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1-06-1999  Annual Report 1998 
Somalia




Initiatives to create a central authority in Somalia met with no success in 1998. Although the country remained split up into areas dominated by different clans, there was a significant move towards regionalization in July, with the creation of regional administrations in Puntland state in the north-east and in the Benadir region, which comprises Mogadishu. The Benadir administration was the fruit of months of meetings and negotiations, but strong opposition from key players in Mogadishu severely hampered its efficiency and made the security situation even worse. The seeds of a similar administration were sown in Jubaland towards the end of the year, but here too, persistent insecurity prevented the initiative from getting off the ground. Somaliland, which was still seeking recognition as an independent State, was relatively peaceful in comparison with previous years.

Elsewhere chaos and anarchy reigned, with not even the rudiments of a local administration in place. Clashes between clans, sub-clans and even families resorting to guns to resolve differences continued to make the lives of civilians a misery in many parts of the country. The situation deteriorated in southern Somalia, where fierce fighting took place over the town of Baidoa and for control of the port of Kismayo. These clashes claimed many casualties, not least because large numbers of mines had been laid in the area. In a more positive development, in the Gedo region, two other warring factions, the SNF* and Al Ittihad, [32] agreed to settle their differences peacefully in the second half of the year.

Effects on the civilian population

The absence of a central government, combined with the devastation caused by the civil war, persistent insecurity and the lack of any kind of infrastructure, had serious implications for the daily life of the civilian population. The health system remained in a critical state, without qualified medical personnel or public health facilities, apart from those provided by humanitarian agencies and a few private local initiatives whose services had to be paid for. The economy, which relied to a large extent on the livestock trade with the Gulf States, received a crushing blow at the beginning of the year when Saudi Arabia banned the import of Somali livestock. This had especially severe effects on the pastoralists and transporters whose livelihood depended on this trade. Thousands of people also fell prey to the vagaries of the climate, which brought regular flooding or drought. Furthermore, many civilians were forced to flee areas affected by conflict and swell the ranks of displaced people already living in camps, faced with poor hygiene, shortage of food and lack of medical and sanitation facilities. Landmines, both old and new, represented an additional hazard, rendering entire areas inaccessible to the civilian population or cutting them off from the rest of the country.

Hostage crisis

For humanitarian agencies working in Somalia, security remained the principal concern. For this reason, the ICRC continued to base its Somalia delegation in Nairobi. [33] From there, delegates travelled regularly to Somalia to carry out specific activities or monitor ongoing ones, while maintaining a close working relationship with local field staff and using local contractors to deliver relief consignments.

The ICRC’s fears for the security of its staff proved to be only too well-founded on 15 April, when armed gunmen seized ten Red Cross/Red Crescent aid workers in Mogadishu North immediately after their ICRC-chartered aircraft had landed at the Isley airstrip. Together with the Federation, the ICRC publicly appealed to the abductors to release the hostages immediately and unconditionally. Throughout the crisis, the ICRC relied heavily on its network of Somali contacts (Somali Red Crescent Society, clan elders, Somali politicians and other influential figures) to find an appropriate solution. This policy proved to be the wisest, and the captives were freed safe and well on 24 April, without payment of a ransom by the ICRC.

The hostage-taking incident led to restrictions on the movements of expatriates and the suspension of all activities in Somalia other than "life-saving" programmes such as first aid, assistance to the war-wounded and basic curative services for local communities. Support for the Somali Red Crescent’s tracing services and dissemination programmes was also maintained. In addition, the ICRC completed projects for which it had made a commitment and which did not require an expatriate presence, for instance, the drilling of boreholes. The hostage crisis also prompted most other humanitarian organizations to suspend or limit their operations throughout the country.

Flood devastation

Until April, the ICRC continued its assistance to the victims of the flooding that devastated southern Somalia at the end of 199734 and in early 1998. Because of the particular security context in Somalia, the ICRC took the lead in the Movement’s flood-relief operation. All operations were, however, carried out in close consultation with both the Federation and the Somali Red Crescent.

In Lower Shebele and Lower Juba, water remained stagnant for weeks – and in some cases for months – leaving fields submerged and villages inaccessible. In the initial stages of the emergency the ICRC targeted the most needy, delivering basic shelter materials and high-protein biscuits to some 228,000 people in Gedo, Juba, Hiran, Middle and Lower Shebele.

Harvests were poor and many underground grain stores (bakar) were destroyed in the flooding, depriving many people of their coping mechanisms and leaving them extremely vulnerable. During a second phase of the assistance operation, 258,500 people were provided with seeds to be planted once the waters receded in an attempt to forestall future food shortages. Subsequently, the ICRC switched to an integrated approach, focusing on longer-term food security, health care and water and sanitation programmes. Logistics posed a major problem, as many roads were damaged and a number of areas cut off. All manner of means were employed to bring aid to the beneficiaries, ranging from aircraft, boats, lorries and pick-up trucks to donkey carts and camels.

The incidence of water-borne diseases increased rapidly as open expanses of polluted water spread. Consequently, water and sanitation programmes were in great demand. Activities were centred on the lower Juba valley, where water-purification and well-cleansing programmes were set up to minimize the risks of diarrhoea. Efforts were also made to control malaria and respiratory infections and to monitor outbreaks of haemmorhagic fever.

Cholera strikes

Cholera was a source of particular concern, as the annual cycle started earlier and the incidence was higher than usual, with more than twice the amount of cases being recorded than during the epidemic in 1997. Several "cholera isolation sites" and treatment centres were opened in Mogadishu and in Lower Shebele, Middle Shebele, Hiran and Lower Juba as the outbreak spread from the cities to rural areas. ICRC teams supported these and other medical facilities treating the increasing number of patients by providing expertise, training of local counterparts in preventive and curative techniques and furnishing supplies for medical and water and sanitation activities. Joint ICRC/Somali Red Crescent teams also pursued their preventive and health education programmes, particularly in remote villages, in an effort to raise public awareness of the risks related to the disease and to underline the importance of hygiene and oral rehydration therapy.

