Country report Lebanon

ICRC worldwide consultation on the rules of war

Report by Greenberg Research, Inc.
**About the People on War project**

To mark the 50th anniversary of the modern Geneva Conventions (on 12 August 1999), the ICRC launched its People on War project with the aim of building greater respect for fundamental humanitarian principles. At centre stage is a worldwide consultation giving the general public a chance to air their views on the many facets of war. The idea was that civilians and combatants alike would be able to share their experiences, express their opinions on what basic rules should apply in war, discuss why those rules sometimes break down and look at what the future holds.

With this in mind, the ICRC commissioned Greenberg Research, Inc. to design a research programme that would enable people to be heard in the most effective way possible. Under the guidance of Greenberg Research, ICRC staff and Red Cross and Red Crescent volunteers carried out this consultation in 12 countries (Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, Colombia, El Salvador, Georgia/Abkhazia, Israel, the occupied territories and the autonomous territories, Lebanon, Nigeria, Philippines, Somalia and South Africa), conducting in-depth, face-to-face interviews, group discussions and national public opinion surveys. Surveys on the basis of a questionnaire only were conducted in a further five countries (France, Russian Federation, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States) in order to reflect these people’s perceptions of war.

Greenberg Research analysts then prepared a series of Country Reports on the basis of the findings. The reports open up this new, important discourse to a wider audience, while remaining conscious of the need to protect the safety of all those who participated.

By making this consultation public, the ICRC hopes to initiate a local and international debate on the humanitarian aspects of war - a debate that should be joined by the major political players, international and non-governmental organizations and aid specialists.

**Greenberg Research, Inc.**

Greenberg Research is an opinion research firm that has worked for over two decades to help organizations and leaders around the world advance their goals in the face of rapid change. It specializes in using advanced methods of opinion research - surveys, focus groups and in-depth interviews - to help form strategies for political parties, corporations and non-governmental organizations.

Greenberg Research has extensive experience in Europe and the United States, but also in the Middle East, Asia, southern Africa and Central and South America. It has conducted research in war-torn, politically complex and remote settings. In its work for corporations and non-governmental organizations, it has explored a broad range of global issues, including landmines, genetic engineering, climate change, race and gender relations, trade and information technologies.

---

The opinions expressed in this report are not those of the ICRC. The ICRC retained Greenberg Research, Inc. to design and oversee the People on War consultation. Greenberg Research compiled and analysed the results and is responsible for the content and interpretation.

---

ICRC, Geneva, November 1999
# Table of contents

**Country context** ii

**Country methodology** iii

**Executive summary** iv

**The war experience** 1
   - Figure 1: The war experience 1
   - Figure 2: Personal description of the war 2

**The meaning of norms** 5
   - Figure 3: Combatants and civilians 5
   - Figure 4: Basis for the norm 6

**Attacking non-combatants** 8
   - Figure 5: Acceptance of war practices 8

**Treatment of captured combatants** 10
   - Figure 6: Captured enemy combatants 10
   - Figure 7: Wounded or surrendering combatants 11
   - Figure 8: While under enemy control 12

**Explaining the divergence between norms and practice** 12
   - Figure 9: Why combatants attack civilians 13
   - Figure 10: Impact of sidedness 15
   - Figure 11: Consequence of attitudes 16
   - Figure 12: Impact of war experience 17

**Internationalization of the war** 18
   - Figure 13: Knowledge of laws 18
   - Figure 14: Geneva Conventions 19
   - Figure 15: War crimes 20

**The role of the ICRC/Red Cross** 22
   - Figure 16: Red Cross and protection 22
   - Figure 17: Turn to for help 23
   - Figure 18: Biggest role 23

**Annex 1: General methodology** 25

**Annex 2: Questionnaire** 28
Country context

The war that has convulsed Lebanon for more than two decades is one of the most complex, long-lasting and destructive conflicts that any country has endured since the end of World War II. The war has centred on a lethal combination of conflicts: the outbreak of internal fighting in 1975 and an international conflict involving Palestinian groups and the Israeli and Syrian armies. These conflicts have left some 150,000 people dead, uprooted more than 800,000 others, and destroyed a once-thriving nation.¹

The civil war began in 1975 with the collapse of a power-sharing agreement that divided governing authority between Christians (primarily the dominant Maronite denomination) and Muslims (including the traditionally powerful Sunnis and impoverished Shiites). The Muslims called for reform, claiming that the agreement did not reflect their new majority status. A pair of violent incidents — attacks by Christian militiamen and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) — triggered the conflict, which gradually spread throughout the nation and turned the capital city of Beirut into a frontline battleground.

Over the next 15 years, the war featured an ever-changing cast of characters and innumerable intricate plot lines, until a cease-fire was proclaimed in 1991. Four features, however, remained constant.

First, Lebanon's geographic position and the presence of the PLO and more than 300,000 Palestinian refugees have turned the country into a major battleground in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Syria, with its political and military influence, has been the dominant force in determining Lebanon's leadership; in the name of stability it has intervened time and again on behalf of both Christians and Muslims. For its part, Israel has invaded Lebanon on numerous occasions, attempting to crush the PLO and establishing a buffer zone patrolled by the Israeli-controlled South Lebanon Army (SLA). Even today, fighting between Lebanese armed groups — chiefly the Hezbollah — and the Israeli army and the Israeli-controlled SLA, have caught numerous civilians in the crossfire.

Second, efforts by members of the international community to intercede in Lebanon's civil war have generally not managed to meet their objectives. In 1978, after a major Israeli invasion, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was established to supervise the withdrawal of the Israeli army and the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty in southern Lebanon; today it is a permanent feature of the landscape, since Israeli troops remain in the south. In 1982, after a massacre in the Palestinian refugee camps, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Italy dispatched a multinational force to bring stability to Beirut. Welcomed at first, the force soon became the object of attacks. The allies withdrew after suicide truck bombings killed several hundred American and French soldiers.

Third, the violent and diverse character of warfare in Lebanon has reflected the wide range of combatants, which has included regular armies, guerrilla forces and militias. Tactics have included air bombardment, tank battles, block-by-block urban assault, truck bombings and a constant series of assassinations. In addition, scores of Westerners have been taken hostage by various factions; most have been released in exchange for prisoners.

Fourth, Lebanon has been further destabilized by power struggles within various religious groups. Today's Lebanon is slowly rebuilding, but the country remains hostage to its own fissures and the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict.

Country methodology

The findings in this report are based on a consultation carried out by the ICRC in Lebanon. The project was overseen by a multinational research team from Greenberg Research, with the participation of a local partner, The Market Research Organization (MRO), a public opinion research firm based in Beirut. With their help and guidance, ICRC staff and members of the Lebanese Red Cross Society (LRCS) conducted the various components of the research.

The Lebanese consultation comprised three elements:

· Eight focus groups (FG), for which participants were recruited by specially trained ICRC staff. The groups were facilitated in Arabic by professional moderators affiliated with the local partner, MRO, and supervised by Greenberg Research staff. The moderators received additional training and instructions from Greenberg Research. Sessions were held with the following groups: relatives of missing persons, young men who grew up during the war, ex-combatants, fishermen, former detainees, those wounded in the war, Lebanese Red Cross first-aiders and displaced women. Whenever possible, groups were organized according to gender and included participants with similar ethnic and religious backgrounds. The discussions were held in venues provided by ICRC staff in several locations throughout Lebanon, including Beirut, Jounieh, Tyre, Furn El Chebbak and Q’ana. Research observers listened to the groups from a separate area with the aid of a simultaneous translator. Both the English translation and the discussion in Arabic were audiotaped for analytical purposes. The focus groups were held between 16 and 20 March 1999.

· Nineteen in-depth interviews (IDI) carried out by ICRC local staff. Half of these interviews mirrored the composition of the focus groups; the ICRC selected the other half. Those selected by the ICRC covered a wide range of people, including an international peacekeeper, the mothers of a prisoner and a detainee, doctors, journalists, religious personnel, ex-combatants, fishermen and the war-disabled. Greenberg Research trained ICRC local staff in how to recruit participants and conduct a structured, 45-minute interview. Each interview was audiotaped in Arabic and later translated into English. Interviews were conducted between 24 March and mid-April 1999.

· A nationwide quantitative opinion survey conducted among 1,000 respondents 18 years of age and older and stratified according to population. Lebanese Red Cross volunteers and ICRC local staff conducted the survey under the supervision of Greenberg Research. Fifty-five of the questionnaires were administered in southern Lebanon by ICRC local staff. All volunteers received training from MRO. The survey took place from 26 March to 24 April 1999. Respondents were selected using a multistage cluster sampling method in which every adult had an equal chance of being selected. Percentages reported here are subject to a sampling error of +/- 4.5 percentage points (at a 95 in 100 confidence level). Results in smaller segments, such as the 200 interviews in the northern area, are subject to an error of +/- 9.5 percentage points.2

---

2 These estimates are based on population values of 50 per cent. Obviously, many reported percentages are lower or higher than that; higher percentages would have a smaller sampling error. For example, a reported percentage of 90 per cent for the total population would have a sampling error of +/- 2.5 percentage points.
Executive summary

The war in Lebanon is a story of both an internal and an international conflict waged on a common battlefield. On the one hand, there was a civil war between Lebanon's various religious denominations — or “confessional” factions — fought primarily around Beirut and formally concluded nearly a decade ago; on the other hand, an international conflict, concentrated in southern Lebanon and primarily involving Israel. At the height of these wars in the 1980s, competition between different religious groups and the Arab-Israeli conflict combined to create one of the world's bloodiest and most dangerous war zones.

The war in Lebanon was truly chaotic, disorienting and brutal. The sheer numbers and types of combatants produced a perilous situation that has kept civilians constantly off balance. The issues that inflamed the war — and those that continue to fuel the situation in southern Lebanon — go to the very roots of the Lebanese polity: national identity, religious tolerance, power sharing, national sovereignty and the future of Palestine.

The combination of actors and issues created a highly volatile climate in which constant fear and death became the motifs of people's lives. Reciting the casualties of the war — 150,000 dead, more than 800,000 refugees and several thousand missing persons — only begins to scratch the surface of the economic, physical and psychological devastation that will affect generations of Lebanese people for decades to come.

The ICRC consultation in Lebanon uncovered a dilemma at the heart of people's attitudes towards war, a dilemma created in large part by the extraordinary violence and harshness of the Lebanese experience. On the one hand, among all factions of society, the war reinforced a strong cultural and normative bias towards protection of civilians during wartime. On the other hand, the reality of this war — and in particular the cycle of attack-and-revenge it generated — has helped produce a widespread willingness to tolerate actions against civilians as a part of war. Indeed, from the beginning of the war, the question of whether civilians would be involved was effectively rendered moot.

