This case involved an assessment of income tax made by an inspector of taxes under the Finance Act 1964. The appellant disputed this assessment on the basis that her taxes would be "devoted to the construction of nuclear weapons with the intention of using those weapons if certain circumstances should arise" and that this would conflict with an Act of Parliament: the Geneva Conventions Act 1957. The preamble to that act stated the following: "Whereas, with a view to the ratification by Her Majesty of the conventions set out in the schedules to this Act [the four Geneva Conventions of 1949], it is expedient to make certain amendments to the law."

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UNGOED-THOMAS, J.: This is an appeal against an assessment under Sch. D for 1964-65, and also an assessment to surtax 1963-64. Both these cases raise the same point. The submission is that the assessments are invalid because it is to be taken that what is collected will be, in part, applied in expenditure on the armed forces and devoted to the construction of nuclear weapons with the intention of using those weapons if certain circumstances should arise. It is conceded for the purposes of this case that a substantial part of the taxes for the years that I have mentioned was allocated to the construction of nuclear weapons. The issue therefore becomes whether the use of income tax and surtax for the construction of nuclear weapons, with the intention of using them should certain circumstances arise, invalidates the assessments.

The assessments were made under statute, and the relevant statute is the Finance Act 1964 s. 12 — the Finance Act being based on the provisions of the Income Tax Act, 1952. Section 12 of the Act of 1964 provides:

"Income tax for the year 1964-65 shall be charged at the standard rate of 7s. 9d. in the pound, and in the case of an individual whose total income exceeds £2,000 at such higher rates in respect of the excess as Parliament may hereafter determine."

The ground on which it was argued that the use of this money for the construction of nuclear weapons is illegal is that such use conflicts primarily with Conventions incorporated in an Act of Parliament — and, so it was suggested, impliedly ratified by them — and also ratified by the Crown in the usual way; and also because, according to the Case Stated, it was contrary to international law. But the case presented before me was rested primarily, at any rate, on a conflict between two statutes — namely, the statute which refers to the Geneva Conventions (viz., the Geneva Conventions Act, 1957) and the Finance Act 1964. Before coming to the Act of 1957 I shall deal first with the relationship of statute law to international law and international conventions.

First, international law is part of the law of the land, but it yields to statute. That is made clear by the case of Collco Dealings, Ltd. v. Inland Revenue Comrs. [2], where VISCOUNT SIMONDS [3], quoted with approval, and in accordance with the decision of the House of Lords in that case, MAXWELL ON THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES (10th Edn.) p. 148. I quote: "But if the statute is unambiguous, its provisions must be followed even if they are contrary to international law." It is therefore very understandable why the taxpayer in this case relies primarily, at any rate, not on a conflict between international law in general and the statute, but on the conflict between the Act of 1957, and its reference to ratification, and another statute, the Finance Act 1964. Secondly, conventions which are ratified by an Act of Parliament are part of the law of the land; and, thirdly, conventions which are ratified, but not by an Act of Parliament, which would thereby give them statutory force, cannot prevail against a statute in unambiguous terms. The law is thus stated in OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW (8th Edn.) at p. 924:

"The binding force of a treaty concerns in principle the contracting States only, and not their subjects. As international law is primarily a law between States only and exclusively, treaties can normally have effect upon States only. This rule can, as has been pointed out by the Permanent Court of International Justice, be altered by the express or implied terms of the treaty in which case its provisions become self-executory. Otherwise, if treaties contain provisions with regard to rights and duties of the subjects of the contracting States, their courts, officials and the like, these States must take such steps as are necessary, according to their Municipal Law, to make these provisions binding upon their subjects, courts, officials and the like."

"Such treaties as affect the private rights and, generally, as require for their enforcement by English courts a modification of common law or of a statute must receive parliamentary assent through an enabling Act of Parliament. To that extent binding treaties which are part of international law do not form part of the law of the land unless expressly made so by the legislature. That departure from the traditional common law rule is largely due to the fact that, according to British constitutional law, the conclusion and ratification of treaties are within the prerogative of the Crown, which would otherwise be in a position to legislate for the subject without obtaining parliamentary assent."

