, Geneva, 1999, pp. 83-88 and, in particular, pp. 681-682: the case of U.S. v. William List and Others.

 67 On such disintegration of State structures, see the Preparatory Document drafted by the ICRC for the First Periodical Meeting on International Humanitarian Law, Geneva, 19-23 January 1998, in Sassòli and Bouvier, op. cit. (note 66), pp. 482-492.

 68 See Protocol I, Arts 43(2) and 44(2).

 69 Under Art. 4(A)(2) of the Third Convention the only exception to this rule concerned armed forces which did not distinguish themselves sufficiently from the civilian population. All their members lost combatant status, including those who wore a distinctive sign. Art. 44(4) of Protocol I has individualized this rule. Every member who distinguishes himself sufficiently from the civilian population has combatant status, even if most of his comrades do not respect the rule.

 70 Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, loc. cit. (note 5), para. 239, citing Tadic, Trial Chamber, Judgment, loc. cit. (note 15),

para. 633.

 71 Ibid., citing Tadic, Trial Chamber, Judgment, loc. cit. (note 15), para. 634.

 72 Ibid., and Tadic, Trial Chamber, Judgment, loc. cit. (note 15), paras 656-657.

 73 Ibid., and Tadic, Trial Chamber, Judgment, loc. cit. (note 15), paras 658-659.

 74 Ibid., para. 249.

 75 Ibid., and Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Jurisdiction, loc. cit. (note 4), para. 141 (discussing whether the Statute exceeds customary international law by requiring the existence of an armed conflict).

 76 Ibid., para. 251.

 77 Ibid., para. 248 (footnote omitted).

 78 For the facts of this case, ibid., n. 318, referring to the decision of the Supreme Court for the British Zone (Criminal Chamber),

9 November 1948, S. StS 78/48, Justiz und NS-Verbrechen, Vol. II, pp. 498-499.

 79 Ibid., paras 257-266.

 80 Ibid., para. 252; see also Tadic, Trial Chamber, Judgment, loc. cit. (note 15), para. 634.

 81 Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, loc. cit. (note 5), para. 245 (footnote omitted).

 82 Ibid., paras 257-266.

 83 See R. Bindschedler, “Die völkerrechtliche Stellung Deutschlands”, Annuaire suisse de droit international, Vol. 6, 1949, p. 59.

 84 Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, loc. cit. (note 5), para. 270.

 85 Ibid., para. 268.

 86 For example, Swiss Penal Code, Art. 115.

 87 Compare, for example, the difference between the much lower penalty in Art. 151 of the Swiss Penal Code for maliciously causing harm to assets and that foreseen in Art. 146 of that Code for fraud: the only difference between the two crimes being the motive of enrichment. The American law covering fraud and swindles also has such a motive requirement: “Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false pretenses… ”, 18 U.S.C. sec. 1341 (1988) (emphasis added). Another example can be found in the definition of bribery under the U.S. Code: “Whoever… corruptly gives, offers or promises anything of value to any public official… with intent to influence any official act…”, 18 U.S.C. sec. 201b(1) (1998) (emphasis added).

 88 Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, loc. cit. (note 5), para. 269.

 89 Ibid., para. 260, describing the facts of the Sch. case.

 90 For a description of the facts of this case, op. cit. (note 78).

 91 Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, loc. cit. (note 5), para. 254.

 92 See, for example, 18 U.S.C. sec. 1111 (1998) (defining murder), and 18 U.S.C. sec. 1112 (1998) (defining manslaughter).

 93 The Chamber did so because it felt it to be a matter of general significance for the Tribunal’s jurisprudence. Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, loc. cit. (note 5), para. 281.

 94 ICTY Statute, Article 5: Crimes against humanity

The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for the following crimes when committed

in armed conflict, whether international or internal in character, and directed against any civilian population:

(a) murder;

(b) extermination;

(c) enslavement;

(d) deportation;

(e) imprisonment;

(f) torture;

(g) rape;

(h) persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds;

(i) other inhumane acts.

 95 See, for example, the description and analysis of the varying interpretations, made by the Trial Chamber, of whether crimes against humanity require a discriminatory intent. Tadic, Trial Chamber, Judgment, loc. cit. (note 15), para. 650, n. 154, and

paras 651-652; compare this analysis with that made by the Appeals Chamber, Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, loc. cit. (note 5), paras 289-291.

 96 Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, loc. cit. (note 5), para. 285.

 97 Those grounds mentioned are national, political, ethnic, racial or religious. Report of the Secretary-General, loc. cit. (note 1), para. 48. The statement by the U.S. as a member of the Security Council also included gender, see UN SCOR, p. 16, UN Doc. S/PV.3217; see also Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, loc. cit. (note 5), para. 300.

 98 Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, loc. cit. (note 5), para. 285.

 99 See, e.g. Art. 5(c) of the Statute of the Military Tribunal for the Far East, and Art. II(1)(c) of Control Council Law No. 10. See also supra note 95 (referring to the description and analysis made by the Trial Chamber and the Appeals Chamber of the varying interpretations of the elements of crimes against humanity).

 100 Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, loc. cit. (note 5), para. 285.

 101 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its 48th session, May 6-July 26, 1996, UNGAOR 51st Sess., Supp. No. 10 (A/51/10).

 102 Loc. cit. (note 5), para. 291, and paras 221 f. (providing the Appeals Chamber’s first reference).

 103 Supra note 3.

 104 Ibid., Art. 7(1); see also supra note 95 (referring to the description and analysis by the Trial Chamber and the Appeals Chamber of the varying interpret ations of the elements of crimes against humanity).

 105 Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, loc. cit. (note 5), paras 285 and 293-304.

 106 Ibid., para. 285.

 107 Report of the Secretary-General, op. cit. (note 1).

 108 For statements by Security Council members, see UN Doc. S/PV.3217.

 109 Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, loc. cit. (note 5), para. 293.

 110 Ibid., para. 295.

 111 Ibid., para. 296.

 112 Ibid.

 113 Ibid., paras 282-286.

 114 Ibid., para. 300.

 115 Ibid., para. 304. See, e.g. Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Jurisdiction, loc. cit. (note 4), paras 75, 88 and 143.

 116 Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Jurisdiction, loc. cit. (note 4), para. 28.




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