Lebanon is a naturally divisive country, an uneasy collection of religious and ethnic groups. In focus groups and in-depth interviews, participants consistently based their identity not in the notion of being “Lebanese” but in their religious beliefs and allegiance to clan, family or religious leaders. From the beginning of the conflict, in fact, each faction established a separate armed force, claimed a “zone” of its own, and pledged to protect its people. On both military and political levels, this arrangement made civilians into prime, even legitimate, targets.

Outside powers tried to stabilize the situation, but in many cases civilians did not benefit from their efforts. When regional powers would intervene on behalf of one faction or another, that faction would take advantage of its temporary strength and launch massive assaults on its opponents. The nature of the conflict in southern Lebanon almost guaranteed that outside intervention would result in civilian casualties.

The character of the combatants in Lebanon certainly offered no reassurances to civilians. Among the soldiers and fighters were Lebanese state security forces, guerrilla armies, loosely formed militias attached to various political and religious movements, the professional armed forces of Israel and Syria, the irregular forces of the proto-state of Palestine, and the Lebanese allies of foreign powers. So many people attached to so many different causes and carrying so many weapons ensured an armed enemy for civilians of every stripe.

Finally, the tactics of warfare in Lebanon were a recipe for appalling damage to civilian lives and property. Foremost among these were aerial assaults, combat in urban areas and indiscriminate shelling - each of which carried the certainty of civilian casualties. And the many factions who used tactics

---

such as suicide bombings and hostage-taking had no intention of distinguishing between civilians and combatants.

**The war's toll.** Few of Lebanon's estimated 3.5 million people have escaped the terrible consequences of this chaotic war.

- Many Lebanese felt the impact of the war in its harshest forms. Three out of ten Lebanese surveyed report that a family member was killed during the conflicts. Fourteen per cent were wounded; 12 per cent were tortured; 7 per cent report the sexual assault of an acquaintance and 6 per cent were kidnapped or taken hostage. In focus group discussions, participants were particularly bitter about the killing and imprisonment of people for reasons as simple as their name or the colour of an identification card.

- Presenting a list of 12 negative physical and psychological effects of the war — ranging from imprisonment to property damage — 44 per cent of those surveyed say they had personally been subject to four or more.

- Sixty per cent say the war took place where they lived, 22 per cent say they lived under enemy control and 43 per cent report being forced to leave home and live elsewhere. Sixty per cent report losing contact with a close relative.

- More than six out of ten respondents (62 per cent) say they were humiliated during the war. When asked to describe their feelings about the war, “hateful,” “humiliating” and “horrible” were the words most often mentioned. People in the focus groups express particular dismay at the random way that the war struck civilians and the “brother against brother” nature of the conflict.

**Protection of civilians.** The vast majority of Lebanese strongly believe civilians should be shielded during wartime, an attitude based primarily on religious beliefs and conceptions of human rights.

- Given the chance to name actions by combatants that should not be allowed, only 3 per cent of respondents say that “everything is allowed in war”.

- More than two-thirds of respondents (68 per cent) say combatants should attack only the enemy and leave civilians alone — a viewpoint echoed in focus group discussions and interviews. There is almost unanimous agreement that certain actions — random shelling in civilian areas and attacks on women and children — are out of bounds.

- Asked why combatants should not take actions that threaten civilians, 71 per cent cite moral norms (“it's wrong”), while 25 per cent give a more pragmatic reason (“it just causes too many problems”).

- Of those who say actions by combatants against civilians are wrong, almost equal numbers (57 and 56 per cent, respectively) cite religion and human rights (“freedom from being attacked”) as their reasoning.

- Weapons that unfairly or indiscriminately target civilians are rejected by Lebanese across religious and ethnic lines. Nuclear and chemical weapons top the list, but weapons intimately familiar to Lebanese — including landmines, cluster bombs and car bombs — are mentioned by significant minorities.
Attacks on non-combatants. Despite their professed beliefs, 15 years of extraordinarily violent war and a destructive cycle of hatred and revenge has left a significant minority of the Lebanese people open to attacks on civilians.

- While a majority say combatants should avoid civilians completely, almost one-third (29 per cent) take a more pragmatic view, saying combatants should “avoid civilians as much as possible”. In focus group discussions and interviews, participants say the line between civilians and combatants became too blurred to distinguish between the two.

- Almost one-third (32 per cent) of respondents justify as “part of war” attacks by combatants on populated villages, even when told the attacks would kill many civilians. Twenty-three per cent sanction depriving the civilian population of food, medicine or water in order to weaken the enemy. In contrast, only 13 per cent of respondents are willing to sanction attacks on inanimate objects, such as religious and historical monuments.

- Respondents draw a clear distinction between attacking civilians who voluntarily aid the enemy and those who are forced to help. Respondents are five times more likely to sanction attacks on civilians who voluntarily transport ammunition and almost four times as likely to sanction attacks on civilians who voluntarily provide food and shelter to combatants.

- Respondents who took sides during the war or experienced serious consequences are much more likely to sanction actions that threaten civilians.

Prisoners at risk. The vast majority of Lebanese strongly believe that prisoners should be properly treated. But the survey reveals that respondents have little trouble abandoning their beliefs when confronted with hypothetical life-or-death scenarios.

- Seventy-seven per cent reject the proposition that captured combatants deserve to die and a similar number (78 per cent) say they do not approve of killing prisoners if the other side were doing so.

- More than two-thirds (67 per cent) say a captured enemy combatant cannot be subjected to torture to obtain military information. But more than one in four Lebanese disagree.

- More than four out of five respondents believe prisoners are entitled to contact their relatives and be visited by a representative of an independent organization. Ninety-two per cent name the ICRC as that organization.

Internationalization of the war. Constant interventions by foreign armies and international organizations have left Lebanese bitter about and distrustful of international institutions and outside powers. Respondents, however, are familiar with — and supportive of — international aid organizations.

- Despite intense international involvement in their country’s war, almost one-third of Lebanese have not heard of the Geneva Conventions. Of those who were familiar with them (56 per cent), 37 per cent could accurately describe them.

- Almost one-half of respondents (48 per cent) believe the Geneva Conventions make no real difference in war, while 43 per cent say they can help prevent wars from getting worse. In-depth interviews reveal admiration for the purpose of the Geneva Conventions, but little faith in their efficacy.
· Those respondents who have personally experienced negative consequences of the war or are pessimistic about the possibility of a lasting peace are far less likely to believe in the efficacy of the Geneva Conventions. Only 18 per cent of those who have been imprisoned say the Conventions can help in war, versus 72 per cent who say they make no difference.

· The Red Cross is extraordinarily well known in Lebanon. Virtually everyone surveyed—97 per cent—properly identified the red cross emblem.

· Lebanese consider that the red cross emblem protects the wounded (24 per cent), civilians (12 per cent) and prisoners of war (6 per cent). But it is mainly seen as protecting those who care for the vulnerable. Seventy-three per cent associate the red cross emblem with the protection of Red Cross staff, medical personnel, buildings and vehicles.

· Nearly half (48 per cent) of respondents mention the ICRC/Red Cross as the institution that plays the biggest role in helping civilians, a finding that holds true across regions. The UN and international humanitarian organizations are mentioned by about one in four respondents.
The war convulsed Lebanese society. The issues that inflamed the war and the situation in southern Lebanon are issues that go to the root of the Lebanese polity — national identity, religious tolerance, power sharing, national sovereignty and the future of Palestine. The sheer number of actors in the war — from state security and irregular forces, formal and guerrilla armies to foreign allies — was enough to create a chaotic situation in which the war was fought either in the cities or the countryside, or both, on a daily basis.

The war, accordingly, affected almost everyone. The extent to which the civilian population lived with the daily threat of war and the war’s effects is simply astonishing. More than three-quarters of the people surveyed say they lived in areas where the war took place. Nearly a third lived under enemy control (22 per cent living in areas controlled by the enemy and 5 per cent were imprisoned by the enemy). In addition, nearly one in six people (16 per cent) report that they directly participated in the war as combatants.

The intensity and extent of the suffering people endured are almost unimaginable. Three out of every 10 people lost a member of their family in the war and 60 per cent lost contact with a close relative. Nearly half (47 per cent) suffered serious damage to their property and nearly a third (31 per cent) had their houses looted. Forty-three per cent had to leave home and live elsewhere. More than three in five Lebanese (62 per cent) say they felt humiliated during the war. Many felt the impact of the war in its most direct forms: 14 per cent were wounded; 12 per cent were tortured; 7 per cent report the sexual assault of an acquaintance; and 6 per cent were kidnapped or taken hostage. (See Figure 1.)
In the focus groups, participants are particularly bitter when discussing the loss of family members and the torture and kidnapping of civilians, many of whom were killed or imprisoned on the grounds of their religion or association with the opposing side, often on the basis of their name or colour of their identification card. Checkpoints were set up at the borders of the myriad zones of control throughout Beirut and its suburbs where people of differing backgrounds were often beaten, kidnapped or killed. The real threat of being killed just because of one’s identification was noted many times in every focus group as one of the worst aspects of the war.

I remember an incident that happened to me [on] the Black Saturday, where I was standing on one of the checkpoints. I was 14 years old, when a service car stopped. I started to check their IDs when I discovered that one of the passengers was a Muslim. I immediately returned his ID and asked the driver to [drive] away. I knew that if I told that this person was Muslim, it would have been his end. (FG, ex-combatants, Jounieh)

We stopped naming our children Maron because it might cause him to get killed at the checkpoints... Others... used to remove their family names from their identification cards because it reflected their religion. (FG, displaced persons, Beirut)

It is no wonder, then, that the Lebanese war experience is best conveyed by this cluster of words: hateful (47 per cent), humiliating (46 per cent) and horrible (43 per cent). (See Figure 2.)

![FIGURE 2](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personal description of the war</th>
<th>47%</th>
<th>46%</th>
<th>43%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hateful</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humiliating</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horrible</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disruptive</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenging</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exciting</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncertainty</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remote</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confusing</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hopeful</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Powerless</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question: Which two of these words best describe the war for you personally?

In the focus groups, the refrain of madness, destruction and loss recur time and time again.

