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Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977.
Commentary -
Spies
[p.561] Article 46
-- Spies
[p.562] General remarks
1765 Under the terms of Article 24
of the Hague Regulations, the employment of measures necessary for obtaining information about the
enemy and the country are considered permissible. This information
may often be obtained by methods which, if not always detected, are
at least openly employed for this purpose: a listening post, aerial
photography, surface exploration etc. However, despite enormous
technical progress, particularly in the field of listening-in devices
and aerial photography (satellites), these methods occasionally prove
to be incapable of penetrating well guarded secrets. This is where
espionage comes in, i.e., resorting to the secret agent, which is not
prohibited by either written or customary international law
applicable in case of armed conflict, though States are left free to
punish spies who are acting against their interests. Thus in times of
armed conflict a spy does not engage the international responsibility
of the State which sends him.
1766 Espionage in the true sense, whether it entails a civilian or a member of the armed forces acting in secret, (1) is traditionally
distinguished from what was formerly known as "war treason", which
takes place particularly, though not exclusively, when a civilian
living in occupied territory gives information to the enemy of the
occupying forces. (2) The "war traitor" violates the law of the
occupier. As such, he commits a violation of the law which the
Occupying Power is entitled to promulgate, (3) on the understanding
that the latter shall, on its part, [p.563] act in accordance with
the rules in force, particularly the 1907 Hague Regulations (Articles
42
-56) and the fourth Convention (particularly Articles 47
-78).
1767 Paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article confirm the traditional rules on espionage by reaffirming the essential principles of these rules.
The specific object of paragraphs 3 and 4 is to extend, for members
of the armed forces, the application of these rules to occupied
territory. As regards persons who are not members of the armed
forces, they are entitled to the guarantees laid down in Section III
of Part IV of the Protocol, particularly those of Article 75
' (Fundamental guarantees) ' which, in the case of arrest, supplement
the other guarantees already laid down in the fourth Convention. It
is understood that the derogations contained in Article 5
continue to
apply in occupied territory (Article 45
, paragraph 3, second
sentence). As regards this matter, the same applies to a spy who is a
member of the armed forces captured in the act.
Paragraph 1 -- The sanction for espionage
1768 This paragraph illustrates what has been termed the dialectics of espionage. As we have seen, resorting to this method of combat is not
prohibited. Yet, despite ("notwithstanding") the other provisions of
the Conventions and the Protocol, any member of the armed forces who
is caught while he is engaged in espionage may be deprived of his
prisoner-of-war status and punished. In law this appears
contradictory. In fact, the Parties to the conflict are here given a
means of defence against a particularly dangerous method of
combat. (4) However, it is quite clear that this is not an
obligation, but merely a power: "shall not have the right to the
status of prisoner of war and may be treated as a spy". (5)
Nevertheless, this does not mean that the corresponding provisions of
the first and Second Conventions do not apply in full when a spy is
wounded, sick or shipwrecked. Moreover, a spy who has been deprived
of his prisoner-of-war status, like any other spy who is not a member
of the armed forces, is a civilian protected by the fourth
Convention, though Article 5
considerably reduces the guarantees in
this particular case. Similarly it is on this point that other
provisions of the Protocol contain substantial guarantees,
particularly in Article 75
' (Fundamental guarantees). ' In the
territory of a Party to the conflict these guarantees are also
assured to a protected person who is personally subject to a
legitimate suspicion that he is engaged in an activity which
endangers State security or if it is established that he is in fact
engaged in such activities. The fourth Convention, Article 5
,
paragraph 1, provides that such persons, who may also be spies or
[p.564] persons suspected of espionage, are not entitled to claim
such rights and privileges under that Convention as would, if
exercised in the favour of such persons, be prejudicial to the
security of the State, though it is understood that they are not
deprived of the rights of fair and regular trial (paragraph 3). In
occupied territory, in accordance with the same Article 5
, the spy
may be deprived of his rights of communication, and this restriction
is not removed by Article 75
' (Fundamental guarantees) ' of the
Protocol (see Article 45
-- ' protection of persons who have taken
part in hostilities, ' paragraph 3).
