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Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977.

Commentary - Protection of works and installations containing dangerous forces

[p.1461] Article 15

-- Protection of works and installations

containing dangerous forces

General remarks

4814 During the conflicts which have characterized the last forty years, works and installations containing dangerous forces,

particularly dykes and dams, have often [p.1462] been the object of

attacks and destruction resulting in serious consequences and leading

to heavy losses among the civilian population. (1)

4815 In order to safeguard the civilian population from this sort of catastrophe, the ICRC had already proposed immunity for such works

and installations in its Draft Rules of 1956 for the Limitation of

the Dangers incurred by the Civilian Population in Time of War. (2)

It will be recalled that those Rules were drawn up for all kinds of

armed conflict, irrespective of whether they are internal or

international. (3)

4816 Article 15 has the same tenor as the first sentence of paragraph 1 of Article 56

of Protocol I ' (Protection of works and

installations containing dangerous forces). ' (4) The simultaneous

negotiation of these two provisions in Committee led to some

additions being made to the draft presented by the ICRC. (5) These

consisted of the ways in which the protection of such works and

installations could be applied. (6) The text as finally adopted was

reduced to the simplest essentials; unlike Article 56

of Protocol I

' (Protection of works and installations containing dangerous

forces), ' it expresses the general principle without providing for

any exceptions, which means that the rule is stated more

categorically.

4817 Protocol II does not set out to protect civilian objects generally. (7) Works and installations containing dangerous forces

are the object of special protection because of the serious

consequences that may ensue if they are destroyed.

Text of the article

4818 This provision is aimed at protecting the civilian population against the effects which might result from the release of dangerous

forces such as large quantities of water or radioactivity. For this

purpose it prohibits attacks on dams, dykes and nuclear electrical

generating stations if such attacks could release dangerous forces

causing severe losses among the civilian population, even assuming

such works and installations to be military objectives. (8) The list

is exhaustive, which does not mean that there are not other kinds of

works or installations whose destruction is likely to entail heavy

losses among the civilian population. Thus, for example, the problem

of storage facilities for crude oil and oil products and the risks of

oil rigs were raised during the Diplomatic Conference. (9) In the end

it was only possible to arrive at a consensus on the items listed

above, though this does not exclude the protection of other types of

installations under different international legal régimes.

[p.1463] 4819 The extent of the protection of works and installations covered in this article is limited to cases in which an attack may cause

severe losses among the civilian population. Thus such objects are

not protected in themselves, but only to the extent that their

destruction would release forces dangerous for the civilian

population.

4820 This means that, assuming such a work or installation were a military objective, it could be attacked as long as the civilian

population were not seriously endangered thereby. On the other hand,

protection is automatic, irrespective of the civilian, military or

combined use made of the installation or works, whenever an attack

could cause the release of dangerous forces resulting in severe

losses among the civilian population.

4821 The term "severe losses" is taken from military terminology, and clearly this must be judged in good faith on the basis of objective

elements, such as the existence of densely populated areas of

civilians (villages or towns) in the area which would be affected by

the release of dangerous forces.

4822 The ICRC draft provided that the parties to the conflict would endeavour not to locate military objectives in the vicinity of such

objects, in order to prevent the danger of indirect attacks, i.e.,

the incidental effects of an attack directed against a nearby

military objective. (10) In the absence of this special provision,

which was not retained, (11) it is appropriate to recall that the

civilian population is entitled to general protection against the

effects of hostilities. (12) In any case, the prohibition laid down

in this article covers attacks on military objectives in the direct

vicinity of works or installations which might very well have the

incidental effect of releasing dangerous forces and seriously

injuring the civilian population. On the other hand, consciously

locating military objectives in the vicinity of such works or

installations would constitute a violation of the principle laid down

in Article 13

' (Protection of the civilian population), ' paragraph

4823 Article 56

' (Protection of works and installations containing dangerous forces), ' paragraph 7, of Protocol I, provides for the

optional identification of works and installations containing

dangerous forces by means of three bright orange circles. A precise

description is given in Annex I to Protocol I (Article 16

' International special sign). ' (13)

4824 This special optional identification is not specified in Protocol II. If a country were to decide to adopt it in time of peace for

Protocol I, the identification would of course retain the same

function and the same purpose in case of non-international armed

conflict. However, such identification, which has an optional

character, does not have the same importance in a situation covered

by Protocol II. In fact, the forces engaged in a confrontation could

be expected to be familiar with the location of dams, dykes and

nuclear electrical generating stations, since [p.1464] they are

situated in their own country, in the territory of which the

hostilities are taking place. Moreover, this element might play a

favourable role in their protection as it is the interests of both of

the parties to the conflict not to destroy such works and

installations.

' S.J. '

* (1) [(1) p.1462] See historical information given in commentary Art. 56, Protocol I, supra, p. 665;

(2) [(2) p.1462] Art. 17;

(3) [(3) p.1462] Ibid., Art. 2;

(4) [(4) p.1462] Apart from some slight differences in the wording of the French text of the article;

(5) [(5) p.1462] Draft Art. 28. See commentary, infra, p. 1463;

(6) [(6) p.1462] O.R. XV, p. 323, CDDH/215/Rev. 1;

(7) [(7) p.1462] See introduction to this Part, in fine, supra, p. 1446;

(8) [(8) p.1462] The concept of military objectives is defined in Art. 52, para. 2, Protocol I. Reference may be made to

the commentary thereon, supra, p. 635;

(9) [(9) p.1462] O.R. XV, p. 352, CDDH/III/264/Rev.1;

(10) [(10) p.1463] Draft Art. 28, para. 2;

(11) [(11) p.1463] O.R. IV, p. 90, CDDH/427;

(12) [(12) p.1463] See Art. 13 and the commentary thereon, supra, p. 1447;

(13) [(13) p.1463] See commentary Art. 56, para. 7, of Protocol I, supra, p. 675, and Article 16 of Annex I thereto,

supra, p. 1295;