War is crazy. War is suffering and destruction. (FG, relatives of missing persons, Beirut)
War is destruction... Our children are lost... Our husbands gone... We have nothing... Our houses destroyed... What more can we describe? (FG, relatives of missing persons, Beirut)

War was very sad, it was full of destruction, poverty and torture. The worst thing in the war was that one would go out and never come back. (FG, displaced persons, Beirut)

Civilians enjoyed no protection. In Beirut, busy streets and quiet neighbourhoods alike became zones of urban terror. In the south, the air attacks in the foothills and seaside towns seemed to seek out civilians rather than serve a military purpose. Most focus group participants had some grisly experience to relate:

The combatants used to enter civilian areas and burn houses and kill civilians just to show the other side they are there. (FG, young adults, Beirut)

The Israeli Army ruined our boats by shooting at them. They have also beaten me and my brother. Why did they do so? (FG, fishermen, Tyre)

I remember it as if it were yesterday. My husband and I took the ground when the shelling started. I remember feeling warm water on my body. I touched the water and it turned to blood. I sank in blood... I could not sleep for more than an hour without thinking about it. (FG, war-wounded, Q’ana)

As mentioned earlier, the majority of Lebanese (62 per cent) say they felt humiliated during the war. Several also elaborated on this during the in-depth interviews.

Of course, we all felt humiliated. For example, we left our houses; we left our interests, our jobs; we lost part of our families. We moved from one village to the other. We slept in the open air. There is nothing more humiliating. (IDI, disabled man, Beirut)

I feel humiliated every day... even after the end of the war when I find there is still a soldier wearing a suit different from that of my army and being able to stop me in the street and ask about my ID... (IDI, woman, Achrafieh)

There are nevertheless a sizeable number who regard the war in a positive light: 13 per cent feel that the war was challenging; 6 per cent think it was exciting; and 3 per cent see some hope in the war. Some of the participants in the focus groups and interviews regard the experience as sowing the seeds of a new nationalism which incorporates two strains of thought: the need and hope for creating a Lebanon where citizenship takes precedence over confessional diversity, and the imperative of unity against outside powers:

At least the Lebanese should understand that this country is his. He should put his hand in his brother’s hand. They should not let any strange power profit from it. (IDI, paramedic, southern Lebanon)

There’s a bit of maturity and civil sense and sense of patriotism that appeared among the Lebanese population. (IDI, religious sister, Saida)
In addition, some note the emergence of a better understanding of Lebanon’s geo-political position, while others say the pain and suffering offered an incentive to avoid future wars as a solution to Lebanon’s problems. These are, nevertheless, minority viewpoints.

The war inflicted its injuries and suffering on combatants and non-combatants alike. As one would expect, combatants bore the brunt of imprisonment (24 per cent versus 3 per cent of non-combatants), kidnapping (23 per cent versus 3 per cent), torture (35 per cent versus 7 per cent) and injuries inflicted by the fighting (40 per cent versus 9 per cent). One out of every ten combatants know someone who was raped, compared with just 3 per cent of non-combatants. While a majority of non-combatants (57 per cent) lost contact with a close relative, a much larger percentage (78 per cent) of combatants did so. Just 2 per cent of combatants say they did not have a negative experience during the war, whereas more than 40 per cent suffered six or more such incidents.

The war in Lebanon did not offer special protection for women. Asked how many of a list of 12 negative effects of the war they had experienced, 85 per cent of women say they have been the victim of at least one, compared with 89 per cent of men. Forty-two per cent of women report experiencing more than four such incidents, compared with 47 per cent of men. Although men are twice as likely to have been imprisoned, kidnapped or tortured, there is only a slight difference with respect to being wounded in the fighting (17 per cent of men versus 11 per cent of women), losing a family member (30 per cent each), being forced to leave home (42 per cent versus 44 per cent), serious damage to property (47 per cent each), or loss of contact with a close relative (59 per cent versus 62 per cent).
The meaning of norms

Despite their experiences, it is clear that, at least in principle, the Lebanese recognize that war should have limits. Only 3 per cent of respondents say that “everything is allowed in war”. Only 2 per cent approve of attacking both combatants and civilians. For two-thirds, civilians are out of bounds: 68 per cent believe that it is not acceptable to attack civilians at all. And even though 29 per cent are less absolute and only require combatants to “avoid civilians as much as possible”, the in-depth interview and focus group participants were insistent on the need to avoid civilians at all costs.

When asked what is not permitted in war, there is a strong focus on protecting civilians. A 52 per cent majority believe it is wrong to attack or hurt civilians. Others cite fighting in civilian areas (13 per cent), killing children and the elderly (12 per cent), and killing or raping women (9 per cent). Eleven per cent say that property crimes, such as stealing, should not occur. The violence and bloodshed that took place in civilian areas is clearly a principal feature of the horror of the war in Lebanon, and it is what most people immediately refer to when asked to identify which aspects of the war strike them as fundamentally wrong.

[The fighters] should not have shot people, bombed cars, kidnapped people, burnt houses, and stolen. There is nothing worse than that and the kidnapping was the worst. (FG, relatives of missing persons, Beirut)

The fighters used to enter the shelters and tell all the people inside that they are going to die. The fighters used to queue people with their heads to the wall and shoot them. They were innocent civilians, and the fighters should be in the battlefield. (FG, displaced persons, Beirut)

Indiscriminate shelling and seemingly pointless killings are bitter memories for most of the focus group and in-depth interview participants. In particular, the random nature of this violence has been hard to come to grips with.
Random shelling... and the missiles that caused damage more than anything else. The fighting should be limited only to the battlefield, and only between those who are fighting from the military forces. Children and civilians should not be involved. (FG, ex-combatants, Jounieh)

Fighters should not enter people’s houses and shoot them randomly. (FG, displaced persons, Beirut)

If you are in east Beirut and I am in west Beirut, we should not bomb each other randomly. (FG, fishermen, Tyre)

The random shelling... did not distinguish anyone. (IDI, disabled man, Beirut)

The focus on protecting civilians is also linked to the shared conviction that there are certain types of weapons that should not be used in war. Most Lebanese share the opposition to car bombs that an ex-combatant from Beirut articulated: “I consider it a weapon against civilians and not a weapon against the combatants.” Two-thirds of Lebanese (68 per cent) say that nuclear weapons should not be allowed in war. One young man interviewed said nuclear weapons should not be allowed “because it doesn’t hit one person but hits a whole environment — houses, people and streets. Many innocent people would die.” (IDI, young man, Hazmieh) Thirty-four per cent believe landmines are unacceptable, and 31 per cent mention cluster bombs. Finally, a majority (54 per cent) mention chemical weapons as off-limits.

When survey respondents are asked why certain practices should not be allowed during war, 71 per cent cite moral norms (“it’s wrong”) and 25 per cent demonstrate pragmatism (“it just causes too many problems”). Fifty-seven per cent of those who say “it’s wrong” refer to religion as the basis for the norm, 56 per cent to human rights, 46 per cent to their personal code and 37 per cent to Lebanese law. Among the three religions, Muslims most often cite religion as the basis for their convictions (71 per cent), compared with 53 per cent of the Christians and 45 per cent of the Druze.

FIGURE 4
Basis for the norm
(per cent of total population responding “it’s wrong”)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basis for the norm</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Against your religion</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against human rights</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against your personal code</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against the law</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against what most people here believe</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against your culture</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question: When you say it’s wrong, is it primarily wrong because it is...?
In the focus groups, however, the overwhelming response to why certain practices are wrong is based on a cluster of moral values: humanity, dignity, innocence and fairness.

Fighters can fight each other. But what wrong have the people in streets done to be kidnapped?... They are innocent. They are just walking in the streets. Fighters are acting against humanity. (FG, relatives of missing persons, Beirut)

War should take place in the battlefield and on the frontier between countries, but not... by shooting between one house and the next house. (FG, displaced persons, Beirut)

Those who do not have the ability to defend themselves should not be involved in war, such as children or old people or women or other unarmed civilians in their houses. There is a big contradiction. Someone armed against an unarmed person. This is not fair. (FG, ex-combatants, Jounieh)

If you have a weapon and your enemy does not, you should not shoot him. (FG, fishermen, Tyre)

Many Lebanese base their opposition to war crimes on their understanding of human rights, which to them focus on a very basic concept: the freedom from being attacked.

[Human rights is] his right to live free and happy. To feel safe and confident no one will attack him. (FG, war-wounded, Q’ana)

Human rights — each one of us has the right to live and should not be attacked if he is staying inside his own house. (FG, young adults, Beirut)

Humans should live in dignity and should be protected by the State against kidnapping, hurting, or burning houses. (FG, relatives of missing persons, Beirut)

More than the rest of Lebanon, Beirut during the civil war was a macabre and disheartening place, where tension was thick, danger was constant, and destruction was all around. This finding is further reinforced when one considers that even though just a quarter of all respondents have a pragmatic approach to certain practices in war (“it just causes too many problems”), more residents of Beirut actually choose this reasoning over the morally based “it’s wrong” response (50 to 48 per cent). It is the only group to do so — indeed, the only subgroup in which more than 30 per cent give this response.

Among those Lebanese who oppose certain war practices for pragmatic reasons, residents of Beirut are much more likely than the rest of the population to say that they just cause too much destruction. Nearly three in five surveyed in Beirut (58 per cent) mention this option, compared with just 46 per cent of the whole population. They are also 10 per cent more likely to cite hate and division as reasons why certain actions just cause too many problems (73 to 63 per cent). Roughly a third of those surveyed in Beirut and pragmatists as a whole cite psychological damage.
Attacking non-combatants

On a general level, there is almost complete acceptance that attacks on non-combatants are out of bounds. But in answer to questions detailing more specific situations, responses reflect the grim realities of people’s war experiences. Although two-thirds of Lebanese (68 per cent) hold the view that only combatants may be attacked during war, almost a third adopt a more lax standard — “avoid civilians as much as possible”. In all circumstances, a majority of Lebanese also believe it is wrong for combatants to attack civilians.

Significant minorities of the public, however, find tolerable a number of actions that might kill or hurt civilians in order to stop or weaken the enemy. More than one in five respondents (22 per cent) say that it is acceptable to attack civilians who voluntarily give food and shelter to enemy combatants. Almost a quarter (23 per cent) would allow the civilian population to go without food, medicine or water if it weakened the enemy. Twenty-seven per cent would allow the use of landmines to stop enemy combatants, even if civilians could step on them accidentally. And nearly a third (32 per cent) would attack enemy combatants in populated towns and villages even if many women and children would be killed.

FIGURE 5
Acceptance of war practices
(per cent of total population responding)
In stark contrast to the figures presented above, 82 per cent say attacking religious and historical monuments is wrong and not part of war, underscoring another critical point about the war in Lebanon — the importance of religious symbols and the centrality of religion to the war.
Lebanese generally believe that captured enemy combatants should be treated properly. Fully three-quarters of respondents (77 per cent) say they do not believe a captured combatant ever deserves to die. Similarly, 78 per cent say they would not approve of killing prisoners if the other side were doing it. Sixty-seven per cent say that a captured enemy combatant cannot be subjected to torture to obtain important military information. Three out of five say they would help or save an injured or surrendering combatant who had killed someone close to them. Eighty per cent of the respondents believe that captured combatants are entitled to contact their relatives and 83 per cent believe that they must be allowed a visit from a representative of an independent organization. (See Figure 6.)