1769 Nevertheless, if a person suspected of espionage appears to be a member of the armed forces, (6) he should have the benefit of
prisoner-of-war status as long as there is any doubt regarding the
matter of his right to such status, and until a competent tribunal
has decided on this matter (Article 45
-- ' Protection of persons who
have taken part in hostilities, ' paragraph 1). In short, there may
exist two conflicting presumptions simultaneously: prisoner of war or
spy. The presumption of prisoner-of-war status should prevail, at any
rate whenever the person concerned has not been charged on the basis
of prima facie evidence. (7)
1770 The deprivation of prisoner-of-war status already constitutes a punishment in itself and can therefore only take place following the
tribunal's decision. (8) This applies a fortiori to the deprivation
of prisoner-of-war treatment. Furthermore, the Conference did not
intend to change the substance of the traditional rules of espionage
adopted in The Hague, but merely sought to supplement and elaborate
them. (9) This conclusion was confirmed by the wording of Article 39
' (Emblems of nationality), ' paragraph 3, which refers to the
"existing generally recognized rules of international law applicable
to espionage".
1771 Under the terms of the Hague Regulations, "a spy taken in the act shall not be punished without previous trial" (Article 30
). Does this
mean that the spy can only be punished as such if he is caught in the
act? In fact, this is certainly the sense of the Regulations, as
Article 31
provides that, "a spy who, after rejoining the army to
which he belongs, is subsequently captured by the enemy, is treated
as a prisoner of war, and incurs no responsibility for his previous
acts of espionage". (10)
[p.565] 1772 The text of the Protocol is equally explicit when it states in the present paragraph that, when a member of the armed forces falls
into the power of an adverse Party "while engaging in
espionage", (11) he "shall not have the right to the status of
prisoner of war and may be treated as a spy".
1773 As regards the tribunal, it is in no way obliged to take into account the motives of the accused, and may convict him equally
whether he has acted from patriotic motives or for reasons of
personal gain. (12) In many cases the tribunal will have to pronounce
sentence merely on the basis of a presumption. The use of perfidious
means such as the misuse of the flag of truce, the red cross emblem,
signs, emblems or uniforms of the United Nations or of neutral or
other States not Parties to the conflict, (13) can constitute an
aggravating circumstance. This may also apply to the employment for
purposes of espionage of medical aircraft, which under the terms of
Article 28
' (Restrictions on operations of medical aircraft), '
paragraph 2, "shall not be used to collect or transmit intelligence
data and shall not carry any equipment intended for such
purposes". (14)
Paragraph 2 -- Definition of a spy (15)
1774 In fact this paragraph does not give a definition of a spy. Moreover, some considered that such a definition does not belong in a
text of humanitarian law. However, by giving a sufficiently precise
description of those who shall not be considered as spies, it is
possible to deduce the constitutive elements of espionage in any
specific case, by means of a contrario reasoning. Supplemented by the
provisions of paragraph 3, which relate to occupied territory, these
elements do give, after all, the complete characteristics of the spy
as he is defined in the Hague Regulations. (16) The resulting
definition, without being fundamentally different, is nevertheless
wider than that of the Regulations, and corresponds to that which is
[p.566] found today in most military manuals. Strictly speaking, this
paragraph corresponds to the second paragraph of Article 29 of the
Hague Regulations, which also gives a description of those who shall
not be considered as spies, though admittedly in a form which is in
some respects rather outmoded. (17)
1775 In the sense in which spies are generally understood today, the spy corresponds to the definition that was already given by Lieber:
"a person who secretly, in disguise or under false pretence, (18)
seeks information with the intention of communicating it to the
enemy" (Article 88
). It logically follows that anyone who seeks
information while dressed in the uniform of his armed forces, cannot
be a spy. But the expression "gathers or attempts to gather", which
is used in the present paragraph, as it is with other words ("obtains
or endeavours to obtain") in the definition of the Regulations,
clearly shows that no distinction is made between the attempt and the
successful operation. As regards the territorial field of application
of the rule, there is no longer an intent to limit it to the area of
operations. It covers all "territory controlled by an adverse Party":
national or occupied territory, area of operations (on land, at sea,
or in the air), including the territorial sea. In paragraph 2, the
nature of the information is not defined, while paragraph 3, which
deals with occupied territory, specifies that this should be
"information of military value". This distinction in the wording is
deliberate, as inhabitants of occupied territory should not be open
to the accusation of espionage for no good reason. Thus it is up to
each Party to the conflict to determine what information could fall
under the scope of this paragraph. (19) However, in general, it is
accepted that nowadays information can create a military advantage,
even when it does not have a military character.
