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Some Questions and Answers about aspects of the ICRC appeal on Biotechnology, Weapons and Humanity

26-11-2003

Answers to your questions about the risks, rules and responsibilities associated with biotechnology, its military applications and humanitarian implications.

1. Can you tell us more about the key messages of the 'Biotechnology, Weapons and Humanity' appeal?

The ICRC's key messages are:

Risks – advances in the life sciences carry great potential to benefit humanity. If these same advances are turned to hostile use, they bring enormous risks for all human beings.
Rules – ancient norms and modern humanitarian law prohibit poisoning and the deliberate spreading of disease. The rules must be reaffirmed, implemented and reinforced, including through practical action .
Responsibilities – the risks and rules generate responsibilities for governments, the military, the scientific and medical communities, and industry. The ICRC calls on all of these parties to ensure that advances in the life sciences are not used for poisoning or the deliberate spread of disease.

2. What are the kinds of risks posed by advances in the life sciences?

Known biological warfare agents, such as anthrax or plague, may be manipulated to make them easier to use.
Harmless microbes could be made dangerous. It is already possible to engineer harmless microbes that we live with every day, such as Escherichia Coli , in order to create specific toxins causing illness and disease.
Hostile vaccinations. When producing more sophisticated biological agents, the potential user might also " design " a corresponding specific vaccine for its own population or troops. This might make new biological weapons more attractive.
Research may lead to unintended but dangerous outcomes.
Extremely dangerous viruses may be artificially created. Polio is one such example. But experts believe that in the near future any virus, including the most dangerous ones, could be created in this fashion.
Undetected attacks could alter body functions. " Bioregulators " are chemicals that occur naturally in the body. When their concentrations are changed even slightly, functions such as behavior, consciousness, fertility and body temperature can be dramatically altered. Bioregulators are also manufactured by industry. There is ongoing research on how to deliver such chemicals by, for instance, inhalation of an aerosol. An attack using bioregulators would be difficult to detect.
Effects on agriculture and infrastructure. Concerns about biological agents that target humans are paralleled by concerns about agents that could destroy agriculture and civil and commercial infrastructure. This could have serious effects on human life and well being and could be employed in warfare.
Possible future development of ethnically or racially specific biological agents.

3. Is the ICRC initiative related to possible sanctions or military action against countries with alleged or confirmed biological weapons capabilities?

The ICRC initiative is not connected in any way with discussions on military action or preemptive military strikes against any State. The ICRC initiative responds to the dilemma posed by the rapid advance of scientific capabilities and the failure of international efforts to agree on measures to adequately monitor such developments.

The ICRC is nonetheless concerned about potential violations of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the Biological Weapons Convention. As a matter of policy the ICRC does not normally comment publicly about specific violations.

The many steps being proposed by the ICRC, beginning with a global reaffirmation at the highest political levels of existing norms prohibiting biological weapons, would send a message of determination by the international community to prevent and respond to this type of warfare.

4. Does this mean the ICRC is opposed to advances in the life sciences and biotechnology?

No. The ICRC recognises the great potential for developments in the life sciences to be used for the benefit of humanity – whether in medicine, agriculture, energy, reclaiming of waste or in other areas.

The ICRC's concern is to help ensure that existing international humanitarian law banning poisoning and the deliberate spreading of disease is maintained and strengthened in the face of rapid scientific and technological development. Growing understanding of, and control over, life processes offered by new advances in science must not turned to hostile use. The 1925 Geneva Protocol, the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) prohibit the use of biological or chemical agents or dual use technologies for hostile purposes.

Both Conventions contain the'general purpose criterion'set out in Article II.1(a) and Article VI.2 of the CWC and Article I of the BWC. Specifically, BWC Article I prohibits " microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes . "

Provided the general purpose criterion is implemented properly, it protects the Conventions against obsolescence due to technological advance. New developments automatically come within the general purpose crite rion's purview, and all should be screened accordingly.

However, proper implementation requires adequate awareness of the taboos by those in the life science community as well as the thoughtful application of practical measures to minimise the risk of hostile use. The ICRC's initiative on'Biotechnology, Weapons and Humanity'is designed to help achieve this through a range of undertakings to engage stakeholders in the life sciences about their risks, rules and responsibilities discussed further below.

5. In launching the BWH initiative, isn't the ICRC calling into question the integrity of scientific and medical professionals or industry?

The ICRC is confident that the vast majority of scientists and industrial companies pursue their work in order to benefit humanity and would wish to disassociate themselves from any hostile use of the life sciences.

However, because new advances in the life sciences have profound implications for human welfare and international humanitarian law the ICRC believes that individual scientists and physicians, their communities as a whole, as well as industry, have a responsibility to all in their power to prevent abuse of the results of their work. The ICRC's proposals for codes of conduct, peer review and responsible monitoring provide a means for responsible scientists and industrial bodies to disassociate themselves from unethical and possibly illegal activities.