When asked who should be permitted to visit, an overwhelming majority, 92 per cent believe ICRC representatives should be allowed access to prisoners. This is followed by a small majority (54 per cent) who believe representatives of human rights groups should be admitted. Other representatives are seen as less acceptable: only about a third (36 per cent) would allow a UN person to visit, and fewer than one in five would allow a religious cleric/minister (17 per cent) or a journalist (15 per cent) to visit.

When people are asked to predict their behaviour in several hypothetical situations, support for these norms begins to fray. Indeed, a significant number of Lebanese indicate a willingness to support the killing, torture or mistreatment of prisoners, especially if similar actions are performed by the other side. Nearly one in five (17 per cent) would approve the killing of prisoners if the other side were doing it (compared with 12 per cent who say a captured combatant may deserve to die). Roughly one in four would not save the life of a surrendering enemy combatant who had killed someone close to them (24 per cent) or help a wounded enemy combatant who had killed someone close to them (27 per cent). (See Figure 7.)

In the focus groups and in-depth interviews, respondents often struggle with the hypothetical situations presented. Even though most would like to believe they would help or save an injured or surrendering enemy combatant — even if he had killed someone close to them — they acknowledge what a difficult choice that could be in the heat of battle. As one focus group participant said, “You will have a
conflict deep inside between humanity and animal logic, where your beliefs and values would urge you to save your prisoner, while the other side would urge you to kill him.” (FG, ex-detainees, Tyre) Even a religious sister from Saida said, “Theoretically, yes [I would save him], because it’s my principle, but practically I don’t know. I do not know my reaction to an Israeli combatant.”

Reasons for not killing prisoners ranged from the moral to the pragmatic — from “thou shalt not kill” to safeguarding the prisoner because of his military value.

Injured prisoners are harmless and cannot kill anybody. Prisoners should be saved. (FG, war-wounded, Q’ana)

A prisoner should not be killed, no matter what the case is. (FG, displaced persons, Beirut)

I imagine it would be a hard thing, but I would help him and cure him. Then I would take him so that he could receive a fair trial. (IDI, ex-combatant, Beirut)

The captured or the prisoner is a weapon, a powerful weapon. We can exchange him. It is necessary to keep him. (IDI, disabled man, Beirut)

I would arrest him and try to take information out of him. (FG, young adults, Beirut)

Those who would not help or save an injured or surrendering combatant are often driven by revenge. As one man in Tyre remarked, “This fighter saw our children and women, nevertheless he fought us, and therefore he is a killer and I should shoot him.” They also say they would treat Lebanese sympathizers worse than captured foreign enemies. As one ex-combatant said, “Because the Lebanese is a traitor prisoner, I treat him more severely... his punishment will be a lesson for others.” A man disabled by the war noted, “In all countries, the traitor would be punished differently than a prisoner — maybe he would be executed.”

This quest for revenge, and the intensity of it with regard to one’s fellow citizens helps explain the level of brutality in the civil war — and much of the tolerance of attacks on civilians and mistreatment of prisoners. In some senses, the need for retribution is not surprising. Fifty per cent of those who were under enemy control or imprisoned were personally mistreated and at least 20 per cent were physically injured. Only 6 per cent of those imprisoned or placed under enemy control report being treated properly.
Explaining the divergence between norms and practice

Although the numbers who support a more aggressive response to life-or-death scenarios are a large minority, there can be no doubt that the vast majority of Lebanese, irrespective of religious and community affiliation, strongly believe that it is wrong to attack civilians and to mistreat captured combatants. But the war itself attests to a different reality — there was extensive fighting in civilian areas, which led to forced evacuation from homes, damage to property, looting, kidnapping, torture, humiliation and rape.

Many people volunteer pragmatic reasons for why combatants attack civilians. The choices made from a list of 10 possible explanations suggest that respondents believe combatants are aware of the laws that govern wartime behaviour and believe that they disregard them for various reasons. Most respondents believe hatred of the other side (33 per cent), a determination to win at any cost (29 per cent) or being instructed by their superiors to do so (28 per cent) are what provoke attacks on civilians. Some believe combatants simply don’t care about the laws or that they lose all reason during war (26 per cent each) or they are under the influence of alcohol or drugs (18 per cent). Only one in ten Lebanese believe that combatants don’t know there are rules that govern behaviour during war.

In the in-depth interviews and focus groups, participants are very honest about why they would accept attacks on civilians. As one woman from Achrafieh stated flatly, “...There isn’t any law in war which prevents these things from happening. Everything is allowed in war.” Indeed, it appears that the principle of reciprocity for wrongdoing is what now takes precedence, a sentiment held particularly strongly in southern Lebanon, where there is a greater sense of helplessness in the face of Israeli power.

I don’t object to [killing civilians] because it is part of war. (IDI, mother of prisoner, southern Lebanon)

Just as they attacked us, we should attack them. (IDI, woman, Q’ana)
More often, however, the voluntary nature of civilian support to combatants is what justifies acceptance of attacks on them. While 37 per cent approve of attacks on civilians who voluntarily transport ammunition, the figure drops dramatically to 7 per cent if civilians are doing it under duress. Likewise, 22 per cent say it is acceptable to attack civilians who voluntarily give food and shelter to the enemy, yet just 6 per cent feel that way if that aid is secured by force.

FIGURE 9
Why combatants attack civilians
(per cent of total population responding)

Question: Which two of the following reasons best explain why combatants attack or hurt civilians, even though many people say it is not okay or maybe against the law. Is it because they...

One young adult in a focus group thought that attacking civilians who voluntarily provide food and shelter was “right in the case of war”. An ex-detainee summed it up well when he said, “If they voluntarily provide the combatants with food then they become part of war and are no longer civilians. They [are] the back line.” The war-wounded, too, rely on the “soldiers in civvies”4 defence: “If civilians voluntarily provided the combatants with food and shelter, that means they support them.” When pressed, they go on to say that “the civilian supporting the combatant is a combatant. The resistance is the people.” This stance is summed up by an ex-detainee:

Imam Ali once said: ‘You have three friends and three enemies. Your friends are your friend and friend’s friend and enemy’s enemy, while your enemies are your enemy and your friend’s enemy and your enemy’s friend.’

The severity of the response varies depending on the particular action or the perceived level of complicity. As one ex-combatant related in an interview, “If this person was transporting ammunition, even if he were not a combatant, I [would] attack him. I would not attack him if he was transporting food.” (IDI, ex-combatant, Beirut)

Confessional violence and factionalism are also at the root of these answers. Once again, hatred emerges as the dominant motivator in the war in Lebanon. “Hateful” is the word chosen most often

---

4 i.e., combatants dressed in civilian clothing.
to best describe the war (47 per cent), and almost two-thirds (63 per cent) of the Lebanese who say there should be limits to what combatants can do in war because of the problems their actions generate believe these acts only perpetuate hate and division in the nation. Finally, a plurality of respondents (33 per cent) believe that hatred of the other side is what drives combatants to kill civilians. This intense hatred has produced such emotional excess that several focus group and in-depth interview participants likened combatants to animals that have no reason.

The civil war is usually run by personal emotions, that is why there was no limit of the war. (FG, ex-detainees, Tyre)

If [as in the war] each one of us takes his right by force, we shall become like animals. (FG, LRCS first-aiders, Beirut)

What we have seen in war was animal instincts and no respect for human beings. (FG, ex-detainees, Tyre)

I want to live in peace not in a jungle. (FG, young adults, Beirut)

Because it is difficult to come to terms with the devastating impact religious and cultural differences among Lebanon’s confessionals have had on the country, there is a collective readiness to deny responsibility and avoid casting blame for actions during the war. Many describe the war as evolving into a series of mindless retributions for real and perceived wrongs, propelled by the inertia of hate often aimed at particular groups but carried out indiscriminately. Many respondents choose reasons that absolve the perpetrators of responsibility for their actions: they were told to do so (28 per cent), they lose all sense during war (26 per cent), they are under the influence of alcohol and drugs (18 per cent), or they are scared or too young (11 per cent). (See Figure 9.) Nearly four out of five (79 per cent) agree that too many children fought in the war who were too young and too irresponsible to become combatants. In the focus group discussions and in-depth interviews, participants elaborate at length on why they choose not to assign blame for the atrocities committed during the war.

...The young men fighting in the Lebanese war were under drugs, and when they woke up they did not know what had happened... The combatants had orders to execute and were not free to choose. (IDI, ex-combatant, Beirut).

Fighters who [killed civilians] in Lebanon were pushed by their superiors. They were teenagers, and none of them were above 20 years old.” (FG, relatives of missing persons, Beirut)

The leadership of the parties used these poor people who fought with dignity. (FG, ex-detainees, Tyre)

Those who were killing people during the war were hired. (FG, fishermen, Tyre)

I think the combatants were not aware of what they were doing. They gave them drugs to brainwash them and do whatever they ordered them to do. (FG, displaced persons, Beirut)

I don’t think these fighters fought for themselves. The main reason was money. They were tempted with money to kill civilians. (FG, relatives of missing persons, Beirut)
The combatants in war were the systems that wanted to reach their goals, and used weak people... We Arabs always carry slogans and can easily be used as a tool by others to accomplish their goals. And for sure, money is the major factor. (FG, LRCS first-aiders, Beirut)

FIGURE 10
Impact of sidedness
(per cent of total population responding)

The effect that allegiance to a cause or side in battle has on a person’s willingness to cross the line that separates combatants and civilians is also important in coming to a better understanding of the divergence between norms and practice. Respondents who took sides during the war in Lebanon are much more likely to sanction attacks on civilians. A respondent who identified with a side in the war is almost three times as likely to sanction the use of landmines near civilians (43 per cent to 15 per cent), twice as likely to sanction the kidnapping of civilians (34 per cent to 17 per cent) and twice as likely not to help a wounded enemy combatant (38 per cent to 19 per cent). They are twice as likely to accept attacks on civilians who provide food and shelter to the enemy (20 per cent to 10 per cent), almost twice as likely to allow civilians to be deprived of food and water (38 per cent to 20 per cent), or to sanction enemy attacks on populated villages and towns (45 per cent to 23 per cent). (See Figure 10.)