1776 The problem of uniform is possibly an even more vexed question. (20) One delegate at a plenary meeting asked what
significance it should be given "in the case of combatants who were
not required to wear uniform, and who, in any case, had no chance of
wearing one". (21) The question was by no means irrelevant, although
it is understood that the word "uniform" applied not only to a
uniform in the conventional sense, but to any distinguishing sign
which warranted that the activity in question had nothing clandestine
about it. In addition, the Rapporteur declared that this means that:
"any customary uniform which clearly distinguished the member wearing
it from a non-member [of the armed forces], should
[p.567] suffice". (22) All the same, that does not alter the fact
that certain categories of combatants can, as we have seen, (23) be
exempt from all distinguishing signs with the exception of the open
carrying of arms. (24) However, as the majority of delegations only
seemed to be able to envisage such an eventuality in occupied
territory, this problem will be examined in the context of paragraph
3. It should suffice here to remember that, in the view of several
experts, the characteristic feature of the spy is not primarily the
clandestine nature of his activities, for the search for information
is often carried out at night or in order to avoid capture, observers
camouflage themselves, etc. The spy employs pretence and deceit, and
this, depending on the circumstances, could constitute an unlawful
ruse of war or even an act of perfidy within the meaning of Article
37
' (Prohibition of perfidy). '
Paragraph 3 -- Occupied territory
1777 At first sight the text of this paragraph seems to express a self-evident fact, i.e., that only a spy can be considered to be a
spy in occupied territory, and then only if he is caught in the act.
In reality the situation in occupied territory is complex, and the
rules needed to be clarified. This provision covers only residents of
occupied territory who are members of armed forces, and not the
civilian population. (25) Paragraph 4 deals with the non-resident, so
the concept of residence is common to paragraph 3 and paragraph 4.
The Rapporteur states that the Working Group did not devote much
attention to the question who will be considered to be a resident. A
number of delegations would have preferred to add qualifications such
as "usual" or "ordinary" to the word "resident" in order to exclude
from the benefits of paragraph 3 any person sent to the occupied
territory in order to engage in espionage. However, the Rapporteur
points out that such a person can always claim to have been sent
there to engage in hostile acts, and that in this case, it would be
impossible to furnish the proof. (26) The fact remains that this
paragraph concerns only residents, i.e., the inhabitants of occupied
territory, whether nationals or not, who are properly entitled to
live in [p.568] this territory either permanently or on a long-term
and ordinary basis, (27) which corresponds with the concept of
ordinary residence. (28)
' First sentence -- Definition of the spy who is a resident of occupied territory '
1778 The formulation of this provision is in many respects similar to the general definition of the spy given in Article 29
, paragraph 1,
of the Hague Regulations. This is primarily because of the negative
turn of phrase which gives the provision a restrictive scope. It
should also be noted that the territorial field of application of the
rule is precisely circumscribed as it refers only to occupied
territory. Finally, it does not contain any mention of uniform or the
absence of uniform (obviously a spy could attempt to carry out his
activities under cover of the uniform of the adverse Party) but
refers to the fact that he is acting under "false pretences or
deliberately in a clandestine manner". This expression is virtually
identical to the text of the Hague Regulations. As stated above, the
information which falls under the prohibition is specified here,
whereas it is not specified in paragraph 2: it is information of
military value. (29)
1779 Now this is the crux of the matter: though the person concerned, a member of the armed forces, gathers or attempts to gather
information of a military nature, he need not necessarily be a spy,
even when he is not wearing a uniform. In other words, the absence of
uniform or what takes the place of uniform, is not automatically
equivalent to an activity undertaken "through an act of false
pretences or deliberately in a clandestine manner", (30) since in
certain situations which arise particularly or exclusively in
occupied territory, guerrilla combatants are expressly exempt from
the obligation to distinguish themselves from the civilian population
(Article 44
-- ' Combatants and prisoners of war, ' paragraph 3).
Admittedly such combatants are obliged to carry their arms openly in
combat and preparatory to combat, and they are perfectly capable of
attempting to gather information while carrying their arms openly.
