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  About Dr Jakob Kellenberger

Dr Jakob Kellenberger, born in Heiden, Switzerland in 1944, finished studies of literature and linguistics with a PhD degree at the University of Zurich. He joined the Swiss Diplomatic Service in 1974. As State Secretary for Foreign Affairs from 1992-1999 he also was Chief negotiator/coordinator for the bilateral negotiations between Switzerland and the European Union which lasted from 1994 to 1998. On 1 January 2000 he became President of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

Statement by Dr Jakob Kellenberger, ICRC president

I would like to begin by thanking you all for being here today to join the International Committee of the Red Cross in reflecting on the challenges of "Biotechnology, Weapons and Humanity". Many of you have spent years, and some decades, working on issues at the intersection of biology, military affairs, law and morality. We will certainly benefit from your wisdom and advice. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) would also like to convey to you, and through you to your governments, scientific and medical circles and industrial partners, its profound concerns.

The ICRC's preoccupations and call to action are contained in an "Appeal on Biotechnology, Weapons and Humanity" which has been adopted at the highest level of the institution. You will receive the Appeal in its entirety later this morning. It is being sent today to all governments through Permanent Missions in Geneva and New York and will be made public later this week.

Before presenting the essence of the Appeal I would briefly like to explain the concerns which have prompted the ICRC to launch this initiative.

The "age of biotechnology", like the industrial revolution and the "information age", promises great benefits to humanity. Yet if biotechnology is put to hostile uses, including to spread terror, the human species faces great dangers.

Potential benefits of advances in biological sciences and technologies are impressive. These include cures for diseases, new vaccines and increases in food production, including in impoverished regions of the world.

Yet testimonies from states, United Nations agencies and scientific circles warn of a range of existing and emerging capacities for abuse. These include:


Deliberate spread of existing diseases such as typhoid and anthrax and smallpox to cause death, disease and fear in a population.

Alteration of existing disease agents to make them more virulent, as already occurred unintentionally in research on the "mousepox" virus.

Creation of viruses from synthetic materials, as occurred this year using a recipe from the Internet and gene sequences from a mail order supplier.

Possible future development of ethnically or racially specific biological agents.

Creation of novel biological warfare agents for use in conjunction with corresponding vaccines for one's own troops or population. This could increase the attractiveness of biological weapons.

New methods to covertly spread naturally occurring biological agents to alter physiological or psychological processes of target populations such as consciousness, behavior and fertility.

Production of biological agents that could attack agricultural or industrial infrastructure.

Creation of biological agents that could affect the makeup of human genes, pursuing people through generations and adversely affecting human evolution itself.

The International Committee of the Red Cross considers these examples of possible abuses, which may be elaborated in more detail in the course of our discussions, to be profoundly disturbing. The life processes at the core of human existence must never be manipulated for hostile ends. In the past, scientific advances have all too often been misused. New developments in biotechnology will almost certainly be abused if urgent action is not taken before it is too late.

If the revolution in biotechnology we are witnessing today is harnessed for hostile ends such acts would undermine one of the most fundamental norms of customary international humanitarian law: the prohibition of poisoning and the deliberate spread of disease as a method of warfare. It would be an affront to the ancient taboo against the use in war of "plague and poison", passed down for generations in such diverse cultures as ancient India, the Middle East, Greece and Rome. Such acts would run counter to the survival instinct by which humanity protects itself from disease.

The ICRC deeply regrets that lengthy negotiations to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention through a compliance-monitoring regime did not come to fruition as expected in November 2001. When this diplomatic impasse is seen in light of the potential for abuse inherent in the "biotech revolution", the case for a renewed commitment by all States to existing norms and to the effective control of biological agents is compelling.

And now I come to the essential elements of the Appeal.

In keeping with its mandate to protect and assist victims of conflict and to promote and uphold international humanitarian law, the ICRC appeals firstly to all political and military authorities:

To resume with determination efforts to ensure universalisation and faithful implementation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and 1972 Biological Weapons Convention and to develop appropriate mechanisms to maintain their relevance in the face of scientific developments,
To adopt stringent national legislation for implementation of these instruments and to enact effective controls on biological agents with potential for abuse,
To ensure that any person who commits acts prohibited by the above instruments is prosecuted,

To undertake actions to ensure that the legal norms prohibiting biological warfare are known and respected by members of armed forces,


To encourage the development of effective codes of conduct by scientific and medical associations and by industry to govern activities and biological agents with potential for abuse,

To enhance international cooperation, including through the development of greater international capacity to monitor and respond to outbreaks of infectious disease.


However, the responsibility to prevent hostile uses of biotechnology extends well beyond governments. It belongs, in particular, to scientists and industry.

Secondly, then, the ICRC appeals to the scientific and medical communities and to the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries:


To scrutinize all research with potentially dangerous consequences and to ensure it is submitted to rigorous and independent peer review

To adopt professional and industrial codes of conduct aimed at preventing the abuse of biological agents,

To ensure effective regulation of research programs, facilities and biological agents which may lend themselves to misuse, and supervision of individuals with access to sensitive technologies,

To support enhanced national and international programs to prevent and respond to the spread of infectious disease.

The ICRC calls on all persons to assume their responsibilities as members of a species whose future may be gravely threatened by abuse of biological knowledge. We urge you to consider the threshold at which we all stand and to remember our common humanity.

And finally, as part of a renewed effort to address the risks and assume the responsibilities arising from the current situation, the ICRC urges States to adopt at a high political level an international Declaration on "Biotechnology, Weapons and Humanity" containing a renewed commitment to existing norms and specific commitments to future preventive action. We look forward to working with you in these vital efforts.

I thank you for your attention.

Other documents in this section: Focus > Biotechnology and weapons