The willingness of respondents to accommodate what they regard as the realities of war also sheds light on why the norms and practice of war diverge so radically in Lebanon. Although the vast majority of respondents believe that it is not right to attack civilians (68 per cent), almost a third of people (29 per cent) qualify that by saying “avoid civilians as much as possible”. When specific situations are examined, the difference in attitudes depends in part on whether respondents believe soldiers and fighters ought to avoid civilians as much as possible. Those who say “avoid civilians as much as possible” are nearly three times more likely than those who say civilians should be left alone to sanction attacks on...
civilians who give food and shelter to the enemy (22 per cent compared with 8 per cent). Twice as many of those who say civilians should be avoided “as much as possible” agree that combatants can attack civilians who transport ammunition, attack the enemy in populated villages and towns, deprive civilians of food, medicine and water, or sanction the use of landmines.5

While the ability of such a large minority to shrug off civilian casualties is startling, there is perhaps a simple explanation. The line between combatants and civilians became too blurred to distinguish between the two. The difficulty in discerning the difference was discussed at length in the focus groups and in-depth interviews.

It is hard to differentiate between civilians and combatants, especially when you are attacking military areas... you cannot say it is wrong. If the civilians were staying in the military camps along with the combatants, it would be hard to differentiate, while if they were in separate locations I can differentiate... (FG, female ex-combatants, Jounieh)

If it happens that there are civilians in the locations providing the combatants with food and supplies, then they are considered as part of war and not civilians. (FG, fishermen, Tyre)

The civilians should not be mixed with soldiers, but when there is war, the streets would be part of what is imposed on everybody. (IDI, ex-combatant, Beirut)

---

5 32 per cent of those saying civilians should be “avoided as much as possible” say combatants can attack civilians who transport ammunition, compared with 16 per cent of those saying combatants should leave civilians alone. The other findings are: sanction the use of landmines (39 to 19 per cent); can attack the enemy in populated villages and towns (44 to 24 per cent), and can deprive civilians of food, medicine and water (36 to 20 per cent).
In the civil war, the combatant is with the civilian in the same building. It was difficult to avoid the civilians... It was inevitable to attack civilians. (IDI, paramedic, southern Lebanon)

The only focus group to resist this exception is the war-wounded in Q’ana, who personally experienced the shelling. They were insistent: “We never attack civilians even if they provide combatants with food and shelter... civilians do not contribute in war, therefore they should not be hurt.”

There is also a correlation between the intensity of direct experience of the war and the propensity to accept attacks on civilians. In other words, a person who was involved in or directly affected by the war, whether as a combatant or a victim, is more likely to permit attacks on civilians than those who were not involved in the war. Combatants in particular have a much more hardened attitude towards attacking civilians. Indeed, a majority (57 per cent) would plant landmines even though civilians could step on them or attack the enemy in populated villages or towns despite the possibility of civilian casualties, or deprive civilians of food, medicine or water in order to weaken the enemy (52 per cent). As Figure 12 shows, this broader band of tolerance for civilian attacks is also true for other forms of war experience.6

As previously noted, another war experience that has left its victims scarred and more callous about the conduct of war is imprisonment. Five per cent of those surveyed had been imprisoned by enemy forces, and it is clear that many prisoner experiences were particularly loathsome. Only one in ten were allowed contact with a representative from an independent organization to check on his or her well-being. Also, those respondents who had been imprisoned are split on whether civilians should be left alone or only “avoided as much as possible”— 48 per cent support each approach.

FIGURE 12
Impact of war experience
(per cent of population with specific war experiences)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experience</th>
<th>Would not help/save a wounded/surrendering enemy combatant</th>
<th>Depriving civilians of food, medicine or water in order to weaken enemy</th>
<th>Attacking the enemy in populated villages and towns knowing many civilians/women and children would be killed</th>
<th>Planting landmines even though civilians may step on them</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imprisoned</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combatants</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lived under enemy control</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wounded</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serious damage to property</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forced to leave home</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family member killed</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House looted</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total population</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6 Figure 12 demonstrates how people’s experiences during the war affect their views on the treatment of civilians and combatants no longer taking part in the fighting. For example, 57 per cent of combatants believe that it is acceptable to plant landmines, even though civilians may step on them.
Internationalization of the war

As mentioned earlier, the war in Lebanon was a mix of internal and international conflicts, with two foreign armies and an international force, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), operating on Lebanese soil. Although a near majority (47 per cent) believe that UNIFIL has improved the situation for civilians in southern Lebanon, most of those surveyed (51 per cent) say that its presence has made no difference to them personally.7

Given the degree of foreign and international involvement in the conflict, most people are aware of a number of international aid organizations working in Lebanon and almost everyone is familiar with the Red Cross. Yet almost a third do not know of the Geneva Conventions. Of the 56 per cent who have heard of them, about 37 per cent can accurately describe their content. Still, a large plurality do know that there are laws that prohibit combatants from depriving civilians of food, medicine and water in order to weaken the enemy (48 per cent) and attacking the enemy in populated villages and towns knowing many civilians would be killed (46 per cent). (See Figure 13.)

![FIGURE 13](image)

Knowledge of laws
(per cent of total population responding “yes”)

| Question: Are there any laws that say you can’t do that, even if it would help weaken the enemy? |
|------------------------------|-----------------|
| Attacking the enemy in populated villages or towns knowing many civilians/women and children would be killed | 46% |
| Depriving civilians of food, medicine or water in order to weaken the enemy | 48% |

Just 43 per cent believe that the Geneva Conventions prevent wars from getting worse, while 48 per cent believe that they make no real difference. (See Figure 14.) There are many competing explanations for the deep-seated pessimism about the Geneva Conventions in Lebanon. It may be the length of the war — 15 years — or the fact that the situation in the south is still not resolved.

This pessimism is also reflected in the responses of those who suffered during the war, their direct experience being interpreted as evidence of failure. Seventy-two per cent of those imprisoned feel that the Geneva Conventions do not make any material difference, compared with just 18 per cent who feel they do. Sixty-seven per cent of those wounded in the fighting are sceptical of the efficacy of the Geneva Conventions, as opposed to 28 per cent who believe they make a difference. By contrast, those respondents who were neither imprisoned nor lived under enemy control are more optimistic — 43 per cent believe the Geneva Conventions prevent wars from getting worse as opposed to 38 per cent who think they make no real difference.

The prospect for the future also affects how people respond to this question: more than half of those who think peace will last (53 per cent) say they believe in the efficacy of the Geneva Conventions, compared with 36 per cent of those who fear the future may bring more war. Of this last group, 56 per cent think that the Geneva Conventions make no real difference. The regional differences also tell a story:

---

7 Thirty-six per cent believe UNIFIL is making no difference in general for civilians in Lebanon and 10 per cent think it is making things worse. Thirty-five per cent believe UNIFIL is making things better for them personally and 5 per cent believe it is making things worse.
respondents in Beirut strongly believe that the Geneva Conventions do not prevent wars from getting worse (68 per cent compared with 25 per cent who think they do), while 58 per cent of respondents in southern Lebanon believe that the Geneva Conventions prevent excess in war as opposed to 41 per cent who believe they do not.

**FIGURE 14**

| Geneva Conventions prevent wars from getting worse | 43% |
| Geneva Conventions make no real difference | 48% |
| Don’t know/refused | 9% |

Question: Do you think the existence of the Geneva Conventions prevents wars from getting worse or does it make no real difference?

In the in-depth interviews, several people elaborate on the perceived ineffectiveness of the Geneva Conventions:

The Geneva Conventions... consist of respectable and beautiful legislation. These laws exist, but the way of applying them is not yet found... (IDI, religious sister, Saida)

The Geneva Conventions forbid mistreating prisoners... but in Lebanon it was rarely applicable... When you are dealing with an organized army, in general, the person is arrested and put in jail and when the war ends they exchange prisoners or something like that. With political parties, this didn't exist. (IDI, young man, Hazmieh)

What’s the benefit of law if it is not respected? There is no one in the world who is respecting the laws during war. (IDI, ex-combatant, Beirut)

I have not heard of any organization with such qualities [stopping violations of the rules of war]. I have only witnessed the hazards and sufferings of this war. (IDI, mother of prisoner, southern Lebanon)

The UNO [United Nations] is beautiful and it’s international, but it didn’t have enough power to... force anybody to respect a certain law. (IDI, young man, Hazmieh)

They [UNIFIL] are doing like the ostrich who hides its face under the ground and cannot see the main problems happening. (FG, ex-combatants, Jounieh)

Whatever their views on the efficacy of international law, slightly more than half of the population (51 per cent) believe that there are rules and laws that, if broken during war, the violators should be punished. Only 14 per cent believe that those who break the rules should not be punished. But only a bare majority support punishment; more than one-third (35 per cent) say they are unsure. These numbers
may again reflect an unwillingness to deal with the responsibility for the crimes that were committed by Lebanese against Lebanese. As a woman from Achrafieh stated, “...can you know who did what or who killed who or who wounded who when the war comes to an end? In my opinion we don’t have the right to punish or judge.”

Region is important when it comes to views on punishment. In Beirut, where most of the civil war atrocities occurred, only 37 per cent support punishment. But a very different picture is painted in the south, where the majority (58 per cent) support punishment and only 11 per cent do not. Respondents in the south are clearly thinking of punishment of an external enemy — Israel — that is occupying their land, rather than punishing their neighbours.

Asked to identify the basis for the rules under which criminals should be punished, a majority of respondents focus on international law (31 per cent) and humanitarian law (21 per cent). Fewer mention Lebanese laws (16 per cent) or religious principles (7 per cent).

![FIGURE 15](image-url)

**War crimes**

(per cent of total population responding)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question: Are there rules that are so important that, if broken during war, the person who broke them should be punished?

(per cent of those who responded “yes”)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rule Type</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International law</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian law</td>
<td></td>
<td>21%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanese laws</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious principles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN laws/rules</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lahi laws</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any kind of law</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question: What are these rules based on?  

Less than a majority, however, believe an international court should be responsible for punishing wrongdoers. When it comes to enforcement, Lebanese are equally divided between enforcement by an international court (43 per cent) and domestic enforcement by either the Lebanese government or the Lebanese courts (43 per cent in total). Indeed, in addition to the perceived lack of efficacy of international

---

*Responses were open-ended, that is, respondents were not given a list of options from which to choose.*
institutions in preventing crimes against civilians during the war, there is strong scepticism about the right of an international court to punish wrongdoers.

Part of this scepticism is rooted in people's beliefs about whom they think should be punished. Time and again, people say that “the superiors responsible should be the ones to be punished”. (FG, relatives of missing persons, Beirut) This follows from their belief that the combatants were pushed into the war by other, more powerful forces. As an in-depth interviewee said, “[The combatants] were put in circumstances they were not able to analyse. The ones to be punished are the leaders because their responsibility is stronger and they have placed them in circumstances until they became criminals.” (IDI, religious sister, Saida) However, they believe those who are guilty — the leaders — are the only ones who are in a position to see that punishment is enforced, and an international court is powerless to arrest them.