They are then excluded from being considered as spies. However, apart
from this situation, residents who are members of armed forces
"will almost necessarily in their everyday life come across information of value to the armed forces to which they
belong, and this should not make [p.569] them spies or serve
as a pretext for denying them protection as prisoners of war.
On the other hand, it was agreed that, if they disguised
themselves in order to gain access to secret information or
in other ways used false pretences or deliberate clandestine
acts in order to obtain such information, they would be
spies. For example, the resident who observes military
movements while walking along the street or who takes
photographs from his residence would not be engaged in
espionage; whereas the resident who uses a forged pass to
enter a military base or who, if lawfully on the base,
illegally brings a camera with him, would be engaging in
espionage". (31)
' Second sentence -- Sanction for espionage in occupied territory '
1780 The analysis of paragraph 1 revealed that the spy who rejoins the army to which he belongs does not incur any responsibility for his
previous acts of espionage if he is captured by the enemy later. For
a member of the armed forces who is resident in occupied territory,
there is no such possibility of actually escaping from the power of
the adverse Party, and thus of setting aside the jurisdiction of the
latter in the matter of espionage. Does this then mean that if he is
captured, a member of the armed forces who is a resident of occupied
territory and who has committed an act of espionage, loses all his
rights to prisoner-of-war status until hostilities cease? This is not
the case, and this provision gives the appropriate guarantees.
1781 It is in fact only insofar as he is captured in the act of espionage, that the spy who is a resident of occupied territory loses
his right to prisoner-of-war status. This condition is rendered here
by the expression "unless he is captured while engaging in
espionage". It follows that "the spy who is a resident of occupied
territory may be considered as rejoining his forces whenever he
ceases to engage in espionage". (32) In this context the Rapporteur
adds that:
Although no attempt has been made by the Working Group to define more precisely when a resident may be considered as
engaging in espionage, several delegates suggested that each
act of espionage would end when the information obtained had
been transmitted by the spy to his armed forces. (33) This
approach was commended, as it would reduce the possibility
that an Occupying Power could improperly deprive captured
members of underground armed forces of their rights to be
prisoners of war by asserting that they were captured while
engaging in espionage." (34)
Finally, the considerations relating to Article 46
, paragraph 1, apply a fortiori in occupied territory.
[p.570] Paragraph 4 -- Espionage in occupied territory by a non-resident
1782 In the case of espionage in occupied territory by a member of the armed forces who is not a resident of this territory, the rule
contained in this paragraph corresponds to that of Article 31
of the
Hague Regulations. Thus a spy loses his right to the status of
prisoner of war and may be treated as a spy only if he is captured
before rejoining the armed forces to which he belongs. This condition
will not be deemed to be fulfilled whenever the spy succeeds in
leaving the occupied territory and regaining either the territory of
the Power to which he belongs or that of an Allied Power, or neutral
territory. If he rejoins within occupied territory the clause implies
the presence, if only temporarily, of adverse armed forces organized
in accordance with Article 43
' (Armed forces), ' whether they
consist of a commando raid, a mobile column, a reconnaissance unit or
a forceful search operation. Such operations do not have the effect
of changing the status of the territory in which they take place,
which consequently remains occupied territory subject to the
jurisdiction of the Occupying Power. However, the armed forces which
carry out such operations assure the spy who rejoins them the
safeguards provided for in this paragraph.
1783 In addition, reference should be made to the commentary on paragraphs 1and 3 above.
Conclusion
1784-- Only someone who gathers or attempts to gather information through an act of false pretences or deliberately in a
clandestine manner, with the intention of transmitting it to the
enemy, shall be considered as a spy.
1785-- The spy captured in the act does not have the right to prisoner-of-war status.
1786-- The spy captured after rejoining his armed forces is a prisoner of war. A resident of occupied territory who is captured, but not
whilst engaging in espionage, should also be considered as a
prisoner of war.
1787-- The spy who is denied the status of prisoner of war is a civilian protected by the fourth Convention (except that in occupied
territory may lose his rights of communication (Article 5
)), and
by Article 75
' (Fundamental Guarantees) ' of the Protocol.
1788-- In cases of doubt, the person concerned is treated as a prisoner of war pending a decision regarding his status by a competent
tribunal. Penal sanctions can only be imposed by a judicial
tribunal.