Working alongside the Somali Red Crescent

The Somali Red Crescent remained the only national structure still in existence in Somalia. Both before and after the hostage crisis, the ICRC worked closely with the National Society in all its areas of activity and prepared the way for it to take over management of certain health, tracing and dissemination programmes. To this end, in October the ICRC completed its transfer of responsibility for the tracing service to the Somali Red Crescent, while remaining on hand to provide technical and financial support as needed. With thousands of Somalis still displaced within their homeland or scattered all over the globe, the tracing programme remained one of the largest and most invaluable services rendered in a country whose centralized postal system collapsed years ago.

Traditional values and humanitarian rules

The ICRC kept up its efforts to promote respect for humanitarian rules by drawing parallels with Somalia’s nomadic tradition and oral culture. A series of short plays (googoos) were devised, combining humour, sketches and music and covering such issues as women and war, roadblocks, lack of freedom of movement, aid and aid dependency. They were reviewed and finalized together with the Somali Red Crescent dissemination department and then recorded in Mogadishu for airing on the BBC Somali Service. On the basis of historical research carried out in previous years, [35] the ICRC also developed a dissemination strategy aimed at illustrating the similarities between local traditions of warfare and the basic humanitarian rules contained in the Geneva Conventions.

Tentative resumption of activities

In late December, the ICRC began gradually to resume certain of its activities in Somalia, mainly seed programmes for victims of renewed flooding in the south of the country, deploying a limited number of expatriates and proceeding with extreme care. Other areas, including Mogadishu, remained off-limits.

IN 1998, THE ICRC:


– together with the Somali Red Crescent, ex-changed some 27,300 Red Cross messages between members of dispersed families in Somalia and abroad; opened 443 tracing cases and solved 263;
– broadcast the names of 4,902 Somalis through the BBC Somali Service in Nairobi on behalf of families trying to locate missing relatives;
– distributed 2,577 tonnes of food and some 662 tonnes of seed, together with tarpaulins, blankets, mosquito nets, fishing tackle and basic necessities, to people affected by fighting, adverse weather conditions or poor harvests;
– repaired 11 dykes along the Juba river and rehabilitated irrigation systems covering 1,700 hectares of arable land in the Hiran region; distributed 100,000 sandbags to farmers to fill gaps in the flood protection system;
– distributed 96 tonnes of food aid to orphanages, hospitals, and detainees and guards at Mogadishu central prison assistance to the last group was halted in the course of the year);
– fully supported Keysaney hospital in Mogadishu North, run by the Somali Red Crescent in cooperation with the ICRC, by supplying medicines, surgical materials, cleaning products and fuel and paying running costs and the salaries of staff;
– provided regular or ad hoc support to health facilities treating war casualties (Medina and K6 in Mogadishu South and Galkayo and Baidoa hospitals), channelling supplies through the Somali Red Crescent and the ICRC field officer, and to a number of private hospitals according to needs;
– together with the Somali Red Crescent, set up a temporary health post in Belet Huen to treat flood victims, which gave 10,661 consultations between November 1997 and the beginning of January 1998, and supported 2 Somali Red Crescent mobile clinics in Marere and Jamame (south of the Juba valley), which visited 38 locations by boat to dispense health care to vulnerable people trapped on dykes and patches of dry land, giving consultations until the service was discontinued in mid-March;
– opened 4 cholera treatment centres in the Middle and Lower Shebele, which were subsequently handed over to the Federation and the Somali Red Crescent;
– supported oral rehydration centres and cholera treatment centres in Mogadishu and rural areas, training local staff and supervising them in the administration of intravenous fluids;
– supported 12 Somali Red Crescent outpatient clinics, 2 mother and child health clinics and 3 other outpatient clinics;
– following the floods, set up 46 treated drinking water points serving 50,000 people; cleaned and disinfected 51 wells that had survived the flooding and rebuilt 72 others that had been damaged;
– in areas affected by cholera outbreaks, provided basic water and sanitation support to health posts by constructing latrines, providing plastic sheeting, rehabilitating wells, fixing or installing pumps, installing water tanks and chlorinating water;
– sank, equipped or repaired 12 boreholes, 45 wells and 10 tradit-ional underground reservoirs (berkad), work on some of which was carried out by means of a project delegated to the German Red Cross, and improved water-supply and drainage systems;
– in coordination with the Federation, assisted the Somali Red Crescent in the implementation of its primary health care programmes by training medical personnel, building or rehabilitating dispensaries and furnishing medi-cal supplies;
– supervised 2 Somali health education teams, financially supported by the Federation and based in Bal’ad and Afgoi, which organized training sessions for traditional birth attendants and community health workers from outlying villages;
– continued its programmes for young people and militia members, using plays, comic strips and video cassettes adapted to the Somali culture to encourage them to abide by certain minimum standards of behaviour in the conduct of hostilities;
– took every opportunity to increase awareness of matters relating to protection of the civilian population among the authorities, militias and elders, including promotion of the brochure Spared from the Spear;
– informed a variety of target audiences about its activities in Somalia through publications, press releases and regular contacts with the media;
– organized a dissemination workshop in Djibouti in early December for Somali Red Crescent field officers, focusing essentially on information and communication techniques and using the occasion to distribute the Somali version of the dissemination officer’s handbook.



Notes

32. A radical  Muslim militia.
33. See pp. 129-135.
34. See the ICRC's 1997 Annual Report, p. 100.
35. See the ICRC's 1997 Annual Report, p. 103.

* SNF: Somali National Front

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