In WADE AND PHILLIPS' CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (7th Edn.), at p. 274, after a passage in which it is pointed out that the term "convention" is used of multilateral law-making treaties — and, of course, the Geneva Convention, ratified by the Act of 1957 ,comes within that description — there is this passage :

"At first sight the treaty-making power appears to conflict with the constitutional principle that the Queen by prerogative cannot alter the law of the land, but the provisions of a treaty duly ratified do not by virtue of the treaty alone, have the force of municipal law. The assent of Parliament must be obtained and the necessary legislation passed before a court of law can enforce the treaty, should it conflict with the existing law."

Here, the legislation so relied on is, as I have indicated, the Geneva Conventions Act, 1957. The title and preamble of the Act of 1957 are as follows:

"An Act to enable effect to be given to certain international conventions done at Geneva on Aug. 12, 1949, and for purposes connected therewith. Whereas, with a view to the ratification by Her Majesty of the conventions set out in the schedules to this Act, it is expedient to make certain amendments in the law."

What has been relied on has been the combination of the title and the preamble, which I have read. It is said that the whole object of the Act of 1957 was, first, with a view to ratification by the Crown; and, secondly, with the view to giving effect to the Geneva Conventions. The ratification by the Crown might or might not have been made. If the ratification were made (as in fact, subsequently, it was made in this case), then, of course, the ratification would take effect, not by reason of this Act of Parliament at all, but by reason of ratification by the executive. It would then have the consequences in law which ratification by the executive has, as contrasted with the effect it would have in law if it were ratified by law, embodied in statute and made by Parliament part of the law of this land. The title and the preamble relied on do not make the Geneva Conventions statute; and, therefore, except to the extent of the specific amendments to the law made by the Act of 1957 itself, which I have mentioned and which have not been relied on for the purposes of this case — and which, indeed, appear hardly applicable to it at all — the Act of 1957 does not provide material which can be relied on as being in conflict with the Finance Act 1964 at all. It is conceded by the Crown for the purposes of this case, though not otherwise, that the ratification in fact took place; but it is clear that in so far as the ratification has taken place by executive action and not by parliamentary action, it yields to statute. So even if there were a conflict between what is contained in the conventions ratified and the Finance Act 1964, the Finance Act 1964, unambiguous as it is, would prevail. Therefore, on this ground, apart from any other, the taxpayer's case, in my judgment, fails.

I shall mention another limb to the taxpayer's argument; namely, that any unlawful purpose for which a statutory enactment may be made vitiates the enforcement of that statute. As was pointed out for the Crown, if that argument were correct it would mean that the supremacy of Parliament would, in effect, be overruled. If the purpose for which a statute may be used is an invalid purpose, then such remedy there may be must be directed to dealing with that purpose and not to invalidating the statute itself. What the statute itself enacts cannot be unlawful, because what the statute says and provides is itself the law, and the highest form of law that is known to this country. It is the law which prevails over every other form of law, and it is not for the court to say that a parliamentary enactment, the highest law in this country, is illegal. The result therefore is that on this ground, also, the taxpayer's case fails.

I would merely add this: that references were made in the course of the attractive arguments that were put forward for the taxpayer to the fact that the intention that taxation was to be applied to nuclear weapons had been amply demonstrated by parliamentary papers and other reliable means within Parliament itself. This, of course, is quite clear, and I have no hesitation in accepting it; but either that is part of statute, or otherwise part of the law of the land, or it is not. If it is part of a statute it is statute law and it has to be applied by this court. If it is not, then it has no statutory effect and does not affect what is done by statute, including the provisions of the Finance Act 1964 itself. But the true situation is that such declarations of policy do not have statutory effect; have not the force of law at all, and therefore cannot affect a statute. The terms of the statute in this case are perfectly clear and are binding on the courts of this country.

Solicitors: B.M. Birnberg & Co. (for the taxpayer); Solicitor of Inland Revenue.

Notes

[1] Viz., s. 13 of the Finance Act 1964.

[2] [1961] 1 All E.R. 762; [1962] A.C. 1.

[3] [1961] 1 All E.R. at p. 765; [1962] A.C. at p. 19.

References: International Treaties and Documents
Geneva Conventions Act 1957 .