Moreover, there is deep distrust of international organizations and institutions in Lebanon — born of a sense that the Western powers enforce a double standard with regard to war crimes. A large number of Lebanese are reluctant to put the matter in the hands of an international court, as the following exchange with a former detainee in Tyre illustrates:

Who do you think should punish the criminals of war and take decisions? In Nuremberg trial, for example, we saw what happened with the Nazis. Let me ask what happened with the Air Force fighter who threw the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In half an hour he did what the Nazis did in years.

[Moderator: Do you mean you don’t trust the international trials?]

It is nonsense... When Gerry Adams promised he’ll stop the violence, the President of the United States himself went and met him... On the other hand, Ibrahim [sic] Ocalan visited all European countries and told them he was going to give up the fight... they did not listen to him. Why didn’t they accept Ocalan’s proposal to finish the war, even if he was guilty?

(IDI, former detainee, Tyre)

Even though they are sceptical of international justice, the pain and suffering of the war experience in Lebanon trumps any reservations about their desire for more international aid to help stop the actual commission of violations. A strong majority of Lebanese (69 per cent) say they would like to see more intervention in Lebanon from the international community to deal with violations against civilians and provide assistance to those in need. This is true even for combatants (55 per cent who want more intervention), those who were imprisoned, tortured, or kidnapped (from 55 to 58 per cent), those who supported a side (65 per cent) and all three major ethnic or religious groups.
The role of the ICRC/Red Cross

Virtually everyone surveyed in Lebanon — 97 per cent — could properly identify the red cross on a white background. The red cross is seen as an emblem that protects the vulnerable — the wounded (24 per cent), civilians (12 per cent), the sick and disabled (9 per cent), prisoners of war (6 per cent), and all who need help (11 per cent). But the emblem is seen primarily as protecting those who care for the vulnerable — ICRC/Red Cross personnel (48 per cent), medical personnel (11 per cent), and medical buildings and emergency vehicles (14 per cent).

Residents surveyed in Beirut, in particular, are extremely knowledgeable about the mission of the Red Cross. Nearly three in four people in Beirut say the red cross emblem protects the organization’s personnel; 6 per cent say it protects the wounded and 5 per cent say it protects civilians. In southern Lebanon, 30 per cent identify the red cross emblem as protecting civilians.

Also, while the ICRC/Red Cross is mentioned by a near majority (51 per cent) of Lebanese as the organization people can turn to if civilians are attacked or cut off from basic necessities, just 28 per cent of Beirut residents say the same; in fact, the same number, 28 per cent, say they can’t turn to anybody. By contrast, about two-thirds of residents in southern Lebanon and Nabatieh say they can turn to the ICRC/Red Cross, with 10 per cent or less saying there is no one they can turn to. For example, as was noted in an in-depth interview, “The International Red Cross in Nabatieh. They helped us a lot. One of [their members] called [to check] on prisoners’ status. We held meetings with its members.” (IDI, religious sister, Saida) (See Figure 17.)
Question: Let me ask what can be done if during the war civilian areas are attacked, towns or villages are cut off from food, water, medical supplies and electricity? To whom would you turn to get help or to be protected?

![FIGURE 17](image)

*Turn to for help* (per cent of total population responding)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ICRC/Red Cross</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can’t turn to anybody</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian organizations</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influential people</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN organizations</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanese government</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local government leaders</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International organizations</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious leaders</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charitable organizations</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanese army</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights Committee</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caritas</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relatives/family</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know/refused</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question: I’m now going to describe different kinds of people and organizations. Please tell me which two of these have played the biggest role during the war to stop this (civilian areas being cut off from food, water, medical supplies and electricity).

![FIGURE 18](image)

*Biggest role* (per cent of total population responding) (top two responses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The ICRC or Red Cross</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International humanitarian organizations</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The United Nations</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other countries</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nobody did anything</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious leaders</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government leaders</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists and the media</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military and combatants</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International criminal court</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know/refused</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Overall, it is clear that in Lebanon the ICRC/Red Cross is seen as the institution playing the biggest role in helping civilians who are cut off from essentials such as food, water, medical supplies and electricity. A 48 per cent plurality mention the ICRC/Red Cross as playing the biggest role, and this is true in all regions and among combatants and non-combatants alike. By contrast, only 25 per cent nationwide regard the UN as playing the biggest role. Other international humanitarian organizations are cited by 26 per cent of the public and one in five mention other countries. Interestingly, only 13 per cent say religious leaders played the biggest role — less than the 14 per cent who say nobody did anything. (See Figure 18.)

The suffering inflicted by the war in Lebanon and the present situation in the south has left a deep imprint on all the Lebanese people. The ICRC consultation reveals how that hardship — and the reality of a complex, lengthy war that has swept up civilians without regard to their beliefs — has influenced attitudes towards the limits on war. Lebanon is a place where the ICRC/Red Cross and the international community have a great deal of work ahead of them. Not only does this work involve providing aid and comfort for civilians, prisoners and other victims of war, but it also includes a continuous effort to build consensus for limits in war in a place where those limits have so often broken down.
Annex 1: General methodology

The ICRC’s worldwide consultation on the rules of war, which is the cornerstone of the People on War project, was carried out in 12 countries that have been ravaged by war over the past decades. In each case, the ICRC conducted a public opinion survey with a representative sample of the country’s population and organized in-depth interviews and focus groups with those involved in or directly affected by the conflict.

For comparative purposes, the views of people were also sought in France, Russian Federation, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States on the basis of the opinion survey only.

The consultation was based on three principal research methods:

- A survey of 1,000 (in some cases 1,500) respondents representative of the country’s general population;

- Focus groups (between 8 and 12 depending on the country) allowing a professionally moderated and intensive discussion in small groups;

- In-depth, face-to-face interviews (about 20 in each country) with individuals with specific war experiences.

In almost every case, the ICRC and local Red Cross or Red Crescent staff conducted the interviews, organized the focus groups, including recruitment of participants, and helped with translation/interpreting. Greenberg Research, with a local partner company, developed the sample design for the survey, processed data in electronic form, provided moderators and prepared transcripts.

Opinion survey

Questionnaire. The opinion survey questioned people on their war experiences and views on international humanitarian law. The survey was mainly standardized for all countries, though the wording was modified to reflect each context and to achieve consistent meaning. About 10 per cent of the questions were contextual and in many cases unique to the country. In an additional five countries, the questionnaire was designed to elicit people’s perceptions on war and humanitarian law.

The questionnaires were developed by Greenberg Research, in consultation with the ICRC, on the basis of interviews with humanitarian law experts in the United States and Europe. The survey and questions were pre-tested in Mozambique and Colombia.

Sample design. In each country, interviews were held with 1,000 to 1,500 respondents, selected by a stratified, multistage cluster sampling method. The sample was stratified to ensure representation (500 interviews) from each of the principal conflict-affected geographic areas or ethnic/religious groups. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, this meant some 1,500 interviews (500 from Republika Srpska and 500 each from the Bosniac and Croat areas of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina); in Israel, the occupied territories and the autonomous territories, this meant 1,000 interviews (500 in Israel and 500 in the occupied territories and the autonomous territories). These areas were divided into urban and rural geographic units (strata), to ensure representation of urban and rural populations.

The local partner randomly selected small geographic units within these strata. These units – 100 to 200 in each country – constituted the sampling points for the survey. In each geographic unit, 10 households (though fewer in some countries) were selected using a random route method appropriate to
the country. In some cases, interviewers were provided with a map and a route; in others, interviewers were simply given a route and selection instructions.

Within households, respondents were selected using a Kish grid (a respondent selection key that employs a combination of random numbers, alphabet codes and the number of available members in a household to identify the appropriate respondent) or the birthday criterion (a respondent selection process that employs dates of birth to determine the appropriate respondent). Interviewers were to make three attempts to achieve a completed interview, including locating the respondent elsewhere. In nearly every country, non-response was below 10 per cent.

The demographic distribution of the surveyed respondents was compared with the best available census data on education, age, household type and occupation. Where the sample survey was sharply askew (e.g., too many college-educated or too many young respondents), statistical weights were applied to eliminate the bias.

Interviews carried out by phone reached 755 adults in France, 1,000 in Switzerland, 750 in the United Kingdom and 1,000 in the United States, and 1,000 face-to-face interviews were carried out in the Russian Federation.

Survey administration. In nearly all the countries, the survey was administered by the ICRC, with the assistance of Greenberg Research and a local research partner. Interviews were conducted by Red Cross or Red Crescent staff. Greenberg Research provided training, which typically took two days.

Parallel research. In three of the countries – Colombia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Philippines – Greenberg Research commissioned a parallel quantitative survey, administered by a local research company using professional interviewers, in order to identify patterns of bias. The results of the parallel studies were then compared with the results of the ICRC-administered surveys. The exercise found only a few areas of systematic bias. Those interviewed by the ICRC and Red Cross or Red Crescent staff, for example, were consistently more supportive of the ICRC’s role and more aware of the Geneva Conventions and the rules of war. However, the parallel research found few systematic differences in opinions on international humanitarian law. The ICRC results closely resemble the parallel survey results on most other questions. (A technical report assessing the parallel research and Red Cross bias is available separately.)

In-depth research
Focus groups. The focus groups provided a relatively unstructured environment for people to discuss their war experiences freely, express their views on the appropriate limits to war and consider possible actions against those who exceed them. To be effective, the groups had to be as homogeneous as possible, that is, the participants all had to have similar characteristics. Thus, in general, the participants in a group came from the same area, were all male or all female and shared an important experience (e.g., families of missing persons, ex-soldiers, ex-fighters, prisoners, teachers or journalists). The discussions were frequently intense and emotional and provide a rich commentary on how the public approaches these issues.

In each country, 8 to 12 focus groups were organized – four in each of the principal conflict areas. The participants were recruited by Red Cross or Red Crescent staff, based on guidelines provided by Greenberg Research. The local research company provided a professional moderator, who facilitated the discussions using guidelines prepared by Greenberg Research.

The discussions were held in focus-group facilities, school classrooms, hotel rooms and even in the open air, if, for example, they involved guerrilla fighters. ICRC, Red Cross/Red Crescent and
Greenberg Research staff observed and listened to the discussions from an adjoining location, with simultaneous translation in English. The focus group discussions were recorded and later transcribed in English.

In-depth interviews. To help interpret the full meaning of the survey responses, about 20 in-depth interviews were conducted with individuals who had had specific war experiences. The in-depth interview guidelines repeated questions from the public opinion survey, although they allowed for open-ended, rather than categorized responses. Interviewers were encouraged to probe and follow up on responses.

The in-depth interviews involved a broad range of people – officers, medical personnel, students (secondary school and university), journalists, former combatants, refugees, displaced persons, family members of missing persons, war invalids and others.