6. What is the "Web of Prevention"?

The web of prevention is based on the premise that steps to minimise the risks of poisoning and the deliberate spread of disease resulting from advances in the life sciences can only be truly effective if they result in'joined-up'thinking across all responsible sectors. These sectors include government, the scientific and medical communities, academia and the biotech and pharmaceutical industries.

Serious engagement from responsible stakeholders in the life sciences requires 3 main courses of action:

To acknowledge that minimising the risks from the hostile use of advances related to the life sciences is of concern to them and part of their responsibility;
To identify and implement the necessary actions within their own sphere of influence that will contribute to risk reduction and that will complement actions being taken in other spheres; and
To ensure that their actions are known amongst and will complement the actions of actors in other relevant sectors.

7. Why "a web"?

The possible measures to reduce the risk of poisoning and deliberate spread of disease include (but are not limited to):

development and application of pertinent international treaties;
development and application of criminal law;
disease surveillance;
public health preparedness;
development and application of codes of conduct within the scientific community; and
introduction of legal and ethical considerations into scientific curricula at universities.

Each such measure is a necessary but not, in itself, sufficient to reduce this risk. This means that all preventive measures need to work to enhance each other i.e., that there is a synergy of action between actors – the "Web of Prevention" . Each actor therefore has a responsibility to be aware of the work of other actors and ensuring that their measures a ccord.

If actors employ joined up thinking and ensure synergy of action, the efficacy of modest, individual practical measures together will be greater than their sum.

Structures in the natural world such as spiders'webs and man-made structures such as suspension bridges employ this approach. Such structures can bear heavy loads safely because the loads are distributed among the individual parts; in-built redundancies can cope with extreme forces. The structure becomes strong, flexible and self-adjusting because each narrow vertical strand of the structure is strengthened by horizontal cross-strands and anchor points. This is the rationale for the ICRC promoting the Web of Prevention as a means to reduce the risks in the future of preventing poisoning and deliberate spread of disease.

8. Will this stop a determined terrorist or a state from using biological or chemical weapons?

Promoting the Web of Prevention will have no effect on the risk of poisoning or deliberate spread of disease unless the different actors take action. However, if the action is a result of joined up thinking, the chances for example, of a terrorist getting hold of a particular agent or technology or of a scientist working to develop a state-run programme will both be greatly reduced.

9. Is the ICRC not concerned by bioterrorism?

The ICRC is deeply concerned by the advancing potential for poisoning or deliberate spread of disease. The ICRC is also concerned that constant reference to " bioterrorism " in the media has diverted attention from other major issues such as implementation of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention and a compliance and monitoring regime for this Convention. If all actors concerned viewed their responsibilities as part of the Web of Prevention for poisoning or deliberate spread of disease by whomever on whatever scale, the measures they undertook would also reduce significantly the chances of " terrorist " use of biological agents. It should be borne in mind that, as with chemical weapons, state programmes are the most likely source of large quantities of biological weapons.

10. What have the reactions of governments and others to the ICRC initiative?

The ICRC appeal received universal support from governments when it was launched in Montreux in September 2002.

Since then the ICRC has been consulting with States about the prospect of a ministerial level declaration, to be drafted in the course of 2004. This proposal has received strong support from many governments. We regard the value of a ministerial level declaration as including the following:

(a) Building high-level political awareness of the risks inherent in ongoing developments in the life sciences and the need for preventive action. (Unlike all other BWC review meetings since 1980, the 2001 Review Conference failed to adopt a reaffirmation of existing norms.
(b) Public reaffirmation of existing legal and ethical norms intended to prevent the hostile use of poison and the deliberate spread of disease.
(c) As a tool in helping to engage the ICRC's other target audiences (such as industry and scientific organizations) in raising awareness about their responsibilities, and in encouraging practical action in line with these.

The ICRC has also invested considerable effort in activities aimed at promoting norms against poison and the deliberate spread of disease directly with the spectrum of actors involved in the life sciences. These include industry, academia, scientific and medical associations, as well as governments. The BWH initiative has helped to establish the ICRC as an actor in the biological weapons field. Several promising leads with the biotechnology industry have been established. In addition, opportunities to highlight BWH concerns in education curricula and events aimed at graduate students in the life sciences have also occurred or emerged.

11. What has the ICRC planned to take the initiative forward after the 28th International Conference?

The ICRC has a number of activities designed to support the aims of the appeal planned in 2004. Broadly these activities fall into two tracks:

As part of Track 1 the ICRC will continue to work with governments, for instance in the context of the Biological Weapons Convention and separately on the prospect of a ministerial level declaration to raise awareness about the risks, rules and responsibilities associated with potential hostile use. The ICRC is organising a meeting with States in January 2004 to discuss the ministerial level declaration.
Track 2 concerns outreach to specific, key target audiences in the life sciences. This is a particularly important track in view of the need to promote and disseminate IHL norms into the culture of the life sciences. Activities planned include:

Regional roundtables with industry and the scientific and medical communities;
Development of professional'principles of practice'with the assistance of external experts from various fields related to the life sciences;
An educational module for universities; and
Enhancement of ICRC dialogue and partnership with key stakeholders in biotech nology, especially industry.

Related sections

Chemical and biological weapons