' J. de P. '
NOTES
(1) [(1) p.562] On this concept, see infra, paras. 2 and 3;
(2) [(2) p.562] War treason also includes all acts of sabotage and collaboration with the enemy when they are committed
by persons resident in occupied territory who are not
members of the armed forces, such as: the destruction of
means of communication, assistance to prisoners of war who
are escaping, propaganda favourable to the adversary,
furnishing the latter with means of transport, abusing the
function of a guide for the purpose of misleading
occupying troops etc.;
(3) [(3) p.562] Cf. Fourth Convention, Articles 5, 64 (paragraph 2), 68. As regards nationals of a Party to the
conflict who engage in acts of espionage for the benefit
of the enemy, they are generally accused of high treason
and are subject to national law (on the applicability of
the guarantees of Article 75, see the commentary on that
article). This is without prejudice to provisions of human
rights legislation;
(4) [(4) p.563] Cf. F. Lieber, op. cit.: "While deception in war is admitted as a just and necessary means of
hostility, and is consistent with honourable warfare, the
common law of war allows even capital punishment for
clandestine or treacherous attempts to injure an enemy,
because they are so dangerous, and it is difficult to
guard against them" (Article 101);
(5) [(5) p.563] It will be noted that this expression"shall not have the right"is also used in Article 47 ("shall not
have the right to be a combatant or a prisoner of war")
with regard to mercenaries; Article 44, paragraph 4, deals
with the case in which a combatant "shall forfeit his
right to be a prisoner of war, but he shall, nevertheless,
be given protections equivalent in all respects";
(6) [(6) p.564] See supra, ad Art. 45, para. 1, p. 546;
(7) [(7) p.564] This solution does not affect security measures which the Detaining Power might consider to be
necessary "for reasons of imperative military necessity",
whether this concerns supervision (Third Convention, Art.
126, para. 2), correspondence (Art. 76, para. 3), or trial
' in camera ' (Art. 105, para. 5). Such derogations should
be as short as possible. The problem of the "capture card"
(Art. 70) is more delicate, even though it is not
obligatory, but the prisoner must be registered (Art.
122);
(8) [(8) p.564] Moreover, there may be justifiable concern to avoid abuses during periods of psychological tension which
are characteristic of armed conflict, favouring what could
be called "spy mania", i.e., the fact of considering any
foreigner to be a spy without a valid reason, or on the
flimsiest pretext. Moreover, Art. 44, paragraph 3,
increases the risk of confusion. It has even happened that
escaped prisoners of war have been considered to be spies;
(9) [(9) p.564] See O.R. XV, p. 99, CDDH/III/SR.47, para. 80, and p. 430, CDDH/III/338;
(10) [(10) p.564] The analogy with Article 91 of the Third Convention should be noted. It provides that prisoners of
war who have made good their escape and who are recaptured
shall not be liable to any punishment in respect of their
previous escape. However, this immunity does not extend to
violations committed during the escape, if these are not
linked with the escape, or if they entailed violence
against persons (Art. 93, para. 2);
(11) [(11) p.565] According to Mechelynck, and the deliberations which took place in The Hague, Article 31 of
the Regulations does not only apply to members of the
armed forces, but also to civilians. The inhabitant of an
area which is not occupied, who seeks information in the
enemy's area of operations and returns to his own area
after completing his mission, may not be prosecuted if his
area falls into the hands of the enemy at a later date (A.
Mechelynck, op. cit., p. 302). As regards Article 30, this
protects the inhabitant of occupied territory on the same
basis as any other person arrested as a spy (ibid., p.