The interviews were recorded on tape, transcribed and translated into English by the local partner.
Annex 2: Questionnaire*

Introduction
We are doing a series of interviews on [NAME OF COUNTRY] and would like your help with that. Would it be possible to ask a few questions to the person who is 18 years or older and whose birthday is [FIRST AFTER TODAY]? [IF NECESSARY: The interview will take about 30 minutes.] The questions are about your experiences and opinions on the [war/armed conflict] in [NAME OF COUNTRY OR REGION]. Your identity will remain absolutely confidential.

Let me begin by asking you some questions about yourself to make sure we are talking to all kinds of people. If you don’t want to answer, feel free to tell me so and we will move on to the next question.

1. What is your age? _____
   [Don’t know/refused]

2. How many years of school have you had? ____ years
   [Don’t know/refused]

3. What is your current family situation?
   □ Married (have a husband or wife)
   □ Single
   □ Live together with someone (in a permanent relationship)
   □ Divorced (or separated)
   □ Spouse of missing person
   □ Widow(er)
   [Don’t know/refused]

4. Do you have children? [FOLLOW UP IF “YES”] How many?
   □ No children
   □ Yes ___ children

5. What is your job now or are you not working?
   □ Farmer
   □ Manual worker
   □ Skilled worker
   □ Self-employed
   □ Housewife/home care
   □ Soldier (combatant)
   □ Government employee
   □ Private sector employee
   □ Teacher/professor/intellectual
   □ Pensioner/retired
   □ Unemployed (but looking for work)
   □ Unemployed (not looking for work)
   □ Student
   □ Other [SPECIFY]
   [Don’t know/refused]

*This questionnaire is the standard one used in the 12 countries affected by conflict in the last decades. Some contextual questions were added for specific countries. These do not figure here, but are reflected in the findings presented in each Country Report.
6. Let me ask about the war in [COUNTRY NAME]. Did the war take place in the area where you were living or did the war take place mainly somewhere else?

☐ Area where you were living ➜ GO TO Q7
☐ Somewhere else? ➜ GO TO Q8
☐ Both [Volunteered response] ➜ GO TO Q8
☐ [Don’t know/refused]? ➜ GO TO Q8

7. [IF “AREA WHERE YOU WERE LIVING” IN PREVIOUS QUESTION] Did you live in that area before the [war/armed conflict], move voluntarily, or were you forced to move? [PROBE IF RESPONDENT SAYS “THERE HAS ALWAYS BEEN ARMED CONFLICT”]

☐ Live in same area
☐ Moved voluntarily
☐ Forced to move
☐ [Don’t know/refused]

8. [ASK OF ALL RESPONDENTS] During the [war/armed conflict], did you ever find yourself in a situation of being a combatant and carrying a weapon?

☐ Yes — combatant, carried weapon
☐ No — not a combatant
☐ [Don’t know/refused]

9. [ASK OF ALL RESPONDENTS] Is there anything that combatants should not be allowed to do in fighting their enemy? [PROBE AND WRITE ANSWERS AS FULLY AS POSSIBLE]

[IF NO RESPONSE, GO TO Q11]

10. [IF RESPONDENT GIVES ANY RESPONSE TO PREVIOUS QUESTION] Could you tell me the main reason why they should not do that? Is that because...? [READ AND ROTATE]

☐ It's wrong ➜ GO TO Q10a
☐ It just causes too many problems ➜ GO TO Q10b
☐ [Don’t know/refused] ➜ GO TO Q11

[FOLLOW UP IF MORE THAN ONE REASON SELECTED] Which would be the main reason?

10a. [IF “IT’S WRONG”] When you say, it’s wrong, is it primarily wrong because it is...? [READ AND ROTATE] [TWO RESPONSES ALLOWED]

☐ Against your religion
☐ Against your personal code
☐ Against the law
☐ Against what most people here believe
☐ Against your culture
☐ Against human rights
☐ Other [SPECIFY]
☐ [Don’t know/refused]
10b. [IF “IT JUST CAUSES TOO MANY PROBLEMS”] When you say, it just causes too many problems, are you thinking it...? [READ AND ROTATE] [TWO RESPONSES ALLOWED]

- Produces too much hate and division
- Causes too much psychological damage
- Produces too much destruction
- Causes too much physical suffering
- Other [SPECIFY]
- [Don’t know/refused]

11. Which two of these words best describe the war for you personally? [READ AND ROTATE]

- Horrible
- Disruptive
- Humiliating
- Exciting
- Hateful
- Challenging
- Hopeful
- Confusing
- Uncertainty
- Powerless
- Remote
- [Don’t know/refused]

Note: Version used in countries where there are no clear sides for most of the population; for countries where there are sides, half the surveys will be asked Version A (without sided wording) and half Version B (with sided wording).

12. Now I would like to ask you some general questions about how, in your view, combatants should behave in times of war.

Version A: When combatants attack to weaken the enemy, should they...? [READ AND ROTATE]

Version B: When combatants from your side attack to weaken the enemy, should they...? [READ AND ROTATE]

- Attack enemy combatants and civilians
- Attack enemy combatants and avoid civilians as much as possible
  OR
- Attack only enemy combatants and leave the civilians alone
- [Don’t know/refused]

[FOLLOW UP IF CONFUSION ABOUT YOUR/OTHER SIDE] Just imagine that there is a side in the conflict that you support more than any other side.

Note: in the next set of questions we will be randomly splitting the sample in two. Version 1 will be asked of one half and version 2 will be asked of the other half. If there are clear sides to the war, Version 1 coincides with Version A and Version 2 coincides with Version B. (This means there will always be two and exactly two versions of the questionnaire.)
Let me ask you about some things that combatants may do to weaken the enemy they are fighting against. Please tell me for each of these things whether it is okay or not okay to do it, to weaken the enemy.

13. **Version 1:** Attacking civilians who voluntarily gave food and shelter to enemy combatants. Would it be okay or not okay to attack them in order to weaken the enemy?

**Version 2:** Attacking civilians who were forced to give food and shelter to enemy combatants. Would it be okay or not okay to attack them in order to weaken the enemy?

☐ Okay  
☐ Not okay  
☐ [Don't know/refused]

14. **Version 1:** Attacking civilians who voluntarily transported ammunition for enemy combatants defending their town. Would it be okay or not okay to attack them to weaken the enemy?

**Version 2:** Attacking civilians who were forced to transport ammunition for enemy combatants defending their town. Would it be okay or not okay to attack them to weaken the enemy?

☐ Okay  
☐ Not okay  
☐ [Don't know/refused]

15. I will now describe some situations that may happen during a [war/armed conflict]. For each situation, I would like you to imagine that you are part of that situation. Tell me how you think you would behave if the decisions were completely up to you. Here comes the first imaginary situation.

**Version 1:** Would you save the life of a surrendering enemy combatant who killed a person close to you?

☐ Would save  
☐ Would not save  
☐ [Don't know/refused]

**Version 2:** Would you help a wounded enemy combatant who killed a person close to you?

☐ Would help  
☐ Would not help  
☐ [Don't know/refused]

Now I’m going to ask your opinion on some of the things combatants might do in times of [war/armed conflict].

16a. **Version A:** What about depriving the civilian population of food, medicine or water in order to weaken the enemy?

**Version B:** What about depriving the civilian population on the other side of food, medicine or water in order to weaken the enemy?

Is that wrong or just part of war?
16b. **Version A:** Are there any laws or rules that say you can’t do that, even if it would help weaken the enemy, or are there no laws or rules to stop that?

**Version B:** Are there any laws or rules that say you can’t do that, even if it would help your side weaken the enemy, or are there no laws or rules to stop that?

- [ ] Laws — can’t do that
- [ ] No laws
- [ ] [Don’t know/refused]

17a. **Version 1:** What about attacking enemy combatants in populated villages or towns in order to weaken the enemy, knowing that many civilians would be killed?

**Version 2:** What about attacking enemy combatants in populated villages or towns in order to weaken the enemy, knowing that many women and children would be killed?

Is that wrong or just part of war?

- [ ] Wrong
- [ ] Part of war
- [ ] Both [Volunteered response]
- [ ] [Don’t know/refused]

17b. **Version A:** Are there any laws or rules that say you can’t do that, even if it would help weaken the enemy, or are there no laws or rules to stop that?

**Version B:** Are there any laws or rules that say you can’t do that, even if it would help your side weaken the enemy, or are there no laws or rules to stop that?

- [ ] Laws — can’t do that
- [ ] No laws
- [ ] [Don’t know/refused]

18. **[ASK ONLY IN WAR ZONES WHERE APPROPRIATE]** What about attacking religious and historical monuments, in order to weaken the enemy. Is that wrong or just part of war?

- [ ] Wrong
- [ ] Part of war
- [ ] Both [Volunteered response]
- [ ] [Don’t know/refused]
19. **[ASK ONLY IN WAR ZONES WHERE APPROPRIATE]** What about taking civilian hostages in order to get something in exchange? Is that wrong or just part of war?
   - [ ] Wrong
   - [ ] Part of war
   - [ ] Both [Volunteered response]
   - [ ] [Don’t know/refused]

20. **[ASK ONLY IN WAR ZONES WHERE APPROPRIATE]** Now a question about the “protected areas”. Do you think that these “protected areas” are a good or a bad idea?
   - [ ] Good idea
   - [ ] Bad idea
   - [ ] [Don’t know/refused]

21. **[ASK ONLY IN WAR ZONES WHERE APPROPRIATE]** Did the “protected areas” make it better or worse for civilians during the war, or did they make no difference?
   - [ ] Better
   - [ ] Worse
   - [ ] No difference
   - [ ] [Don’t know/refused]

22. **[ASK ONLY IN WAR ZONES WHERE APPROPRIATE]** Version 1: Did the “Peace support operation” make it better or worse for civilians during the war, or didn’t it make any difference?
   - [ ] Better
   - [ ] Worse
   - [ ] No difference
   - [ ] [Don’t know/refused]

   **Version 2:** Did the “Peace support operation” make it better or worse for you personally during the war, or didn’t it make any difference?
   - [ ] Better
   - [ ] Worse
   - [ ] No difference
   - [ ] [Don’t know/refused]

   **Version A:** Let me ask you about some other things that might happen during war to weaken the enemy. Please tell me for each of these things whether it is okay or not okay to do it in order to weaken the enemy.

   **Version B:** Let me ask you about some other things that your side might do to weaken the enemy during war. Please tell me for each of these things whether it is okay or not okay to do it in order to weaken the enemy.