299);
(12) [(12) p.565] A. Mechelynck, op. cit., p. 294;
(13) [(13) p.565] Cf. Art. 37, para. 1(a) and (d), and Art. 85, para. 3(f);
(14) [(14) p.565] On the general problem of medical confidentiality, see commentary Art. 16, para. 3, supra,
p. 204;
(15) [(15) p.565] Article 40 of the ICRC draft was worded as follows: "1. Members of armed forces in uniform and other
combatants referred to in Article 4 of the Third
Convention, as well as those combatants referred to in
Article 42 who, in their operations, distinguish
themselves from the civilian population and who, having
entered enemy-controlled territory or having remained
therein, gather or attempt to gather military information
for further transmission shall not be considered as
spies";
(16) [(16) p.565] The spy is defined there in a negative and restrictive form: "A person can only be considered a spy
when, acting clandestinely or on false pretences, he
obtains or endeavours to obtain information, in the zone
of operations of a belligerent, with the intention of
communicating it to the hostile party" (Art. 29, para. 1);
(17) [(17) p.566] "Thus, soldiers not wearing a disguise who have penetrated into the zone of operations of the hostile
army, for the purpose of obtaining information, are not
considered spies. Similarly, the following are not
considered spies: soldiers and civilians, carrying out
their mission openly, entrusted with the delivery of
despatches intended either for their own army or for the
enemy's army. To this class belong likewise persons sent
in balloons for the purpose of carrying despatches and,
generally, of maintaining communications between the
different parts of an army or a territory";
(18) [(18) p.566] Paragraph 3, using a similar wording to the Hague Regulations on this point (Art. 29), uses the
expression"through an act of false pretences or
deliberately in a clandestine manner";
(19) [(19) p.566] Thus Article 86 of the Swiss military penal code incriminates anyone who has spied on facts,
dispositions, procedures or objects which are kept secret
in the interests of national defence in order to pass them
or make them accessible to a foreign State, one of its
agents, or the public;
(20) [(20) p.566] On this point see also supra, ad Art. 39, para. 3, p. 469;
(21) [(21) p.566] O.R. VI,p. 111, CDDH /SR.39, para. 115;
(22) [(22) p.567] Ibid., para. 116, and O.R. XV, p. 388. CDDH/236/Rev.1, para. 35, and supra, commentary Art. 39,
para. 2, p. 468;
(23) [(23) p.567] Supra, ad Art. 44, para. 3, p. 527;
(24) [(24) p.567] One delegation claimed in the Working Group that this was a false problem, as the fact that a spy is
wearing purely civilian dress does not constitute a threat
for the civilian population, since the spy has no
intention of opening fire and may not even be armed;
(25) [(25) p.567] According to the Hague Regulations, the situation of an inhabitant of occupied territory was more
or less similar to that of a prisoner on parole. He sees
everything that happens, but this does not authorize him
to reveal it (in this respect, see A. Mechelynck, op.
cit., pp. 262-263). However, it should be mentioned that
the population of occupied territory owes no allegiance to
the Occupying Power (Fourth Convention, Art. 68 ). See also
supra, note 11. In addition, Art. 31 of the Fourth
Convention states that "no physical or moral coercion
shall be exercised against protected persons, in
particular to obtain information from them or from third
parties". On the other hand, the Occupying Power may
subject the population of the occupied territory to
provisions which are essential to ensure its security
(Fourth Convention, Art. 64, para. 2);
(26) [(26) p.567] O.R. XV, p. 431, CDDH/III/338;
(27) [(27) p.568] However, one delegation wished to make a statement to the effect that the term "resident" should be
understood to include persons who had had to leave the
territory as a result of excesses on the part of the
Occupying Power as well as persons evacuated by the
occupying authorities (see O.R. XV, p. 93, CDDH/III/SR.47,
para. 46);
(28) [(28) p.568] Cf. the advisory opinion of the Permanent Court of International Justice of 21 February 1925 on the
exchange of Greek and Turkish populations where the
concept of "établissement" was considered to include two
factors: residence and stability (W. Benedek,"Exchange of
Greek and Turkish populations (Advisory opinion)", in
Bernhardt (ed.), op. cit., Instalment 2, p. 92;
(29) [(29) p.568] It is understood that information which is not of a military nature, but, for example, economic or
political, can be of military value;
(30) [(30) p.568] Cf. the remark of one delegation: "A member of a liberation or resistance movement would not be
considered to be acting under false pretences simply
because he was wearing civilian clothing" (O.R. XV, p. 93,
CDDH/III/SR.47, para. 46);
(31) [(31) p.569] Rapporteur's Report, O.R. XV, p. 430, CDDH/III/338;
(32) [(32) p.569] O.R. XV, pp. 430-431, CDDH/III/338;
(33) [(33) p.569] Cf. the statement of a delegation at a plenary meeting, that the formula"while engaging in
espionage" includes all the stages of the act of espionage
until the completion of the transmission of the
information to the enemy (O.R. VI, p. 116, CDDH/SR.39);
(34) [(34) p.569] O.R. XV, p. 431, CDDH/III/338;