23. First, are there types of weapons that should just never be used during war? **[FOLLOW UP IF YES]** What types of weapons would you think of? **[CHECK RESPONSE BELOW] [DO NOT READ CHOICES] [MULTIPLE ANSWERS ALLOWED]**
   - [ ] Landmines
   - [ ] Laser weapons
   - [ ] Napalm
   - [ ] Nuclear weapons
   - [ ] Chemical weapons
   - [ ] Cluster bombs
24. **Version A:** Combatants planting landmines to stop the movement of enemy combatants, even though civilians may step on them accidentally. Is it okay or not okay to do that if it would weaken the enemy?

**Version B:** Combatants on your side planting landmines to stop the movement of enemy combatants, even though civilians may step on them accidentally. Is it okay or not okay to do that if it would weaken the enemy?

- Okay, if necessary
- Not okay
- [Don't know/refused]

25. In war, combatants sometimes attack or hurt civilians, even though many people say it is not okay and maybe against the law. So please tell me why you think combatants attack civilians anyway. **[PROBE AND WRITE ANSWERS AS FULLY AS POSSIBLE]**

26. Which two of the following reasons best explain why combatants attack or hurt civilians, even though many people say it is not okay or maybe against the law. Is it because they...? **[READ AND ROTATE RESPONSES] [FOLLOW UP IF MORE THAN TWO REASONS SELECTED]** Which would be the two main reasons?

- Don't care about the laws
- Hate the other side so much
- Are determined to win at any cost
- Lose all sense during war
- Are too young to make judgements
- Don't know the laws
- Are often under the influence of alcohol or drugs
- Are scared
- Are told to do so
- Know the other side is doing the same thing
- [Don't know/refused]

27a. Now let me ask you how captured combatants should be treated.

**Version A:** Must a captured enemy combatant be allowed to contact relatives, or doesn’t that have to be allowed?

**Version B:** Must your side allow a captured enemy combatant to contact relatives, or don’t you have to allow that?

- Must allow
- Don’t have to allow
- [Don't know/refused]
27b. **Version A:** Is it true that a captured enemy combatant cannot be subjected to torture to obtain important military information, or can captured combatants be subjected to torture?

**Version B:** Is it true that your side cannot subject a captured enemy combatant to torture to obtain important military information, or can you subject captured combatants to torture?

☐ Cannot subject
☐ Can subject
☐ [Don’t know/refused]

27c. **Version A:** Must a captured enemy combatant be allowed a visit by a representative from an independent organization outside the prison or camp, or doesn’t that have to be allowed?

**Version B:** Must your side allow a captured enemy combatant to be visited by a representative from an independent organization from outside the prison or camp, or don’t you have to allow that?

☐ Must allow ➜ GO TO Q27d
☐ Don’t have to allow ➜ GO TO Q28
☐ [Don’t know/refused] ➜ GO TO Q28

27d. **[IF “MUST ALLOW”]** Which of the following people should be allowed to visit captured enemy combatants...? [READ AND ROTATE RESPONSES] [ALLOW MULTIPLE RESPONSES]

☐ International Committee of the Red Cross representatives
☐ UN representatives
☐ Human rights group representatives
☐ Journalists
☐ Religious clerics/ministers
☐ Other [SPECIFY]
☐ [Don’t know/refused]

Once again, I want you to imagine yourself in the following situations and tell me what you think you would do if the decisions were completely up to you.

28. **Version A:** If one side in the war is killing prisoners, would you approve the killing of prisoners by the other side or would you not approve it?

**Version B:** If the other side in the war is killing prisoners, would you approve the killing of prisoners by your side or would you not approve it?

☐ Would approve
☐ Would not approve
☐ [Don’t know/refused]

[FOLLOW UP IF RESPONDENT PROTESTS] Just imagine you happen to find yourself in this situation.

29. In general, do you ever think that captured enemy combatants deserve to die?

☐ Think deserve to die
☐ No
☐ [Don’t know/refused]
30. Now I’m going to ask you about your actual experiences during the war. Please tell me whether any of the following things happened to you personally or did not happen as a consequence of the [war/armed conflict] in [COUNTRY NAME]. [READ AND ROTATE ORDER]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Happened</th>
<th>Did not happen</th>
<th>Don’t know/refused</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Forced to leave your home and live elsewhere</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imprisoned</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kidnapped or taken hostage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tortured</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Felt humiliated</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lost contact with a close relative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A member of your immediate family killed during the armed conflict</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serious damage to your property</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wounded by the fighting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combatants took food away</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Had your house looted</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somebody you knew well was sexually assaulted by combatants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somebody you knew well was raped by combatants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

31. [ASK ALL RESPONDENTS] Were you imprisoned by enemy combatants or were you living in an area that came under enemy control?

- Imprisoned by enemy combatants ➜ ➜ ➜ ➜ ➜ GO TO Q32
- Living in area under enemy control ➜ ➜ ➜ ➜ ➜ GO TO Q32
- Both [Volunteered response] ➜ ➜ ➜ ➜ ➜ GO TO Q32
- [Don’t know/refused] ➜ ➜ ➜ ➜ ➜ GO TO Q34
- No response ➜ ➜ ➜ ➜ ➜ GO TO Q34

32. [ASK IF “IMPRISONED”, “LIVED UNDER ENEMY CONTROL”, OR BOTH] Please tell me whether any of the following happened while you were under enemy control. [READ AND ROTATE] Did that happen or not?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Happened</th>
<th>Did not happen</th>
<th>Don’t know/refused</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>You were personally mistreated</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You were physically injured</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You were treated correctly</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[READ LAST] You had a contact with a representative from an independent organization to check on your well-being</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
33. [ASK ONLY IF CONTACT HAPPENED, OTHERWISE GO TO Q33] Which of the following people did you have contact with to check on your well-being? [READ AND ROTATE RESPONSES] [ALLOW MULTIPLE RESPONSES]

- [ ] ICRC representatives
- [ ] UN representatives
- [ ] Human rights group representatives
- [ ] Journalists
- [ ] Religious clerics/ministers
- [ ] Other [SPECIFY]
- [ ] [Don't know/refused]

34. Now let me ask you for your opinion about something else, about young people being combatants. At what age is a young person mature enough to be a combatant? [READ LIST UNTIL RESPONDENT Chooses an Answer]

- [ ] 14 or under
- [ ] 15
- [ ] 16
- [ ] 17
- [ ] 18
- [ ] 19
- [ ] 20
- [ ] 21
- [ ] Above 21
- [ ] [Don't know/refused]

35. During the war, did you support [have you supported] one of the sides or did you not support any side?

- [ ] Supported a side
- [ ] Did not support a side
- [ ] [Don't know/refused]

36. Let me ask you something very different. Have you ever heard of the Geneva Conventions?

- [ ] Yes — heard
- [ ] No — not heard ➜ GO TO Q38
- [ ] [Don't know/refused] ➜ GO TO Q38

37. [IF HEARD OF GENEVA CONVENTIONS] Could you tell me what the Geneva Conventions are about? [WRITE DOWN ANSWER AS FULLY AS POSSIBLE] [MARK APPROPRIATE RESPONSE]

- [ ] Accurate [ANY REFERENCE TO LIMITS IN WAR]
- [ ] Not accurate [NO REFERENCE TO LIMITS IN WAR]
38. Let me read you a statement about the Geneva Conventions:

The Geneva Conventions is a series of international treaties that impose limits in war by describing some rules of war. Most countries in the world have signed these treaties.

Do you think the existence of the Geneva Conventions prevents wars from getting worse or does it make no real difference?

- Prevents wars from getting worse
- No real difference
- [Don’t know/refused]


- Red Cross
- Red Crescent
- Red Cross and Red Crescent
- Medical/Hospital
- United Nations
- Army
- Other [SPECIFY]
- [Don’t know/refused]

40. What kind of people or things does this symbol protect? [WRITE ANSWERS AS FULLY AS POSSIBLE]

41. Are there rules or laws that are so important that, if broken during war, the person who broke them should be punished?

- Yes
- No ➜ GO TO Q46
- [Don’t know/Refused] ➜ GO TO Q46

42. [IF YES] So what kind of rules or laws are you thinking about? [PROBE AND WRITE ANSWERS AS FULLY AS POSSIBLE]

43. [IF RESPONDS TO PRIOR QUESTION, OTHERWISE GO TO Q46] What are these rules based on? [READ AND ROTATE] [ONE RESPONSE ONLY]

- [Country name]'s laws
- International law
- Religious principles
- The values people hold
- Other [SPECIFY]
- [Don’t know/refused]
44. If these rules are broken in war, who should be responsible for punishing the wrongdoers? [READ AND ROTATE] [ONE RESPONSE ONLY]

- The government of [country name]
- The [country name]'s courts
- International criminal court
- The military itself
- The civilian population
- Your own political leaders
- Other [SPECIFY]
- [Does not apply, rules are not broken]
- [Don't know/refused]

45. When the war is over, should people who have broken these rules...? [READ AND ROTATE] [ONE RESPONSE ONLY]

- Be put on trial
- Be exposed to the public but not be put on trial
- Be forgotten when the war is over
- Be forgiven after the war
- Granted amnesty
- [Don't know/refused]

46. [ASK ALL RESPONDENTS] Let me ask what can be done if during the war civilian areas are attacked, towns or villages are cut off from food, water, medical supplies and electricity. To whom would you turn to get help or to be protected? [PROBE AND WRITE ANSWERS AS FULLY AS POSSIBLE]

- [Can't turn to anybody]
- [Don't know/refused]

47. I'm now going to describe different kinds of people and organizations. Please tell me which two of these have played the biggest role during the war to stop this. Here are the people and organizations: [READ AND ROTATE] [RECORD THE TWO MOST IMPORTANT RESPONSES] [FOLLOW UP WITH: Which two have played the biggest role?]

- The military and combatants on your side [Version B]
- The military and combatants of the other side [Version B]
- The military and combatants [Version A]
- Religious leaders
- International humanitarian organizations
- Journalists and the news media
- The United Nations
- The ICRC or Red Cross (or Red Crescent)
- Government leaders
- International criminal court
- Other countries
- [Nobody did anything]
- [Don't know/refused]
48. In the future, would you like to see more or less intervention from the international community to deal with these kinds of issues?

☐ More intervention
☐ Less intervention
☐ [No intervention]
☐ [Don’t know/refused]

49. Do you think the peace will last or do you think there will be more war in the future?

☐ Peace will last
☐ More war in future
☐ [Both]
☐ [Don’t know/refused]

50. One last question, what did you learn from the war that you think others should know? [PROBE AND WRITE ANSWERS AS FULLY AS POSSIBLE]
The ICRC’s mission

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is an impartial, neutral and independent organization whose exclusively humanitarian mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of war and internal violence and to provide them with assistance. It directs and coordinates the international relief activities conducted by the Movement in situations of conflict. It also endeavours to prevent suffering by promoting and strengthening humanitarian law and universal humanitarian principles. Established in 1863, the ICRC is at the origin of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.